Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 3: Northern Ireland
15. Chronological account of specific Northern Ireland issues
Ruminant feed ban, notification, and slaughter and compensation
Reasons for the delays in introducing notification and the ruminant feed ban
Meat and bone meal (MBM) imports

15.12 On 1 June 1988 MAFF announced its intention to make BSE compulsorily notifiable and to introduce a ruminant feed ban. ¹ The next day the DANI CVO chaired a meeting to discuss the implications of the MAFF announcement, at which DANI's AHD and VRL staff were present. Dr Robert McCracken, Head of the VRL's Pathology Department, expressed concern that 'the action in GB, limited to clinically affected cattle, was scientifically inadequate to prevent the spread of disease which could be incubating in other animals (and progeny if it turned out that vertical transmission was possible)'. He reported that there was no evidence of BSE in Northern Ireland from laboratory material received to date and that scrapie was present in NI sheep at low levels. However, given the volume of imports from Great Britain, there was a possibility that NI cattle could be incubating the disease. ²

15.13 Mr Rutherford Armstrong, Assistant Secretary (Grade 5) responsible for DANI's Animal Health Division, stressed the need for Northern Ireland to act to protect its animal health status by avoiding importing BSE either in infected animals or in suspect animal protein feeds that were no longer permitted in Great Britain. He said the decision to act in parallel with MAFF could be supported by the presence of scrapie in Northern Ireland sheep and 'similar risk factors to those in GB in relation to the handling of animal by-products'. However, Mr David Carnson, the Under Secretary (Grade 3) responsible for animal health policy, joining the meeting late, said that he considered that 'DANI should not announce any action immediately in the wake of MAFF and should listen to the views of the NI industry in the planned consultations before making any statement'. ³

15.14 At the end of the meeting, a decision was taken to delay introducing any ban in Northern Ireland. Mr Carnson had just spoken to the Revd Ian Paisley MP on the telephone regarding the latter's concerns about the implications of the GB ban for the Northern Ireland beef industry, in particular for its exports. ⁴ In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Carnson said that it would be inaccurate to draw a causal connection between the Revd Paisley's telephone call of 2 June 1988 and the later advice not to recommend an immediate ruminant feed ban. His recollection of the call was that the Revd Paisley was seeking information only and he was satisfied that no decisions were reached on the basis of that call. ⁵

15.15 On the same day, 2 June 1988, DANI officials met representatives of the feed and rendering industries, accompanied by the Revd Paisley. ⁶ The industries were informed of MAFF's decision to introduce compulsory notification of the disease and a ruminant feed ban in Great Britain. It was noted that there were two main issues to be considered: protecting animal health status in Northern Ireland and safeguarding the export trade. DANI officials emphasised that the incidence of scrapie in Northern Ireland was much lower than in Great Britain, but that the Province was not scrapie-free and indeed that one case had been diagnosed that week. They also pointed out that as scrapie was not notifiable in either Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland, it was difficult to assess the level of the disease accurately. As regards BSE in Northern Ireland or the Republic of Ireland, the meeting was assured that it had not yet been found, but over 600 cattle had been imported from Great Britain into Northern Ireland in the previous year.

15.16 Industry representatives expressed a number of concerns in relation to the ban, including the danger that unsaleable MBM in Great Britain would be 'dumped' in Northern Ireland. Questions were also asked about what should be done with animal by-products if they could not be made into MBM.

15.17 Mr Armstrong, who chaired the meeting, stressed that if DANI did not follow the MAFF approach, import controls would be difficult and that Northern Ireland's export markets could be affected, since scrapie was already present in the Province. Either way there would be serious implications for renderers as it seemed that most of their MBM was either exported or used in concentrate feeds. It was conceded by the trade that renderers were already in a serious position as a result of MAFF's decision, and that whatever action was taken by DANI would have comparatively little further effect.

