Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
3. Introduction of the ban on Specified Bovine Offal
Events leading up to the publication of the Southwood Report on 27 February 1989
Receipt of the Report
Initial discussions between MAFF and Sir Richard Southwood
Initial views within MAFF about the suggestion on baby food
Preparation of advice to the Cabinet on the Southwood Working Party Report and the Government's proposed response
Sir Richard Southwood 'clarifies' the definition of offal

Receipt of the Report

3.16 On 6 February 1989 Dr Hilary Pickles PMO (DH), sent the Chief Medical Officer (CMO), Sir Donald Acheson, a copy of her informal note of the Southwood Working Party's final meeting on 3 February 1989. She said that the Report should be with him in a day or two, that the plan was for the Report to be presented to the DH and MAFF Ministers later that week, and that it was hoped that the Report would be published quickly. She also said:

In my view, DH can be very pleased with the way the report has turned out. Sir Richard and his team are to be congratulated. ¹

3.17 On 7 February 1989 Mr Alan Lawrence (MAFF, Animal Health Division) minuted Mr (later Sir) Derek Andrews (MAFF Permanent Secretary) and others in MAFF regarding the final meeting of the Working Party. On the likely timetable of events Mr Lawrence commented:

It is likely that the final version of the Report will be submitted to our respective Ministers by the end of this week. Sir Richard Southwood will then seek an early meeting with Ministers to consider publication and how it should be presented to the media. Urgent consideration will, therefore, need to be given to the Minister's response. I think we should certainly point out the need for time to digest its contents and consider the recommendations. On the other hand there is a case for moving fairly quickly to minimise the chance of leaks or speculation about its contents. ²

3.18 The Southwood Report was delivered to Mr Kenneth Clarke, the Secretary of State for Health, and to Mr John MacGregor, Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, on 9 February 1989. ³ The Report made a number of specific recommendations with implications for human health. Of these the response to the recommendation on potential occupational risks from BSE is dealt with in Chapter 8 of this volume. The recommendation on medicinal products is covered in vol. 7: Medicines and Cosmetics and the recommendation on CJD surveillance is covered in vol. 8: Variant CJD.

3.19 The Southwood Working Party's advice that manufacturers of baby food should avoid the use of ruminant offal and thymus started a chain of events that led to the eventual introduction of a ban on Specified Bovine Offal (SBO). This advice was not in the section of the Report on the Working Party's recommendations, but was included in the section on transmission of BSE in paragraph 5.3.5:

. . . the risk of transmission of BSE to humans appears remote. Nevertheless, because the possibility that BSE could be transmitted orally cannot be entirely ruled out, known affected cattle should not enter the human food chain and action now undertaken ensures this. What evidence there is does not suggest that milk can transmit any of the spongiform encephalopathies. Nevertheless, to be consistent with the earlier recommendation that cattle known to be infected with BSE should not be offered for human consumption, we have recommended that milk from cows suspected as having BSE should be destroyed. Action has also been taken here. Finally if the BSE agent were to be present in an animal it is most likely to be in the spleen and lymphatic tissues in the early stages of infection, and as the disease progresses in the brain and neural tissue. It has been suggested, although clinically affected cattle are being slaughtered and destroyed, that consideration should be given to products containing brain and spleen being so labelled, to enable the consumer to make an informed choice. The Working Party believes that the risks as at present perceived would not justify this measure. We note that current regulations ⁴ that require contents of processed food to be listed permit the generic terms "meat" and "offal". We consider that manufacturers of baby foods should avoid the use of ruminant offal and thymus; the latter can currently be described on food labels as meat. ⁵

3.20 The Report provided no definition of what was meant by 'ruminant offal'. The reasoning behind the Working Party's comment on baby food is considered in vol. 4: The Southwood Working Party, 1988-89.

