Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 2: Scotland
11. Comment
Dr Forbes's alternative views

11.33 Not all 'official' medical opinion in Scotland was content to accept the assurances being offered by Mr John Gummer, as Minister of Agriculture in Whitehall, and the two CMOs (Acheson and Calman). Dr Gerald Forbes had been Dr Skinner's predecessor as the SHHD Senior Medical Officer handling BSE. Dr MacDonald, to whom he reported until 1988, described him as working very diligently and very enthusiastically on environmental health and zoonosis issues. ¹ Dr Calman described him as 'a very distinguished environmental scientist' ² and clearly respected his views. Although Dr Forbes's memory places it rather earlier, Dr MacDonald's recollection was that Dr Forbes had been raising his concerns with him about BSE in the last two or three months of 1987. This was around the same time as Mr Thomson was first informed by MAFF, although there does not appear to have been any contact between DAFS and SHHD about it at that stage.

11.34 In 1990 Dr Forbes had become the Director of the newly formed Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit and was no longer bound by departmental conventions of official reticence. He went public on 21 May (the same day as MAFF Ministers were reassuring Parliament), challenging Mr Gummer's claims about the safety of beef and saying the full facts should be made public. ³

11.35 Unsurprisingly this led Scottish Ministers and senior officials, including Mr Hart, to consider damage limitation. However, they did not want to open themselves to accusations of gagging Dr Forbes. Dr Calman was asked by Mr Hart to put to Dr Forbes that he had a special responsibility to weigh his words carefully. In carrying out this thankless task he appears to have acted with delicacy and propriety. Dr Forbes was clear that he had not been put under any pressure. He told us: 'Dr Calman had been virtually directed to contact me by telephone, to see what we could square out . . . It was just a very gentlemanly discussion.' ⁴

11.36 Dr Forbes continued to press his views in a subsequent memorandum to the Select Committee on Agriculture inquiry into BSE. This document set out many relevant questions, in particular about the continued feeding of MBM to non-ruminants, the safety of mechanically recovered meat (MRM) and the risks associated with removing bovine brains. It was seen by Dr Hine, and, as discussed in the section on Wales, it encouraged her to press her concerns with the Department of Health in London, albeit unsuccessfully.

11.37 Dr Calman was also concerned. He told us that he 'took this to the Department of Health' to discuss and to get assurances and 'at least to bring this to the attention of Sir Donald Acheson and staff in the Department of Health'. ⁵ We think this was a reasonable way for Dr Calman to pursue Dr Forbes's points, though they do not appear to have cut much ice at the Department of Health, and Dr Calman let the matter drop.

11.38 Possibly, Dr Forbes's concerns lingered in the mind of Mr Hart and triggered his reaction later that summer that Mr Davison of DAFS was being unreasonably dismissive of human risk in his minute of 27 August advising Ministers on a response to the Select Committee's report on BSE. Mr Hart set out his doubts in a minute to his opposite number Mr Hamilton, Head of DAFS. On being told of Mr Davison's suggestion that a seminar for the two Departments would be arranged, he appears to have let matters rest. Given that DAFS was taking the departmental lead on BSE and that he had registered his concerns with the Permanent Secretary there, we think it was not unreasonable for him to have done so.

11.39 Dr Forbes's later more sweeping criticisms in his Unit's draft annual report discredited him with both SHHD and DAFS. Dr Kendell clearly did not seek Dr Forbes's views after taking over as CMO.