Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 2: Scotland
11. Comment
Role of the CMO
Dr Calman's public guidance in 1990

11.25 The other main source of information available was the medical network within SHHD. Like its Welsh equivalent, the Scottish Office had the benefit of on-the-spot public health advice from its own CMO and his team, who had a direct line to Ministers. We looked at the role they played, both in relation to Scottish Office thinking, and in relation to the wider public.

11.26 We could find little or no involvement by SHHD in BSE matters apart from the part played by the CMO and his staff. Mr Hart, Head of SHHD between January 1990 and March 1992, described his Department's responsibility for advising on any human health aspects of BSE and taking any necessary protective action as being 'primarily discharged by the CMO'. ¹ He said he had a number of informal conversations with the CMO, at that time Dr Calman, about BSE. ²

Dr Calman's public guidance in 1990

11.27 We therefore explored with Dr Calman how he saw his role in this period and in particular what guidance he offered publicly.

11.28 As elsewhere, the diagnosis of a spongiform encephalopathy in a Bristol cat in May 1990 and the ensuing public alarm about the safety of beef had catapulted the CMO, Dr Calman, into the firing line. Local authorities, hospitals and schools wanted his guidance on what to do.

11.29 Dr Calman had happened to be at a WHO meeting with Sir Donald Acheson when the news came through, and they discussed the matter. We were told by Dr Calman that he did not see transmissibility to humans as likely. As we have noted above, the Scottish Office had felt generally reassured by what they perceived to be the message from the Southwood Report the previous year. Since then precautionary measures had been adopted that went well beyond Southwood. Dr Calman told us how he saw transmission to humans:

. . . possible in terms of being a real possibility that something might happen I think was discounted at the time simply because of the state of knowledge where we were at the time. ³

11.30 However, he knew about transmission of human spongiform encephalopathies and felt that 'BSE should be managed on the assumption that this might occur however remote the possibility'. ⁴ It was not something on which he demonstrated any wish to take a public stance. Mr Kevin Taylor of MAFF observed later that year in a minute to Mr Meldrum that 'Dr Calman's personal views about BSE/scrapie are not known, but he is certainly discreet enough not to rock the boat'. ⁵ Dr Calman's deputy, Dr McIntyre, told us:

In a sense saying that he kept his counsel means that he did not make any other statements about it. But we were taking a great interest in the subject. ⁶

11.31 In May 1990, however, when faced by the sudden crisis of public confidence, Dr Calman had decided to endorse Sir Donald's statement as it stood. While we have criticised Sir Donald for the terms of his public statement (see vol 6: Human Health, 1989-96), we do not level the same criticism at Dr Calman for going along with it. In our view he had little alternative since it was not open to him to disagree publicly with what had just been said. Moreover, like Dr Hine, he appeared to wish to avoid any direct independent statement of his own.

11.32 Dr Calman told us: 'I think the endorsement was not a public one.' ⁷ However, it was in effect just that. It was conveyed in a letter by Dr Rosalind Skinner the following day to 'Chief Administrative Medical Officers, Chief Executives, Community Medical Specialists . . . and Directors of Public Health'. ⁸ It was undoubtedly intended to reassure those questioning whether to withdraw beef from the menu.