![]() |
||||
|
Volume 8: Variant CJD 5.158 While the Southwood Working Party judged that the risk of transmission of BSE to humans appeared remote, they made the reasonable assumption that, if BSE did transmit, the clinical disorder would closely resemble Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease. They recommended the monitoring of cases of CJD through the neurological network with particular emphasis on occupational groups exposed to bovine tissues, and suggested that the new Consultative Committee on Research chaired by Dr Tyrrell should consider arrangements for surveillance. 5.159 Dr Will presented a paper to the Tyrrell Committee in April 1989 on the surveillance of the population for CJD based on the studies he had done as a research registrar with Professor Bryan Matthews in 1979-82. The Tyrrell Committee Report recommended CJD surveillance and a grant application based on Dr Will's report was accepted by the Department of Health, and the CJD Surveillance Unit (CJDSU) started work in May 1990. 5.160 The worst fears of officials and advisors were realised when, on 8 March 1996, the CJDSU reported to SEAC that they were of the opinion that cases in ten young people could be a new form of CJD. The circumstantial evidence of a link with BSE led to the public announcement on 20 March 1996.
5.161 There were indications from 1993 onwards that the CJDSU might indeed detect atypical cases or changing patterns in the incidence of CJD. We have summarised in this chapter the referrals to the CJDSU of cases of CJD in young people, beginning with case A which came to the attention of Dr Will in 1993, and cases of CJD in farmers whose farms had a history of BSE. With hindsight, we know that the farmers and some cases in young people have not been established as vCJD. However, the majority of cases of CJD in young people referred to the CJDSU by the end of 1995 have now been established to be vCJD. Only one of the CJD patients from the UK had been diagnosed in their teens (in 1980) prior to the emergence of BSE. The concern of Dr Will and Professor Collinge that so many young patients had been identified in such as short period was noted in the minutes of the SEAC meeting of 5 January 1996. In late 1995, Dr Will had noted that three of the cases were unusual in that pathological examination had revealed extensive plaque deposition in the brain. Why was it not until March 1996 that the CJDSU concluded that there was indeed probably a new variant of CJD? 5.162 Dr Will considered factors which might have led to increased identification of young patients since 1994:
5.163 At the 23rd meeting of SEAC on 5 January 1996, Dr Will listed four definite cases and one possible case under 30 years of age, along with two confirmed cases and one suspect case aged between 30 and 40. Several days later, the possible case under 30 had been confirmed by neuropathology as had a case in a patient aged 41. In his assessment of the significance of the cases, Dr Will sought up-to-date information from the European surveillance project on CJD. This revealed that between 1993-96 there were five recorded deaths within the age range 20-39. Excluding the teenagers, this age distribution was similar to the UK distribution of cases. 5.164 Dr Will then reviewed the clinical presentation and course of illness in the young cases and this revealed: 5.165 By the end of January, the clinical phenotype and the unusual neuropathology had been recognised by the CJDSU. Similar features had been associated occasionally in both sporadic and familial CJD. Three of the cases had been tested and shown not to have prion gene mutations. They were noted also to be homozygous for methionine at codon 129. Arrangements were made to check for prion gene mutations in the remaining patients. (These results for a total of six patients were available on 4 March 1996.) 5.166 By early March, Dr Will had obtained from European colleagues information on the clinical presentation, phenotype and neuropathology on young patients with CJD identified in continental Europe. The clinical features and duration of illness were variable in these cases and did not follow the pattern that had been recognised in the young cases in the UK. This was confirmed by a literature search of other young cases of CJD from around the world. It appeared probable that the CJD of young patients recognised in the UK was a new variant, unrecognised elsewhere. 5.167 By 13 March 1996, the number of UK patients under the age of 50 with the new phenotype of CJD was nine. 1 This number excluded one case found to have a prion gene mutation. All were homozygous for methionine at codon 129. All had the characteristic phenotype with psychiatric presentation and a relatively long duration of illness. It had been confirmed by three external referees that the pathological features, including prominent plaques, constituted a novel type of CJD, previously unreported. 5.168 It is clear that since the summer of 1995, the key question in the forefront of the minds of Dr Will and his colleagues concerning the young patients with CJD was whether or not there could be a link with BSE. On 8 March 1996, Dr Will and Dr Ironside presented their reasons for concluding that cases in young people could be a new form of CJD. Review of the medical histories of the young patients revealed no common risk factor which might explain the occurrence of their condition. At their meeting on 16 March, SEAC agreed that 'They must take very seriously the possibility that this new risk factor was BSE, although it was noted that the data did not allow this conclusion to be drawn firmly'. 5.169 We believe that the presentation to SEAC on 8 March 1996 could not have been made sooner. It was necessary to establish the clinical and pathological characteristics of the condition in a sufficient number of patients to justify the conclusion that a new variant of CJD had been identified. The findings had to be checked by independent scientists and clinicians, and it had to be shown that what appeared to be a new variant was not in fact a type of CJD previously reported in young people, either in the UK or abroad, before the BSE epidemic. Furthermore, the DNA of each patient had to be analysed to exclude a disease-producing mutation of the prion gene. These were all prerequisites to the conclusion that there was a new variant of CJD which was probably linked with BSE. The time taken to establish a link with BSE does not warrant criticism. A wrong conclusion, hastily drawn, could have created unwarranted public anxiety and could have been very damaging to public confidence.
