Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
7. Human health developments from January 1996 to 20 March 1996
The storm breaks
Emergency SEAC meeting: Saturday 16 March 1996
Monday 18 March 1996: 'a busy day'

Emergency SEAC meeting: Saturday 16 March 1996

SEAC statement

7.261 An emergency meeting of SEAC was held on Saturday 16 March. At the meeting the new variant CJD cases were discussed in detail. ¹ Dr Will reviewed the characteristics of the young cases that had been described at SEAC's last meeting:

. . . initial clinical presentation was in younger patients than normal for CJD and with psychiatric or behavioural problems which then developed to neurological problems and eventually dementia. The disease had a comparatively long incubation period, had abnormal EEG and showed distinctive histopathology, with large distinct plaques. ²

7.262 Dr Will reported that, since the 8 March meeting, a ninth confirmed case of CJD had been discovered in a 31-year-old. ³ Annex 1 to the minutes listed the cases found so far showing details of nine 'confirmed' and three 'suspect' cases of CJD in young patients. ⁴ Members compared this with other recorded young cases of CJD in the UK and in other countries. ⁵

7.263 Having analysed archival and overseas cases, Dr Will concluded that vCJD was a distinct form which was partly age-related, notably including an excess of people under 30. ⁶ It was reported that the data had been examined by three independent neuropathologists in Glasgow, who considered that this was a 'distinct entity unlike any previously seen form of CJD'. The independent experts felt that pathologists in the 1970s and 1980s would have been able to describe the plaques had they occurred in earlier cases, even without the new technique of immuno-staining. However, they noted that it was unusual for young patients to be given a biopsy or post-mortem. The Committee agreed this new variant of CJD was a distinct entity and of great concern, and that they must take seriously the possibility that BSE was a new risk factor, although it was noted that the data did not allow this conclusion to be drawn firmly. ⁷

7.264 The Committee discussed 'Action to take in response to the new CJD variant'. Professor Pattison explained:

. . . that he had asked MAFF if SEAC should be constrained by economic or practical considerations when making recommendations for action. The response had been that the Committee should not be so constrained, although if the suggestions made by the Committee were impractical the department might return them to the Committee to seek its views on other options. However, it was clear that the responsibility for taking decisions on the way forward rested with politicians. ⁸

7.265 Dr William Hueston, veterinary epidemiologist and member of SEAC from 1995, and Dr Will noted that the key issue was to ensure complete removal of all SBO and there 'should be no acceptance of any spinal cord being left attached to carcases'. Professor Pattison asked the Committee whether, if it could be sure that 100 per cent SBO removal could be achieved, it would be satisfied that no further steps needed to be taken. The minutes record:

Professor Almond noted that if one set out to eliminate any potential theoretical risk from BSE then it would be necessary to destroy the entire national herd of cattle, however, various control measures could reduce any risk to a minimal level. Ultimately a decision on whether a zero or minimal risk was acceptable was a political one. ⁹

7.266 The Committee agreed to 'recommend that all steps should be taken to ensure that the current SBO ban be enforced completely rigorously'. ¹⁰

7.267 SEAC considered, but did not reach a conclusion on, the need for further action in relation to SBO. They discussed a complete ban on cattle over 2½ years old in the food chain. Mr Bradley commented that this would be tantamount to saying the SBO ban was not effective. As an alternative, they discussed a requirement that animals over 2½ years old should be completely de-boned and their obvious nervous and lymphatic tissue, which was likely to be the next most infectious tissue after the central nervous system, removed. SEAC decided to give this issue further thought. ¹¹

7.268 The Committee also considered the need for a total ban on the use of MBM on farms and agreed to 'recommend that the use of mammalian meat and bone meal in feed for farm animals should be prohibited'. ¹²

7.269 In addition, SEAC concluded that it was important for the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and ACDP to review the significance of the new findings and 'if necessary issue new guidance as quickly as possible'. ¹³

7.270 The Committee then considered the question 'Is beef safe?'. The minutes of the meeting recorded that:

Professor Pattison noted that on the initial analysis carried out by the Committee it had not been thought necessary to recommend the instant imposition of further public health measures. There were, however, a number of points which needed to be revisited in the light of further information and analysis. However, given this position, there were no recommendations to remove existing products from the shelves. ¹⁴

7.271 Finally, in response to Mr Hogg's letter of 14 March requesting formal advice, ¹⁵ SEAC agreed a brief statement to Ministers. The statement noted the discovery of the ninth confirmed vCJD case among young people and the fact that an examination of other potential factors had 'failed to adequately explain these cases'. The statement continued:

This is cause for great concern. On current data and in the absence of any credible alternative the most likely explanation at present is that these cases are linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the SBO ban in 1989.

