Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
5. Human health developments: 1 January 1991 to 31 March 1995
The background to the proposal for a national system of meat hygiene
Introduction
The European Single Market
Government proposal to introduce the MHS
The MHS and SBO Regulations
Discussion

Introduction

5.85 This section discusses the decision to establish a national system of meat hygiene enforcement in the form of the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS), which was introduced against a background of various, and often conflicting, factors. One of the main factors behind this decision was the establishment of the European Single Market. In this section we look first at the European Single Market and its effects in slaughterhouses before going on to describe the development of the MHS.

5.86 The establishment of the MHS was not part of the response to the emergence of BSE. It had, however, considerable impact on enforcement of the SBO Regulations and is an important part of the BSE story. This section of our report is of relevance when considering the standards of implementation of the SBO Regulations prior to the introduction of the MHS.

5.87 The decision to introduce the MHS came shortly before the Conservative Government's deregulation initiative described earlier in this chapter. The establishment of the MHS was promoted by MAFF as consistent with deregulation. However, it attracted opposition from the meat industry, local authorities and politicians from both sides of the House. Despite this opposition, the Government was persuaded that it should continue with its policy of establishing the MHS. On 1 April 1995, the MHS became the responsible authority for enforcing meat hygiene standards within the meat industry.

The European Single Market

5.88 On 29 July 1991, the Council of the European Communities adopted Directive 91/497. ¹ This was one of a number of measures for the gradual establishment of the internal market (or 'European Single Market') over a period expiring on 31 December 1992. Arrangements were already in place ² for the abolition of veterinary checks at frontiers between Member States. In order to take account of this and to introduce more stringent guarantees at origin (it being no longer possible to distinguish between products for the domestic markets and products to be marketed in another member state), the Directive sought to harmonise the conditions under which meat ³ was declared unfit for human consumption. In general terms, this meant that all slaughterhouses and meat-cutting premises would have to comply with EC rules on hygiene and inspection. There would no longer be any distinction between the regulation of meat for the domestic or export market. Member States were to bring into force the laws and regulations necessary to comply with the Directive by 1 January 1993. The European Single Market is discussed in further detail in vol. 14: Responsibilities for Human and Animal Health. The differences between slaughterhouse practices in domestic and export meat production are discussed in Chapter 4 of this volume.

5.89 The Government also decided that to implement the EC requirements under the Single Market, the Agriculture Ministers should be responsible for licensing all slaughterhouses and meat production premises ⁴, and from 1 January 1993 the provisions of the Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1992 ⁵ took effect. The Regulations made the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (and the Secretaries of State in Scotland and Wales respectively) responsible for licensing all slaughterhouses. ⁶

Derogation from Single Market requirements

5.90 The requirements of the Single Market meant that for many slaughterhouses within the UK, their facilities and operational standards would have to be improved, if they were to remain licensed to operate. There were concerns within the Government and industry that this would force smaller slaughterhouses to close. The extension of veterinary supervision to domestic slaughterhouses, as a consequence of the Single Market, created additional problems through a shortage of OVSs, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

5.91 The European Council issued a further Directive 91/498 to 'take account of local situations and prevent abrupt closures of establishments', which provided arrangements for limited and temporary derogations to be granted to slaughterhouses in operation before 1 January 1992. ⁷ Slaughterhouses applying for the derogation would have to submit a work plan and programme, indicating their proposals to move towards total compliance with the EC standards by 1 January 1996. Earlier in this chapter we looked at the progress made during 1993 and 1994 by slaughterhouses, operating under derogation, towards achieving the requirements of the European Single Market.

