Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
7. Human health developments from January 1996 to 20 March 1996
Discussion
Mr Hogg's questions for SEAC
The use that was made of SEAC
Was the assistance sought from Dr Kimberlin appropriate?
Should Dr Kimberlin have disclosed the request to SEAC?
The MLC briefing paper
MAFF publicity
Discussion

7.31 The time spent by SEAC considering how to answer the Minister's questions necessarily restricted the time available for consideration of other matters. We discussed with witnesses whether it would not have been a good idea to ask SEAC to consider the implications, should it prove that there was a link between BSE and CJD.

7.32 Mr Richard Carden, MAFF Deputy Secretary and Head of Food Safety Directorate, questioned whether SEAC would have had time to comply with such a request:

SEAC was under very great pressure of other business in January 1996. They were often under such pressure of business that they did not complete their agendas. You can see that from the records of their meetings. They were under particular pressure in January, among other things to answer a set of questions which the MAFF Minister, Mr Hogg, had put to them just before that, wanting quite urgently to have their views on some questions related to safety of beef that could be deployed publicly. That was a high priority for MAFF and, if there had been time to spare at the January meeting where those questions were not debated, or at the February meeting where they were debated inconclusively, the reality at the time was such that we would have been pressing them to find time for that.

. . .

I and the MAFF Minister and senior colleagues - were giving weight then to the questions that had been put to SEAC about the safety of beef and to obtaining answers from them. That work was in the event overtaken by what followed, but at that time it was still a priority for us to ask SEAC to find time to deal with that.

. . .

We had always, and still have, to tread carefully in what we ask SEAC to do because the members of SEAC have other occupations that are the main call on their time. We have to judge carefully before we impose new questions on them. It is a committee that has been under very heavy pressure for a very long time and that pressure is felt by members, some of whom have quite recently stood down. They do not all live in the United Kingdom. One, at least, is resident in the United States. We always thought quite long and hard before putting new questions to SEAC as to the real need for doing so. ¹

Mr Hogg's questions for SEAC

7.33 The questions that Mr Hogg invited SEAC to answer were not asked for the purpose of obtaining information. It was anticipated that SEAC would answer them in a manner that would reassure the public that beef was safe to eat. The questions were asked with the intention that SEAC's answers should be used for this purpose.

7.34 When Mr Hogg returned to give evidence in Phase 2 he summarised the position as follows:

. . . the position was we had this crisis in December. I have mentioned it several times. And it became very clear to me two things. One is that people did not trust people like me, and they did not trust the Ministry officials either. It is very embarrassing to face that fact; but I had to recognise that the public did not trust Ministers and officials when they were trying to express what were our best opinions. We were not trusted. That was the first uncomfortable point. So the conclusion that I came to was that it was important to try to formulate kinds of questions that people wanted answered, and then to put it to the people that they were more likely to trust. Therefore, I did formulate a number of questions, with assistance of my officials, for submission to SEAC. And they were thought of, simple questions that I thought were the kind of questions people wanted answers to, because I knew they did not trust me. That seems to me a very respectable and indeed almost modest approach. ²

7.35 We have asked ourselves the following questions in relation to this exercise:

1. Was the use that Mr Hogg sought to make of SEAC an appropriate use of that Committee?
2. Was it appropriate for the MLC to ask Dr Kimberlin to assist in procuring answers from SEAC in a form that was satisfactory to its advertising agents?
3. Should Dr Kimberlin have disclosed to SEAC the nature of the assistance that had been sought from him?

The use that was made of SEAC

7.36 We asked Mr Hogg, using hindsight, whether it was a good idea to ask a body such as SEAC to provide what, in effect, were sound bites, as an aid to restoring confidence in beef. He answered that his preferred course would have been to have in place a body such as a Food Safety Council. In the absence of such a body he turned to SEAC:

We were not trusted, I have made that point; and SEAC was the best we had. I am not saying it was ideal, because it was answering in a sort of ad hoc way. ³

7.37 We asked Dr Kimberlin the same question. His answer was that intuitively he was not very happy with that sort of thing:

. . . intuitively my answer to you has to be that sound bite responses from anybody is not likely to be the answer. I am not sure what is. These are difficult issues to address. You know, the public - we must not underestimate the public. People are not stupid. It is a sort of cliché in a way. People are not stupid. They will not be taken in by sound bites, whether they come from the Minister or SEAC or me or anybody else. ⁴

7.38 We agree with Dr Kimberlin. More fundamentally, we consider that the appropriate role of SEAC was to provide advice to government, not to provide publicity material to bolster the beef market. The limited time of members of SEAC could have been better devoted to advising on other matters, rather than attempting to formulate answers to the Minister's questions.