Sir Donald Acheson submits the report to Mr Clarke

3.21 In his covering minute to Mr Clarke of 9 February 1989 enclosing a copy of the Report, Sir Donald Acheson identified that the key issue in respect of human health was whether the disease could be transmitted to man through the consumption of meat, brain or milk of infected animals. He described the Report as a 'thorough study of the problem with sound and balanced conclusions' and recommended that it be published as soon as possible. However, he cautioned that careful handling was required given the possible public anxiety that might arise as a result of its publication. ⁶

3.22 Sir Donald noted that the Working Party had concluded that it was most unlikely that BSE would have any implications for human health. He continued:

A difficult aspect of the problem is that if transmission did occur it would be several years before the cases began to appear as the incubation period is very long.

On the evidence given in the Report I accept that the risk to man has been extremely small and that (with one possible exception . . . ) every reasonable step has already been taken to minimise any theoretical risk of transmission by destruction of affected cattle. ⁷

3.23 The exception to which Sir Donald referred related to medicinal products. As to these Sir Donald stated:

. . . I am also putting work urgently in hand to satisfy myself that everything possible has been done to ensure . . . that transfer of the BSE agent in human and veterinary medicinal products does not occur. ⁸

3.24 Sir Donald had been alerted to concerns about medicines by Dr Pickles, as appears from a minute that he sent to Dr E L Harris (Deputy CMO, Medicines Division, DH 1988-89) on the same day. The minute stated:

My attention has been drawn to a sentence in Dr Pickles' draft of a submission to the Secretary of State on this matter. It reads: "At the present time we can't give any complete guarantee of safety for human medicines that use bovine materials in manufacture such as most vaccines." Having looked at the [Southwood] report I am not able to find any statement which supports this statement of concern. I have, however, therefore spoken to Dr Pickles on the telephone and she reports to me that for some considerable time she has had serious concern about the safety of bovine-based vaccines in the light of the fact it has been discovered that contamination with placental material (which is known to be heavily infected with the BSE particle) is a distinct possibility in the preparation of material for human vaccines derived from foetal serum. This matter as described to me by Dr Pickles gives me sufficient cause for concern to ask you to look into it urgently together with Medicines Divisions. ⁹

3.25 The response to the passages in the Southwood Report dealing with medicines is considered in vol. 7: Medicines and Cosmetics.

Mr Lawrence presents the report to MAFF Ministers

3.26 In a covering minute dated 9 February 1989 presenting the Report to MAFF Ministers, Mr Lawrence identified four main areas of particular interest to MAFF. These were the recycling of animal waste, biological medicinal products, research, and the use of ruminant offal in baby food. It was noted that 'presumably DOH will have to lead on any possible health implications'. Mr Lawrence copied his minute and the Report to interested divisions within MAFF and requested that 'they provide, very urgently, a preliminary assessment of the Report's contents.' ¹⁰

Initial discussions between MAFF and Sir Richard Southwood

3.27 Following receipt of the Report on 9 February 1989, Mr MacGregor and Sir Richard Southwood met on 14 February to discuss the Report's recommendations, timing of publication, and handling. Others present included Mr Donald Thompson (Parliamentary Secretary, MAFF), Mr Derek Andrews, Mr Keith Meldrum (Chief Veterinary Officer), Mr Alistair Cruickshank (Under-Secretary, Animal Health Group, MAFF), Mr Lawrence, Sir Donald Acheson and Dr Hilary Pickles.