5.92 On 2 December 1992, Mr Gummer answered a Written Answer to a Parliamentary Question on slaughterhouses from Mr David Nicholson MP, on measures MAFF proposed to take to enable small slaughterhouses to survive in the European Single Market. He said:

The single market hygiene legislation is not intended to destroy traditional small businesses . . . My Department has taken a number of steps to ensure that this directive can be implemented sensibly and without imposing unnecessary burdens. During the EC negotiations, we secured agreement that very small abattoirs did not need to comply with all the detailed structural requirements and that all meat premises would be eligible for temporary derogations of up to three years from 1 January 1993 to enable them to upgrade their premises to meet the new standards. ⁸

5.93 On 23 February 1993, Mr Soames replied to a Parliamentary Question from Mr David Porter MP, on what estimate MAFF had made on the number of abattoirs that would not be able to afford to meet the current hygiene arrangements, and would cease business. Mr Soames replied:

So far some 544 slaughterhouses in the United Kingdom have applied for temporary derogations for varying times. We believe the applicants are committed to upgrading their structure and would expect them to have made adequate financial provision to finance the work. We have not been advised by any of them that they intended ceasing business in the next two years. ⁹

5.94 Mr Keith Baker, ACVO, discussed the European Single Market and slaughterhouse derogation in his statement to us:

As part of the requirements for the completion of the Single Market, the Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 1992 were enacted (implementing the requirements of Directive 91/497/EC). These regulations required all red meat slaughterhouses, cutting plants and coldstores to be licensed by MAFF. As permitted by the regulations, day-to-day responsibility for operations in the premises remained with the local authorities. Since many of the premises did not, at that time, meet with the standards of the new regulations, the operators were given a 3 year derogation period, subject to them agreeing to, and carrying out, an improvement programme. This threw a considerable burden on all MAFF staff involved in meat hygiene, and it only indirectly improved the handling and disposal of specified offals by the gradual increase in standards. The burden of work continued well beyond the 3 year period, since operators who failed to meet their commitments were delicensed, leading to appeals (to an independent Meat Hygiene tribunal) which took up considerable extra time and resources.

He continued:

The new regulations also required the presence of Official Veterinary Surgeons in all slaughterhouses, cutting plants and coldstores, for which the slaughterhouse industry had to pay. The industry, in many cases, considered this to be an unjustified imposition, and it made things extremely difficult by withdrawing any co-operation and challenging many of the requirements they felt were excessive. With many of the operators refusing to pay the new charges, the local authorities, who were still required to provide the inspection, found themselves with mounting debts. In addition, since many of the plants were small and located in rural communities, the new requirements were, locally, thought likely to cause their closure, with concern about loss of services. This meant additional work for all MAFF staff involved, and particularly careful handling of the dispute was necessary. ¹⁰

Government proposal to introduce the MHS

The review of fresh meat hygiene enforcement

5.95 Proposals to establish the MHS were first formulated when the Government began to review the effectiveness of the enforcement of meat hygiene controls, in light of the European Single Market and the decision that Agriculture Departments be made responsible in future for the licensing of slaughterhouses and meat production premises. MAFF and DH commissioned a detailed report on alternative methods of 'providing day-to-day meat inspection and hygiene', which was published in June 1991. ¹¹

5.96 After considering the report, Mr Gummer wrote to Mr William Waldegrave, the Secretary of State for Health, ¹² on 18 July to propose the creation of a 'new organisation to provide hygiene control and meat inspection in fresh meat premises'. Mr Gummer accepted there was scope to improve the current enforcement function of local authorities; however, he believed that there would be an inevitable EC challenge to these arrangements as they lacked the 'necessary element of central control'. He felt that a dedicated enforcement service would 'facilitate provision of a high quality and cost effective service' to satisfy the European Community Commission and consumers as to the hygiene standards of British meat production. Mr Gummer concluded that he would write to Cabinet colleagues to seek their agreement to the creation of the service. ¹³

5.97 Mr Waldegrave replied on 18 September 1991 that he was 'content' with the proposal. ¹⁴

5.98 On 4 November 1991, Mr Gummer sent the Prime Minister, Mr John Major, a paper proposing the creation of a national meat hygiene service and seeking his agreement. ¹⁵ A response was received on 14 November advising that the Prime Minister could not reach a decision on the proposal without the view of the Treasury. ¹⁶

5.99 David Mellor, Chief Secretary of the Treasury (1990-92) wrote to the Prime Minister on 3 December 1991, expressing his concerns over Mr Gummer's paper. He was worried about public expenditure and that the creation of the new service would be contrary to 'our aim of reducing the size of the [civil] service'. He also noted that the changes might lead to demands that other aspects of local food safety enforcement should then be centralised. Several other concerns were noted, and Mr Mellor concluded that the matter should be 'properly thought through'. ¹⁷

