Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 2: Scotland
11. Comment
Access to expert advice

11.15 The main reason for accepting the MAFF assessment of risk was that it was seen as reflecting the advice of the top experts in the field - first Southwood, and then SEAC.

11.16 The Southwood Report in 1989 had a strong and lasting influence on Scottish thinking about the human health risk. Mr Thomson, his successor Mr Davison in DAFS, and Dr McIntyre in SHHD all saw this Report as confirming that the risk to humans was remote. Mr Davison 'took quite a comforting message out of Southwood', which he described as representing his knowledge of BSE after he took over in 1990. ¹

11.17 Lord Sanderson likewise in April 1988 was:

. . . comforted by the statement from Ministry vets that there was no evidence then to suggest that BSE could be transmitted to humans. The Southwood findings later confirmed this. ²

11.18 SEAC from 1990 onwards became a crucial source of information for policy-makers. Recognising this, Dr Calman, at that time CMO for Scotland, unsuccessfully pressed in November 1990 for observer status on SEAC. He felt the Scottish Office was 'sometimes . . . not as well informed' as London about all the discussions going on. ³ Although attendance at SEAC was refused, MAFF arranged to supply papers to DAFS for onward distribution.

11.19 Unfortunately, thereafter only limited use appears to have been made of these papers to inform Scottish thinking about how best to handle BSE. Mr Davison 'was barely aware of SEAC during that time'. ⁴ Papers from expert committees struck him as '. . . scientific, it is technical, it is all Greek. . .' ⁵ He saw no animal health side in SEAC's work and relations with it were simply 'hearsay' to him since 'the Scottish Office's relationship with SEAC would be through the medics'. ⁶ Dr McIntyre, who was deputy to three successive Scottish CMOs until he retired in 1993, told us he saw some of the SEAC papers. ⁷ Mr Davison's successor in 1994, Dr Matheson, found the papers 'bulky and very technical' and said he could not pretend to understand them so scanned them briefly and sent them to be filed. ⁸ Mr Anderson, who handled meat hygiene policy and had some concerns about local authority enforcement in slaughterhouses, did not see the papers. ⁹ Nor did Mr Scudamore, the Veterinary Adviser to the Scottish Office, or Dr Kendell, CMO from 1992 onwards, though the latter told us it would have been 'enormously helpful' had he done so. ¹⁰

11.20 We thought the failure to appreciate the significance and value of the flow of information from SEAC indicated liaison problems, and a lack of shared policy perceptions, between the Agriculture and Health Departments. This was not the only example of poor coordination during the BSE story, despite the more compact working environment in Edinburgh. Thus neither SHHD staff nor the CMO can recall being asked to brief Mr Rifkind, the Secretary of State for Scotland, when the Southwood Report came before the Cabinet in 1989. Mr Davison, who knew nothing about slaughterhouses when he took over responsibility for them in June 1991, took it for granted that the SBO ban was 'well bedded in'. ¹¹ He saw the vets as responsible for enforcement. Dr Skinner in SHHD, who was concerned with BSE from 1990 onwards and liaised with DAFS, did not recall ever discussing compliance with SBO Regulations in slaughterhouses and rendering plants with Mr Scudamore (the ACVO). ¹² Mr Anderson did not think Mr Scudamore ever raised the issue of slaughterhouse compliance with the CMO, though 'there were regular meetings between him and our ACVO when this could have been discussed'. ¹³

11.21 Thus, unlike in Wales, there appears to have been no shared body of knowledge in Scotland about slaughterhouse practices, the food chain implications if enforcement of the Regulations was inadequate, and how these might affect the intended BSE safeguards. It was beyond our remit to explore if these communication and policy analysis gaps persist today in Scotland. It is clearly essential that they should not be allowed to do so.