CJD remains a rare disease and it is too early to predict how many further cases, if any, there will be of this new form. The Committee are actively seeking further data from both the UK and abroad to help assess the full significance of the Unit's findings. ¹⁶

7.272 Mr Carden told the Inquiry that SEAC's desire to give further thought to the need for new measures caused acute difficulty over the following three days, in the run-up to the announcement. At meetings over the next few days Mr Hogg, Mr Packer and officials explored with Professor Pattison what SEAC's likely recommendations might be, but it became clear that SEAC could not reach a final view until it had fully assessed all the options. ¹⁷

Sunday 17 March 1996: MAFF and DH meeting with Professor Pattison

7.273 On 17 March, the day following the emergency SEAC meeting, a further meeting was held to discuss the response to SEAC's statement. The meeting was attended by Mr Packer, Sir Kenneth Calman, Mr Meldrum, Professor Pattison, Dr Rubery, Dr Wight, Dr Skinner, Mr Carden, Mr Haddon, Dr Matthews, Dr Render and Mr Eddy. ¹⁸ Professor Pattison briefed those present on the lines along which SEAC was thinking. It was noted that at its meeting the next weekend, SEAC would consider recommendations that covered 'the whole range of possibilities from doing nothing (except reinforcing the current controls) to the destruction of the national herd'. ¹⁹ It would also consider the implications for sheep (including the possibility of an ovine offal ban). ²⁰ Mr Packer considered it necessary to make a public announcement within three to four days to forestall a leak, which was becoming increasingly likely as the information was by then widely known. ²¹

7.274 Sir Kenneth asked Professor Pattison whether it was safe to eat beef. Professor Pattison said that SEAC did not feel they should ban eating beef:

If the SBO ban was fully implemented, meat which reached the market for human consumption, especially from young animals, was very likely to be risk free. However, the Committee could not give a 100% guarantee; it estimated the risk to the individual as between [one in] 3 x 10¹⁰ and 3 x 10¹⁶. The question for today was whether it was safe to eat beef in 1996, whereas the likely exposure was in the mid-1980s. However, unfortunately, this distinction was likely to get blurred. ²²

7.275 Sir Kenneth ran through the text of 'a proposed statement' which concluded that there was no evidence that 'eating beef today' caused CJD. ²³

7.276 Mr Packer had drafted a letter for Mr Hogg to send to the Prime Minister ²⁴ alerting him to developments, which was 'discussed and agreed' at this meeting. ²⁵ (In the event, two letters were sent to the Prime Minister on the following day. The letter discussed at this meeting was sent jointly from Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell and is described in detail below.)

7.277 Later that same day, Mr Packer sent a minute to Mr Hogg informing him of the meeting and its outcome. Mr Packer said:

I understand that the SEAC statement, formally made to you and the Secretary of State for Health, followed intense debate over virtually the whole day. I deduce alternative hypotheses have been seriously tested and no plausible one identified. That is Professor Pattison's view.

. . .

There are vast implications for the Department. Not merely is it probable that we will need to propose schemes of support for the beef industry likely to cost hundreds of millions of pounds per annum, but the organisation of it all will also have a cost. We, therefore, face some weeks of turmoil in which difficult decisions will have to be taken. ²⁶

Monday 18 March 1996: 'a busy day'

9.30 am

7.278 Mr Hogg held a number of meetings on 18 March 1996. Mr Frank Strang (Mr Hogg's Principal Private Secretary) commented that '18 March was a busy day'. ²⁷ At 9.30 am the Minister met Mr Antony Baldry (Minister of State, MAFF), Mrs Browning (Parliamentary Under-Secretary, MAFF) and Mr Packer. The meeting was described in a minute prepared by Mr Strang on 21 March. References in the minute to animals over two years old should probably be read as referring to cattle over 2½ years of age. ²⁸ The minute by Mr Strang recorded:

