Volume 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Part 2: Scotland
10. Chronological account of specific Scottish issues
The concerns of Dr Forbes about BSE

10.41 Sir Donald Acheson was the CMO in DH during 1983-91. Volume. 6: Human Health, 1989-96 of this Report covers events surrounding his public statement in May 1990 that 'beef can be eaten safely by everyone'. This statement was endorsed by Dr Kenneth Calman, then CMO in the Scottish Office, although he did not issue a separate statement for Scotland on the basis that 'several statements from several people might have been confusing in public terms'. ¹

10.42 By this time, Dr Gerald Forbes had left his post as SMO at SHHD and had become Director of the Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit. On 22 May he gave a paper at the Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland, which listed his twelve concerns about BSE and the way it was being handled:

1. Why have recognised epidemiological principles not been followed in the investigation of the disease?
2. Why is it accepted that there is vertical transmission of disease in scrapie and not in BSE?
3. Why are calves from infected animals (30,000 approx. so far) allowed into the food chain?
4. Why is the disease five times more common in England than in Scotland?
5. Has the fodder treatment method used in Scotland helped to limit the spread of disease here?
6. Why are offals from animals under the age of six months allowed into the human food chain?
7. Why are bovine offals allowed to be fed to pigs, poultry and used in pet foods?
8. Has the change in temperature from 130 degrees C to 100 degrees C for the treatment of offals affected the spread of the disease?
9. Is milk from an incubating or infected animal safe to drink?
10. Is full ante-mortem inspection of animals necessary as is undertaken at export approved plants?
11. Is the use of mechanically recovered meat safe?
12. Is it safe to remove the bovine brain from the cranium? ²

Many of these questions proved to be highly pertinent.

10.43 Just before this, Dr Forbes was asked by BBC Radio Scotland whether he believed the 'Agriculture Minister's assurances' that it was safe to eat beef. He replied:

I think it is a statement that cannot be substantiated fully . . . we have to sort out this business of can this disease spread to humans. As far as I am concerned I don't think that has been satisfactorily answered yet. ³

10.44 The comments made by Dr Forbes caused some concern in the Scottish Office. The Head of SHHD, Mr (later Sir) Graham Hart, advised the Minister, Mr Forsyth, that, although Dr Forbes was undoubtedly motivated by genuine concern, his statements were likely to alarm the public and were at variance with the statements of Ministers and the CMO (England). Although he could not bar Dr Forbes from speaking publicly, the latter should have reflected and consulted before doing so. ⁴ Dr Calman would therefore speak to Dr Forbes:

. . . pointing out that he has a special responsibility to weigh his words carefully and that he would be well advised to take advice from CMO before launching out on further public pronouncements. ⁵

10.45 Dr Forbes told the Inquiry that he never felt that the Department was trying to gag him. Dr Calman had telephoned him and he described the ensuing conversation as follows:

Dr Calman had been virtually directed to contact me by telephone, and see what we could square out. This was in relation to the BSE issue. Now, he did contact me. We had a long talk and he said: 'Is that what you believe?' I said: 'Yes.' He said: 'That is fine with me.' This is what you get with someone who can understand the basic problems of epidemiology, or the problems in a disease such as this. But as I say, no-one attempted it. Dr Calman did as he [was] requested. He phoned me, it was just a very gentlemanly discussion. ⁶

Dr Calman told the Inquiry that this accorded with his recollection of the conversation. ⁷

10.46 Dr Forbes continued to press his concerns in other ways. On 7 June 1990 he was invited by the House of Commons Agriculture Select Committee, which was investigating the handling of BSE, to submit evidence on the disease. He did so the next day by letter, enclosing a copy of the paper given to the Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland referred to in paragraph 10.42 above, as well as a paper he had published in the Journal of Infectious Diseases in 1980 on the transmissibility of encephalopathies. Dr Forbes argued that the absolute assurances about the safety of beef which had been given by MAFF and DH could not be sustained. He summarised his main concerns about BSE and human health as follows:

1. Given that it was accepted that scrapie could be transmitted from sheep to lamb, and that scrapie and other diseases such as kuru and CJD had been transmitted to primates, it was irresponsible to state that BSE was not transmissible from cow to calf or from cow to human.
2. BSE was a public health problem as well as an animal health problem and more input was needed from the medical profession.
3. Calves from infected cows should not be allowed into the food chain at all.
4. A research project should be undertaken immediately to determine why Scotland had much lower levels of BSE.
5. As there was a distinct possibility that BSE had passed to cats which had eaten bovine offal, SBO should not be fed to any other animals, nor should SBO from calves under six months old be fed to humans.
6. It was highly doubtful whether the practice of producing mechanically recovered meat should be considered safe.
7. The different standards of meat inspection between meat for the domestic market and meat for the export market could not be justified. ⁸

10.47 In May 1991 Mr Davison and Mr Kenneth MacKenzie (Under Secretary in SHHD) were informed by Mr Leo Cunning of SHHD that the Environmental Health (Scotland) Unit, of which Dr Forbes was Director, was about to publish its first annual report, ⁹ and that the report contained some 'unfortunate and impolitic comments' on matters of interest to SHHD and other Departments. ¹⁰ For example, in the draft report Dr Forbes cited 'the failure to introduce an adequate investigation and control programme for bovine spongiform encephalopathy' as one of the environmental and public health 'failures' of the year. ¹¹

10.48 The reaction of Scottish Health officials was that Dr Forbes had seriously overstepped the mark and had abused his position. ¹² However, in the light of the fact that his contract of employment allowed him to publish his views without consultation with his employers, it was thought that, if he could not be dissuaded from modifying or publishing the report, nothing more could be done but be ready to brief Ministers to face possible questions from the press. ¹³ In the event, the published version of the Report referred simply to the 'lack' of an adequate investigation and control programme for BSE. ¹⁴