7.39 Had SEAC provided the sound bites that were hoped for, we consider that the nature of the exercise would have been apparent to the public and SEAC's credibility damaged in consequence. In the event, it does not seem to us that all members were prepared to cooperate in a venture of this nature. The draft responses to the questions provided by Professor Almond were neither in form, nor in substance, suitable material for promoting beef.

Was the assistance sought from Dr Kimberlin appropriate?

7.40 This question, also, was discussed with Mr Hogg. His approach was robust. When told that the MLC had sought Dr Kimberlin's help in securing some of the answers he commented:

Well, good; we wanted an answer. These characters in SEAC are not going to be dictated to by the MLC. SEAC were professionals, and they gave their professional opinion. They could see a lobby group coming across the garden as well as anybody else. MLC plays a perfectly sensible and decent role in formulating the questions. There is no way that a professional body of people of Doctor Pattison's distinction would allow the MLC to dictate the answer. ⁵

7.41 Despite Mr Hogg's answer, we question whether it was desirable for the MLC to lobby SEAC, an independent advisory committee. If it was to make such an approach, this should have been done openly. In the event, however, Dr Kimberlin did not disclose to SEAC the nature of the assistance that the MLC had sought from him, nor does Mr Maclean's evidence suggest that he assumed that he would do so.

7.42 Dr Kimberlin was a paid consultant of the MLC. Mr Maclean told us that he understood that his request to Dr Kimberlin fell within the scope of the consultancy agreement. He said that he was, however, only seeking Dr Kimberlin's assistance in procuring answers to the questions that were succinct. He was not seeking to influence the content of the answers. He went on to emphasise that it was no part of Dr Kimberlin's role to assist the MLC by saying, or getting others on SEAC to say, anything which they did not genuinely believe. ⁶

7.43 Dr Kimberlin said this about Mr Maclean's letter:

What this letter is, if you like, is part of the consultancy in the sense that this is the way that Colin Maclean often communicated with me. He was indeed in the habit of letting me know what was going on, expressing his views, often very forthrightly, regardless of whether I agree with him or disagree with him. He believed the best use to make of consultants is to keep them informed at least of his views and his concerns, rather than keeping me in the dark.

If that is part of a consultancy, then letting me know these things was part of the consultancy. It was not by any sort of agreement. It is just something that happened. ⁷

7.44 It was pointed out to Dr Kimberlin that Mr Maclean had sought his help. Dr Kimberlin answered that this placed him under no obligation. ⁸

My conduct, the way I drafted those answers would be, if you like, wearing my SEAC hat. What MLC said or anybody else said would by itself have no influence whatsoever. I would make up my own mind. I made my own submission and acted accordingly, treating SEAC now as the client, not MLC. I really saw no problem there. In fact this sort of situation happened to me all the time as a professional consultant, these things do happen. You simply draw the lines. I have no difficulty in drawing the lines as to whom I was working for now. Once these questions came and Tom Eddy invited me to submit a response I was now working for SEAC, not working for the MLC. ⁹

7.45 It is not apparent to us, and we do not believe that it was apparent to Dr Kimberlin, that he was only being asked to seek to ensure that SEAC's answers were succinct. We think that the request would naturally have been understood as going to both form and the substance of the replies.

7.46 We accept that the request would not have led Dr Kimberlin to seek to procure a response from SEAC that he did not believe was accurate. We further accept that Mr Maclean would not have expected his request to have such a result. Nonetheless, we do not believe that the request should have been made. There could well have been a conflict between the answers that the MLC and its advertising agency were looking for and the answers that members of SEAC were minded to give. Indeed, so far as Professor Almond was concerned, that proved to be the position.