The Minister agreed to write to the Prime Minister along the lines of the Secretary's draft (to which was subsequently added DoH's contribution). He said that it was very difficult to know what we would be able to say in any statement. It would not be enough to say that we did not know whether or not beef was safe. We would need to set out the positive steps we were taking. He suggested that these should be a ban on the sale of beef on animals over 2 years old, the withdrawal of meat products and the setting up of an inquiry. ²⁹

7.279 Mr Packer questioned the justification for such a ban. He said that the legal basis for taking such a step would be difficult as neither SEAC nor the CMO had recommended such action. Mr Hogg pointed out that:

It was clear from SEAC's advice that BSE was potentially transmissible from animals over 2½ years. This meant that we had to rely entirely on our SBO controls. However, our audits had shown clearly - and would no doubt continue to do so - that these controls were not implemented perfectly on every occasion. In other words, we could not guarantee that SBO material was not finding its way into the food chain. We no longer had our belt and braces. ³⁰

7.280 Mr Hogg told us:

I always approached this matter on the basis of belt and braces; that is to say that we needed to have a belief, as long as we had it, that it was not transmissible, plus a range of what I described as mechanical controls.

When one element went, e.g. transmissibility, then the position was untenable. That is why, when we learnt that in March 1996, I came to the conclusion that the 30 month rule was an imperative, because I did not believe that you could rest public health on a full adherence within the slaughterhouse or elsewhere like deboning plants with regulations. I did not think that was realistic or safe. ³¹

. . . once the belt had gone [ie, the absence of evidence of transmissibility], I did not think it was responsible or proper, as we were dealing with the serious issue of public health, to rely on the abattoir controls, because I did not believe they would be implemented fully and therefore I was determined to find another belt and the belt that I had found, which I had obviously found before this, was the 30 month rule, so I was determined to reinstate both and I was not going to be persuaded to take a different view because I thought it was my duty to put in place as comprehensive a set of public health controls as I could. And Mrs Browning I am glad to say agreed with me. ³²

7.281 Mr Hogg explained what was meant by 'belt and braces': 'the belt being that there was no risk of transferability from cattle to man, and the braces being that SBO controls were in place should such an unlikely event occur'. ³³

7.282 It was recorded in the minute that Mr Packer responded: 'The key point here was proportionality. The proposals which the Minister had in mind would have very severe cost implications. We would need the recommendations of the scientists before taking such steps.' ³⁴ Mr Baldry agreed that they should wait for the advice of SEAC. ³⁵

7.283 Mr Packer also questioned whether an Inquiry was necessary, as MAFF 'had given a full account to Parliament in relation to the 1990 Select Committee Report'. ³⁶

7.284 It was agreed, however, that Mr Packer would prepare in draft a letter to the Prime Minister with Mr Hogg's two proposals. ³⁷ (This letter was sent to the Prime Minister the next day. It dealt with Mr Hogg's specific proposals and was sent separately from the letter to the Prime Minister referred to at paragraph 7.276 above.)

7.285 After this meeting Mr Hogg, Mrs Browning, Mr Packer and Mr Carden discussed with Mr Meldrum, Mr Middleton (MAFF Legal Department) and Mr Eddy the practical implications of Mr Hogg's proposals. Mr Meldrum noted that there was a danger that Mr Hogg's proposals might be seen as disproportionate to SEAC's advice. 'More generally, this would be the first time we had ever pre-empted the conclusions of the scientific experts.' Mr Hogg said he wanted MAFF to be ready to introduce his measures; that it was important to be able to deal 'with the situation which arose until such time as SEAC had given its considered advice'. With regard to the age limit Mr Meldrum noted that very few BSE cases had been found in under-2½-year-olds, and that the levels of infectivity of organs in those cases was low. It was also easy to identify cattle at this age from their teeth. Mr Hogg also said he was inclined to the option of withdrawing beef products from the market. ³⁸

7.286 Later that day Mr Packer submitted the draft letter for Mr Hogg to send to the Prime Minister on 'extra measures' that would have to be taken to protect human health. ³⁹ This draft included the suggestion that it was 'essential' to adopt these extra measures 'even though SEAC has not yet made definite recommendations'. ⁴⁰ Mr Packer explained in his covering note that the draft followed the earlier discussions, save in one particular. Mr Packer thought that in relation to the plan 'of removing all beef products from the food chain . . . the difficulties are almost insuperable and the potential cost enormous'. Mr Packer said these difficulties seemed to render this element of the proposed interim response 'disproportionate to an extent that is not acceptable'. ⁴¹ This draft was revised in certain respects as we set out below (see paragraph 7.305).

