Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
2. The slaughter and compensation scheme
Introduction

2.1 In June 1988, the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order 1988 introduced the compulsory notification of BSE and the ruminant feed ban. ¹ In respect of notification, the Order required farmers or their vets to notify the local Divisional Veterinary Officer (DVO) as soon as possible, if they suspected that an animal was affected by BSE. MAFF would send one of its own vets to investigate, and in the meantime the farmer was required to keep possession of the animal. ²

2.2 On 8 August 1988, two further Orders came into effect: The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (Amendment) Order 1988 ³ and The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Compensation Order 1988. ⁴ These Orders set out what was to be done with those animals detained on suspicion of being infected with BSE. They introduced a policy of compulsory slaughter of BSE-infected animals and payment of compensation to the owner of the slaughtered animal (referred to as the slaughter and compensation scheme). The events which led to the introduction of the Orders are described in vol. 3: The Early Years 1986-88. Their later counterpart Orders in Northern Ireland are described in vol. 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

2.3 This chapter examines the operation of the slaughter and compensation scheme. It begins with a description of the procedure by which animals showing clinical signs of BSE were notified, inspected, valued and, where necessary, slaughtered. The scheme applied to animals under suspicion of having the disease, by virtue of their showing clinical signs, and was a significant public health measure removing these animals from the human food chain. In Chapter 3 we look at the public health measure introduced in November 1989 to remove from the human food chain certain high-risk tissues from subclinical animals, ie, those incubating the disease but not yet showing clinical signs.

2.4 Following the commencement of the slaughter and compensation scheme, a number of practical difficulties with its operation became apparent. In response, measures were introduced such as the ex gratia compensation policy and the adoption of random ante-mortem inspection of cattle in domestic slaughterhouses in England and Wales. We outline why such measures were considered necessary and the form that they took.

2.5 The major problem identified in the early days of the slaughter and compensation scheme was the level of compensation payable to owners of BSE suspects. Critics of this aspect of the scheme argued that even though compensation was fixed at 50 per cent of the animal's sound market value (ie, 50 per cent of its value if it had not been ill), there was an incentive for less scrupulous farmers not to notify suspected BSE cases. ⁵ Following lobbying by industry and consumer groups, the Government increased the compensation to 100 per cent in February 1990. This chapter charts the move towards this change in policy. It also deals with a further change in the calculation of compensation in 1994.

2.6 While the perceived low level of compensation was one possible reason for farmers not to notify their BSE suspects, the growing importance of having a herd with BSE-free status meant there was another pressure. The chapter examines BSE-free herd status in this context. The general level of compliance with the slaughter and compensation scheme is also addressed. Although there was considerable speculation about farmers avoiding their obligation to notify BSE suspects, concrete evidence of cattle owners deliberately doing so remained scarce.

2.7 Annex 1 of this chapter summarises the terms of the relevant Orders on slaughter and compensation and the subsequent amendments to the Orders up to 20 March 1996.