7.47 In a late additional comment to the Inquiry, Mr Maclean said, in relation to the possibility that Dr Kimberlin's interest in assisting the MLC might conflict with his duties as a member of SEAC:

Next, the Committee asks whether, if Dr Kimberlin were found to have had an actual or apparent interest in assisting the MLC as far as was reasonable, I accept that my request put him in a position whereby his interest in assisting the MLC conflicted, or might reasonably have been perceived to conflict, with his duties as a member of SEAC. I do not accept that there was any actual conflict between Dr Kimberlin's position (as a paid consultant of the MLC) and his duties (as a member of SEAC). The MLC never asked Dr Kimberlin to do or say anything which he would not otherwise have been prepared to do or say. Thus, the position and the duties were complementary not inconsistent. In a limited sense, however, I do accept that there could have been an apparent conflict. The acceptance is limited because any conflict would have been apparent only to an observer who knew none of the surrounding circumstances and who read in isolation my letter dated 3rd January 1996 to Dr Kimberlin. I certainly do not agree that a conflict might reasonably have been perceived.

7.48 We consider that Mr Maclean's request put Dr Kimberlin in a position where he might have an apparent conflict of interest and that, for this reason, the request should not have been made.

Should Dr Kimberlin have disclosed the request to SEAC?

7.49 As to this question, Dr Kimberlin said:

I neither replied to that letter, nor did I notify anybody about it. I saw no need whatsoever, because at the end of the day what I did would be determined by what I thought was appropriate in the context of SEAC. SEAC is now the client, not MLC . . . ¹⁰

But my role was very clear. No matter what Colin Maclean said to me; no matter what MLC sent, once I started drafting those responses for SEAC, I was now working for SEAC. SEAC was the client. It is a very easy switch for me to make. It is something I did all the time. I worked for many, many different organisations, different companies; often they were competitors. It was not a problem . . . ¹¹

All I can say is that in my mind I had no trouble whatsoever in making these distinctions, and behaving in a manner which I thought was appropriate for an independent consultant. Outside maybe it did look different. Clearly it did, because you have picked it up. You have picked it up now, not earlier . . . ¹²

I have to be honest and say that I was rather less concerned with appearances and much more concerned with doing a job as a professional. ¹³

7.50 We are in no doubt that Dr Kimberlin should have disclosed the nature of the request that he had received from the MLC. The fact that he was a paid consultant of the MLC was known. This had formally been declared to the House of Commons on 18 October 1994. ¹⁴ On this occasion, however, in his capacity as consultant, he had received a specific request for assistance with the form of the answers to the questions that SEAC had been asked to give. Mr Eddy then asked him to draft some of those answers. In respect of one answer the wording he chose to use was almost identical to that suggested by the MLC's advertising agency. We do not suggest that any of Dr Kimberlin's draft answers failed to reflect a response that he considered appropriate to the question. Nonetheless, some of those answers were in marked conflict with those that Professor Almond considered appropriate. There was in this situation a potential conflict of interest and, to anyone who did not know Dr Kimberlin, an appearance that his draft answers might be influenced by the interests of the MLC. It is unfortunate that Dr Kimberlin did not pay a little more attention to 'appearances'.

7.51 Dr Kimberlin's solicitor submitted to us on his behalf lengthy arguments as to why he was under no obligation to disclose the request made by Mr Maclean. We identified the following as the two main strands:

1. Dr Kimberlin's disclosure in October 1994 of his consultancy with the MLC was a sufficient disclosure of interest. No principle required repeated disclosure of interest.
2. It was absurd to suggest either that Dr Kimberlin would be biased, or that he might appear to be biased, in performing his duties as a member of SEAC by conflicting interests.

7.52 We reject both these submissions. We are not here concerned with legal duties but with ethical behaviour. The special circumstances that we have described above might well have led anyone becoming aware of them to suspect that Dr Kimberlin's answers had been influenced by the interests of the MLC. There was a potential conflict between his duty to advise impartially and the interests of his client, the MLC, which was capable of giving rise to an appearance of bias. We think it no more than obvious common sense that Dr Kimberlin should have disclosed the request that had been made to him.

The MLC briefing paper

7.53 On 3 January 1996, Mr Don Curry (Chairman of the MLC) wrote to Dr Eileen Rubery (Under Secretary, Head of Health Aspects of the Environment and Food Division in Public Health, DH) enclosing an MLC 'briefing paper' on BSE. ¹⁵ He stated:

In view of renewed public concern about the supposed risks to the human population from BSE, the Meat and Livestock Commission has prepared the enclosed briefing paper, which I hope you will find useful when addressing this and related issues.

. . .

MLC is concerned that recent media hysteria over the issue has posed an irresponsible threat to the livelihoods of the many thousands of people in this country whose jobs depend on the production of beef and beef products. It is our view that this industry is making a positive and beneficial contribution to the economic diversity and strength of the UK food industry. We hope this is a view you will share with us.