5.100 At a meeting between MAFF, DH and Treasury officials on 18 December 1991, the Meat Hygiene Division was asked to amend the paper so as to spell out in greater detail the 'pros and cons' of the options which had been rejected and to take the Treasury concerns into account. ¹⁸

5.101 The paper was redrafted and forwarded to Mr Gummer by Mrs Jane Brown on 10 January 1992. Mrs Brown advised the Minister that the redraft had been officially cleared with Welsh Office Agriculture Department (WOAD), Scottish Office Agriculture, Environment and Fisheries Department (SOAEFD) and DH. She also noted that 'the meat industry and the veterinary profession are very anxious to have an early decision'. The Minister approved the redrafted submission. ¹⁹

5.102 Mrs Brown told us:

The Prime Minister's Office asked Machinery of Government Division in the Cabinet Office to take forward discussions with a view to resolving the Treasury concerns. Meetings took place during December and January and agreement was reached between officials on amendments to the paper circulated by Mr Gummer in November which addressed the Treasury points. ²⁰

5.103 A final meeting between MAFF, DH and Treasury took place on 25 February. ²¹

5.104 The submission was further redrafted. It was then forwarded to the Prime Minister on 27 February 1992 by Sir Robin Butler, Cabinet Secretary. It noted difficulties within slaughterhouses resulting from the current system of enforcement, and recommended the introduction of the MHS. Part of the 'summary of Departmental views and issues for decision' in the submission said:

Existing arrangements for the enforcement of hygiene rules in meat plants are ill-suited to the needs of the Single Market. Some changes are inevitable to meet the requirement for veterinary supervision of all plants and the need for central accountability. In addition to these new factors, there are problems with the present system which need to be resolved, in particular poor standards in domestic plants, and lack of consistency in enforcement. ²²

5.105 The Prime Minister responded on 3 March 1992 that he agreed that the responsibility for meat hygiene enforcement should be transferred from local authorities to a central service. ²³

5.106 The decision to introduce the MHS was announced by the Mr Gummer and reported in a press release on 9 March 1992. ²⁴

Response to the Single Market and the proposal to establish the MHS

5.107 Ten months earlier in a news release on 24 May 1991 the IEHO had expressed concern about the proposed new service. The news release had been issued in response to the MAFF and DH report published in June 1991 entitled 'Review of Fresh Meat Hygiene Enforcement in Great Britain' (see paragraphs 5.95-5.96 above). Miss Linda Allan, Under Secretary of the IEHO, was quoted as saying, among other things:

A system which removed the responsibility for meat inspection from local authorities would see the end of an integrated food inspection service. The loss of co-ordination and of the holistic approach to food control could be detrimental to public health, as well as being a doubling up of resources. ²⁵

5.108 On 9 March 1992, the same day as the Prime Minister's announcement to create the MHS, the British Veterinary Association (BVA) issued a press release welcoming the Government's decision to introduce the MHS and stated:

. . . We particularly welcome the fact that this will strengthen the position of the Official Veterinary Surgeon both in supervising the welfare of animals at slaughter and in protecting the consumer. ²⁶

5.109 The Association of District Councils published a press release on 9 March 1992 expressing their 'dismay' that local authorities would lose their role in meat inspection:

District councils and their environmental health officers and meat inspectors have been responsible for a comprehensive food safety and hygiene enforcement service. This continuity of enforcement in the food chain from slaughter to consumption is a very important factor and a strength of the existing system. It is a pity the Minister has decided to weaken this regime by transferring the duty of meat inspection to MAFF. ²⁷

5.110 The announcement by the Prime Minister to establish the MHS had been made in the run-up to the general election held on 9 April 1992. Mrs Brown, in her written statement to the Inquiry, described briefly the reaction by the Labour Party to the decision:

During the Election period reports in the trade press suggested that the Labour Party might overturn the decision to set up the agency, and local authority and environmental health interests signalled that they would lobby against it if Labour were returned. ²⁸

