Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
3. Introduction of the ban on Specified Bovine Offal
Consideration of baby food and cull cows
Initial discussions in MAFF
MAFF's consideration of removing cull cows from the food chain
MAFF contacts DH for advice on which types of high-risk offal to ban in baby foods
The Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food (the Richmond Committee)

Initial discussions in MAFF

3.146 The Food Standards Division in MAFF had responsibility for advising on and preparing the legislation for the proposed baby food offal ban. On 28 February 1989 Mr Cockbill noted that the prohibition was to be limited to processed foods, and that there was no intention to restrict the sale of offal itself at retail level. He suggested that instructions to MAFF's Legal Department should propose freestanding Regulations, rather than an amendment to the Meat Product Regulations. ¹

3.147 On 3 March 1989 Dr Woolfe of Food Science Division minuted Mr Cockbill about baby food. He said that the Southwood Working Party had in effect been advising that any offal at risk of transmitting BSE should not be used in baby foods. On this basis, other organs such as endocrine and pituitary glands should be included in the definition of 'offal'. He also suggested that it would be logical to extend the prohibition to products derived from these types of offal. ²

3.148 Mr Cockbill replied to Dr Woolfe on 8 March 1989. He agreed with Dr Woolfe that it was necessary to ensure that all the potential carriers of the 'virus' were covered by the Regulations. However, he added:

We need however to be wary of casting the net too wide in case we catch products for which there is no justification on restricting them. What I have in mind here is your suggestion that we should also cover all products produced from offals. ³

MAFF's consideration of removing cull cows from the food chain

3.149 Meanwhile, on 21 March 1989, the Parliamentary Secretary, Mr Donald Thompson, asked Mr Lawrence to consider the possibility of a measure requiring that cull cows (and possibly old bulls, rams and ewes) be excluded from human consumption. He also asked for advice on whether legal powers existed to do this, and whether the 'economic consequences' (compensation) would be welcome. The minute from his Private Secretary said:

His reason for suggesting this is that these animals could be culled before they start to display the external symptoms of BSE which would, in other animals, mean that they were not sent for human consumption. Mr Thompson appreciates that this would be an ultra-precautionary measure. ⁴

3.150 In oral evidence Sir Donald said he had always been worried about subclinical animals whose brains might have been infected before clinical symptoms were exhibited. He was concerned that these cattle might have been entering the human food chain:

If the disease was subclinical, and the disease was subclinical, it seemed to me that the place it would gather was in the brain. So we had always - I had always - worried about subclinical animals whose brains were affected. ⁵

3.151 Mr Meldrum, in his evidence to the Inquiry, commented that Mr Thompson's initial query was one of the 'factors contributing to the gradual thinking process' that led to the eventual SBO ban. ⁶

3.152 On 29 March 1989 Mr Lawrence minuted Mr Cruickshank in response to Mr Thompson's query about cull cattle. ⁷

2. Presumably the logic behind the proposition is that older animals will have been incubating the disease for some years but will not have quite reached the stage where clinical signs become manifest. The counter argument is that they would have exhibited clinical disease prior to the point when they are culled, if disease were to be present in the animal. This is on the basis that the majority of clinical cases are occurring in the 3-5 age bracket and that a significant proportion of cull cows are over 5 years of age when slaughtered. ⁸

3.153 He noted that the Southwood Working Party had considered subclinical cattle entering the food chain, and concluded that it was unlikely that BSE would have any implications for human health:

4. For the reasons described I see no human health reasons for taking measures which would keep cull cows and old bulls out of the food chain. In the case of scrapie in sheep the point has been made that a link between the disease and CJD has not been established. Neither is there any evidence that scrapie, which has been present for over 200 years in this country, has ever posed a human health risk. Again I see no grounds for taking the suggested measures in relation to cull rams or ewes. ⁹

3.154 On 30 March 1989 Mr Meldrum minuted Mr Lawrence, saying:

I agree with the thrust of your minute of 29 March and that the Parliamentary Secretary should be advised that his suggestion should not be pursued.

In particular:-

1. We can hardly now go farther than the Southwood recommendations.

2. If we were to go further we would have to consult Southwood and this would be presentationally extremely difficult.

3. To remove all cull ruminants would be seen as a gross over-reaction and would run counter to the line that we have taken previously, e.g. there is no known hazard from either scrapie or BSE to human health. ¹⁰

3.155 Mr Meldrum also commented that Mr Andrews was concerned about some of the adverse publicity MAFF was receiving about the use of brains in human food and intended to raise this with Mr MacGregor. He added that Mr MacGregor might wish to reopen the issue and possibly seek a voluntary restraint on the use of brains and spinal cords in human food. He therefore advised Mr Lawrence that it might be wise to 'knock the cull scheme on the head' but 'leave the door open fractionally on the end use of brains and spinal cords originating from adult cattle and sheep'. ¹¹ At this time, it does not appear that Mr Thompson was notified of Mr Meldrum's and Mr Lawrence's opinions on his suggestion.

