Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
5. Human health developments: 1 January 1991 to 31 March 1995
Hygiene standards and enforcement arrangements in slaughterhouses between 1991 and March 1995
Certain unsatisfactory aspects of enforcement arrangements in slaughterhouses
Deregulatory pressures in Government and the effect on meat hygiene
Discussion

Certain unsatisfactory aspects of enforcement arrangements in slaughterhouses

5.36 In the following paragraphs we look at certain aspects of the enforcement arrangements at slaughterhouses which received greater attention during 1991 to March 1995. Because there is only limited primary evidence on this, much of what follows is based on the perceptions of witnesses, as presented in statements or discussed at the hearings. In particular we look at general difficulties with enforcement and the relationships between the various bodies involved: AMIs, EHOs and OVSs.

General difficulties with enforcement in slaughterhouses

5.37 On 31 January 1992, as part of the work to develop proposals for a national system of meat hygiene enforcement (ie, the MHS), Mrs Jane Brown forwarded a paper to Mr Andrew Whetnall, Head of the Machinery of Government Division, Cabinet Office (1989-96). This noted difficulties within slaughterhouses based on the system of enforcement in place at that time:

Premises are monitored by staff of the State Veterinary Service (SVS), who offer advice to the local authorities on standards and interpretation of the rule but have no powers to ensure that this advice is followed in domestic plants, although powers to suspend or withdraw export approval exist in relation to EC-approved red meat plants.

. . .

The present system of enforcement following licensing is ill equipped to meet the more demanding standards of the new EC rules; to provide effective veterinary supervision; or to satisfy the EC Commission.

. . .

The State Veterinary Service, who monitor standards, have no real control over LAs. The Official Veterinary Surgeon, who is usually contracted to the LA as part of the present LA meat hygiene team on a part-time basis, has little real management control over the meat inspectors in the plant.

. . .

Standards of enforcement are uneven across the country. Guidance can of course be given from the centre - and has been given in the past - but liaison arrangements can be cumbersome and costly and no effective method of securing co-operation between the local authorities and the State Veterinary Service on a nation-wide basis has been found. Previous attempts to set up Regional Liaison Committees following an earlier review have failed. The industry is becoming increasingly aware of - and critical of - inconsistency of standards across Great Britain. ¹

5.38 Mr Johnston NcNeill, Chief Executive Designate of MHS, ² told us in a written statement that many local authority staff working in licensed slaughterhouses did not have a 'robust enforcement culture instilled into them'. ³ In oral evidence, he explained that background work to develop an enforcement hierarchy for the MHS had revealed a relaxed approach to enforcement by local authority meat inspectors and OVSs. He said:

. . . We endeavoured to find out what level of enforcement activity had been employed by local authorities in enforcing the regulations and were unable to get any clear picture, although it did not appear to be of any great substance. And in discussions with staff, particularly as we took a much more robust enforcement line, on issues such as presenting carcasses with spinal cord present and what not, it became apparent to us that there was, I think it would be fair to say, a reluctance on the part of some of our veterinary surgeons and indeed meat inspection staff to move down this more formal enforcement road . . . in previous cases it had been perhaps a more relaxed approach to enforcement. ⁴

5.39 In Chapter 4 we described the evidence of Mr Richard Lodge, Head of Food and Health and Safety for Birmingham City Council since 1993, in relation to the Preston Report's comments on the variation in the level of enforcement of hygiene standards between slaughterhouses.

Relationship between local authority environmental health departments (EHDs) and their meat hygiene staff (AMIs and OVSs)

5.40 As described previously, during the period covered by this chapter, local authorities' EHDs employed AMIs and OVSs for meat hygiene inspection work at slaughterhouses.

