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Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
6. Events from 1 April to 31 December 1995: human health returns to the agenda
Pronouncements and publicity in relation to BSE from various quarters
Press coverage in October and November
The 'World in Action' documentary on 13 November 1995 and MAFF's reaction
Public statement by Professor Sir Bernard Tomlinson and media response
Statement by Mr Dorrell, 3 December 1995
The MLC's advertising campaign
Ministerial reaction to media coverage about BSE
Beef in schools
Article in the Independent by Dr Robert Will

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Press coverage in October and November

6.269 In October and November 1995 numerous press articles appeared with headlines which suggested that BSE posed a great risk to human health, and that the true position was being hidden from the general public. It was reported in a Sunday Times article that:

Consumers have eaten meat from more than 1.5m cows infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) according to a study by scientists who claim the government has underestimated a potential risk to human health. 1

6.270 Furthermore, the Sunday Times on 29 October 1995 reported that:

Blood supplies could be contaminated with the human equivalent of 'mad cow' disease according to a leading American scientist. Research by Dr Paul Brown, medical director of the American Public Health Service, has found that more than one in 10 victims of the fatal brain disorder, Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD), had given blood before developing the first symptoms. 2

6.271 The Daily Telegraph, under the headline 'Most beef eaters "already exposed to mad cow agent"', reported:

Most people who ate beef before the start of the 'mad cow' disease epidemic will have been exposed to the agent which causes it, doctors say. 3

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The 'World in Action' documentary on 13 November 1995 and MAFF's reaction

6.272 On 13 November 1995 Granada Television screened a 'World in Action' documentary on BSE. In a letter from Mr William Hague, the Secretary of State for Wales (1995-97), to a concerned constituent, the programme was described as dealing 'with a serious issue in an irresponsible manner'. 4 On 14 November 1995 Mr Meldrum distributed a note on the five main issues he had identified in the programme, to be used to answer media inquiries. The issues were:

  1. The number of subclinically affected cattle entering the human food chain: Mr Meldrum stated that 'we have always assumed that cattle could enter the human food chain that had been exposed to BSE. It was for precisely that reason that our SBO controls were introduced in 1989.'
  2. An allegation that affected cattle were slipping through surveillance nets at markets and slaughterhouses: Mr Meldrum discussed the procedure for cattle that were recognised and reported as having BSE.
  3. Infectivity in liver: Mr Meldrum discussed the reasons why liver was excluded as an SBO. He wrote, 'When one looks at all these factors together it has been concluded that any risk to man is extremely remote from liver or any other offal not covered by the Specified Bovine Offals ban.'
  4. Lack of testing for BSE at slaughter: Mr Meldrum stated that there was no test for live cattle, but MAFF supported a large research programme on this.
  5. Whether SBO were removed at slaughter: Mr Meldrum discussed the checking procedures in slaughterhouses and stated:
The Minister has made clear to slaughterhouse operators the importance he attaches to complete compliance with the SBO rules and that prosecution will follow when public health is jeopardised as a result of failure to meet the requirement to remove spinal cord from the split spinal column. The removal of spinal cord from the spinal column is relatively easy (as could be seen in the World in Action film) and there should be no splashing of material onto the carcase. 5

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Public statement by Professor Sir Bernard Tomlinson and media response

6.273 On 1 December 1995 the BBC Radio 4 consumer programme 'You and Yours' broadcast an interview with Professor Sir Bernard Tomlinson (Emeritus Professor of Pathology, University of Newcastle upon Tyne). In the interview Professor Tomlinson said:

Until we can say quite positively there really is no evidence now that BSE transfers to humans, until we can say that, I believe we've got to pay that price and all offal should be kept from public consumption. But I certainly don't eat any longer beef pies, for instance, or puree, I wouldn't eat a burger. 6

6.274 The interview was publicised in advance on breakfast television 7 and in newspapers. The Daily Star, in an article entitled 'Danger in a burger: Health Chiefs warning', reported that Sir Bernard had vowed not to eat beefburgers for fear of 'mad cow disease'. Sir Bernard was quoted as saying, 'I wouldn't eat a burger at the moment in any circumstances.' 8 The Daily Express ran a similar story. 9