5.111 After the election, when the Conservative Party was returned to Government, MAFF and DH continued to face opposition over the European Single Market and the proposed MHS. Mrs Brown again describes this in her written statement to the Inquiry:

During late 1992 and 1993, MHD was heavily engaged in implementing the Single Market Fresh Meat Directive and in negotiating and preparing to implement the other Single Market Directives in the meat sector. The Fresh Meat Directive was extremely unpopular with some sectors of the meat industry, the major retailers (whose cold stores came within its scope) and politicians and journalists who perceived it as over-regulatory. MAFF was accused of over-implementing the EC requirements. In October 1992 the Parliamentary Secretary (Mr Soames) took an extremely hostile Adjournment Debate in the Commons when Conservative backbenchers attacked the Directive and queried the need for additional hygiene precautions. On 28 October Mr Gummer gave evidence to the Agriculture Select Committee, in which he gave graphic examples of hygiene failings in slaughterhouses and referred to BSE as one of the reasons why enforcement in slaughterhouses needed to be fully effective. This was a deliberate attempt to alter the climate of the debate in Parliament and in the media. ²⁹

5.112 Mr Gummer's evidence to the Agriculture Select Committee is recorded in paragraph 5.27.

Disagreement within the Government in 1993 on the creation of the MHS

5.113 In May 1993, Mrs Gillian Shephard succeeded Mr Gummer as the Minister of Agriculture. In July 1993, Mr Capstick, requesting Mrs Shephard's endorsement of the MHS, sent her a submission on the MHS (also referred to as the NMHS). ³⁰

5.114 A videoconference was then held with the Minister, together with Mr Meldrum, Mr Baker, Mrs Brown, Mr Lawrence and others. The meeting was described in a minute of 15 July 1993 from Mr Barnes to Mrs Brown, which noted:

The Minister said that she wanted more information on three areas before approving the National Meat Hygiene Service policy. First, how would it be possible to present it to the public as a deregulatory measure? Second, what would be the cost of the service, to industry and the public purse, and how would its manpower be organised? Third, how could MAFF ensure that the removal of work from local authorities resulted in a reduction in their staff numbers to balance the new staff in the NMHS?

. . .

The Minister said that before giving her policy approval she would like advice from you (Mrs Brown) and Mr Dugdale as to how the policy could successfully be presented to the public as deregulatory. ³¹

5.115 Mrs Brown provided further detailed advice to Mrs Shephard on 21 July 1993 on the presentation, costs and staffing of the NMHS. ³² This was followed by a meeting on 28 July 1993 between the Minister, Mr Packer, Mr Haddon, Mr Baker, Mr Lawrence and others, after which the Minister said 'in the light of the further information she was now persuaded of the merits of the proposed NMHS'. ³³

5.116 Mrs Shephard said in her statement to us:

I was particularly concerned about how it would be possible to present the NMHS to the public as a deregulatory measure, what it would cost the industry and the public purse, how its manpower would be organised, and how MAFF could ensure that the removal of work from local authorities resulted in a reduction in their staff numbers to balance the new staff in the NMHS. After discussing the matter with officials, and receiving some further information from Mrs Brown, the Head of the Meat Hygiene Division at MAFF, I was satisfied that the NMHS would bring consistency of enforcement and the management structure would be more lean and efficient, allowing a reduction in the cost to the industry and more effective use of the flexibility which the legislation allowed. I also thought the establishment of the NMHS would introduce better accountability of enforcement officers who would be more directly accountable to ministers and hence to Parliament rather than the existing situation where local authorities were responsible for enforcement of the regulations. ³⁴

5.117 Meanwhile, the new Secretary of State for Wales, Mr John Redwood (1993-95), had also received a submission on the NMHS, seeking his approval of the service. In a minute to Mr Lawrence on 22 July 1993, Mr Alun Huws of WOAD said of Mr Redwood:

. . . his first reaction to our parallel submission to yours was that he would prefer powers to rest with the local authorities, with constraints set centrally. He is also unhappy with the representation that the NMHS measures are deregulation ones (by virtue of their being in the deregulation bill.)