5.41 Mr Soul considered that the AMIs were largely left to their own devices:

I think under the local authority system a lot of meat inspectors were pretty much left to their own devices and I think many of them became almost a part of the plant staff and were getting involved in trimming and perhaps even dressing and so on, which was clearly the plant responsibility, rather than keeping themselves somewhat removed from that and recognising their role as an enforcement officer. I think there were other difficulties with the local authority system where, because of local influences and so on, and local employment, it may have been quite difficult for the Environmental Health Department to take a firm enforcement line with certain local employers. ⁵

5.42 Mr Lawrence, MAFF, MHS Project Team, told us about the findings from investigations by the MHS Project Team into local authority enforcement arrangements. Among other things, the investigations determined that there were over 1,000 meat inspectors working for over 300 local authorities. ⁶ He said that:

In many cases, there seemed to be an unclear management chain. Meat inspectors did not seem to know who to report to. If they wanted advice on personnel matters, who were they to go to? Ostensibly it was the EHO, but he was often quite a long way away working in the council offices. Most of the OVSs were on contract and again there were problems about the working together, if you like, between the OVS and the meat inspector. In other words, in many parts there did not seem to be any team work. The meat inspectors did not respect the OVS and vice versa.

In some cases, there was animosity between plant management and inspectors. In a few cases there was actual intimidation. I think that has been borne out by some of the press reports I have seen in the Meat Trades Journal very recently, but that was a problem.

In one or two instances we felt that the plants actually had influence over the local authorities. If a plant was in financial difficulty and that plant had a large number of employees working locally, then the closure of the plant could have meant loss of jobs. I think that may have impacted on the attitude of the local authority to the work that they were undertaking in those plants. ⁷

5.43 Mr Lawrence also told us that, in setting up the MHS, MAFF sought to overcome these difficulties:

We wanted to overcome some of the difficulties we had identified with local authorities, we wanted clear lines of communication, we wanted team work. We wanted better relations with plant management, not too close, not cosy, but it is essential to have good working relations with plant management. If there are problems identified, they have to be dealt with and they have to be dealt with quickly. ⁸

5.44 We have recorded in Chapter 4 comments by Mr Andrew Fleetwood on lack of support for OVSs from the local authority and difficulties about the relationships between OVSs and AMIs.

5.45 Mr Cheale and Mr John Baker, his predecessor as President of the Federation of Fresh Meat Wholesalers ⁹, also told us about friction between OVSs and EHOs. The following exchange took place:

MRWALKER: We heard evidence from the Environmental Health Officers last Friday that they thought the OVSs were superfluous, they were not doing anything that a Environmental Health Officer could not do.

MR CHEALE: I will not be glib and say that we thought a lot of the Environmental Health Officers were superfluous as well. I think there was a bit of friction if you like when the Environmental Health Officers saw much of what they considered to be their job going over to the OVSs in export plants, and then obviously later on to every plant.

MR WALKER: Yes. We also talked a little bit to the Environmental Health Officers about the distinction between using an Environmental Health Officer and using the meat inspector and the picture that emerged was that there would be the use made of both Environmental Health Officers and meat inspectors for the purposes of meat inspection. Did that vary in your experience from region to region, or plant to plant?

MR BAKER: I would say from plant to plant, yes. As far as the bigger plants were concerned I mean we had our own meat inspectors, a team of meat inspectors, whereas a smaller plant would be using slaughtering at different times of day, whatever, not necessarily all week, and they would be controlled by the local EHO as against the meat inspector. So it varied really between the size of the plant mainly.

MR WALKER: Did this have any impact on your operations whether you were dealing with a meat inspector or an Environmental Health Officer?

MR CHEALE: Well, we always dealt with the Environmental Health Department, you know. If we were exporting we had to have a vet anyway. ¹⁰

Tensions arising from the EC requirement for veterinary supervision at slaughterhouses exporting to other Member States

5.46 Some witnesses told us of a long history of tensions arising from EC requirement for veterinary supervision, through OVSs, at slaughterhouses licensed to export to other Member States. Mr Alistair Cruickshank, MAFF Under Secretary, told us that at the time these requirements were introduced in the 1970s:

. . . throughout the rest of the community meat hygiene was solely a veterinary responsibility and they expected us to adopt the same system. In the UK it was not a veterinary responsibility, it was the responsibility of the Environmental Health Departments. In practice the work of the actual meat inspections was done by authorised meat inspectors but they were supervised by the Environmental Health Officers. The Environmental Health Officers wanted to retain that role and they got political support for this, and MAFF was therefore arguing in Brussels for Environmental Health Officers to have the responsibility for supervising hygiene in the slaughterhouses.