6.275 Mr Haslam told us that the view of such an eminent neuropathologist was significant enough to become a main news item and that the situation had been exacerbated when the BBC established a helpline for listeners to call for advice on how they should react. He stated:

The Meat and Livestock Commission discovered that the advice given by the 'help-line' included the suggestion that meat stock-cubes were unsafe. This was a matter of great concern to companies such as Oxo, whose product was derived from South American sources. I made a telephone call complaining to the BBC. However, damage to public confidence had resulted. This led to the reaction from schools with many declaring that they would take beef off their menus. 10

6.276 On 2 December 1995 an article in the Times entitled 'Brain specialist is challenged to justify burger scare' reported that Sir Bernard Tomlinson had said that he was still eating steak and beef but would not eat beefburgers 'under any circumstances'. 11 Sir Bernard was reported as admitting that he had no proof of a link between BSE and CJD but that he considered the risk was too great to be discounted. He was quoted as saying:

I certainly would advise teenagers not to eat these things. I have become more cautious because of recent CJD cases in dairy farmers and teenagers. These seem to be more than coincidence. My feeling now is that it is possible BSE is transmitting to humans.

6.277 In response, Mrs Angela Browning was quoted as saying:

I have invited Sir Bernard to tell us why he has come to this conclusion. He does not seem to be basing it on scientific evidence.

6.278 On 13 December 1995 Sir Bernard replied to Mrs Browning. 12 He confirmed that he had no further scientific evidence and that since his retirement from neuropathology he had not attempted to keep up with the literature. However, he stated:

Until a few months ago I thought transmission of BSE to humans unlikely, based on the lack of evidence that scrapie, over many decades, has failed to transmit to humans, or for that matter, to cattle. Despite the doubts now arising about the BSE epidemic resulting directly from the feeding of cattle with infected sheep tissues, that hypothesis remains the only one to work on if human safety is paramount. If scrapie has transmitted to cattle it demonstrates with alarming clarity the dangers of assuming that the species barrier will totally protect humans who ingest beef tissues infected with BSE. That would be so even without the plentiful evidence that the TSEs in most species can be transmitted to other species . . .
What has convinced me of the need to be more cautious is the recent occurrence of CJD in farmers and in adults under 40 years, and particularly in teenagers . . .
Firstly, how strong is the evidence of which organs experimentally are likely to contain the responsible agent and therefore should be excluded, even if the quantity of agent is small? We have no real evidence which excludes the possibility that repeated ingestion of small doses may be incremental and eventually cause the disorder . . .
Secondly, it seems to me that complicated regulations relating to offal and its destruction, or its permissibility within the food chain, are unlikely to be carried out completely within the production line conditions of the abattoir. Some of the regulations covering SBOs would require time-consuming dissection.

6.279 On 3 December 1995 an article entitled 'Closing in on a killer' in the Sunday Times reported that when asked whether he thought beef was perfectly safe to eat Mr Hogg had replied, 'Yes, I do.' 13 The article also reported that when questioned about the mounting concern of scientists, he had admitted:

I cannot on the evidence before me give a categoric guarantee that it cannot be transmitted. We believe it cannot be and the scientific evidence suggests it cannot be.

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Statement by Mr Dorrell, 3 December 1995

6.280 Following the announcement by MAFF on MRM and the failings in slaughterhouses, discussed previously in this chapter, there was much media interest and publicity on the issue. Mr Stephen Dorrell (Secretary of State for Health) took part in an interview on London Weekend Television on the subject on 3 December 1995. Mr Dorrell discussed the interview in his statement to the Inquiry:

The MAFF announcement on slaughterhouse failings raised renewed concerns about the safety of beef eating. There was widespread media interest. The issue surfaced in the course of an interview which I gave to Jonathon Dimbleby (LWT) on 3rd December 1995. I had been invited onto the programme to discuss the National Health Service, but in view of the topicality of BSE Mr Dimbleby commenced the interview by asking about the government's assessment of the risk that BSE could be transmitted to humans in the form of CJD. I said that science suggested that there was no link, but even if science was wrong on that subject, government had removed from the human food chain the organs that could conceivably be linked to a transmission. Mr Dimbleby said 'So, there is you are saying no conceivable risk from what is now in the food chain; that's the position?' and I responded 'that is the position.' I regretted that response because Mr Dimbleby's summary of my words went further than the words of the Chief Medical Officer. As a consequence of this interview, I was reported in some newspapers the next day as having said that there was no conceivable risk from eating beef. 14

