Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 3: Northern Ireland
16. Comment
NI assessment of the risk to human health

16.7 When BSE first emerged, it was seen in Northern Ireland solely as an animal disease. DANI was firmly in the lead, and the messages about risk to human health came mainly through DANI staff, from their London contacts. They were in constant touch in particular with the CVO in England and his staff. Mr Ron Martin, the NI CVO after 1990, told us that if he wanted to know something he 'phoned either Keith Meldrum or Kevin Taylor [in England] and I would be told of that'. ¹

16.8 Mr Shannon, the Grade 7 in AHD at DANI up to 1992, told us:

Our initial primary interest lay in protecting the Northern Ireland cattle population from the disease so long as it did not manifest itself in the Province . . . At that time, the risk to human health was not apparent. All efforts were concentrated on reducing and eliminating the disease in animals. ²

16.9 Mr Martin told us: 'In the early stages (in our case 1988 and early 1989) the amount of advice received from MAFF on the public health implications was minimal.' ³ He attributed this to MAFF reliance on the scrapie theory.

16.10 We could not establish exactly when the DHSS NI first learnt of the disease or sought to discuss it with DANI, or at the RCDLG. It can be supposed that Dr McKenna would have attended the quarterly meeting in London of CMOs in March 1988 and learned about BSE from Sir Donald Acheson, even if he had not heard, as some others did, via the grapevine. DANI knew by 24 March 1988 that the CMO London was looking into the possible implications for human health. ⁴

16.11 Dr Jack was dismissive of the notion that the DHSS NI might have been brought in when he first learned of the disease. He thought he might have mentioned BSE at an NI Permanent Secretaries meeting under 'Any Other Business' in May 1988, 'although it could have been even later'. ⁵ He said the DHSS NI was kept informed of the action being taken through getting a copy of his submission to Ministers dated 6 July 1988, recommending import controls and notification. The CMO would have been kept informed through the 'close relations between the Northern Ireland CMO and his counterpart in London'. ⁶

16.12 It seems to us that this discounting of human health risks owed much to the reassuring message coming from MAFF reinforced by the absence of any cases of BSE in the Province at the time. In Northern Ireland, as in Scotland and Wales, it was only in May 1990, following the identification of a spongiform encephalopathy in a cat and the resultant press and public concern, that the medical establishment was drawn into the debate.

16.13 Mr Martin saw the MAFF advice on public health as changing slightly in 1989 to a view that there might be a risk. He saw the Southwood baby food recommendation as an example of such a view. ⁷ However, the message from the Department of Health in Whitehall continued to be reassuring, driven in part, we believe, by its preoccupation at this time with avoiding a vaccine scare (see vol. 7: Medicines and Cosmetics). Dr McKenna believed that there was little risk to human health. He told us: 'Throughout the time I did not feel that the public was in significant danger.' ⁸ Southwood confirmed his view that risks to human health were 'very negligible'. The baby food recommendation caused him to pause, but he concluded 'this was being ultra ultra careful'. ⁹ Likewise, the SBO ban was 'an exercise in caution of which I approved', though he saw it as 'ultra precautionary'. ¹⁰ Dr Jack told us he was aware of a minute of 9 January 1989 by Dr Pickles which provided him with reassurance on safety matters from the officials with primary responsibility for human health. ¹¹

16.14 We have no evidence that these perceptions led to any laxity in Northern Ireland over enforcement of the measures adopted. However, it seems to us likely that in the same way as appears to have happened in other parts of the UK, they must have coloured the attitudes both of departmental enforcement staff and of the private sector interests responsible for taking action. ¹²