3.156 At a meeting with Mr Thompson on 3 April 1989, representatives from Compassion in World Farming expressed concern that offal was being banned from baby food but not from meat pies and other meat products. ¹²

Mr Meldrum requests a draft paper on cull cattle

3.157 On 5 April 1989 Mr Thompson and Mr Meldrum discussed the disposal of brains and spinal cords of adult cattle and sheep. Mr Meldrum noted that Mr Thompson's concerns about cull animals related to the remote risk associated with the consumption of brain and spinal cord derived from cows, bulls, ewes and rams at the end of their working lives.

3.158 On 10 April 1989 Mr Meldrum asked Mr Lawrence to prepare a draft paper on the issue of removing cull cattle from the food chain, in consultation with Mr Bradley. Mr Bradley and Dr Watson received a copy of this minute. Mr Meldrum explained that Mr Thompson recognised that such a change of direction would be presentationally difficult and that it would almost certainly involve approaching Sir Richard Southwood for his view. Mr Meldrum added:

We shall need to assess the available evidence on the presence of the scrapie agent in various materials, to remind ourselves of the Southwood recommendations and to outline the presentational difficulties that would occur were we to change our line at this time. It would certainly indicate that we were far more concerned than we were at the time of the publication of the Southwood Report and would be presentationally extremely difficult. ¹³

3.159 On the same day Mr Lawrence put forward advice to Mr Thompson noting that the Southwood Working Party's recommendation that clinically affected animals should be destroyed was made purely as a precautionary measure. He reiterated that there was no evidence that scrapie had posed a risk to human health and noted:

The legal position in relation to this proposal is that in the absence of any evidence that the cull animals are diseased or any reasonable suspicion that they may be diseased and, furthermore, in the absence of any evidence that if such animals were diseased that it could be transmitted to humans from the meat or offal obtained from them, any prohibition on the consumption of such material would be ultra vires. ¹⁴

3.160 The economic effects of excluding cull cows and ewes from the food chain were noted as being very significant. Mr Lawrence concluded:

7. Clearly, of paramount concern, is human health. In this context, for the reasons given, there would not appear to be human health grounds for taking such action. Southwood made no such recommendations and I can see no reason to take further measures. If we were to consider doing so we would presumably need to consult Sir Richard again, and that would be presentationally very difficult. In view of this and the legal, economic and practical problems which would arise, the firm advice is not to take this any further. However, if the Parliamentary Secretary is still concerned about this he may wish to discuss the whole issue with officials. ¹⁵

3.161 See paragraphs 3.204-3.206 for an account of the submission that eventually went forward to Mr Thompson in May 1989.

Mr Bradley's note to Dr William Watson on 'BSE - Disposal of brains and spinal cords from aged-cull cattle and sheep'

3.162 On 12 April 1989 Mr Bradley sent a note to Dr Watson in response to Mr Meldrum's minute of 10 April 1989. He made the following point:

1. BSE is a notifiable disease and in theory no clinically affected animals should enter abattoirs. Brain and cord will however be infected pre-clinically though not to such a high titre as in clinically affected animals. It is even more important to recognise that spleen and lymphoid tissues and gut will be infected in the pre-clinical stage. Why is there no concern about this?

3.163 He noted from personal experience the problem of carcasses being split in a manner that caused serious contamination of the meat from spinal cords and risks to abattoir workers of exposure to the BSE agent. He also said:

In sheep natural scrapie agent is detectable in gut and spleen at 14 months and brain at 25 (Hadlow 1983). Richard Kimberlin may think less. Based on this information we can expect lymphoreticular infection in cattle during the second year of life and brain soon after. It can therefore be anticipated that even in infected BSE animals destined to get clinical disease at say 4 years infectivity will certainly be in lymphoreticular tissue and possibly also in brain and cord even at normal slaughter age.

3.164 Mr Bradley discussed scrapie, and noted that 'since 1985 BSE infected material via rendered products may have been exposed to sheep . . . If BSE is a danger to humans, however unlikely, we must assume 1989 scrapie (or rather an unknown proportion of it) is also a potential risk.' He then continued:

7. In dealing with the problems presented in the CVO's minute (and there is clearly some earlier information which is not presented) we are required to make some form of risk assessment. Two points arise:-

(a) Inherent risk in known (scrapie) or assumed (BSE) infected tissues; and

(b) Cross contamination of otherwise 'clean' or low risk tissues by standard abattoir and butchers techniques.

It is quite clear that in an infected animal in the late pre-clinical phase (ie that which concerns the Parliamentary Secretary) that lymphoreticular tissues, certain other tissues including some endocrines and gut plus CNS are highly likely to be infected to a high titre of significance to humans if the agent is transmissible to them. Muscle however is likely to be safe except if it is cross-contaminated.