This was extremely unpopular with the veterinary service as you might expect, as they believed they were the professionals with the right qualifications to supervise hygiene in the slaughterhouses. There was no support whatsoever from the rest of Europe. There was a good deal of enmity between the veterinary profession and the environmental health officers on the meat hygiene issues in the 1970s. This did drag on to some extent. It coloured relationships, I think, between the Ministry and the district councils. It got a bit better, I think, in the early 1980s. Certainly we had a high regard for a number of the Environmental Health Officers and some of the district councils. On the whole the feeling was that the standards of hygiene in slaughterhouses was pretty low in the UK, a good deal lower than most other developed countries. ¹¹

5.47 Mr Graham Jukes of the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health (CIEH) told us that the introduction of veterinary supervision in export-approved slaughterhouses during the 1970s created difficulties with MAFF. He stated:

. . . within mainland Europe the so-called animal of an Environmental Health Officer is not readily recognised as being a fit and appropriate person to carry out and authorise meat and meat inspection, principally because they use veterinary personnel who are not to the same level of qualification as veterinary surgeons within the UK, and would be regarded, certainly we regarded them as equivalent to EHOs and meat inspectors. However, our colleagues in MAFF could not and did not support the view of the Chartered Institute that we were equivalent; and therefore the debate that occurred during that period meant that if export slaughterhouses were to export and continue exporting then local authorities had to employ Official Veterinary Surgeons to authorise the fitness of the meat and the products, Environmental Health Officers and meat inspectors worked alongside Official Veterinary Surgeons within that process. But I think it caused a considerable amount of conflict at the time, and concern within the profession that we were not being regarded as perhaps we felt we should be . . . local authorities experienced great difficulty in employing OVSs . . . and while many of our colleague OVSs were extremely competent and good at what they were doing, they were very much at the top of the chain, and sitting alongside EHOs and meat inspectors carrying out that function and literally just putting a stamp on after the work had been done. I defer to my veterinary colleague on the left as to whether or not that is the right inference to put on it. But certainly from the Chartered Institute's perspective many of the concerns raised with us in the 1980s were about the superfluousness of this particular process. I think in one of our papers we have described it as a meaningless paper chase. ¹²

5.48 Dr Joseph Gracey, Editor of the seventh edition of Thornton's Meat Hygiene, 1981, commented on the different professionals involved in meat inspection (EHOs, AMIs and OVSs). He told us:

There has been, I have to say, a bit of interdisciplinary rivalry which I deplore. As far as I am concerned, the people who should be inspecting meat are those who go through a proper form of training which is, at the moment, inadequate in a lot of areas. ¹³

Relationship between slaughterhouse operators and OVSs and the SVS

5.49 We have recorded in Chapter 4 evidence by Mr Fleetwood about circumstances which encouraged an attitude of some slaughterhouse operators that OVSs interfered in the running of the business, and his experiences that standards in some slaughterhouses lapsed when veterinary supervision was not present.

5.50 Earlier in this section we looked at the findings of the 1993 report by Dr Johnston and Mr Spurr in relation to hygiene standards in a sample of slaughterhouses operating under temporary derogation (provided for under the terms of the European Single Market, as discussed later in this chapter). The report also drew attention to problems between slaughterhouse operators and the SVS in relation to progress towards achieving compliance with the European Single Market requirements:

We found considerable confusion existed within the industry on many points. There was total apathy from some operators who still do not believe that the single standard (even in hygiene) will ever be achieved.

. . .

While the plants are operating under the three year extension there is little, if any, evidence of any work in hand or planning at a sufficiently advanced stage to be able to agree their work plan for derogation prior to 18th April 1993. We urge the State Veterinary Service to make every effort to obtain the co-operation of individual operators to overcome that problem. ¹⁴

. . .

We found wide variation in the approach which had been adopted by Veterinary Officers in discussing the future work plan requirements with individual operators . . .

There had been instances of poor communication between State Veterinary Services and operators. Differences in approach included, for example, the level of written comment and confirmation of requirements between individual officers, and where the responsibility for producing work plans lay. In some cases, we found a greater emphasis on structural requirements and variation in interpretation of points of detail, when, in our opinion, there was a more pressing need to tackle basic hygiene problems.