3.28 The briefing note for the meeting prepared for Mr MacGregor by Mr Lawrence noted that the Working Party's advice on baby food was not a specific recommendation, and outlined a number of points:

• thymus was not used in the preparation of baby food;
• kidney and liver were used in baby food preparation, but no other offal was; and
• non-ruminant liver and kidneys could be used as ingredients. ¹¹

3.29 Mr Lawrence recommended that the Ministry should contact baby food manufacturers as a matter of urgency about avoiding the use of ruminant offal and thymus. ¹²

3.30 The minute describing the meeting recorded that MAFF would contact the baby food industry on how it might restrict the use of ruminant offal and thymus. It also noted that Mr MacGregor had observed that the baby food recommendation 'was likely to be the focus of press attention', and in the discussion which followed Sir Richard:

. . . commented that the point relating to baby food was not a specific recommendation. He could only say that the likelihood of problems arising through the use of these products in baby food was very low indeed and the suggestion was a counsel of 'extreme prudence'. ¹³

3.31 The minute also noted that officials 'should prepare papers to circulate to MISC 138 as soon as possible'. MISC 138 was the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Food Safety, chaired by the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, which had been constituted on 2 February 1989 to review current issues on food safety, including the adequacy of research programmes and possible requirements for legislation. ¹⁴

Initial views within MAFF about the suggestion on baby food

3.32 Meanwhile Mrs Attridge, then Head of the Emergencies, Food Quality and Pest Control Group at MAFF, ¹⁵ had received a copy of the Report. The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) had recommended that she be consulted on ingredients of baby food. ¹⁶ Mrs Attridge minuted Mr Cruickshank on 15 February 1989:

Liver and kidney, which are the major element of offal likely to be found in baby food, constitute an important part of the diet particularly for certain vitamins which babies need when they are moving on to solid food. Certain ethnic groups cannot eat pigs' liver and there could therefore be a risk of malnutrition if the rather vague recommendation in the Southwood report were to lead to the removal of cow and sheep liver and kidney from baby food. Moreover, the question would be asked whether it was safe for adults.

Presentationally it would be difficult for the Department of Agriculture to raise these points when it goes public on the Southwood report but I suggest that they are of sufficient importance for us to take up the matter with the CMO and to put in the press notice being issued on the Southwood report something on the lines:

'I understand the Committee did not have the opportunity to examine thoroughly all the scientific evidence relating to offal, particularly liver and kidney in human and baby food and I am therefore proposing to refer [I have therefore referred] the matter to the CMO to seek his advice before taking any further action.'

This would enable us to assess more fully what the actual risks are and what the risks are of any ban on liver and kidney in baby foods.

We do not wish to create problems for young children and ethnic minorities simply on the basis of poorly substantiated speculation. On the other hand, if there is clear evidence this must be taken into account. My understanding is that the evidence is not clear-cut and does need further consideration. ¹⁷

3.33 Mrs Attridge's comments reflected views communicated to Food Standards Division by Dr M L Woolfe of the Food Science Division. In a subsequent minute, which was copied to Mr Charles Cockbill (Head of Food Standards Division,1983-95, MAFF), Dr Woolfe observed:

The Committee's conclusion on baby foods does not appear to have been well thought out, and I am pleased that the matter may be referred to the CMO. The concern for baby foods derives from evidence that very young calves are more susceptible to the BSE agent than older ones. Comparing bovine and human life spans, it would appear more consistent to be concerned about young children and adolescents and not just babies . . .

The report reflects further concern in the use of certain offal in meat products and calls for its separate labelling. This is an issue which needs pursuing as a preventive measure. At present the Meat Products Regulations allow thymus to be used and described as meat in the ingredient list of any meat product. Brain, spleen and spinal cord can only be used in cooked meat products and will be labelled as the generic term 'offal'.

There are two approaches to achieving a change in these particular aspects of the regulations. Standards Division are reluctant to amend the regulations on this point because these are several problems which need resolving in the regulations and this could prolong amendment for a considerable time. The approach left is a voluntary one. The Southwood Report claims that provided safeguards are taken, BSE might be brought under control within 10 years. The Ministry could approach the various trade associations and request a voluntary ban on the use of ruminant thymus, spleen, brain and spinal cord either sold fresh or in meat products. Failing this their use could be allowed, but a voluntary request to label products indicating the presence of these organs. Although this would give the consumer an informed choice, it could also create unnecessary anxiety in the public as recent food scares have shown. ¹⁸