It is a big step to take to try to eliminate certain items from the food chain. However it would be relatively simple to reduce risks considerably by sending for rendering or incinerating specified easily identified, organs and ensuring the necessary training and adjusted slaughter and butchering procedures to reduce cross-contamination. Spleen, uteri (assuming a pregnancy and fetal membrane infection), all endocrines, heads (unopened but after removal of muscular tissue) and spinal cord from sheep over 1 year and cattle over 2½ years could be designated unsaleable for human consumption.

I specifically recall advising Dr Martin on the infectivity of spleen and lymphoid tissue and this is reported in paragraph 5.3.5 of Professor Southwood's Report. The report states the risks as currently perceived do not justify even labelling of food containing brain and spleen so why has the concern increased since the publication of the report only a few weeks ago?

3.165 Mr Bradley discussed the problem of cross-contamination of 'clean' carcasses with potentially infected material. He concluded:

9. Scientifically, there is no doubt a risk that scrapie/BSE agent is present in abattoirs and butchers. The risk factors to humans are presumed but not actually known to be low. We either must stick to our guns on the basis scrapie has been safe for 200 years (for humans) and 'forget' sheep and deal with cattle on the same basis or adopt some precautionary measures. This might be done on prohibiting certain specified organs to be used for human food but by ignoring potential cross-contamination. Extreme measures might be possible but are likely to be very costly, impractical and result in over-reaction. Another technique would be to give information and guidance to the public but let them (and the individuals) make their own judgement. On balance there would not be much less to elimination (on an age basis) of specified tissues from adult cattle alone (ie those Mr Thompson is concerned with). If brain and spinal cord alone were identified it would be illogical to not also include spleen (and placenta).

10. It would seem sensible that the vertebral column (including perhaps because of its proximity the pelvis) is not permitted to be used for human food (eg bone broth/gelatin) since it is highly likely to be seriously contaminated in an infected animal exposed in calfhood. You might consider not permitting recovery of meat scraps from vertebral column. ¹⁶

3.166 We have set out this note in detail, for much of it was highly relevant to issues which were to arise later. It was a manuscript note and Mr Bradley did not know what Mr Watson made of it. ¹⁷ Mr Lawrence could not remember whether he saw the note or discussed its contents with Mr Bradley. ¹⁸

MAFF contacts DH for advice on which types of high-risk offal to ban in baby foods

3.167 On 28 March 1989 Mr Cockbill had sought advice from Dr Pickles on high-risk types of offal which might be subject to the proposed baby food regulations. He also commented that opinions were already being expressed that a similar offal ban should be introduced for meat products consumed by adults and older children. ¹⁹

3.168 Dr Pickles responded to Mr Cockbill's request for information on 13 April after seeking advice from Dr Richard Kimberlin (an independent consultant on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), who had been Director of the NPU. ²⁰ She noted that she was not persuaded that this was a matter in which the CMO should be involved. Dr Pickles recommended that while the spleen, intestines, spinal cord and thymus should be subject to the Regulations, pancreas and tailmeat should not be included. She considered this meat safe and not susceptible to the BSE agent, although she acknowledged that it should be recognised that the level of suspicion about these types of offal was higher than other tissue.

3.169 In relation to the offal ban involving baby food, but not other food, Dr Pickles said:

The justification for exclusion of these tissues from baby food and not all food is based on uncertain data. There is suspicion that the young of a species are more susceptible to spongiform encephalopathies than adults, but it is difficult to separate out the confounding factors of differential relative exposure and life expectancy from true susceptibility . . . I think you have no alternative but to restrict the regulations to food promoted for use by babies. If we were persuaded that the risk was appreciable, then more rigorous steps would have been taken to promulgate advice against feeding of offal to babies. Whilst we are being low key on this, extension of regulations - say to label other offal-containing food as unsuitable for babies - might be seen as overkill. Nevertheless, I would favour full disclosure about offal and thymus content on all food and gentle persuasion to food manufacturers to look to other ingredients. So if public pressure, or new scientific evidence, means this position needs to be modified in future, manufacturers are well prepared. ²¹

3.170 On 18 April 1989 Miss C Bowles (Private Secretary to Mr Thompson, 1988-89) minuted Mr Lawrence to say that Mr Thompson wanted advice on the removal of the brain and certain types of offal of cull cows from the human food chain, not the whole animal. ²² MAFF officials had already persuaded him to abandon the idea of the latter in Mr Lawrence's submission of 10 April. ²³

3.171 On 20 April 1989 Mr Cockbill sent a minute to Mr Lawrence giving detailed information which he had acquired as to the extent to which types of bovine offal were used in foodstuffs. ²⁴ He explained why this information had been obtained:

When we were instructed following acceptance of the Southwood Report to prepare regulations prohibiting the use of offals in baby foods it was evident to us that it was a very short side step from that position to questions being asked about the use of offals in meat products designed for the general population but which could well be consumed by young children or adolescents. We particularly recognise such products as burgers and sausages which are both currently controlled by the Meat Products and Spreadable Fish Products Regulations 1984. Our thoughts along these lines were in fact echoed by some press articles which have suggested that if it is necessary to ban offals in baby foods it should perhaps be necessary to ban offals in all meat products. In the light of that it was clear to us that when the proposed regulations prohibiting offals in baby foods were circulated for comment, as they have to be under the terms of the Food Act, we needed to be prepared to answer questions about similar action against meat products generally . . .