We are convinced that State Veterinary Service Officers were not consistent and, in some cases, firm enough in their requirements to plant-owners and operators. ¹⁵

5.51 The report expressed concerns about the provision of OVSs:

We were very concerned to find little evidence, in most cases, of any attempt to provide an integrated meat inspector/veterinary service or to relate hours of attendance by Official Veterinary Surgeons to throughput and standard of hygiene or on an assessment of risk. In many cases, the Local Authority appeared disinterested . . .

We see a real need for an integrated meat inspection/veterinary service to enforce the new Meat Hygiene Regulations. We are encouraged by the decision that the National Meat Hygiene Service will be established in 1995 and see this going a long way to improving matters. There is the potential for a real improvement. We see scope for the Meat Hygiene Headquarters and State Veterinary Service to take a stronger lead in managing the transition and encouraging better integration of the Official Veterinary Surgeon/Meat Inspector role in the hygienic operation of the plant in the interim. ¹⁶

Relationship between the SVS and EHOs

5.52 Mr Richard Packer, MAFF Permanent Secretary, told us about SVS's limited powers of enforcement before the MHS was introduced. He said:

So far as MAFF is concerned, though the SVS monitored enforcement in slaughterhouses before 1 April 1995, it did not have full legal powers to back this up (indeed, it did not even have formal powers of entry). Rather, it could only point out deficiencies to local authorities and leave action to them. This was not wholly satisfactory since pointing out deficiencies was in itself an implicit criticism of the enforcement activities of the same local authorities . . .

The SVS was not resourced to undertake work which was the responsibility of other authorities; and could only do so to the detriment of other work. ¹⁷

5.53 We referred in Chapter 4 to the oral evidence of Mr David Taylor ¹⁸ about the role of the SVS. We note here what he told us about the relationship between MAFF Meat Hygiene Veterinary Officers and EHOs. He said:

In some places, the relationship between the EHO . . . and the veterinarian was extremely good . . . In other places it was more difficult.

Some times the local authority were not very happy that a plant should be visited at a particular time, and it became more difficult to gain access, but it varied from division to division from place to place. ¹⁹

5.54 In July 1993, Mr Charles Capstick, MAFF Head of the Food Safety Directorate, sent a submission to Mrs Gillian Shephard, the Minister for Agriculture, briefing her on the background to the decision to establish a national meat hygiene service (as discussed later in this chapter). The submission stated:

Meat hygiene enforcement had been a troublesome area ever since the UK joined the Community. The British tradition of using Environmental Health Officers (EHOs) rather than veterinarians to supervise meat inspection is not acceptable to other Member States or to third countries [non-EC Member States]. A system of veterinary supervision was therefore put in place, alongside the local authority EHO - supervised inspection arrangements, in meat plants which wished to export. This was bureaucratic and costly to the industry, and failed to satisfy the Commission inspectorate because of problems with:

a) accountability - for the purposes of international trade, an effective system whereby the central veterinary authority can guarantee standards in plants and deal with any complaints is required. The present local authority based system does not provide a clear line of accountability to the SVS, and necessitates a high level of monitoring which is burdensome for industry and expensive for MAFF.

b) management control of the inspection service - the Commission inspectors are critical of the line management arrangements in most local authorities. Meat inspectors are normally line managed by the EHO; the Official Veterinary Surgeon (OVS) is generally employed on a contract basis and has no real management control. This in turn makes it difficult to maximise the use of meat inspectors to save on costly OVS time. It also requires a very lengthy chain of communication from MAFF via the Chief Executive and CEHO to the OVS and inspection staff in the plant.

c) inconsistency - standards of enforcement in meat plants have varied widely across the country, despite repeated attempts to improve liaison between the State Veterinary Service and local authorities.

d) costs - the meat inspector/EHO/OVS structure is expensive and differing enforcement and charging policies have led to wide variations in charges and widespread dissatisfaction in the industry. ²⁰

Shortage of veterinarians for meat hygiene inspection duties

5.55 Prior to the introduction of the European Single Market on 1 January 1993 (see paragraphs 5.88-5.94 for further information), only slaughterhouses exporting meat had to comply with EC regulations that required meat hygiene supervision to be undertaken by veterinarians. After 1 January 1993, veterinary supervision was required at all slaughterhouses.