He has, therefore, not approved any of the measures proposed for the deregulation bill relating to the NMHS. ³⁵

5.118 Mrs Shephard wrote to Mr Redwood on 17 August 1993:

You will know that I have been giving detailed consideration to the proposal to establish a National Meat Hygiene Service (NMHS) to take over hygiene and welfare enforcement work in fresh meat plants, a task currently undertaken by 300 local authorities. Like you, when I was first made aware of these proposals, I had initial misgivings. However, having asked officials to provide me with more information and having discussed it again with them, I am now firmly convinced that this is the right course and I believe we should go ahead . . . I do not wish to labour the principal benefits I see in the setting up of the Service . . . But in summary I believe that it will lead to improved cost-effectiveness, accountability and consistency in the enforcement of hygiene and welfare standards. ³⁶

5.119 Mr Redwood replied on 29 August and said:

. . . I have had doubts about the wisdom of establishing another body to carry out the work of meat hygiene and enforcement. In general, I would prefer not to add to centralised bodies where effective arrangements can be made using existing local structures. I agree that improvements to cost-effectiveness, accountability and consistency in carrying out functions in this area are needed; but I am not persuaded that in this particular instance the creation of a centralised service is the best way of achieving these ends. ³⁷

5.120 On 6 September, Mrs Shephard replied, reiterating her reasons for supporting the introduction of the NMHS:

I believe that the NMHS offers the prospect of real benefits for our meat industry; there is strong support from most of the key players, and the backlash if we were to reverse the decision would, in my judgement, be extremely damaging. ³⁸

5.121 Mrs Shephard and Mr Redwood met on 29 September 1993; however, Mr Redwood still expressed doubts about the creation of the NMHS. ³⁹ In a minute dated 6 October to Mr Redwood, Mrs Shephard noted he was wondering how 'we can ensure that it [NMHS] remains a lean, efficient and cost-effective organisation'. Mrs Shephard replied:

There is certainly considerable inefficiency in the system at present, because of the intensive State Veterinary Service input required to maintain standards anywhere near an acceptable level and to iron out some of the worst inconsistencies of approach. Once the NMHS is in place, there will be real scope to streamline things. In practice, the SVS will discharge the licensing role simultaneously with the task of auditing the NMHS's performance - a job which would need to be done in any case. The SVS PES forecasts envisage a 75% reduction of input in meat plants (from 60 to 15 man years) as a result of establishing the NMHS. This is in addition to the savings in inspection staff in the plants which will be possible under the NMHS, through more cost-effective deployment across local authority boundaries. ⁴⁰

5.122 Mrs Shephard concluded the minute by stressing the need to make progress on the matter.

5.123 Mr Redwood was still not content with the proposal and on 12 October said:

The organisation seems over-complex in relation to the work and in my view it unnecessarily separates the licensing and enforcement functions. Presentationally, the establishment of a fresh layer of bureaucracy and the expenditure on the start-up costs (albeit in the short term) do not fit in with our efforts on deregulation and reducing public expenditure.

In view of this, I have to confirm that I am not content with the proposal to establish a National Meat Hygiene Service. I would prefer to keep the existing local structure in place (with detailed advice from Government to improve standards where necessary) for the present; and for a thorough reappraisal of the whole question of meat hygiene enforcement to be carried out. Our aim should be to establish a lean and efficient organisation without the panoply of additional checks and controls entailed by an Agency, and to ensure that all work in this area is incorporated in the organisation's functions. ⁴¹

5.124 On 14 October, Mrs Shephard wrote to Mr Michael Portillo, the Chief Secretary of the Treasury (1992-94), about the setting up of the MHS. ⁴²

5.125 Mr Portillo replied on 27 October that 'I am concerned that creating a new centralised regulatory body may not necessarily be as attractive as it seemed to us 18 months ago'. He suggested that Mrs Shephard look at whether 'cost and service improvements could not be delivered adequately through management change in local authorities' and was 'a little sceptical too that a national agency to enforce national standards is an ideal solution'. ⁴³

5.126 Mrs Shephard responded on 29 October that Mr Portillo's questioning of the establishment of the MHS surprised her:

. . . All the points you raise were examined exhaustively when the original decision to proceed with a National Service was made and approved by all departments concerned including your own . . . I continue to be under pressure about the inconsistencies and unsatisfactory nature of the present inspection system. These representations would greatly increase if we changed policy now. ⁴⁴