Preparation of advice to the Cabinet on the Southwood Working Party Report and the Government's proposed response

3.34 As part of the preparations for publication of the Report of the Southwood Working Party, MAFF took the lead in drafting a paper for the Cabinet Ministerial Group on Food Safety, MISC 138. On 17 February 1989 Mr Cruickshank minuted Mr MacGregor attaching a draft paper, a draft announcement and a draft Question and Answer (Q&A) brief prepared for the meeting of the Cabinet Group. Mr Cruickshank sent the same drafts to Mrs Dora Pease (Under Secretary, Health Services Division, January 1989-July 1992, DH) inviting her comments. Mrs Pease referred the documents for advice to Dr Pickles and Mr G T Weir (Head of Health Services Division, HS4, 1987-90). ¹⁹

3.35 The draft paper gave the background to BSE, the establishment of the Southwood Working Party, its recommendations and the Government's proposed response. The draft paper noted that:

The Working party concludes that from present evidence it is likely that cattle will prove to be a 'dead-end host' for the disease agent and most unlikely that BSE will have any implications for human health. ²⁰

3.36 The draft paper also noted that, despite the Working Party's general conclusions, they had made a number of recommendations aimed at minimising any possible risk to human health. On baby foods the draft paper stated:

The Working Party considers that the manufacturers of baby foods should, as a precautionary measure, avoid the use of ruminant offal and thymus. Sir Richard Southwood has told the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food that the likelihood of problems arising through the use of these products in baby food is very low indeed and that this suggestion is counsel of 'extreme prudence'. In practice thymus is not used in the preparation of baby foods but kidneys and liver are because of their nutritional value. Officials will contact manufacturers urgently to seek their reaction to the suggestion. ²¹

3.37 On the same day, Mr Cruickshank replied to Mrs Attridge's minute of 15 February, noting that he had received her minute only after he had circulated the draft paper for the Cabinet Group. He commented that consequently the draft paper did not include her suggested insertion on baby food. His response expressed some reluctance to go as far as Mrs Attridge proposed:

I do, however, wonder whether it would be appropriate to give as much prominence as you suggest to our doubts about the wisdom of excluding liver and kidney from baby foods. I fear that if we imply now that we think Southwood was mistaken in the advice he gave on this point we shall be exposing ourselves to considerable criticism by the media - regardless of the merits of the argument. I wonder if it might not be better to play this issue as slowly as possible. As suggested in para 7 of the MISC 138 paper, the first step might be for officials to contact the manufacturers; if their reaction is that the risk to health through removing cow and sheep liver and kidney from baby food outweighs the risk of transmitting BSE, it would then perhaps be appropriate for us to go back to the CMO. ²²

3.38 On 20 February 1989 Mrs Attridge minuted Mr Cruickshank expressing concern about the proposed line to take on baby food in the draft paper to the Cabinet Group and in the announcement. ²³ The minute was also copied to the offices of DH and MAFF Ministers, Mr Derek Andrews and Mr Richard Gueterbock (MAFF Special Adviser), Mr Capstick, Mr Meldrum, Mr Lawrence and others. ²⁴ In the minute, Mrs Attridge again raised her concern that MAFF would be asked why action should be taken on baby food, but not other food. She stated:

Unless we have some definitive answers to these questions we will be accused once more of spreading the maximum amount of uncertainty over products which have very considerable nutritional advantages for all sectors of the population on a scientific base which on current evidence does not appear to be clear-cut. ²⁵

Further development of the draft papers for the Cabinet Group in the light of Mr MacGregor's comments

3.39 Mr MacGregor's comments on the 17 February draft Cabinet Group paper were sent to Mr Cruickshank on 20 February. These included:

Paragraph 7 - add in to the end of the paragraph on baby foods - 'This however will be a sensitive area as soon as the report is published and will need careful handling.' . . .