7.287 Details of the plan that Mr Packer was referring to, and the difficulties involved, were explained in more detail by Mr Hollis in a minute dated 18 March 1996. ⁴² Mr Packer had asked him for a 'rapid assessment' of the implications of a ban on 'the sale for human consumption of all beef from UK cattle of more than 2½ years of age, including meat products'. In his minute Mr Hollis described the difficulties involved in recalling such meat:

Small retailers, caterers and wholesalers will not know the age of their meat. The major supermarkets have sophisticated systems which permit them to know this information and most of their fresh meat comes from young animals. In theory they should not therefore be adversely affected in this area, but the strong likelihood is that they would withdraw all meat from their shelves, whatever the age of the animal from which it came. Customers may well return all the beef in their freezers. In practice it would be impossible to refuse the return of any meat or meat product because there would be no way of saying how old was the animal from which it came.

7.288 Mr Hollis's 'conservative guess' of the costs involved in such a recall was 'at least £1 billion'.

7.289 He also estimated the cost of compensation to producers for cull cows compulsorily slaughtered to be of the order of £350 million per year plus a further £200 million for slaughter and disposal costs. ⁴³ Mr Carden told the BSE Inquiry that the latter proved to be a reliable estimate of the costs involved in the Over Thirty Months Scheme (OTMS) that was implemented after 20 March 1996. ⁴⁴

1.00 pm

7.290 At 1.00 pm a meeting was held between Mr Hogg and Professor Pattison to discuss SEAC's likely advice for government action in response to the new findings. Professor Pattison told the meeting:

It was clear that a new form of CJD had developed in the 1990s and - assuming it had not arisen spontaneously - that the relevant event had taken place in the mid to late 1980s. Although it was possible that there was some other factor, the Committee had concluded that the most likely explanation was BSE (Professor Pattison put the likelihood at 60%). ⁴⁵

7.291 Asked about the likely spread of the new disease, Professor Pattison said that:

. . . it was possible that the 9 cases were in some way special and that there would be no more. Alternatively, the disease might spread as with BSE in cats, with a small number of cases - say, 4 or 5 - each year. Its spread was unlikely to be like that of BSE itself: the fact that cattle had been fed back to cattle had inevitably amplified that disease. However, it was conceivable that humans might be particularly susceptible. ⁴⁶

7.292 He said that it would be clear 'within about a year' how the disease would develop.

7.293 Mr Hogg asked what SEAC was likely to advise by way of response measures. Professor Pattison outlined a range of ideas but said that SEAC would not be in a position to advise until its meeting at the weekend (23-24 March). He said that some members felt that existing SBO controls would suffice 'provided they were enforced in 99.9% of cases', but that others were not sufficiently confident in the controls. Professor Pattison stressed the relative degrees of risk in older cows:

. . . on the worst case scenario, we could expect around 5,000 older cows (i.e. over 2 years) which were incubating the disease to reach the foodchain (although, of course, the SBO material would have been removed). Unfortunately, we could also expect around 24,000 infected young animals to reach the foodchain. However, older animals were likely to be at least 10 times more infectious than younger ones . . . Action on older animals was therefore likely to take out at least half the potential problem. Such action might involve either removing the animals from the foodchain altogether or insisting that the meat be boned out, with all lymphatic nodes and nerves being removed. ⁴⁷

7.294 Mr Hogg said he was minded to take interim measures, including the prohibition of the sale of meat from cattle over 2½ years of age, withdrawal of all beef products from the shelves and a ban on the export of such goods. ⁴⁸ Professor Pattison 'was not at all surprised at the Minister's intentions and understood his wish for a bigger margin of safety'. He described this option as 'justifiable, logical and not irrational' and said 'SEAC was likely to be debating conclusions of this very nature'. ⁴⁹

7.295 Mr Hogg was also minded to ban the use of MBM in all feed. Professor Pattison agreed, 'particularly given the continuing risk of cross-contamination'. ⁵⁰

7.296 Mr Hogg said in oral evidence to the Inquiry:

I had come to a firm view and SEAC had not, but I wanted to be sure that it was in the spectrum of what Pattison thought that SEAC would be recommending and did not lie outside the spectrum. I did not think they would recommend anything more dramatic, but I did not want to be doing anything which was manifestly silly, so I was saying to Sir John [Pattison], 'This is what I have in mind, I would like to test it with you'. The phrase, as you can see at the top of the next page, 'justifiable, logical and not irrational', was I was asking him whether I was subject to judicial review if I did it. I put the test to him as I understood it. That is how that conversation went . . .

