Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 3: Northern Ireland
14. Departmental responsibilities
Department of Agriculture for Northern Ireland (DANI)
Animal Health Division
Livestock and Meat Marketing Division
Veterinary Service
The Science Service
The Agri-Food Development Service

14.2 During the period covered by the Inquiry, DANI reported to a Parliamentary Under-Secretary, a post held at different times by, among others, Lord Lyell and Lord Skelmersdale in the House of Lords, and by Mr Peter Bottomley in the House of Commons. The DANI divisions of relevance to the Inquiry were:

• Animal Health Division;
• Livestock and Meat Marketing Division;
• the Veterinary Service, headed by the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for Northern Ireland;
• the Science Service, headed by the Chief Scientific Officer (CSO) for Northern Ireland; and
• the Agricultural Service (including the Agri-Food Development Service), headed by the Chief Agricultural Officer (CAO) for Northern Ireland. ¹

14.3 The DANI Permanent Secretary when BSE emerged was Dr William Jack. He held weekly meetings with the Under and Assistant Secretaries in the Department, together with the Heads of the three professional divisions and other senior staff, to ensure that all senior managers were aware of current and potential business and problems, and that action was properly coordinated. ² The key administrators in relation to BSE were Mr David Carnson (Grade 3, Under Secretary), Mr Rutherford Armstrong and later Mr Pat Toal (Grade 5, Assistant Secretary), and Mr Gregg Shannon and later Mr Liam McKibben at Grade 7 level.

14.4 Dr Jack told the Inquiry that it was DANI's policy that all branches should maintain contact with their counterparts in other Departments. On animal health matters, this included the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in Whitehall, the Department of Agriculture in Dublin and, to a much lesser extent, the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands. ³ Mr Liam McKibben, head of the Animal Health Division between 1992 and 1995, said that he had attended meetings regularly with senior management within DANI and with colleagues in MAFF and the Scottish and Welsh Offices on policy matters. ⁴

14.5 As in Wales and Scotland, officials in DANI tended to have a much wider range of responsibilities than their corresponding grade in MAFF. Dr Jack explained:

The same degree of specialisation was simply not possible here and this is why so much emphasis was laid on maintaining close cooperation with MAFF officials in relation to many aspects, including BSE. ⁵

Animal Health Division

14.6 Animal Health Division (AHD) had four main areas of responsibility:

1. prevention of animal disease coming into Northern Ireland, particularly taking into account the requirements of EU law; ⁶
2. control or eradication of any animal disease detected in Northern Ireland, again in light of the relevant EU law;
3. introduction of legislation to give effect to these policies; and
4. providing administrative support for the implementation of relevant controls (mainly by veterinary staff), including assessing the appropriate levels of compensation to be paid out and the provision of the necessary funds. ⁷

14.7 Although DANI enjoyed considerable autonomy in agricultural matters, it was regarded as desirable, where a threat to public and animal health existed on a UK-wide basis, that policy be formulated to combat such a threat on the same basis. As in Wales and Scotland, the general policy lead was therefore taken by MAFF and the Department of Health (DH) in Whitehall. As Mr Pat Toal said in his statement to the Inquiry:

There are considerably greater resources available to MAFF for policy formulation than exist in any Territorial Department. All Government sponsored R&D was undertaken by MAFF and it was on the basis of this research that policies in relation to BSE were developed. The other main influence on BSE policy was the findings of Government-appointed expert committees. In particular I am referring to the Southwood Committee, the Tyrrell Committee and most recently the Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee (SEAC). ⁸

14.8 Consequently the policy role of AHD during the BSE crisis tended to be limited to ensuring that the policy developed by MAFF and its subsequent implementation took proper account of Northern Ireland's circumstances.

Livestock and Meat Marketing Division

14.9 The Livestock and Meat Marketing Division was generally responsible for the marketing of beef, sheepmeat and their products, and a number of other matters including the licensing of slaughterhouses and the registration of export plants.

Veterinary Service

14.10 The Veterinary Service in Northern Ireland was entirely separate from MAFF's State Veterinary Service in Great Britain. The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) for Northern Ireland advised Ministers and senior officials directly. He was supported by two Deputy Chief Veterinary Officers (DCVOs), one with responsibility for development of policy advice, and the other for the implementation of policy. Mr Bill Sullivan was CVO until 1990, when he was succeeded by Mr Ron Martin, who had previously been DCVO (Policy). Dr Robert McCracken took over from Mr Martin as DCVO (Policy).

14.11 The DCVO with the responsibility for policy advice led a team of veterinarians based at DANI headquarters which advised the CVO on 'veterinary public health, enzootic diseases, epizootic diseases and animal welfare'. This meant providing the CVO with policy options for the control of animal diseases in Northern Ireland and recommendations as to which options were most appropriate. ⁹ The DCVO (Implementation) and his staff provided advice on practicality and resource implications when policy options were being considered by the CVO, and subsequently ensured implementation of the chosen policy.

14.12 In addition to the group which directly supported the CVO, the Veterinary Service had another three sections with involvement in BSE, namely:

1. meat hygiene and inspection;
2. epizootic diseases such as BSE; and
3. enzootic diseases such as bovine tuberculosis and bovine brucellosis.

14.13 The Veterinary Service in Northern Ireland had some wider responsibilities than its counterpart in Great Britain. One example of this was meat inspection in slaughterhouses, which in Great Britain was the responsibility of local authorities until the introduction of the Meat Hygiene Service in 1995. In Northern Ireland almost all meat inspection was the responsibility of the Veterinary Service. ¹⁰

14.14 Veterinary inspection of meat was necessary given Northern Ireland's substantial reliance on beef exports and the accompanying need to comply with international standards in meat inspection. ¹¹ Almost all of the slaughterhouses in Northern Ireland were EU-approved so that most meat, whether it was for export or the domestic market, was prepared to the same standards and under the same levels of supervision. The only exceptions were four small slaughterhouses for which local authorities had responsibility.