15.18 On 13 June 1988 Mr Carnson minuted Lord Lyell to inform him of developments since the minute of 26 May, notably that MAFF was likely to delay the introduction of the ruminant feed ban until later in the summer but was to go ahead and make BSE notifiable. He noted that this would allow further consideration to be given to the implications of the ban before implementing it in Northern Ireland. ⁷

15.19 Mr Carnson also outlined the concerns of the Northern Ireland feed and rendering industries' representatives as expressed at the meeting with DANI officials on 2 June, not least the severe restrictions they faced on what they could produce and sell following MAFF's decision. They also felt that their product was less at risk than the GB product. Mr Carnson noted that at another meeting with DANI officials on the same day, the Ulster Farmers' Union (UFU) had accepted the need to make the disease notifiable even though no cases had occurred in Northern Ireland.

15.20 The BSE Order 1988 (SI 1988/1039), making BSE notifiable, came into force in Great Britain on 14 June 1988, save for the provisions relating to the ruminant feed ban, which were to come into force on 18 July 1988.

15.21 On 28 June Mr Shannon of DANI's AHD attended a MAFF meeting in London with representatives of the GB cattle industry, to discuss the introduction of the ruminant feed ban. ⁸ At the meeting Mr Alan Lawrence of MAFF's Animal Health Division explained that from 18 July to 31 December 1988 the use of ruminant protein in ruminant feeds would be prohibited, but that in the meantime MAFF teams would investigate the protein-processing plants to see which processes could destroy the infective agent. The legislation would be reviewed in the light of what was discovered. ⁹

15.22 During June, following advice from Sir Richard Southwood, MAFF decided to introduce a slaughter and compensation scheme for infected animals, with compensation set at 50 per cent of market value. The approval of the Treasury was obtained early in July and the Orders implementing the scheme in England, Scotland and Wales came into force on 8 August. ¹⁰

15.23 Dr Jack met Mr Carnson on 1 July to discuss the implications for Northern Ireland of the actions being taken by MAFF. Taking into account the fact that there had still been no cases of BSE in Northern Ireland and that, on current knowledge, the risks of scrapie infection from MBM produced in Northern Ireland were lower than in Great Britain, they came to the conclusion that a ban on the use of animal protein in animal feed produced in Northern Ireland would not be justified on animal health grounds at this point. However, it was also agreed that this decision was to be reviewed immediately if BSE occurred in Northern Ireland. During this meeting, Dr Jack concluded that action was needed to close the door on any further risk of importing the disease from GB sources, via either 'at risk' cattle or infected feed. This would involve stricter import controls for cattle and the suspension of import licences for animal protein produced in Great Britain. ¹¹

15.24 In oral evidence Dr Jack explained this apparent change of mind (ie, to delaying the introduction of a ban locally) by saying that he was wary of damaging the favourable perception which the Northern Ireland public had of his Department. He had thought that this damage might occur if MBM were banned without firmer evidence of the risks it posed, particularly in view of the different conditions in Northern Ireland. He was concerned that acting without apparent justification could lead to public suspicion that the Department was withholding information.

15.25 On 6 July Dr Jack put a submission to Lord Lyell setting out the agreed line, which advised against the ban but recommended that import licences for animal protein from Great Britain should be suspended and that BSE should be made a notifiable disease in Northern Ireland. The submission stated that MAFF was 'pressing NI to implement this measure'. The advice to the Minister was that:

As part of a Member State which has BSE elsewhere, we consider this to be a sensible step to maintain consumer confidence in local meat products and to ensure continued access for NI livestock and produce to export markets. This move already has the support of the UFU. ¹²

15.26 DANI officials, including the CVO and Mr Shannon, met with the UFU and representatives of the feed and rendering industries again on 14 July 1988. Mr Shannon announced that the Minister had decided that BSE was to be made notifiable in Northern Ireland in early August, but that there should not be a ban on the use of locally produced animal protein in ruminant feed rations. However, import licences for MBM from Great Britain would be suspended. It was DANI's understanding that such imports were extremely small in quantity, and the impact on the industry would therefore be minimal. ¹³ In response to a question from representatives, Mr Shannon said that it had not yet been proved that the causal agent of BSE was to be found in MBM, but that this was the strongest theory on the current evidence available to the experts. Should cases of BSE appear in Northern Ireland, the decision not to introduce a feed ban would immediately be reviewed and a slaughter and compensation policy imposed to mirror that of Great Britain.

