Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 3: Northern Ireland
15. Chronological account of specific Northern Ireland issues
Emergence of BSE

15.5 Mr Ron Martin was Deputy Chief Veterinary Officer for Northern Ireland during 1985-90, and CVO until 1996. He told the Inquiry that he heard about BSE via 'the veterinary grapevine' and informal discussions with colleagues in the Veterinary Service, probably during 1987. His first direct involvement came in the spring of 1988, when MAFF officials including Mr John Wilesmith (Head of the Epidemiology Department at the Central Veterinary Laboratory in England) visited Northern Ireland to explore why the disease had not appeared there. ¹

15.6 Dr William Jack, Permanent Secretary to DANI until his retirement in 1989, said that he first heard about the disease in 1987 via the agricultural press. The first formal notification from MAFF came when a copy of a submission dated 16 February 1988 being prepared for the MAFF Minister was sent to Mr D Hirrell, Assistant Secretary at DANI with responsibility for the Livestock and Meat Marketing Division. ² Mr Hirrell informed Dr Jack. The submission advised that the origin of the disease was not known and that options being considered by MAFF were making the disease notifiable and introducing a policy of compulsory slaughter with compensation. ³ DANI was also later given copies of the minutes of a meeting of MAFF senior officials and the MAFF Parliamentary Secretary on 26 February. These referred to the need to consult the CMO (England) on the question of human health and noted that, as the evidence on the link with feedstuffs had been 'firmed up', it was possible that the disease could still be contained so that a slaughter and compensation policy would not be necessary immediately. ⁴

15.7 On 29 February Dr Jack took part in his first formal discussion about BSE at a meeting of senior DANI staff. At this time, he decided that no action was necessary in Northern Ireland, since there was no record of the disease there and the incidence of scrapie was very low. The following month Sir Donald Acheson (CMO, England) minuted his Ministers in the Department of Health to alert them to the new disease and to seek agreement to the setting up of an expert group (the Southwood Working Party) to advise on any risk to humans. ⁵ Dr Jack told the Inquiry that he was not consulted by MAFF about the terms of reference or composition of the Working Party. ⁶

15.8 Dr McKenna (CMO, Northern Ireland) said that he was first alerted to the existence of BSE during April 1988, when he received a copy of a note from MAFF to Sir Donald Acheson. ⁷

15.9 In the same month Dr Jack and Mr Bill Sullivan (then CVO for Northern Ireland) had a meeting with the MAFF CVO, Mr William Rees, at which they were 'given an indication of the position in GB'. ⁸ At this stage no cases of BSE had as yet been reported in Northern Ireland, so DANI's primary interest lay in protecting the NI cattle population from the risk of horizontal transmission of BSE from cattle imported from Great Britain, while maintaining cattle exports. Mr Gregg Shannon of DANI's Animal Health Division explained to the Inquiry:

During the early stages the major policy aspect demanding attention was the protection of Northern Ireland from inclusion in the stricter health certification demanded from Great Britain for meat and live animal exports. At that time the risk to human health was not apparent. All our efforts were concentrated on reducing and eliminating the disease in animals. Our interest was in agreeing adequate certification of imported animals to minimise the risk of importing the disease if it was eventually to prove contagious. ⁹

15.10 On 16 May DANI received a copy of another submission by MAFF to Ministers, which concluded by recommending that urgent discussions take place with the affected parties (ie, industry and farmers) about a temporary and voluntary withdrawal of meat and bone meal from use in animal feed, making BSE notifiable and introducing a slaughter and compensation policy. ¹⁰ Ten days later Dr Jack put a submission based on this to Lord Lyell, Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Lords) at the Northern Ireland Office with responsibility for Agriculture. ¹¹ Dr Jack's submission informed Lord Lyell of the position in Great Britain, the setting up of the Southwood Working Party and the circumstantial evidence that suggested there was a direct link between affected animals and the consumption of meat and bone meal (MBM) which had not been subjected to sufficient processing to render the scrapie agent inactive. ¹²

15.11 Dr Jack concluded that the Minister should agree that, in the event of MAFF banning the use of MBM in ruminant feed and making the disease notifiable, 'the Department should enter into immediate discussion with the Ulster Farmers' Union and animal feed industry with a view to introducing similar controls in NI'. He felt that if a ruminant feed ban was introduced in Great Britain, or if BSE was made notifiable there, Northern Ireland would have 'little option' but to take similar action. ¹³ He also observed that in the event of a compensation scheme being instituted in Great Britain, Northern Ireland would have to consider something along the same lines. The Minister agreed to this course of action on 31 May 1988. ¹⁴ Dr Jack told the Inquiry that although the first concern behind his statement was that the NI export trade in beef might be affected if they did not follow suit with the ruminant feed ban, he was also concerned with protecting animal health. ¹⁵