14.15 The fact that there were fewer slaughterhouses than in Great Britain also meant that inspection could be carried out at a higher level. ¹² Each export slaughterhouse had a full-time DANI Veterinary Officer present, together with a trained team of DANI Meat Inspectors. In addition, Divisional Veterinary Officers (Meat) based at DANI headquarters at Dundonald House in Belfast visited export plants once a quarter for the purpose of checking compliance with licensing requirements, monitoring hygiene and meat inspection standards, and reporting any problems to the CVO. ¹³

14.16 The epizootic disease section of the Veterinary Service assisted with the formulation of policy in relation to epizootic diseases, including BSE. According to Mr Samuel MacDonald, Senior Principal Veterinary Officer from 1985 to 1995, the section's responsibilities were:

(a) Provision of expert advice to Senior Management and to Animal Health Division on formulation of policy in relation to serious animal and poultry diseases such as Swine Fever, Foot and Mouth Disease, Fowl Pest etc (Epizootic Diseases) [and] other miscellaneous animal and poultry diseases including BSE; Animal Welfare; and trade in certain products of animal origin.

(b) Preparation of contingency plans for dealing with outbreaks of serious animal disease.

(c) Preparation of staff instructions for field staff carrying out farm visits and other field duties relating to implementation of policy in the above areas.

(d) Provision of advice and guidance to the field on the implementation of policy.

(e) Monitoring implementation of policy. ¹⁴

14.17 The enzootic disease section was less involved in BSE policy matters but did provide the cattle-tracking system. The principal responsibilities of the section were:

(a) Provision of expert advice to Senior Management and to Animal Health Division on formulation of policy in relation to Enzootic Disease, Zoonotic Disease, Licensing and use of Veterinary Medicines, and cattle identification and movement control.

(b) Interpretation of Brucellosis Test results.

(c) Preparation of instructions for implementation of policy in the field.

(d) Provision of advice and guidance to the field on implementation of policy.

(e) Monitoring implementation of policy. ¹⁵

The Science Service

14.18 DANI had its own scientific service headed by the Chief Scientific Officer and consisting of a number of scientific research divisions which included the Veterinary Research Laboratories (VRL).

14.19 Although this capacity was available to DANI, Dr Cecil McMurray (CSO, February 1988 to March 1996) said that an early decision was made not to carry out research into BSE in Northern Ireland, because:

A There was no DANI research expertise in scrapie or other TSEs.

B DANI did not have appropriate animal accommodation or mouse colonies for carrying out specific investigations on pathogenesis, transmission or infectivity studies.

C Appropriate expertise existed elsewhere in the UK and research programmes had already been initiated or were under way in institutes, eg, by MAFF (CVL) and AFRC (at Edinburgh and Compton) when [BSE] became a direct issue in Northern Ireland.

D Research budgets were stretched and there was no spare capacity for undertaking new programme areas and especially of the scale necessary to make a unique impact alongside programmes being carried out elsewhere. ¹⁶

14.20 However, a number of research projects relating to BSE were proposed in 1989 by Professor John McFerran, then Chief Veterinary Research Officer at the Veterinary Research Laboratories. Dr McMurray told the Inquiry that he understood that these were later carried out. ¹⁷ In addition, Mr Owen Denny, DVO, was involved in major epidemiological modelling. ¹⁸

14.21 DANI also funded research on animal health undertaken at the Faculty of Agriculture and Food Science at Queen's University, Belfast. Senior staff of the Faculty held dual appointments at the University and DANI Research Divisions. Dr McMurray had himself been Head and Professor of Food and Agricultural Chemistry at the University until 1988. ¹⁹ Dr Jack said:

The bulk of research commissioned from the Research Divisions was of an applied nature relative to farm production and food processing. An ability to identify major pathogens was retained together with such research as was required for University teaching purposes. Basic science was not commissioned from DANI but left to the Research Councils funded from Great Britain. ²⁰

14.22 According to Dr McMurray, DANI was not represented on any of the expert committees set up by MAFF during the BSE crisis. It therefore relied on MAFF to pass on scientific and technical information on issues surrounding BSE, and usually received such information after the implications had been explored and proposed actions recommended. The scope for the DANI CSO to evaluate the relevant scientific issues and to influence subsequent policy formulation was consequently limited.

14.23 The VRL was principally responsible for the provision of a diagnostic pathology service to DANI and to the farming community and veterinary practitioners generally. VRL staff interpreted and reported on the results of tests carried out following the gross post-mortem examination of animals, in particular where results indicated the involvement of diseases subject to statutory control.

14.24 The VRL's role in relation to BSE was limited to pathological diagnosis of the disease and disposing of infected carcasses in its incinerator. From the beginning of the epidemic, all suspect or confirmed BSE cases in Northern Ireland were incinerated, unlike in other parts of the UK where they were often disposed of in a landfill site, because numbers outstripped incinerator capacity. All reports on suspect BSE cases were forwarded to the Veterinary Service. ²¹

The Agri-Food Development Service

14.25 The Agri-Food Development Service, headed by the Chief Agricultural Officer, was responsible for monitoring compliance with the statutory requirements imposed on the manufacture and use of feedstuffs. This task was undertaken by DANI Fertilisers and Feeding Stuffs Inspectors, who made regular visits to feedmills, on-farm feed mixers and farms. ²² While Inspectors were responsible for monitoring compliance, the Animal Health Division took over when action was required in terms of warning letters, consideration of prosecution, and passing on information to industry organisations, the Minister and senior officials. ²³