5.170 We now turn to consideration of the procedures in place for CJD surveillance. It is hard to see what alternatives to the CJDSU could have been more effective. The CJDSU was a research unit, established on the basis of a remote possibility that BSE might be transmitted to humans. It was sensible to have a dedicated unit to monitor a comparatively rare and complex group of disorders for which there was no laboratory test. The decision to place the responsibility for surveillance with a small research team of dedicated medical scientists headed by a clinical neurologist with extensive experience in CJD was entirely correct. The CJDSU was a research unit whose work deserves nothing but praise. 5.171 It is unlikely that existing institutions responsible for monitoring public health would have achieved the same result in as short a time. The OPCS (later the Office of National Statistics) is experienced in monitoring health trends but is largely dependent on death certification. While this may be sufficient for indentifying trends in relatively common causes of death, the procedure is inefficient for rare complex disorders in which diagnosis is difficult. The correct certification of causes of death is notoriously unreliable and especially so for a condition like CJD which can be mistaken for other more common neurodegenerative disorders such as Alzheimer's disease. In such circumstances, the underlying diagnosis may even be omitted and the immediate cause of death recorded, for example bronchopneumonia. 5.172 There has been much discussion about whether or not the PHLS could have provided surveillance of CJD. The PHLS was established in 1940 to monitor infectious disease in the community and to provide laboratory diagnosis for many zoonotic disorders. They have a network of laboratories throughout England and Wales and many other resources including epidemiologists, statisticians and field workers. They have access to medical registers in the NHS and close links with clinicians. However, in 1989 they did not have expertise in CJD and most importantly there was (and still is) no established laboratory test for either CJD screening or for diagnosis in suspect cases. None the less, we believe that, short of undertaking CJD surveillance themselves, the PHLS could have given considerable assistance to the CJDSU. They might have provided expertise in epidemiology based on their experience of work in the field of investigating disease outbreaks. Their field epidemiologists could have been involved in designing questionnaires, interviewing relatives and in collecting unbiased answers designed to explore aetiogical factors. They had the resources to conduct active surveillance throughout the UK through polling neurologists and other relevant groups of clinicians and compiling null returns in addition to suspect cases. They could have provided access to medical registers, hospital in-patient and out-patient statistics and an efficient system of communication within the PHLS network. They could have helped to look for potential routes of infection between cattle and humans, for example by investigating possible associations with vaccines prepared from bovine products. In these and other respects, the PHLS could have contributed to the CJDSU surveillance of CJD and their programme of epidemiological research. These comments in no way detract from the sterling work of the CJDSU team who so promptly detected the emergence of vCJD and so efficiently established the clinical and pathological characteristics of the disease. While assistance from the PHLS could have been valuable, it would not have enabled identification of vCJD at any earlier date. We do not criticise those who concluded that the task of monitoring CJD should be left to the Surveillance Unit.
5.173 We now turn to consider whether the communication of information from the CJD Surveillance Unit to the Department of Health was adequate. The only matter that gave us concern in this regard was Dr Will's reply to Mr Skinner on 23 February 1996. In his reply to Mr Skinner on 23 February 1996, Dr Will stated that 'There is a remote theoretical risk that BSE in cattle might cause disease in humans' and 'that this is likely to be negligible provided statutory measures are fully enforced'. He added that he agreed with the statement that 'there is currently no scientific evidence that BSE can be transmitted to humans and that eating beef causes CJD'. Dr Will stressed to us that at this time there were 'a whole range of issues that had to come together' before he reached a stage at which he considered there was sufficient evidence to make a scientific judgement that there had been a change. This range of issues included genotyping results, reaching more conclusions about the neuropathology and the clinical phenotype and other issues. The word 'currently' in Dr Will's reply to Mr Skinner did not preclude the materialisation of any new evidence. In the event, that new evidence was announced only four weeks later. 5.174 We have given our reasons above (paragraph 5.170) for concluding that the CJD Surveillance Unit could not have informed SEAC of the emergence of a new version of CJD earlier than 8 March 1996. It was not until about 13 March that Dr Will was sure that the novel clinical phenotype had not been reported outside the UK, that the distinct neuropathological findings had been confirmed by independent pathologists, and that prion protein gene mutations were not involved. Until this information had been assembled Dr Will did not feel in a position to make a scientific judgement that there was evidence that BSE could be transmitted to humans. 5.175 However, we note that some inkling of what was to come is to be found in the minute dated 1 March from Mr Eddy to Mr Haddon, Mr Meldrum, Mr Taylor and Dr Render, in which it is indicated that the Department of Health had been informed that the results were beginning to look rather firmer and that there was a new sub-population of the disease emerging. We do not think that Dr Will was able to go this far on 23 February and we consider that his presentation to SEAC on 1 February had given Mr Skinner a fair picture of the degree to which his thinking had progressed. In these circumstances, we do not think that Dr Will can be blamed for continuing to be cautious in his reply to Mr Skinner on 23 February 1996. 2