5.127 Mr Redwood, who had received a copy of the initial letter to Mr Portillo from Mrs Shephard and further correspondence from her, ⁴⁵ wrote to Mrs Shephard on 26 October 1993:

I am sorry to be holding out against implementation of what I know to be a previously announced decision. I really do feel however that this proposal - which will necessarily entail significant setting up costs - should at the very least be deferred. Indeed my own strong preference would be to work to improve the present arrangements. ⁴⁶

5.128 Mrs Shephard replied to Mr Redwood on 4 November:

You suggest that we should defer setting up the NMHS. I do not think this is a realistic option. The decision was announced over 18 months ago, has been accepted by all the main interest groups, including the local authorities, as established Government policy, and is strongly supported by the great majority of the meat industry, who foot the bill for the inspection service.

We are already being criticised for not making more rapid progress. I cannot see how I could defend a reversal of our agreed policy. The PES costs are small compared to the potential longer term savings for both Government and industry. This year's experience of introducing the new Regulations via the local authorities gives me no confidence at all that a fresh joint effort between them and central Government would be any more successful than the previous failed attempts to improve enforcement in this sector. ⁴⁷

5.129 On 9 November 1993, Mr Ian Lang (now Lord Lang), Secretary of State for Scotland (1990-95), who had received copies of the previous correspondence, wrote to Mrs Shephard, with copies to Mr Portillo and Mr Redwood:

I was party to the decision in March last year to create the national meat hygiene service, and we looked very thoroughly at the merits of all options at that time. I have seen no new arguments to justify reopening a question which has been decided. There was a long history of problems with the present system based on local authorities, and the creation of a national service should close that chapter. ⁴⁸

5.130 Mr Redwood and Mr Portillo, on the 14 and 15 November respectively, both indicated their acceptance of the introduction of the MHS. ⁴⁹

5.131 Mrs Brown said in her statement to us that 'it was of course not possible to take any definitive steps on recruitment or other aspects of establishment of the MHS while these exchanges were taking place between Ministers'. ⁵⁰

5.132 Mr Packer was asked in oral evidence about whether there was a conflict between introducing the MHS and the deregulation initiative:

. . . there was a specific deregulation scrutiny carried out, I think, by the Deregulation Unit which concluded that the Meat Hygiene Service should go ahead. So I think the argument unequivocally has to be that as regards the then Government's central initiative there was not a conflict. However, the deregulation initiative was dragged into the argument by many people who did not want to go ahead with the service for various reasons. ⁵¹

1994 and the run-up to the commencement of MHS operations on 1 April 1995

5.133 Work continued on the establishment of the MHS during 1994. ⁵² The Chief Executive Designate of the MHS, Mr Johnston McNeill, was appointed, and an MHS project team worked on finalising the responsibilities of the Service. ⁵³

5.134 Liaison meetings were organised between the MHS team and representative bodies of local authorities, including LACOTS ⁵⁴ and the AMA (Association of Metropolitan Authorities). ⁵⁵ The LACOTS Food Safety Panel was also consulted. ⁵⁶ Mrs Brown commented in a submission on 30 September 1994 (see paragraphs 5.140-5.141) that:

While the Association of District Councils, the Association of Metropolitan Authorities and the IEHO are formally opposed to the MHS, all three organisations have stated publicly that they will co-operate with MAFF and the Chief Executive over the transfer of responsibility. In private, many individual local authorities are relieved at the prospect of losing one of their more troublesome functions. ⁵⁷

5.135 Mr McNeill discussed the relationship between local authorities and the MHS team in oral evidence:

In the main we had very good working relationships with the local authorities and, through organisations such as LACOTS and the Department of Health and others, maintained very good communication and working relationships. We had some difficulty with some local authorities. Part of the transfer of staff process required them to complete a questionnaire. We engaged the services of WS Atkins -

MR MATOVU: Can I just pause there? You are referring to 'we'. Who are 'we'?