We are not seeking to amend the Meat Products Regulations but as indicated above it is necessary to forearm ourselves against reactions to the baby foods proposal. I would certainly agree that if as a result of the consultation on the baby foods proposals Ministers were forced to consider the question of offals in meat products generally we would need to go back both to the Department of Health and to Prof. Sir Richard Southwood for views before considering proceeding along that particular track. ²⁵

The Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food (the Richmond Committee)

3.172 Health and Agriculture Ministers set up the Committee on the Microbiological Safety of Food, under the chairmanship of Sir Mark Henry Richmond ²⁶ (hereafter referred to as the Richmond Committee), on 21 February 1989. The Committee's terms of reference were:

To advise the Secretary of State for Health, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretaries of State for Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, on matters remitted to it by Ministers relating to the microbiological safety of food and on such matters as it considers need investigation. ²⁷

3.173 The joint secretaries to the Committee were Mr Chris J Ryder (of MAFF's Food Safety, Fertilisers and Feedingstuffs Standards Division) and Dr Eileen Rubery, PMO at DH.

3.174 On 14 April 1989 Dr Pickles raised with Dr Rubery the question of whether the Richmond Committee should be invited to consider BSE. She enclosed a draft paper for the Committee, which included a number of questions relating to food 'that might be regarded as still being unresolved'. ²⁸

3.175 On the same day Dr Rubery told the Richmond Committee Shadow Group that Dr Pickles felt that there were some loose ends on BSE that the Richmond Committee ought to follow up. ²⁹ This suggestion was rejected by Mrs Attridge, Mr Crawford and Mr George Thomson (Department for Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland - DAFS), who considered that the idea was 'pointless so soon after the Southwood Report and likely to undermine for no good reason the assurances Southwood gave to the public.' ³⁰ Mr Cruickshank subsequently endorsed this view. ³¹

3.176 Shortly after 14 April, Dr Rubery drafted a letter to Sir Mark Richmond which stated that there was no substantial new information since the Southwood Report, but that:

There are clearly a number of unresolved questions on which more information is needed before any sensible judgement can be made. ³²

3.177 These were the questions that had been identified by Dr Pickles. Dr Rubery had set them out as follows:

1. How much evasion of the slaughter order is taking place (compensation is only 50%) and consequently how many clinically affected animals are still being eaten?

2. Should CMO's recommendation that offal not be fed to babies be promulgated more widely?

3. Should the ban of offal in baby food be extended to include (i) pancreas (sweetbread), oxtail (rich in peripheral nerves) and possibly even liver and kidney and/or (ii) to all processed food for human use or even (iii) to a total ban on sale for human consumption of some beef offal?

4. Should we be more cautious about scrapie in sheep, particularly since we cannot be sure that the agent has not increased in virulence in recent years, hence leading to BSE?

5. Since the ruminant feed ban came into effect, even more potentially BSE- and scrapie-infected material is being fed to poultry and pigs. Should this worry us? (poultry have been shown able to carry the infection of TME [Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy]). ³³

3.178 The draft letter closed with the suggestion that consideration of these issues should await the results of further research. ³⁴ This letter was not sent to Sir Mark Richmond, as Mr Chris J Ryder objected to it. ³⁵

3.179 Later, on 30 April 1989, Sir Donald Acheson minuted Dr Diana Walford, a Senior PMO in DH:

I understand that various issues relating to BSE are being proposed for discussion at Richmond. My view is that unless there are very good reasons, BSE should not be discussed at that Committee so soon after the Southwood Report. I would wish personally to clear any question which was felt to be sufficiently important to justify re-opening the issue at this stage. ³⁶

3.180 Sir Donald Acheson discussed this decision in his written evidence.

I advised that as the Southwood Report had been published only three months previously, it was premature to reopen the matter unless there were very good reasons (ie new developments) to do so. In the absence of those it would imply a lack of confidence in the Working Party's conclusions if the Richmond Committee were to consider BSE. This was not, in my view, warranted. ³⁷

3.181 The Richmond Committee accepted Mr Ryder's suggestion that, in the absence of further data, consideration of BSE was inappropriate. ³⁸