A considerable amount of further thought needs to go into this particularly in light of Mrs Attridge's recent minute on the subject. ²⁶

3.40 Mr MacGregor accepted Mrs Attridge's recommendation that the matter should be referred to the CMO. He recalled in oral evidence:

I think that it was when Mrs Attridge raised the liver and kidney point that I realised we had an issue here that was quite a problem, and we needed to get further advice and further sorting of it out. ²⁷

3.41 Dr Pickles recorded the following in a minute to Dr Diana McInnes (Private Secretary to the CMO): ²⁸

1. We spoke about MacGregor's concern about baby food and how, if asked about beef liver and kidney, he was proposing replying:

I understand that the committee (Southwood's) did not have the opportunity to examine thoroughly all the scientific evidence relating to offal particularly liver and kidney in human and baby food. I therefore propose to refer the matter to the CMO to seek his advice before taking any further action.

2. Whilst we agree this was clearly passing the buck, I guess it's the best MacGregor can do. If CMO were content with this line, I could seek the appropriate information and advice - including from Sir Richard although I don't think it would be necessary to recall his group - and put together a paper on what information and opinions are available. Inevitably, it would mostly be based on what is known about the distribution and oral transmissibility of scrapie. It may be that little could be said without further research. ²⁹

3.42 On 21 February Mr Cruickshank circulated to MAFF Ministers and relevant officials a revised draft of the MISC 138 paper which had been amended in the light of MAFF Ministers' views. In particular it now included Mrs Attridge's suggestions about seeking advice from the CMO about liver and kidney in baby foods. Paragraph 7 of the revised draft paper stated:

The Working Party did not in fact examine all the scientific evidence relating to offal, particularly liver and kidney in baby food. The Chief Medical Officer will therefore be considering this further and advising on any action required. ³⁰

3.43 The Q&A brief attached to the draft paper circulated by Mr Cruickshank had been expanded to bring in substantial extra contributions from DH. It included the following:

Q. Why does Southwood suggest baby food manufacturers should avoid the use of ruminant offal and thymus?

A. Sir Richard has said that the likelihood of problems arising through the use of these products in baby food is very low indeed, and the suggestion (it is not a recommendation) is counsel of extreme prudence.

Q. What will Government do about this?

A. The Chief Medical Officer will consider and advise. ³¹

3.44 On 21 February Mr Cruickshank sent the revised draft paper and attachments to DH and asked for their final comments to enable MAFF to complete the draft before submission to the Prime Minister and other members of the Cabinet Group MISC 138. ³²

Consideration by the Cabinet of the Southwood Working Party's Report and proposed Government response

3.45 On 22 February 1989 Mr MacGregor submitted the finalised paper, including the text of the proposed announcement and briefing material, to the Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, and other members of the Cabinet Group MISC 138. ³³ His covering letter made reference to the very 'difficult presentational issues' arising from some of the recommendations including the recommendation on baby foods. Mrs Thatcher decided that the Southwood Report should be considered by the full Cabinet, rather than MISC 138.

3.46 On 23 February the full Cabinet discussed the Southwood Working Party's Report. The minute records that Mr MacGregor opened the meeting by stating that:

The working party had presented its report on 9 February and, in view of the intense current public interest in food safety and the risk of the working party's findings being leaked, it was necessary to publish the report with as little delay as possible. It would, however, raise a number of difficult issues that required the most careful handling. ³⁴

3.47 Mr MacGregor explained that the Southwood Working Party had concluded that on present evidence it was most unlikely that BSE would have any implications for human health. However, it had made a number of recommendations aimed at minimising any possible risk to humans of which the baby food recommendation would require particular care. He went on to report his conversation with Sir Richard Southwood on this topic, and the latter's remarks that this suggestion on baby food represented a 'counsel of extreme prudence.' Mr MacGregor added that:

The problem was, therefore, that the working party's ultra-cautious approach might have the effect of stimulating disproportionate public alarm, but it would not be feasible for the Government to appear to be disregarding the working party's advice. ³⁵