7.54 The briefing paper stated:

British beef is safe to eat. The existence of BSE in cattle and the similar disease in humans, CJD (Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease) does not imply any link between the two . . .

The most eminent scientists who are involved in studying and seeking to understand the disease do not believe that there is a significant risk to humans. They include: Professor John Pattison, Dean of University College Medical School and Chairman of the independent Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee; Dr Robert Will, Head of the CJD Surveillance Unit, and a world authority on this disease; Dr Richard Kimberlin, a world authority on scrapie and similar diseases.

[SEAC] has itself found no evidence to suggest that there is an emerging CJD epidemic. The Chief Medical Officer, Dr Kenneth Calman (Sir Kenneth Calman), is satisfied that 'there is no scientific evidence of a link between meat eating and CJD and that beef and other meats are safe to eat'.

7.55 On 15 January 1996, on behalf of Dr Rubery, Mr Mike Skinner, DH HEF1C Division, ¹⁶ drafted a letter to Mr Curry (in response to the MLC letter of 3 January 1996). In his covering note to Dr Rubery, Mr Skinner noted that the MLC paper 'takes a very strong pro-safety of beef line and overstates the weight of interim conclusions from current scientific evidence'. ¹⁷ He said that the paper mentioned Professor Pattison, Dr Will and Professor Collinge:

. . . in a way which appears to associate them with the conclusions in the paper. We do not feel these are altogether legitimate and they may well agree. The best way forward would be to let them have copies of the briefing paper and invite them to comment. ¹⁸

7.56 Mr Skinner sent the MLC paper for comment to Dr Will and Professors Pattison and Collinge on 12 February 1996.

7.57 On 18 January Dr Rubery replied to Mr Curry's letter of 3 January, saying that the MLC briefing paper was 'in line with current Government advice' on the safety of beef. 'However,' she said:

. . . you have misquoted the Chief Medical Officer. The statement you quote is taken from our press notice of 5 October 1995 (copy attached) and should have read 'I continue to be satisfied that there is currently no scientific evidence of a link between meat eating and the development of CJD and that beef and other meats are safe to eat'. In our view, the reference should continue to be to current scientific evidence until the results of further research and surveillance become available and this may not be for some years. However, I need to also point out to you that CMO has revised his advice since 5 October 1995 and this is now set out in the MAFF press notice of 28 November 1995. Again I enclose a copy and you will see the relevant section reads: 'There is currently no scientific evidence that BSE can be transmitted to humans or that eating beef causes CJD'. ¹⁹

7.58 On 12 February 1996 Mr Skinner forwarded to Dr Will, Professor Pattison and Professor Collinge the MLC briefing paper and a copy of Dr Rubery's letter to Mr Curry of 18 January. In his covering letter Mr Skinner said:

Dr Rubery has replied saying that as regards to the safety of beef, the briefing paper is in line with current Government advice. However, the CMO's advice should have read 'there is currently no scientific evidence that BSE can be transmitted to humans or that eating beef causes CJD'.

Dr Rubery has asked if you could give your views on the briefing paper . . . Could you let me have your comments by 4 March. ²⁰

7.59 On 23 February 1996 Dr Will replied to Mr Skinner's letter of 12 February about the MLC's briefing paper. He said:

My view is that there is a remote theoretical risk that BSE in cattle might cause disease in humans. The risk from beef and beef products is likely to be negligible provided statutory measures are fully enforced. I would also agree with the statement that there is currently no scientific evidence that BSE can be transmitted to humans or that eating beef causes CJD. ²¹

7.60 Mr Skinner had been present at SEAC's meeting of 1 February, when concerns were being expressed about the possibility that the young cases of CJD might evidence the transmission to humans of BSE (see paragraphs 7.139-7.147). It would have been better if he had invited Dr Will, Professor Pattison and Professor Collinge to consider carefully whether they wished to be associated with the MLC briefing paper.