MR McNEILL: Initially the process team, who of course had visited a number of slaughterhouses and spoken to a number of local authorities, and then myself and the project team. Then, once the structure was filled, the senior management came on board and they of course would interface with local authorities. Each regional director would be in communication with local authorities on various issues. But as I was mentioning, we sent all of the local authorities who had responsibility for meat inspection work the questionnaire that was prepared by WS Atkins to try to identify the number of staff they employed who, of course, would have a right of transfer to the new Meat Hygiene Service. In some cases it was quite difficult to get that information and we had problems with some local authorities who resented, I think, the loss of this role.

. . .

. . . I think we finally ended up transferring staff from I think it was 176 local authorities, and of course they transferred with their individual terms and conditions, which meant we ended up with really 176 sets of terms and conditions, which we spent the next year harmonising, which was a fairly major exercise, as you can imagine. ⁵⁸

5.136 The Deregulation and Contracting Out Act was passed in October 1994. It contained provisions to allow Ministers to exercise powers similar to those of local authorities, providing the legislative framework for the creation of the MHS:

Ministers acting under the Food Safety Act 1990 will be put in the same position as food authorities, allowing them to authorise any person to be an authorised officer for enforcement purposes. Regulations made under the Act will be enforceable by Agriculture Ministers acting alone in their own territories. Welfare, including the licensing of slaughtermen, will also be transferred from local authorities to Agriculture Ministers. In effect, along with changes to secondary legislation, the Meat Hygiene Service will act as an enforcing authority under Ministerial direction. ⁵⁹

5.137 Mrs Brown described in her statement to us that in 1994:

The political climate remained extremely difficult with the Quality Meat and Livestock Alliance orchestrating a campaign against the meat hygiene legislation including a "payment strike" which led to a challenge of the UK interpretation of the veterinary supervision requirements of the Fresh Meat Directive in the European Court. ⁶⁰

5.138 The Quality Meat and Livestock Alliance (QMLA) was made up of number of smaller abattoir operators who felt that veterinary supervision was not required within their premises. ⁶¹

5.139 At the end of July 1994, Mr William Waldegrave and Mrs Angela Browning succeeded Mrs Shephard and Mr Soames as Minister of Agriculture and MAFF Parliamentary Secretary respectively. On 22 September, Mr Waldegrave asked for detailed advice on the introduction of the MHS, as he foresaw difficulties in its approaching introduction. He was concerned about criticisms that had been made about the Service and asked (among other things) 'why is the status quo untenable, or so much worse than the MHS?' ⁶²

5.140 A submission was prepared by Mrs Brown for the Minister on 30 September 1994. ⁶³ She said that the status quo was untenable because:

. . . as expected, the extension under the Single Market rules of veterinary supervision to all abattoirs has been extremely difficult to implement under the current local authority arrangements. Many Environmental Health Departments resent the requirements to employ a vet, and the OVS tends to be excluded from the EHO/meat inspector management line. The Commission inspectors were extremely critical of supervision and enforcement during their visit to derogated GB plants earlier this year . . . we believe that the commitment to establishing the MHS will enable us to counter their criticisms on this occasion.

If the status quo were to be retained, we believe that other Member States could begin to create difficulties for our meat exports on the grounds that Community rules are not being adequately enforced. While BSE remains a problem it is particularly important that other Member States have confidence in our enforcement arrangements. At present we know that there are some problems over the disposal of specified bovine offal; a single agency responsible for all the fresh meat plants will enable MAFF to control the position much more effectively.

As indicated above, local authorities are gearing up to withdraw from meat inspection from next April. While some have done a good job in the past, many others have not. It would be unrealistic to expect the majority of LAs to see meat hygiene as a priority function in future, given the difficulties of implementing the Single Market rules, the continuing legal challenge from the Quality Meat and Livestock Alliance, and the Government's decision in 1992 that a centralised agency would offer a more cost-effective and consistent service to consumers and to the industry. ⁶⁴

5.141 Mrs Brown also noted that most consumer and welfare groups were supportive of the MHS and that 'opposition is coming . . . from the Quality Meat and Livestock Alliance'. She said that the QMLA membership was mainly drawn from smaller sized abattoirs 'the sector of the industry which had been declining most rapidly in recent years as a result of market forces and which, by and large, has the greatest problems in relation to hygiene standards'. ⁶⁵