3.48 The minutes recorded that, following Mr MacGregor's remarks, Mr Kenneth Clarke said:

. . . the working party's comments on baby food were the main problem. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this topic and of the tentative nature of the working party's comments he had considered that the best way forward might have been for the Chief Medical Officer to be asked to consider the matter in greater depth. However, the Chief Medical Officer had that morning told him that he did not think it would be right for him to do other than accept the working party's finding. That being so, the Government had no alternative but to accept the working party's conclusions on baby food and to be seen to act on them. He agreed that publication of the report should not be long delayed. ³⁶

3.49 The minutes recorded that in discussion the following views were expressed by individual members of the Cabinet:

a) The Southwood Report appeared to be less precise than might have been expected of a report by eminent scientists on a matter of such moment, and its comments might well have an enormous impact on the public and on industry. Nevertheless, once such expert advice was commissioned by the Government it was not feasible for Ministers to appear to substitute their own judgement for it. Unless the Government's own professional advice pointed in another direction, there was no option but to accept the Report's findings as the basis for policy.

b) Although it might well be that the Government was left with little room for choice in this particular matter, it was unsatisfactory that policy decisions should in effect be put into the hands of specialised experts. The Southwood Report's findings on baby foods, which were not even cast in the form of a clear recommendation, were based on assumptions at the most remote edges of probability, and it was not clear that the action proposed was in proportion to the risk. In logic, the working party's comments on baby foods would extend with equal validity to the feeding of any ruminant kidney or liver to young children. Hitherto, liver had been generally considered one of the best foods for children and it was extraordinary that it should so suddenly be questioned. It was clear, furthermore, that the proposals would have implications for the meat industry as a whole, and not simply for baby food manufacturers.

c) On the other hand, the working party's caution and the tentative nature of some of their comments were only to be expected. Scrapie had existed in sheep for 200 years, but it was only known to have crossed to another species very recently. Two years ago there were no affected cows, whereas now there were nearly 3,000. It would be an appalling tragedy if the disease were to cross a further species boundary and affect humans. It was not unreasonable for the working party to have contemplated all possible precautions.

d) Even if the Government accepted the Southwood Report's findings on baby food, there was a range of possible action. Prohibition of the manufacture of baby foods containing ruminant offal would be the most extreme step, and this might necessitate consultation under the Food Act. On the other hand, the food manufacturers themselves would almost certainly want to be seen to cease the manufacture of such baby foods as a consequence of the Report's publication. The position on imported baby foods would need to be considered, as would the advice that should be offered on the use of existing stocks of baby foods and on food for older children. There should be a clear line on all these points before an announcement was made. ³⁷

The summing-up of the Cabinet meeting

3.50 In her written evidence to the Inquiry, Lady Thatcher recalled that most of the discussion on the Working Party's recommendations related to the issue of baby foods. She confirmed the account given in the minutes of her summing up at the end of the meeting:

I cannot now recall who made particular points, but I believe that it was in the context of the discussion we had had about baby food that I said in summing up, that the report was likely to raise considerable alarm, and that some of the recommendations and suggestions in it were not based on precise and firm evidence. I went on to say that there were manifest difficulties in handling the situation, but it had to be borne in mind that the disease's recent crossing of the species boundary from sheep to cattle was a new phenomenon and it was not known whether a further crossing of the species boundary to humans was possible. In these circumstances the guiding principle was that the Government should be seen to act on properly qualified advice, and the Chief Medical Officer had a crucial role in this. On that basis, the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and the Secretary of State for Health should urgently prepare a clear and accurate statement of the Government's position in relation to the report, taking account of the points made in discussion. The announcement should be made as soon as possible, in a way that involved Sir Richard Southwood himself, the Chief Medical Officer and the Chief Veterinary Officer as well as Ministers. ³⁸