MAFF publicity

7.61 On 12 January 1996 Mr Packer minuted Mr Hogg and copied the minute to Mrs Angela Browning (MAFF Parliamentary Secretary), Mr Carden, Mr Geoffrey Hollis (MAFF, Head of Livestock Group, Mr Meldrum, Mr Martin Haddon, Mr Johnston McNeill (Chief Executive, Meat Hygiene Service (MHS)), Mr Eddy, Dr Tim Render (Animal Health (Disease Control) Division) and others. ²² Among other matters he informed the Minister about his meeting earlier that day with Mr Colin Maclean. He told the Minister that 'it is clear the MLC are very worried and believe PR action on BSE is needed urgently'. The MLC had proposed two courses of action. The first involved a 'conventional' advertisement campaign, which Mr Packer thought 'did not seem to present any problems' but he asked that MAFF be kept 'in touch with their intentions'. The second course of action proposed by the MLC was to 'put positive messages into the public domain'. The MLC had proposed a seminar to 'educate a range of "reasonable" scientists on BSE' in the hope that they would 'subsequently put forward a more positive line on beef'. Mr Packer regarded this strategy as 'more complex'. The MLC also proposed a more proactive approach to schools through the Local Education Authorities (LEAs), especially those which had banned beef. In regard to this approach Mr Packer 'made it clear we would not envisage joint MLC/MAFF approaches'.

7.62 Mr Hogg met Mr Packer and other MAFF officials on 16 January 1996. ²³ In the discussion of the MLC's proposals Mrs Browning did not want to back a seminar for scientists. She suggested that contacts with LEAs should be followed through with further written material and oral briefings if necessary. Mr Hogg concluded as follows:

(i) [MAFF's] principal role was to put factual information into the public domain. We should take opportunities to repeat the press conference we had held in December. This could be done, for example, at the launch of the next six-monthly report, or when we published the answers to our questions to SEAC;

(ii) we should not be involved with the MLC campaign. However, we should be prepared to support a bid to Brussels for EU money;

(iii) we should prepare an up-to-date pack of written briefing material. [Mr Eddy] should discuss this with the Information Division;

(iv) we should identify nationally particular groups where briefing would bear fruit. This would include both written material and oral briefing. The team for the latter might be Mr Kimberlin, Mr Bradley, Mr Taylor and, possibly, a CJD expert. [Mr Eddy] should submit to Mrs Browning a list of the groups we should target;

(v) at the local level, we should, at least initially, concentrate on the LEAs. We did not for the time being have the resources necessary to provide anything other than written material for other groupings. ²⁴

7.63 On 18 January 1996 Mr Eddy minuted MAFF's Chief Press Officer Mr John Smith, and his colleague Mr Wagstaff. He copied the minute to Mr Carden, Mr Meldrum, Mr Haddon, Mr Kevin Taylor, Assistant CVO, and Dr Render. ²⁵ He said:

It is clear from the meeting which we had with the Minister earlier this week that we need to produce a document aimed at the intelligent layman on BSE. One potential audience would be local authority education committee members who we need to persuade to drop bans on beef in schools. Very roughly I think we are talking about aiming at Telegraph rather than Times readers and at people who have an interest but not a scientific background or the inclination to wade through a large amount of technical detail. ²⁶

7.64 He said the information pack might include 'a new version of the document "BSE and the Protection of Public Health" ²⁷ which Mr Kevin Taylor had drafted, which again is probably a little long and upmarket for the more general reader'. ²⁸

7.65 Mr Eddy asked for the Press Office's views on:

. . . what might go in an information pack, (b) whether we should produce such a note. There seems to be a general view amongst senior management that we should (c) if so, how do we go about doing it and (d) in conjunction with the CVO and Mr Haddon's Groups, what it should cover. ²⁹

7.66 On 19 January 1996, in response to a request by Mrs Browning for a background note on BSE and CJD to circulate to MPs, Dr Render sent her a set of Questions and Answers plus a draft cover letter to be signed by Mrs Browning. ³⁰ He copied it to, among others, Mr Hogg, Mr Packer, Mr Carden, Mr Haddon, Mr Meldrum, Mr Kevin Taylor, Mr Eddy and Mr Skinner. The Questions and Answers were based on the note that Dr Render had circulated for use in replying to letters from members of the public. ³¹ The note now quoted from Professor Pattison's and Dr Will's letter of 13 December: 'If there was any risk to human health from BSE, and there may be none, then we have no doubt that that risk is very much less in December 1995 than it ever has been'. ³²

7.67 In February 1996, MAFF revised and reissued two booklets called 'BSE and the Protection of Human Health' ³³ and 'BSE and the Protection of Animal Health'. ³⁴ Mr Kevin Taylor had originally drafted these booklets in August and October 1994 respectively, and they had been in circulation since then. ³⁵ Mr Taylor told us that 'the original impetus for writing these was my perception that some practising veterinary surgeons had little understanding of the measures which were being taken or the rationale for those measures'. ³⁶ In conclusion, the booklet on human health stated:

Fear of the unknown is understandable, and easily encouraged by irresponsible and inaccurate reporting. Despite the claims which have been made, there is no current scientific evidence to indicate a link between BSE and CJD.