5.142 Mr Packer also wrote to the Minister on 3 October 1994 in support of establishing the MHS. ⁶⁶

5.143 Discussions then took place on the presentational problems of the MHS, and official plans for managing the launch process. ⁶⁷

5.144 The MHS Framework Document was finalised in March 1995 following consultation with Cabinet Office and Treasury. ⁶⁸ Detailed performance targets were set and published on 31 March 1995. ⁶⁹ The MHS framework is discussed in Chapter 6 of this volume.

5.145 Mrs Brown concluded in relation to the MHS:

. . . the establishment of the MHS took place in difficult circumstances. The decision to set up a centralised service under the control of Agriculture Ministers was contrary to the general thrust of Government policy, and the unpopularity of the EC meat hygiene legislation with some sectors of the industry and with certain MPs, journalists and lobbyists inevitably made the task of 'selling' the concept of the MHS extremely difficult. Nevertheless it was possible to push the project through to completion without making any compromises which undermined the fundamental objective of putting in place arrangements which would allow enforcement to be delivered consistently and to ensure that effort was directed to the areas which were perceived as critical for public health, including of course the SBO controls when the SVS monitoring in mid 1995 revealed failures at slaughterhouse level. ⁷⁰

The MHS and SBO Regulations

5.146 It does not appear that in 1991-94 there was any concern that the inconsistent enforcement standards of meat hygiene regulations in general, or the poor hygiene standards often reported in slaughterhouses (important factors behind the creation of the MHS), might have implications for the enforcement of the SBO Regulations. Mr Gummer, when addressing the Agriculture Committee in October 1991, had referred to BSE as one of the reasons why enforcement in slaughterhouses needed to be fully effective. But he did not suggest that there were doubts as to whether the SBO controls were being satisfactorily enforced. ⁷¹

5.147 In oral evidence Mr Martin Haddon (MAFF) said that he was aware of the report of Johnston and Spurr (discussed above) detailing problems within derogated slaughterhouses. However, at the time he did not see any link with the enforcement of the SBO Regulations:

I was aware from early on in my tenure of the post that there were concerns about the variability and in some cases poor standards of hygiene in the dressing of meat in slaughterhouses, and of poor compliance with structural standards and so on which were increasingly being imposed or going to be imposed and subsequently were imposed under Community legislation. And there were also arguments about the degree of supervision and the desirability or otherwise of having veterinary supervision in all slaughterhouses.

I did not, I think, make a link in my mind between such deficiencies as I heard about and the application of the SBO controls; and I suppose, with hindsight, I can say that I think I may have thought that the SBO controls were rather simple to carry out and that the sort of deficiencies in terms of, you know, the spraying of water on carcasses or the drains or fecal contamination and so on seemed to be rather more subtle, and things requiring a different order of supervision and management than the SBO controls. ⁷²

5.148 In his oral evidence, Mr Packer was referred to the reasons behind the establishment of the MHS and the implications of this on enforcement of the SBO Regulations:

MR WALKER: . . . you have helpfully set out some of the factors which were referred to in the submission in relation to the Meat Hygiene Service. One of those factors was: 'inconsistent and sometimes poor standards of enforcement'. You were aware of that being a factor?

MR PACKER: Yes, I was.

MR WALKER: Did that give you cause for concern about enforcement of the SBO regulations?

MR PACKER: Not directly, but one needs to go according to the evidence; and we had no evidence that the SBO regulations were not being followed. And indeed in my early period in 1993 with Mr Simmons's report, [I] had reason to believe they were being followed. Later, of course, evidence became available that they were not. ⁷³

Discussion

5.149 The establishment of the MHS was not a measure taken in response to the emergence of BSE. Accordingly it has not fallen within our terms of reference to consider why so long a time elapsed between the decision to introduce the Service and the implementation of that decision. In the event, the establishment of the MHS had a beneficial impact on the implementation of both the human and the animal SBO ban. It is unfortunate that this was so long delayed.