5.176 The difficulties that arose from involvement of the CJDSU in the public debate are illustrated by the Parliamentary Food and Health Forum on 20 February 1996 at which Dr Will was an invited speaker. At that meeting Dr Will found himself obliged to deal with the question whether the age distribution of CJD appeared to have changed in the past year. During his talk, he stated that current evidence did not suggest any definite change in the pattern of CJD that could be attributable to BSE and that there was no overall change in the age-specific incidence of CJD in the UK. He was recorded in a note of the meeting as stating that current information was reassuring and that any risk to man from BSE might not be evident for some years. Four weeks later, results of key investigations had been completed and different conclusions had been drawn. 5.177 Dr Will stated to us that his view at this time was that there was no overall change in the age specific incidence of CJD in the UK. He stated that this view was based on the statistical analysis provided by Dr Gore on 5 February 1996. Dr Gore's calculations were based on the first of four young cases of confirmed CJD (aged 16, 19, 29 and 30 years) which had occurred during the 5-year-period between 1990-96. When considered in relation to the three young cases (aged 35, 36 and 38 years) occurring in the previous quinquennium, the probability of observing four cases was not expected. No account was taken of the younger ages of the four cases, nor of the fact that by 20 February 1996, eight cases under the age of 40 were known. Statisticians approach these matters by attempting to assess the likelihood that the cases in question may represent no more than random events. If the probability of the cases in question being a random event is less than 5 per cent then they would normally be thought to have statistical significance. The probability of eight cases occurring by chance was now 0.03, ie within the 5 per cent probability to which statistical significance is generally ascribed. It was therefore not strictly correct to conclude that there had been no statistically significant change in the age distribution of cases in the UK. 5.178 Although the numbers had just achieved formal significance levels, we believe that Dr Will had reason to be cautious about the implications of his findings. Before coming to a conclusion that there might be a link with BSE, it was necessary to make sure that the eight cases had a consistent phenotype. Dr Will was correct in waiting for the results of genetic analysis on 4 March 1996 and for the independent expert review of the pathological material. He had to be sure that similar cases had not occurred outside the UK during the same period. It was this that provided the circumstantial evidence of a link with the BSE epidemic. All the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle were not in place until mid-March 1996 and Dr Will did not feel confident to suggest the existence of a link with BSE until they were. 5.179 Dr Will has explained his reticence at the Food and Health Forum meeting about his concerns about CJD in young patients. He believed that it would be premature to make a public announcement before he was satisfied that all aspects had been fully examined and the results peer-reviewed. An announcement of a change in numbers of young patients over such a short period might have precipitated a crisis of some magnitude based on the unsupported assumption that the changes were due to BSE. It was imperative that other explanations had to be rigorously investigated before coming to such a conclusion. 5.180 Undoubtedly the recognition of an increasing number of young people affected with CJD in late 1995 and early 1996 placed the CJDSU in a difficult position if asked publicly about a possible link with BSE before investigations on the patients had been completed. The position was particularly acute for Dr Will on 20 February. Although he was concerned about the cases of CJD in young people, he felt he could not publicly refer to the change in the number of young patients. 5.181 We have some sympathy for Dr Will in the situation in which he was placed. The CJDSU are to be commended on the sound work that they had done in identifying the new variant of CJD. It is unfortunate that Dr Will found himself in a position where he was required to speak in public about the risk that BSE might cause disease in humans. With hindsight, it might have been better for him to have refrained from making any comment, and from participating in the Food and Health Forum, until his investigations were complete. Given the position in which he found himself, we do not criticise Dr (now Professor) Will.
5.182 As set out in more detail in vol.2: Science (Chapter 4), the link between BSE and vCJD, suggested on the circumstantial evidence that the two conditions were associated in both time and space almost exclusively in the UK, was soon supported by experimental and biochemical results. Chief among these were the strain typing results in mice which revealed in 1997 that BSE and vCJD had similar incubation periods and lesion profiles in the brain. Type 4 glycosylation patterns were found in both, and studies using transgenic mice in which the murine prion gene had been replaced by the bovine gene strongly suggested that the infective agent was identical in both conditions. Present evidence seems overwhelming.
|
||||
|
© Crown Copyright 2000. Legal notice. Any part of this report may be reproduced subject to acknowledgement. |
||||
| The Inquiry Report | Findings & conclusions | Download report as PDF | Evidence | Contact details | Order a copy | Glossary | Chronology | Who's who | Key to footnotes | Help | Search | ||||