6.281 Mr Dorrell's statement attracted great media attention. The following day the Times, in an article entitled 'Dorrell tries to allay BSE beef fears', reported that Mr Dorrell and Dr Kenneth Calman (CMO) had 'issued the assurance in the face of growing doubts by eminent scientists about the safety of beef'. The article said Mr Dorrell would let his children eat hamburgers, and made the same pledge on behalf of Dr Calman. 15

6.282 An article in the Daily Telegraph entitled 'Dorrell rules out BSE ban on beef offal' said that Mr Dorrell had rejected calls for a total ban on cattle offal, and maintained that science suggested no link between BSE in cattle and CJD. The article again quoted Mr Dorrell's television interview:

Even if the science was wrong on that subject, we've removed from the human food chain the organs that could conceivably be linked to a transmission. 16

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The MLC's advertising campaign

6.283 In response to the increasing alarm in the press over risks to human health, the MLC decided to launch an advertising campaign. This was to include the insertion of advertisements into national newspapers, the issue of a question-and-answer pack for independent retailers and an information pack for staff in multiple retailers to deal with questions about BSE. 17

6.284 On 3 December 1995 MLC issued an advertisement in the Sunday Telegraph entitled 'If you're in two minds about serving beef, a chance to digest the facts'. 18 This was initially intended to be an information handout to butchers. However, because of an upsurge in public interest as a result of the television programmes (see paragraphs 6.272-6.275), the MLC decided to publish the statement. 19

6.285 In summary, this advertisement listed the following so-called 'fictions' and 'facts' about British beef:

Fiction

There is a link between [BSE] and [CJD].

Fact

Not so. BSE . . . is an animal disease which affects only cattle. CJD affects only humans. There is no evidence whatever of any link between them.

Fiction

BSE is on the increase.

Fact

Wrong. Reported cases peaked in early 1993 and have since fallen sharply. They are currently less than half the peak level and still falling.

Fiction

CJD is on the increase.

Fact

Wrong again. The incidence of CJD is not only statistically minute (it affects about one person in a million) but has remained stable for as long as records go back.

Fiction

If you don't eat beef, you'll have a better chance of avoiding any risks.

Fact

On the contrary, CJD has been recorded in vegetarians as well as meat eaters, and occurs at much the same rate in countries where BSE is not even present.

Fiction

There must be some truth in the scare otherwise they wouldn't be taking so many control measures.

Fact

No, the truth is that the control measures are implemented to reassure the public.

Fiction

Control measures are just an empty gesture.

Fact

Far from it. British veterinary and abattoir regulations, along with their enforcement, are as strict as the strictest in the world . . . With such stringency, even the remotest perceived risk is avoided.

Fiction

They talk about beef being safe but some forms of beef are probably safer than others.

Fact

Beef is beef is beef. Be it prime cuts, mince, burgers, pies or sausages. All play a key role in providing the nation with a healthy, balanced diet. Enjoy it, just as you have always done.

Fiction

The weight of opinion suggests beef is not safe.

Fact

Not at all. British beef has been endorsed by independent scientists, world health organisations and government authorities, both in the UK and European Union.

6.286 The advertisement concluded by quoting Dr Calman as saying, 'British beef is perfectly safe to eat.'

6.287 On 4 December 1995 Dr Metters (Deputy CMO) faxed Mr Carden (Food Safety Directorate, MAFF) regarding the MLC statement. 20 He stated:

I do not know what influence or control your Department has over the Meat and Livestock Commission. However, if the Commission are intending to quote the Chief Medical Officer in their future publicity, I hope you can make the point with them that they must use accurate quotations and not embellish them with their own spin.
The CMO's public statements have been that 'beef is safe'. The word 'perfectly' has not been used by Ken Calman or his predecessor, Sir Donald Acheson. For complete accuracy the word 'British' has not been used recently either.
. . . It is not in their interests or ours for the CMO's words to be manipulated so that he has no alternative but to issue a public clarification of his position.

6.288 Mr Carden responded on 5 December accepting the 'force of the criticism'. 21 He stated that the MLC was an independent organisation and not part of the Ministry, but that he had passed the point on and received an assurance that MLC had no intention of distorting the CMO's words on this occasion and would aim to avoid doing so in the future.