5.56 Even before the extension to domestic slaughterhouses, there had been shortages of OVSs in export-approved slaughterhouses.

5.57 The problems local authorities faced when recruiting veterinarians were noted as part of the routine preparations immediately before the general election of 9 April 1992. These preparations included a draft submission sent on 2 April 1992 by Mr G P Hobrough, G Division, Meat Hygiene Division, to Mr Martin Haddon, Animal Health and Veterinary Group. ²¹ The draft, entitled 'National Meat Hygiene Service - Draft Submission for a Labour Administration' noted the following on current staff resources:

Meat Hygiene work as presently organised is not very attractive to vets, not least because they lack a clear role within the local authority and are not in a position to take responsibility for the hygiene standards in the plants. With some 300 additional vets likely to be required after 1992 in order to provide the inspection level required in EC rules, recruitment and retention of sufficient veterinary staff will be difficult unless a more satisfactory organisational structure can be achieved. ²²

5.58 On the same day, Mr Capstick met with Mr Brian Dickinson, Under Secretary, Head of Food Safety Group, MAFF, ²³ and Mr Jim Humble of LACOTS. ²⁴ The minutes of the meeting recorded that Mr Capstick 'expressed concern about the inadequacy of the present regime of [local authority] meat inspection which had become an issue of serious Ministerial embarrassment'. ²⁵

5.59 Problems with staff resources and the implications for slaughterhouses were discussed at a meeting of MAFF officials and local authority representatives on 6 October 1992. Local authority representatives expressed their concern about the shortage of OVSs, and were anxious to know what assistance MAFF would provide. Mrs Brown, who chaired the meeting, was reported as saying 'there ought not be an overall shortage given the numbers trained over the last four years'. She could not give a commitment that MAFF Veterinary Officers (VOs) would be available to carry out ante-mortem checks.

5.60 Miss Allan (Institution of Environmental Health Officers - IEHO) asked whether authorities should take out insurance policies to compensate plants that could not operate because of local authorities' failure to provide an inspection service. Mrs Brown was reported as saying that MAFF did not expect to close plants for this reason, and that competent vets from EC Member States could be granted emergency designations to work in plants. ²⁶

5.61 On 10 December 1992, MAFF invited LACOTS to consider whether local authorities might welcome MAFF assistance in the recruitment of OVSs from other Member States to fill vacancies within the UK. ²⁷

5.62 In oral evidence, Brian Etheridge (formerly of the Association of District Councils) told the Inquiry of the difficulties local authorities faced employing OVSs:

. . . local authorities were having enormous difficulty in securing the offices of veterinary surgeons. Those that they did were often engaged in private practice and therefore were not able to spend the greatest part of their commitment to this post. Some local authorities were also complaining to us that once at the plant they were unsure of their responsibilities, were not entirely sure why they were there. And local authorities, I think sadly, in a way, did not encourage the employment of these vets to become part of the management system of the local authority, so perhaps understandably they felt slightly detached and confused. ²⁸

5.63 The 1994 report by EC veterinary inspectors of the results of their surveillance missions to UK slaughterhouses operating under derogation (as discussed above in paragraphs 5.20-5.23 in relation to hygiene standards) commented that 'OVSs were insufficient in number and in presence ie, the slaughterhouses were not supervised in accordance with the Directive'. ²⁹ The report went on to describe how the inadequacy of the veterinary supervision was exacerbated by the following factors, some of which we have mentioned earlier in this section:

The OVS line-managers were non-veterinarians who themselves were not line-managed by the State Veterinary Service of MAFF;

AMIs and EHOs are not placed under the authority and responsibility of the OVS who is therefore not assisted by auxiliaries;

OVSs are employed by local authorities in such a way that their role is considerably reduced vis-à-vis the requirements of the Directive, and in some cases virtually confined to that of assessing certain animals at ante-mortem inspection;

Since local authorities employ individual OVSs, practices containing OVSs or companies employing OVSs, there is no guarantee of continuity and there is little if any coherence in terms of veterinary control. ³⁰

Deregulatory pressures in Government and the effect on meat hygiene

5.64 The Conservative Government began emphasising the need for Government Departments to identify options for removing regulatory controls, as part of the policy on 'lifting the burden from business' during 1992. This deregulation initiative was often at odds with the enforcement of meat hygiene standards within slaughterhouses, particularly with the move towards the higher standards required by the approaching European Single Market.