15.27 The administrative arrangements to stop the export of MBM and greaves from Great Britain to Northern Ireland were implemented on 18 July 1988, providing for the suspension of import licences for proscribed animal protein produced in Great Britain with effect from 25 July 1988. Feed for ruminants manufactured in Great Britain in accordance with the BSE Order 1988 was not affected. ¹⁴

15.28 On 5 September Dr Jack put a submission to Lord Lyell reporting progress and inviting the Minister to agree to the making of legislation to provide, on a contingency basis, for slaughter and compensation for any BSE cases in Northern Ireland. Such a move would form part of a package of NI legislation on BSE, revised to reflect later GB proposals, and allow for legislative differences in the Northern Ireland enabling legislation. ¹⁵ The recommendations in the submission were accepted by Lord Lyell.

15.29 On 14 November 1988 Dr Jack was informed about a suspected case of BSE in Northern Ireland that had been diagnosed by a VRL pathologist. ¹⁶ Material from the animal was sent to the Central Veterinary Laboratory at Weybridge in England, and the diagnosis was confirmed on 20 November. DANI issued a news release on 28 November confirming that a 5-year-old Friesian cow had been diagnosed with BSE, the first case to be confirmed in Northern Ireland. ¹⁷ The Republic of Ireland reported its first case of BSE just over two months later, on 25 January 1989, and its second case the day after. ¹⁸

15.30 It was initially proposed to introduce compulsory notification of BSE and the slaughter and compensation policy in a single Statutory Instrument. However, under the enabling Northern Ireland legislation, the Diseases of Animals (NI) Order 1981, the provisions were subject to different forms of parliamentary scrutiny and so could not be contained in a single Order. Accordingly on 28 November 1988 two Orders were made: the Diseases of Animals (Modification) Order (NI) 1988 placed BSE on the list of notifiable diseases and provided for compulsory slaughter with compensation for suspected cases; ¹⁹ while the BSE Order (NI) covered movement controls in relation to affected or suspected animals, prohibition of disposal of carcasses except by burial or incineration, and arrangements for valuation, slaughter and compensation. ²⁰ Both of these Orders came into effect the following day.

15.31 As in Great Britain, the level of compensation was set at 50 per cent. Compensation levels for previous schemes had differed in some instances between the two parts of the UK, largely on the basis of local market conditions and the nature of the infection. When the UFU had been approached in July 1988 about the possibility of making BSE notifiable in Northern Ireland, they had raised the question of compensation, ²¹ aware as they were of negotiations being held between MAFF and the National Farmers' Union in Great Britain. The UFU asked for similar compensation to apply in Northern Ireland if there were an outbreak. The NI Department of Finance and Personnel gave its approval in early July 1988 for compensation to be paid in Northern Ireland at the same percentage as in Great Britain. ²²

15.32 On 29 November Dr Jack put a submission to Lord Lyell confirming that the first case of BSE in Northern Ireland had been diagnosed and that a press release had been issued to this effect. He sought Lord Lyell's agreement to the introduction of a ruminant feed ban in the Province. ²³ Dr Jack advised that MAFF had extended the time limit of the ban in Great Britain until the end of 1989 because 'the scrapie or scrapie-type agent hypothesis remains strong and . . . researches in GB have not yet produced a definitive heat treatment to eliminate the highly resistant scrapie organism during commercial manufacturing of [MBM]'. The Minister was also told that the GB authorities planned to ban the sale or use of milk from suspect animals for human or animal consumption (except for cows' own calves). This had been recommended by the Southwood Working Party. The first case of BSE in Northern Ireland, which had been in a home-bred animal, indicated that the whole Northern Ireland bovine population was at risk and not only imported animals. A ruminant feed ban in Northern Ireland was now 'essential to avoid increasing the risk to the NI bovine population, whether it comes from GB, NI, or any other ruminant protein source'. ²⁴