6.289 The advertisement was later re-run on 10 December 1995 in the Mail on Sunday and the Independent on Sunday, with slight changes. 22 The fifth point in the above summary of the advertisement was omitted, as was the statement from the CMO. Instead, the new advertisement was endorsed by a quotation from Dr Robert Will (Director of CJD Surveillance Unit and Deputy Chairman of SEAC 23) stating:

I do not believe there is a significant risk from eating beef and I have therefore not altered my consumption of beef or beef products, neither has any of my colleagues at the CJD Surveillance Unit.

6.290 The Advertising Standards Authority received complaints about eight aspects of the advertisement. In July 1996 the Authority upheld five of the complaints against the MLC. 24

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Ministerial reaction to media coverage about BSE

6.291 On 5 December 1995 a two-page briefing on BSE and CJD was provided to the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, to help him prepare for Prime Minister's Questions. 25 This gave a brief overview of BSE as well as discussing the remarks made by Sir Bernard Tomlinson. The briefing stated that Sir Bernard had caused 'unnecessary and unjustified alarm about the safety of beef products such as burgers and pies' and that he had been invited to submit any new evidence for SEAC to consider.

6.292 Also on 5 December 1995 Dr Metters wrote to the Editor of the Times about 'increased recent speculation' of a causal link between BSE and CJD. He said that the CJDSU and SEAC had been established to advise on this, and that the CMO 'has consistently stated that if he became aware of evidence that BSE was causally linked to CJD he would immediately advise the public. There is, however, no current scientific evidence that BSE can be transmitted to humans.' 26

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Mr Hogg briefs the Cabinet

6.293 On 7 December DH sent a further two-page briefing to the Prime Minister on CJD and BSE which had been agreed by Dr Calman and Dr Metters. 27 On the same day the Cabinet met, and Mr Hogg updated his Cabinet colleagues on the BSE situation. In particular the minutes note that:

. . . there had been a renewal of intense media interest in the possible dangers to human health from Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) fuelled by doubts expressed by a number of eminent scientists. There had been no change in the scientific evidence underlying the Government's stated view that there was no reason to believe that BSE could be transmitted to humans. 28

6.294 Mr Hogg commented that 'in response to recent incidents and in order to reassure the public' he had issued a draft order that day banning the use of bovine vertebral column in the production of MRM. 29 During the discussion the point was made that 'the Government should continue to try to keep discussion of BSE on as open and non-partisan level as possible'. 30 The importance of marshalling 'independent scientific opinion in support of the Government's case at the earliest moment possible' was also noted. 31 And further:

The Chief Medical Officer and Chief Veterinary Officer ought to be by far the most convincing spokesmen for the Government on the key question of whether BSE could be transmitted to humans from infected meat. 32

6.295 There were also concerns about meat products containing MRM produced prior to the order banning the use of vertebral column that were already on sale; in particular, whether they would have to be withdrawn from retail outlets.

6.296 In summing up the discussion,

THE PRIME MINISTER said that there was a disturbing degree of public anxiety over BSE once more and that the Government must be ready with an immediate and coherent response. The key element in that response should continue to be the assurance from the Government's chief professional advisers that there was no evidence that the disease could be transmitted to humans. 33

6.297 In order to clarify the line to take on the safety of meat products that were already on sale, the Prime Minister invited the Lord President of the Council, Antony Newton, 34 to meet with the four Agriculture Ministers, the Secretary of State for Health and the Chief Secretary, Treasury with the CMO and the CVO in attendance. 35 The meeting took place on 7 December and Mr Hogg followed up the meeting by writing to the Lord President on 8 December summarising the steps that he was proposing to take. 36 The letter was copied to the Prime Minister, Cabinet colleagues, Sir Robin Butler and Dr Calman. Mr Hogg outlined the control measures that MAFF had already taken, such as the slaughter and compensation policy and the SBO ban. He then outlined the proposed draft Order on MRM. A 'line to take' briefing note was attached to Mr Hogg's letter. In relation to MRM, the briefing note stated:

SEAC considered whether any products containing bovine MRM which have already been manufactured should be removed from the shops. SEAC recommended that MRM from bovine vertebral columns should not be included in human food. The Chairman has confirmed that it is not necessary to remove any product containing such bovine MRM from the shelves. The Chief Medical Officer similarly sees no need for any existing products to be withdrawn, and has not advised that this should be done.
If either the Chief Medical Officer or SEAC were to make any such recommendation, we would of course follow that advice. 37
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MAFF Ministers meet to consider next steps

6.298 On the afternoon of 7 December 1995 MAFF Ministers met with officials 'to discuss the latest state of play on BSE'. 38 The meeting discussed issuing a SEAC letter to the newspapers. It was agreed that Mr Meldrum and Mr Carden would discuss this with Professor John Pattison, but that the actual wording would not be suggested and it would be up to the Professor to express the issues in his own terms. Mr Hogg said that 'he had not ruled out the possibility of paying for space, possibly to publicise the SEAC paper'. 39

6.299 At the meeting it was also agreed that Mr Eddy would start drafting a set of questions to be put to SEAC with a view to publishing the answers. The questions put to SEAC and SEAC's answers are discussed in Chapter 7 of this volume. Further, it was agreed that Mr Hogg would hold a press briefing on 14 December 1995, accompanied by Professor Pattison, Dr Calman and Mr Meldrum, and that the MAFF Ministers would write to leading parliamentarians setting out the latest position on BSE in full. 40

6.300 The arrangements for the intended press briefing were discussed at a further meeting between MAFF Ministers and officials on 11 December. 41 The meeting also discussed the role of SEAC. A note of the meeting was sent to Mr Eddy and copied to others in MAFF. On the issue of the questions to be put to SEAC, the note recorded:

It was agreed that there remained a need to take steps to ensure that accurate and up-to-date facts and figures got into the public domain. The Minister said that he still wanted to put to SEAC a range of basic questions, the answers to which could be put into the public domain. Mr Meldrum was concerned about the load which we were putting on the first meeting of SEAC in the new year. They would require at least half a day for their discussions on the BSE research programme. Mr Taylor suggested that there might be advantage in asking a member of SEAC itself to draft the answer to the questions (i.e. not leave the task to you, the Committee's Secretary, given your obvious connection with MAFF's own work on BSE). The Minister was attracted to this idea, which he would put to Professor Pattison. 42

6.301 Mr Eddy commented on this meeting in his statement to the Inquiry:

On 11 December 1995 I attended a meeting with the Minister and others about the press conference announcing the MRM legislation and the need for a more comprehensive presentation of the Government's position and clarification of the role of SEAC. This involved confirmation that the Minister wanted SEAC to answer a range of basic questions which could then be put in the public domain. There had been an earlier meeting which I did not attend and I had also minuted colleagues about my own thoughts on improving links with consumer groups. The package prepared for the press conference included an open letter which Professor Sir John Pattison and Dr Will wrote to the Secretary of State for Health and the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food setting out the position at that time. 43

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Beef in schools

6.302 We described in Chapter 4 how concerns had been raised in May 1990 about the safety of beef in school meals. These concerns became prominent again in late 1995. The Times reported on 5 December 1995 that half of the 130 primary schools in West Glamorgan had taken beef off the menu. 44

6.303 On 7 December 1995, in an article entitled 'Schools told to ban beef', the Guardian reported that the Local Authorities Catering Association (LACA), which had been receiving hundreds of calls from worried parents and head teachers, had advised school cooks to substitute turkey, chicken and pork for beef. 45 The article reported that individual schools had already done this and that two local authorities were operating a 'blanket ban'. It further claimed that fears had been brought to a head following Sir Bernard Tomlinson's warning about allowing children to eat beefburgers.