5.65 On 13 October 1992, Mr Gummer discussed with Mr Derek Andrews, MAFF Permanent Secretary, Mr Capstick, and other MAFF officials the enforcement of regulations in relation to red meat hygiene, particularly in the context of the soon-to-be-introduced European Single Market. A minute describing their discussion stated:

Overall, the Minister said that he wished to give a policy steer. The mood of the public had changed; they were now more worried about overzealous enforcement than about the risk of food poisoning. MAFF's policies should therefore be as relaxed as possible while still protecting public health. In particular, it should not be suggested that the problem of over detailed enforcement was due to the EC. ³¹

5.66 The approach to food safety in light of the Government's emphasis on deregulation was highlighted on 3 November 1992, when representatives of DH, including Baroness Cumberlege, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, ³² met with Mr Soames, Mr Capstick and other representatives of MAFF. The minutes of the meeting recorded:

Ministers agreed that EC directives now dictate the content of much UK food safety legislation. The impact of many vertical (i.e. product specific) directives was proving burdensome on the food industry as was the way the FSA and hygiene regulations were being enforced . . . Ministers agreed there should be a joint policy in the light of the Government's drive for deregulation and the avoidance of undue burdens on business, to ensure that legislation was not enforced over-zealously at the local level. Two tests of any proposals were, in Lady Cumberlege's view, whether there was a serious health problem and what the effects were on industry (since unemployment could lead to ill health). Mr. Soames agreed that both Departments should work jointly for a less regulatory approach to food safety, provided that public health was protected. It was agreed that there was a need to have particular regard to small producers. ³³

5.67 The Prime Minister, Mr John Major, in a letter to Mr Gummer dated 30 November 1992, described his views on the need for deregulation, and the role of meat hygiene controls:

. . . I am absolutely determined to reduce the burden of regulation on business. The regulatory burden we are imposing on business frustrates enterprise, innovation and growth. Regulations result in lost jobs, reduced international competitiveness and higher public expenditure. We must change all this.

. . .

We also need to look at the new rules on meat hygiene which have caused alarm to local business, including butchers and village shops selling meat. Do we go too far in bowing to EC pressure on such things? ³⁴

5.68 The Government's approach to deregulation was again highlighted on 2 February 1993, when the DTI issued a press release entitled 'Government goes to war on red tape'. Michael Heseltine, President of the Board of Trade, ³⁵ was quoted as follows:

There is general agreement across the Government that the time has come to weed out the sort of regulation which is over-bureaucratic and places excessive burdens on business and on the public. ³⁶

5.69 Deregulatory achievements since April 1992 and proposals for further deregulation were listed, including a proposal of 'easing controls on small slaughterhouses'. ³⁷

5.70 Deregulation in the face of the forthcoming European single standard in meat and its effect on meat hygiene was raised on 1 April 1993, when a Steering Committee establishing the MHS had its first meeting. ³⁸ The minutes noted that Mr Keith Meldrum, CVO:

. . . did not accept that implementation of the Fresh Meat Directive was an example of over-regulation. Local authorities had failed to maintain standards of hygiene of operation in domestic slaughterhouses and in many cases, visits by EC Inspectors would result in demands for closure. ³⁹

5.71 On 22 October 1993, the MAFF Parliamentary Secretary, Lord Howe ⁴⁰, announced a seven-point plan of deregulation. ⁴¹ Mrs Brown described it in her statement to us:

This plan . . . included the introduction of a slaughterhouse performance monitoring system (the Hygiene Assessment System or HAS) designed to focus the attention of the enforcement officers on real hygiene risks and to promote consistency of enforcement in the run-up to the MHS. This system focused on the general requirements of the hygiene legislation and did not specifically assess handling of specified bovine offal which at this point was not perceived as a key public health (as opposed to animal health) problem. ⁴²