Sir Richard Southwood 'clarifies' the definition of offal

3.51 On 23 February 1989 Sir Donald Acheson telephoned Sir Richard Southwood to clarify the meaning of 'offal'. ³⁹ It was established that it 'referred only to spleen, brain, spinal cord and intestine'. ⁴⁰

3.52 Mr Clarke and Mr MacGregor met later on 23 February, accompanied by officials from DH and MAFF, including Sir Donald Acheson, Mr Cruickshank and Dr Pickles. ⁴¹ The purpose was to discuss two outstanding concerns on baby food and vaccines. The note of the meeting recorded it had been understood that the term 'offal' used in the Southwood Report included liver and kidneys. However, it was confirmed that Sir Donald Acheson had established with Sir Richard Southwood that it referred only to brain, spinal cord, spleen and intestine. Sir Donald Acheson said that he was confident that these tissues and thymus were not used in baby food. Nonetheless, written assurances had been sought from UK baby food manufacturers. It was recorded:

Now that it was clear that the offal in question and thymus were not currently used in baby food, it was felt appropriate for the Government to take legislative steps to ensure that they would not be used for this purpose in the future. ⁴²

3.53 On the afternoon of 23 February, Sir Donald Acheson wrote to Sir Richard Southwood, advising of the discussions with MAFF, and stating they had 'agreed on a line concerning baby foods'. A copy of part of the proposed press announcement was included for Sir Richard Southwood's approval:

In his report Sir Richard Southwood says:

'We consider that manufacturers of baby foods should avoid the use of ruminant offal and thymus.'

What does he mean and what are the implications?

The term 'offal' mentioned in the report refers to brain, spinal cord, spleen and intestine, as defined in the regulations quoted. The CMO is satisfied that none of these nor thymus is currently used in the manufacture of baby food. CMO also advised that mothers ought not to feed these materials to infants. With regard to other meats which people sometimes refer to as offal, like kidney, liver and heart, the evidence in relation to a theoretical risk is so slight that there is no need for concern. These are extremely nutritious foods which are beneficial. ⁴³

3.54 Later, on the same day, Mr J D Garnett (Food Policy Division, MAFF) minuted Mr MacGregor. ⁴⁴ His minute stated that the meaning of 'ruminant offal and thymus' had been clarified with Sir Richard Southwood.

The Working Party had intended this to refer to offal as described in Schedule 2 part II of the Meat Products and Spreadable Fish Products Regulations, 1984, plus thymus (which appears in Schedule 2 Part I of the same regulations). This means that items such as liver, kidney and heart, which the housewife might regard as 'offal', would not be restricted by the Working Party's advice. ⁴⁵

3.55 The minute then stated that UK baby food manufacturers did not, and did not wish to, use thymus or offal as defined by the Southwood Working Party. They had confirmed a written undertaking would be provided to this effect. The minute concluded:

We can thus say without reservation that thymus and 'offal' (as referred to in the Report) are not used in baby foods; and we can be reassured that CMO's advice, cleared with Sir Richard Southwood will be that we need not be concerned at the inclusion in infant diets of kidney, liver and heart . . . ⁴⁶

3.56 On 24 February 1989 Sir Richard Southwood sent a fax to Sir Donald Acheson. He confirmed the interpretation of offal, as provided in the draft press announcement:

The committee had before it many samples of baby foods; we noted that though 'beef' or 'meat' were listed as ingredients, offal was not, and we doubted if manufacturers would include it. We did note however that under the relevant labelling regulations, thymus could be included as meat, but expected that manufacturers would be able to respond to our report by assuring you that they would not include it. The enquiries you have made obviously confirmed these assumptions, though it would be prudent to alter the labelling regulations so that thymus cannot be included in meat.

Thus, I would conclude that there is absolutely no reason for concern with respect to meat products; as you advise, items strictly classified as offal (that is not including heart, liver or kidney) ought not to be fed to infants, though on present evidence, any risk is very small. ⁴⁷