6.304 Also on 7 December 1995 Dr Kendell (Scottish CMO) issued a statement in response to media interest and reports that schools and caterers were starting to remove beef from menus. 46 The statement said:

The Government's independent scientific advisers are saying consistently that there is no evidence at all that eating beef or other foods derived from beef is dangerous. My general advice to people is therefore to carry on eating what you want to eat as you were before.
We have no evidence of any connection between BSE and CJD. However, both conditions are being closely monitored and studied by scientists, in this country and abroad, as there is much about both that is still unknown. 47

6.305 Dr Kendell's statement is discussed further in vol. 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

6.306 The Times reported Mrs Browning as saying that parents were 'overreacting'. 48 On 8 December the Independent reported that more than 1,150 schools had either completely removed beef from their menus or were offering alternatives. 49

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Article in the Independent by Dr Robert Will

6.307 On 8 December 1995 the Independent published an article by Dr Will entitled 'No significant risk from beef'. Among other things, he said:

Transmission by the oral route in these diseases is extremely inefficient, requiring exposure to large doses of infectivity.
. . .
The crucial issue is the level of exposure to infection and this may be the reason why BSE has transmitted to other species rather than implying a more potent infectious agent. It is of note that there are many zoo species which must have been exposed to BSE through food stuffs but have not developed a spongiform encephalopathy.
From the perspective of human health, it is clearly essential that people are not exposed to levels of infection that might cause disease, if the BSE agent were a risk to man.
. . .
The recent upsurge in interest in CJD has been prompted by a number of factors: an increase in the total number of cases of CJD in the UK, the occurrence of CJD in four farmers with potential occupational exposure to BSE, and the identification of two cases of CJD in teenagers. The incidence of CJD remains similar in other countries in Europe and also elsewhere, indicating that there is no relative increase in the incidence of CJD in the UK that can be attributed to BSE. The likely reason for the increase in numbers of cases is that there has been an improvement in identification of cases of CJD both in the UK and elsewhere.
The occurrence of CJD in four farmers is less easy to explain and is understandably causing concern. However, no means by which BSE could be transmitted through farming has been established and the incidence of CJD in farmers in Europe is similar to the UK. Again, there appears to be no increased relative risk in the UK to farmers that can be related to BSE.
The occurrence of CJD in teenagers is tragic, but cases of CJD in teenagers have been described previously in other countries where there cannot be a link with BSE. There is also the possibility that cases of CJD in younger patients may previously have been missed because of misdiagnosis . . .
In my opinion, there is a risk of over-interpreting small numbers of cases, and statistical analysis may be unreliable . . .
No link between BSE and CJD has been established, but the possibility of such a link cannot be excluded for many years because of the long incubation period in these diseases. In my view, the possibility of such a link remains theoretical . . .
This is why the SBO ban is so important and why I believe the risk from eating beef is negligible . . . I do not believe it is reasonable to conclude that there is significant risk from eating beef. I have therefore not altered my consumption of beef or beef products, and neither have any of my colleagues at the CJD Surveillance Unit. 50

6.308 Dr Will told the Inquiry that, following the publication of this article, Mr Colin Maclean of the MLC faxed to him a draft advertisement which was to appear in the press, entitled 'If you are in two minds about whether to serve beef, a chance to digest the facts' (see also paragraphs 6.283-6.290). The advertisement now contained a quotation from the article in the Independent. Dr Will said that he telephoned Mr Maclean to say that he was concerned about the draft advertisement because the quotation was incomplete and misleading, and because he was not happy with the tone of some of the 'fact/fiction' statements it made. He suggested amendments but was not sent a further draft and was not asked to approve the advertisement prior to its publication. He was therefore surprised to see that, while the advertisement quoted him more fully, it did not include other amendments he had suggested. In oral evidence he stated:

. . . I was unhappy because I had written this, and it was a quote from an article I have written; and I felt that it would be inappropriate for me to say that no one could quote it. But I felt very uneasy about this quotation being associated with some other statements that I was deeply unhappy about. 51

6.309 However, Mr Maclean's evidence to the Inquiry was that the telephone call with Professor Will had been 'positive and good-natured' and he did not recall 'Professor Will expressing any reservations about the tone or contents of the proposed advertisement'. 52 He then listed seven reasons in support of this. These were:

    1. He would have remembered if Professor Will had expressed such reservations as he had a long-standing and amicable relationship with him;
    2. If Professor Will had recommended such changes he would have discussed them with him and others at the MLC. The conversation was about five minutes long and he did not discuss it with others at the MLC;
    3. He agreed to change the quotation at the end of the advertisement in the way requested to Professor Will. Mr Maclean believed that this was a positive change as in his opinion it strengthened the advertisement;
    4. He does not remember Professor Will asking to see an amended draft but if he had done so Mr Maclean would have provided one and if necessary delayed the publication;
    5. Professor Will did not express any concerns to Mr Maclean or any other member of the MLC once the advertisement had been published;
    6. Mr Maclean recalls Mr Gwyn Howells (Marketing Director of the MLC) being in the room during the telephone conversation and that 'he was happy with the amendment';
    7. A minute from Mr Meldrum to Mr Carden on 15 December 53 noted that Mr Meldrum understood that Professor Will gave permission for the advertisements and suggested words that strengthened the message. 54