5.72 Mr David Taylor, Head, Red Meat Hygiene Veterinary Section, and Mr Alick Simmons, Senior Veterinary Officer (Red Meat) Division, Meat Hygiene Veterinary Section, SVS ⁴³, discussed the role of the SVS in implementing the move in slaughterhouses towards the standards in meat hygiene required under the European Single Market. This role was often in conflict with the deregulation initiative. In evidence to the Inquiry, Mr Simmons told us:

It is worth pointing out we were also working in a culture in which ministers had made public announcements where they said that veterinary officers will be sensible pragmatic and flexible in their interpretation of the legislation when it comes to licensed slaughterhouses. That message could not be ignored. ⁴⁴

5.73 Mr Taylor said:

In 1992, we were given a very definite political steer by the then Minister that - I forget the exact words - but it was something to the effect that the public was more concerned with over-zealous implementation than with - and I think it was public health issues, or something of that sort. But certainly the first part of the statement was that the public was more concerned with over-zealous implementations. And the RMHAs in the field who were carrying out the licensing responsibility were despondent because they were being asked to license plants which, in their opinion, were not always fit to be licensed and there was the possibility for derogation for a period of years after 1st January 1993. A large proportion of the slaughter industry took advantage of that opportunity. And the RMHAs were then required to advise them of what standards they needed to reach in order to obtain a licence.

So that was the background, that was the atmosphere in which they were trying to give this advice. It was not a happy time. ⁴⁵

5.74 Mr Mike Ashley and Mr Mark Du Val, representing local authority organisations, ⁴⁶ told us of their concerns at the deregulation drive and the problem that it represented for local authorities in enforcing food and meat hygiene regulations:

MR ASHLEY: . . . It was something I was concerned with at the time. The associations, indeed the associations were concerned about the Government policy in respect of a strong deregulatory campaign, and also the linked - I think they bounced off each other - and the linked sort of media campaign that was run. It was particularly associated with an Observer journalist Mr Christopher Booker who wrote a series of articles around this time, who very much portrayed local authority enforcement officials as 'little Hitlers'. That in many ways picked up and reflected an increasing Government campaign to go for so-called 'light touch' regulation.

Another feature of it which is very clearly linked was that following many of the food scares of the late 1980s, that had been part of the reason why a quite robust Food Safety Act was brought in in 1990, which tried to, in a sense, push the pendulum towards regulation, but a couple of years later the Government was clearly signalling in various ways that a pretty light touch in applying this and many other regulations ought to be used. And frankly it did contribute to a considerable level of confusion and concern in the regulatory enforcement community generally about what they were supposed to do. On the one hand there were many concerns, environmental and food safety, that people were concerned about, and on the other Government was giving some very strong signals that business could be relied on to look after their own regulation and that local authorities ought to apply a pretty light touch.

SIR NICHOLAS PHILLIPS: How was that message coming across to the local authorities? You said in various ways?

MR ASHLEY: Ministerial speeches. I think - I cannot recall any specific circulars that colleagues perhaps can. There is no question that the Government Ministers were making it clear in various ways that they wanted to signal a much more deregulatory approach.

SIR NICHOLAS PHILLIPS: Was this message in any way being conveyed by MAFF officials?

MR DU VAL: I think the answer to that is yes. MAFF actually published a deregulation plan which set out very clearly MAFF's views on these things. I think because a lot of the media attention seemed to be focusing on food related matters, partly because at the time one was seeing a significant upheaval in food legislation and the product specific Directives being implemented and things like that. So I think yes, people did very much link it to MAFF as being one of the loudest voices in that area. ⁴⁷

5.75 Mrs Brown, in oral evidence to us, discussed the pressure on MAFF to proceed with improving the enforcement methods in slaughterhouses and introducing the MHS, in a political climate of deregulation:

. . . The deregulation initiative was a very important part of Government policy during 1992 onwards, and it did mean that all the regulations we were responsible for were under very close scrutiny, and we needed to be very clear that everything we were doing was properly justified on public health grounds and was not simply regulation for the sake of regulation, and was not being enforced overzealously, which is rather different from being enforced properly. That meant that we were very much under scrutiny in everything we were doing in relation to setting up the hygiene service and slaughterhouses, and constructing some fairly robust arguments to try and satisfy other parts of Whitehall that our policy of tightening up on enforcement in slaughterhouses would actually deliver public health benefits. ⁴⁸

5.76 Mr Soul told us that in relation to the work leading up to the introduction of the MHS in 1994 and 1995:

I have to come back to this constant conflict which existed throughout that period between seeking deregulation, but at the same time seeking the highest possible standards. ⁴⁹

Discussion

5.77 We have described the standards of meat hygiene in slaughterhouses in the period up to 31 March 1995 in some detail. We have also described the system for enforcing the various statutory regulations that applied to slaughterhouse operations. These set the context in which the SBO Regulations fell to be implemented and enforced.

5.78 It is important to appreciate that the shortcomings that we have described in the first part of this chapter related to general standards of hygiene. During the period covered by this chapter there were no reports that criticised the task of removing from the carcass those tissues that were unfit for human consumption and, in particular, the specified bovine offal (SBO). Nor was there criticism during this period of the performance by the meat inspectors of their duty to ensure that all such tissues had been removed, before the health stamp was applied to indicate that meat was fit for human consumption.

5.79 Our initial reaction was that poor standards of general hygiene were likely to be accompanied by similarly poor standards of removal of SBO and that if those responsible for enforcing hygiene regulations were failing to do so they would be likely to be demonstrating a similar laxity in ensuring that matter unfit for human consumption was removed in accordance with the Staining and Sterilisation Regulations and the SBO Regulations.

5.80 The evidence has persuaded us that this initial reaction was unfounded. When the MHS replaced the hundreds of local authorities responsible for regulatory enforcement in slaughterhouses, an internal audit of standards of implementation and enforcement of the SBO Regulations became possible. Monitoring by members of the SVS was also facilitated. Shortcomings in the removal of spinal cord were identified. These are described in Chapter 6 of this volume. Annex 1 to that Chapter shows that in the nine-month period from July 1995 to March 1996 segments of spinal cord were found by SVS staff on 23 occasions, involving 22 slaughterhouses. In most instances these were in portions of carcass that had been health stamped by the meat inspector. By a process of extrapolation it has been calculated that, on average, segments of spinal cord were probably left unremoved in four cases out of 1,000. ⁵⁰

5.81 Four cases out of 1,000 are four cases too many. But this is not a picture of a widespread failure to comply with the Regulations requiring removal of SBO from that part of the carcass going into the human food chain. We do not think it is in any way comparable to the failures to comply with hygiene requirements. On the contrary, it suggests that in general the removal of the spinal cord was carried out efficiently and effectively. We have commented in Chapter 3 on the inevitability of the occasional failure to remove spinal cord, an inevitability that was recognised by the paper on slaughterhouse practices prepared for SEAC's sixth meeting, which we have discussed in Chapter 4.

5.82 The results of the SVS surveillance in 1995, coupled with those of the Eville & Jones Survey (see Chapter 6) and of the MHS internal Hygiene Advice Team survey (see Chapter 6) indicate that, in a small minority of slaughterhouses, inadequate attention was paid to the requirement to remove all of the spinal cord. We do not find this surprising.

5.83 The fact that meat inspection was a responsibility shared among so many different authorities and exercised in such a wide variety of slaughterhouses would have made it difficult, if not impossible, for MAFF to bring about a significant improvement in standards of implementation and enforcement of the removal of the spinal cord beyond those described above. In the event, MAFF did not attempt to do so until after the introduction of the MHS. This was because it was only then that failures to remove spinal cord were reported and attention was focused on the significance of these. At the same time the existence of a single enforcement authority enabled effective measures to be taken, including the injection of additional resources, which enabled 100 per cent removal of the spinal cord to become a realistic target.

5.84 With one exception, ⁵¹ the Veterinary Field Service (VFS) failed to report any failures to remove spinal cord during the period 1990 to 31 March 1995. We will consider the reason for this failure after we have described the events leading up to the institution of the MHS.