15.33 DANI officials met industry representatives on 2 December 1988 to inform them of the identification of BSE in Northern Ireland and the decision to introduce a feed ban. It was agreed at this meeting that, in order to allow the industry time to clear stocks, the ban would not take effect until early 1989. ²⁵ Dr Jack said in a written statement to the Inquiry that renderers had indicated to DANI that under a third of MBM production went into ruminant feed, and that the feed trade had only two weeks' stock in the pipeline. It is not clear whether this information was given at the meeting on 2 December or subsequently. ²⁶ Dr Jack's concerns about this had been that 'if they had a lot of stock in the pipeline then obviously it was going either to have to be destroyed or it would slip out somehow or . . . it may well [have been] used in feed for pigs and poultry which was difficult to enforce'. ²⁷ In a letter to the industry to advise of the coming into effect of the ruminant feed ban, Mr Shannon pointed out that DANI inspectors were empowered to take samples of feedstuffs suspected of containing prohibited ruminant protein. ²⁸

15.34 The Northern Ireland ruminant feed ban took effect on 11 January 1989 (almost six months after the GB ban), under the provisions of the Diseases of Animals (Feeding Stuffs) Order (Northern Ireland) 1989. The Order stipulated that it would cease to have effect on 1 January 1990. The ban was subsequently extended indefinitely. ²⁹

15.35 Mr Shannon told the Inquiry that the feed ban did not come into force until this time because there were errors in the original drafts received from Great Britain. He said in evidence:

Those were sorted out. We put the stuff to our lawyers and we followed, more or less, the rules governing introduction of legislation including consultancy periods and periods for coming into force and that made it that the earliest date we did not transgress that was by 10 January. ³⁰

Reasons for the delays in introducing notification and the ruminant feed ban

15.36 As the previous account shows, although the intention in Northern Ireland was to remain in step with Whitehall on the BSE issue, initially a different approach was adopted. According to Dr Jack, the decision not to follow MAFF precisely was based on the different conditions which applied in Northern Ireland. Not least among these was the fact that the local economy was heavily dependent on exports of livestock and beef. DANI was concerned that importing countries and the EU might have used the ruminant feed ban to forbid imports of animals and meat from Northern Ireland, with serious consequences for the whole industry. ³¹ Nevertheless, Northern Ireland relied 'very much' on the information it obtained from scientists in Great Britain and on close cooperation with MAFF officials. Dr Jack described this information as 'all part of a very useful background to allow us to have a decent base on which we took our decision'. ³² We set out below the detailed explanations we were given for the delay.

(a) Absence of BSE in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland

15.37 The primary reason for the different approach was that the first confirmed case of BSE was not recorded in Northern Ireland until four months after the ruminant feed ban was in place in England, Scotland and Wales. This was nearly four years after the cows on Pitsham Farm in Sussex (England), one of which was later the first confirmed case of BSE, were beginning to show symptoms of the disease. Furthermore, when the ban was introduced in Great Britain, the NI farming industry and veterinary profession were already aware of the disease and would have been on the lookout for cases. ³³ Meanwhile, the Republic of Ireland had likewise not had any cases of BSE by the summer of 1988, ³⁴ and this fact was taken into account in assessing the risk factors for Northern Ireland. ³⁵ The Republic of Ireland had also not imposed a ruminant feed ban, and did not do so until 25 July 1990, a year and a half after its first case was confirmed.