6.310 Professor Will responded to Mr Maclean's statement in a further written statement. He agreed that Mr Maclean faxed him a copy of the draft statement on which he made various annotations. 55 These included a 'marginal' line against the third 'fact', scribbling out the fifth 'fact' and 'fiction', and another 'marginal' line against part of the sixth 'fact'. He ringed the word 'safe' in the next step of statements and added the words 'CJD Surveillance Unit' at the end of the quotation. He then stated:

I was unhappy when I saw the advert published because I did not think that it accurately reflected my views in that it linked my name to each of the facts/fiction statements in the body of the advert and I had not been shown a copy of the final version of the advert before it was published . . .
I considered what action I should take when I saw the advertisement and I sought advice from my medical defence organisation. I was advised that it was best not to pursue matters and there the matter rested until I was contacted by the Advertising Standards Agency. I had made no secret of my unhappiness with the advert and colleagues of mine would have known my feelings. 56
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1 YB95/10.22/1.1-1.2

2 YB95/10.29/2.1

3 YB95/11.14/16.1. The article refers to the views of Dr Patterson and Dr Dealler. Dr Dealler's views are discussed in more detail in vol. 11: Scientists after Southwood, 1989-96

4 YB95/12.15/14.1

5 YB95/11.14/13.1

6 YB95/12.01/11.2; see also S387 Tomlinson para. 7

7 YB95/12.01/11.2

8 'Danger in a burger' at YB95/12.01/10.1

9 YB95/12.01/9.1

10 S385 Haslam para. 34

11 YB95/12.02/1.1-1.2

12 YB95/12.13/18.1-18.3; Sir Bernard Tomlinson's knowledge and experience concerning spongiform encephalopathies and dementias are set out at S387 Tomlinson para. 1 and S387A Tomlinson paras 3-6

13 YB95/12.03/1.1-1.2 at 1.2

14 S297 Dorrell para. 103

15 YB95/12.04/10.1

16 Ibid.

17 YB95/11.23/6.2

18 M44 tab 12; see also S147 Maclean para. 53

19 T108 p. 84

20 YB95/12.04/4.1

21 YB95/12.05/6.1

22 M44 tab 12

23 Deputy Chair from April 1994, and previously a member of SEAC and the Tyrell Committee

24 YB96/7.00/9.1

25 YB95/12.05/14.1 and YB95/12.05/15.1; see also S400 Major para. 81. It is unclear who provided this briefing

26 YB95/12.05/7.1

27 YB95/12.07/13.1

28 YB95/12.07/14.4

29 YB95/12.05/7.1

30 YB95/12.07/14.4

31 YB95/12.07/14.5

32 YB95/12.07/14.5

33 Ibid.

34 Lord Newton was Lord President of the Council and Leader of the House of Commons from 1992 to 1997

35 YB95/12.07/14.5

36 YB95/12.08/24.1-24.8

37 YB95/12.08/24.4

38 YB95/12.08/2.1 para. 1. The meeting was attended by Mr Hogg, Mrs Browning, Mr Packer, Mr Osborne, Mr Carden, Mr Meldrum, Mr Haslam, Mr Kent and Dr Render

39 YB95/12.08/2.1

40 S103 Carden para. 46; YB95/12.08/2.1-2.2

41 YB95/12.12/2.1-2.3

42 YB95/12.12/2.2

43 S109 Eddy para. 94

44 YB95/12.07/20.1

45 Ibid.

46 YB95/12.07/12.1; see also T76 p. 102

47 See also vol. 9: Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland

48 YB95/12.07/27.1

49 YB95/12.08/34.1

50 YB95/12.08/12.1-12.2

51 T138 pp. 129-30

52 S147G Maclean para. 8

53 YB95/12.20/15.1

54 S147G Maclean para. 9

55 YB95/12.00/11.1

56 S61E Will paras 14-15

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