This does not, however, mean that BSE could not be transmitted to humans if a determined enough effort were made to do so, for example, by direct inoculation of infected cattle brain. The epidemic in cattle is declining, and strengthened controls will ensure that the decline continues. Nevertheless, effective controls must be maintained and enforced to ensure that the human population is not exposed to cattle tissues which may contain the BSE agent, whether in food or in medicines. The control measures which are in place are designed to achieve this, and they are supported by a body of scientific evidence which suggests that, if they err at all, they do so because they are more restrictive than is necessary. Despite the encouraging indications from recent research, we cannot and will not relax our precautionary measures.

SEAC will continue to review the evidence and give independent scientific advice to the Government . . . Its existence and operation provide an independent guarantee to the consumer that all the evidence is constantly reviewed, and that when action is needed it will be recommended, irrespective of the consequences. The Committee has noted the action taken by the Government to protect public health, and is satisfied that British beef is safe. ³⁷

7.68 Mr Taylor wrote to Mr Brian Kilkenny of the MLC on 15 February 1996 enclosing a copy of a draft of the 'BSE and the Protection of Human Health' booklet. He noted that the MLC had offered its assistance in converting this booklet into a much shorter handout which could be made widely available to consumers. ³⁸

7.69 On 29 February 1996, Dr Ailsa Wight minuted Dr Jeremy Metters (Deputy CMO) about a meeting at which publicity had been discussed with MAFF officials. ³⁹ She stated:

1. Dr Rubery, Mr Skinner, and I met MAFF officials yesterday and one item we discussed was how to address public concerns about BSE.

2. MAFF have produced a detailed 'information note' for consumers, industry, food writers etc., which the Department has had an opportunity to comment on and which takes account of comments made by the MAFF Consumer Panel.

3. The attached leaflet is a distillation of the main points for easy consumption, and intended for wide distribution. We considered there was some merit in the leaflet being issued jointly by both Departments . . .

. . .

5. We are considering other routes through which public health information might be disseminated and will keep you informed. ⁴⁰

7.70 The attached draft leaflet was entitled 'British Beef and BSE: The Facts'. On its front page it stated:

Two facts should be made absolutely clear at the outset:

Fact 1 There is currently no scientific evidence to indicate a link between BSE and CJD.

Fact 2 The independent expert committee set up to advise the Government on all aspects of BSE is satisfied that British beef is safe to eat. ⁴¹

7.71 The draft leaflet also set out a series of questions and answers about BSE. ⁴²

7.72 On 1 March 1996, Dr Metters minuted Dr Wight expressing his concerns about MAFF's proposed publicity information on BSE. ⁴³ He was 'not in favour of DH being co-authors of the documents'. He said:

. . . some statements are too definite and in time may be seen to be wrong. We should not follow MAFF's hyperbole of reassurance. We must leave DH Ministers and CMO in particular, an escape route if any of these categorical statements turns out to be WRONG. ⁴⁴

7.73 Mr Carden told the BSE Inquiry that the work on publicity material was concluded in the early part of 1996 and went to Ministers 'on the precise day when the first report suggesting there was new variant CJD came through and it was overtaken'. ⁴⁵

Discussion

7.74 We are about to turn to consideration of the extent to which MAFF and DH were alerted, before the beginning of March, to the storm that was about to break. It seemed to us significant that on 28 February Dr Rubery, Mr Skinner and Dr Wight should have agreed with MAFF officials that DH and MAFF should issue a joint leaflet including the statement 'despite the claims that have been made, there is no current scientific evidence to indicate a link between BSE and CJD', and which referred to 'the encouraging indications from recent research'. ⁴⁶ This does not suggest any apprehension as to the storm that was about to break.

7.75 We suggested to Sir Kenneth Calman that it would be surprising to find Dr Rubery, Mr Skinner and others discussing issuing this leaflet, and Dr Wight saying it would be a good idea to have it going out as a joint leaflet, if this was in the context of joint discussions about how the Departments were going to deal with a possible emergency situation. Sir Kenneth responded:

This leaflet of course had been in preparation for some time and like many things, they grind on and it comes to a point when it is inappropriate. I think Dr Metters' minute of 1st March makes it very clear that this was inappropriate. ⁴⁷