(b) Low incidence of scrapie in Northern Ireland

15.38 Another factor which contributed to the decision not to implement the ruminant feed ban in tandem with MAFF was the very low incidence of scrapie in Northern Ireland between 1980 and 1987, with just over one case a year on average. ³⁶ Local farmers and vets were well aware of scrapie and, according to Dr Jack, his vets were confident that the incidence of the disease was low despite there being no formal procedure for its notification. ³⁷ In oral evidence, however, Mr Sullivan (the CVO) conceded that there would have been an incentive for farmers to conceal cases of scrapie so as to protect the health status of their stock. ³⁸

15.39 Mr Sullivan said that when he was first told of the scrapie theory (as the original causal agent of BSE), he was 'not 100 per cent sold on it'. It seemed to him surprising that only a few animals would become affected after being fed the 'infected' concentrate. Moreover, Great Britain had been exporting MBM for years and yet BSE had not been recorded in any other country. This was hard to explain even given the fact that the vast majority of MBM went into pig and poultry food. ³⁹ Dr Jack noted that at the time the decision was made not to introduce the ruminant feed ban, there was only circumstantial evidence that MBM was the cause of the outbreak of the disease. He had had reservations about the theory, though MAFF had not put forward any other means of transmission as a serious possibility. ⁴⁰

(c) Different rendering processes

15.40 Mr Martin told us:

In early 1988 there was a visit to Northern Ireland by MAFF officials who were considering why Great Britain had the disease and Northern Ireland did not. They advised that while time, temperature and pressure of rendering procedures in Northern Ireland had reduced in the 70s and early 80s as elsewhere in the United Kingdom they had not fallen to as low a level in the plants in Northern Ireland as in parts of Great Britain. It therefore seemed that there was a much smaller risk of BSE being transmitted to cattle in Northern Ireland through feedingstuffs produced here. ⁴¹

15.41 In oral evidence Mr Sullivan conceded that only one rendering plant in Northern Ireland had been visited by MAFF staff, but pointed out that at that time in Northern Ireland there were 'not that many rendering plants'. ⁴²

15.42 Although DANI considered that the ban would affect the whole production chain from renderers to farmers to consumers, it predicted that the greatest impact would be on the renderers, who were already badly affected by the loss of their export trade to Great Britain. ⁴³ In addition, in the absence of a foolproof test for ruminant protein in feed (see paragraph 15.52), policing the ban would be extremely difficult. ⁴⁴

(d) Island status

15.43 In Dr Jack's view the 'sea boundary' with Great Britain and relatively expensive cross-channel freight charges severely curtailed the movement of cattle, except for high-quality breeding stock. The quantity of cattle imported was very small in relation to both the total NI herd and the Great Britain herd, making the chances of the disease having entered Northern Ireland also very small. ⁴⁵ He told the Inquiry that, in addition, high-quality cattle would normally have been kept in herds where the farmer was very alert to any symptoms of disease and would have contacted a Veterinary Officer on noticing anything unusual. He therefore thought that DANI would have been quite quickly advised of new cases.

15.44 In oral evidence Dr Jack said that, when making the decision not to implement the ruminant feed ban in July, his Department had certainly considered the risk of the BSE agent being recycled through locally produced MBM made from the carcasses of infected animals. However, he did not regard the risk as great - again because of the small number of cattle imported into Northern Ireland. ⁴⁶

(e) Alternative import measures adopted

15.45 At the time the ruminant feed ban was being considered, DANI had already decided on measures to minimise the risk of importing the BSE agent. These have been discussed above (in paragraphs 15.26 and 15.27), but included a ban on the import of cattle which had moved through a herd in which BSE had been found, and a ban on the import of any progeny - not just in the first generation - of an affected female animal. ⁴⁷

Meat and bone meal (MBM) imports

15.46 As a result of its relatively large livestock industry (both sheep and cattle), Northern Ireland was more than self-sufficient in home-produced MBM at the time the BSE crisis was emerging. There had been no pressure from importers of NI animals and meat to ban the feeding of NI-produced MBM to NI ruminants. According to DANI officials, there had been no imports of MBM from Great Britain in the three years prior to 1988, and the batch of 200 tonnes mentioned in paragraph 12.15 above was in 1983. To minimise future risk, DANI was in the process of suspending licences for the import of all animal protein from Great Britain. ⁴⁸