. . . we had lost our belt. I knew therefore that there was a risk of transmissibility, or at least SEAC thought there was a risk of transmissibility and I was not going to depart from that view. I knew full well that the SBO controls were not adequate in my judgment. Therefore I had to put something else in place. I was testing out on him whether the 30 month rule was something that he thought was sensible, whether it fell within the spectrum of what he judged sound, and it did, he said so. ⁵¹

Prime Minister formally notified of developments

7.297 On 18 March 1996 the Prime Minister received two letters about BSE. The first was sent jointly by Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell to inform him of the recent developments on the possible emergence of a new variant of CJD. The second letter was from Mr Hogg alone and set out his proposals for measures to be taken in the light of the new findings.

First letter to the Prime Minister

7.298 Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell jointly wrote to the Prime Minister a letter based on Mr Packer's draft of the previous day, at around lunchtime on 18 March. The SEAC statement dated 16 March 1996 was attached. ⁵²

7.299 The letter alerted Mr Major to 'a very serious development on BSE'. It explained that the CJD Surveillance Unit 'appears to have identified a new variant' of CJD in young people in the UK, and that SEAC had 'concluded that exposure to BSE is the most likely explanation'. Exposure 'almost certainly' had been in the middle 1980s.

7.300 The letter included an outline of DH and MAFF responsibilities. In summary, these were:

DH Responsibilities

• Reassure public anxiety about the current safety of beef.
• Ask the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) to look at worker safety as a matter of urgency.

MAFF Responsibilities

• MAFF acknowledged that it faced a major crisis of confidence in British beef. The financial implications of that for individuals, companies and the Government would be severe. The beef industry's output was valued in 1995 at £2 billion. It also accounted for investments probably running into the billions and the export market for calves (currently at 500,000 p.a.) would disappear.

7.301 It was noted that a 'detailed analysis' of what would need to be done would depend in part:

on SEAC's recommendations and policy conclusions that will flow from them. We may, for example, even have to prevent cattle over the age of 2 ⁵³ from entering the human food chain. Some consequences are predictable: the reduction in consumption is likely to lead to large sales of beef from younger animals into intervention. Older ones . . . most of which are currently exported in the form of various cuts of beef, and which could be thought to present a greater risk of transmitting BSE . . . will become virtually unsaleable and we could face major problems of carcass disposal. The export market for calves (currently running at some 500,000 p.a.) could disappear. There are implications for slaughterhouses and other types of business. The financial implications for individuals, for companies and for [the Government] could be severe.

The milk industry is considerably bigger than the beef industry and because there is no reason to doubt the safety of milk, it is essential and right that nothing is said which undermines confidence in the product. ⁵⁴

7.302 The letter suggested that a leak was increasingly possible and that there should be an announcement to the House and the public in the next day or two. ⁵⁵

7.303 At 4.00 pm that afternoon ⁵⁶ Mr Hogg met Mr Michael Heseltine (Deputy Prime Minister). Mr Heseltine 'asked about the implications' of slaughtering the entire national herd. ⁵⁷ Mr Hogg told the BSE Inquiry that he did not take this as Mr Heseltine's considered view or suggestion, merely as a question that he 'threw . . . out as a possibility'. ⁵⁸

7.304 Mr Major had apparently not yet seen the letter. Mr Heseltine told the BSE Inquiry:

I took the unusual step of interrupting a meeting that the Prime Minister was holding and provided him with a summary of the information that had been provided to me by Mr Hogg. I drew Mr Major's attention to the minute that had been prepared by Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell. ⁵⁹

Second letter to the Prime Minister

7.305 Later on 18 March, Mr Packer submitted to Mr Hogg a revised draft of the second letter for the Prime Minister. ⁶⁰ In it Mr Hogg proposed taking interim measures in advance of SEAC advice:

The balance of probability concerning the transmissibility of BSE to man has been fundamentally altered by the SEAC statement. It is right to act now to protect and be seen to protect the public further. The likely Parliamentary and public perceptions point the same way. I would propose to explain to the House that such measures were interim and awaited definitive SEAC advice before being confirmed or amended. Obviously though it would be sensible to work with the trend of the discussions in SEAC. This, following a conversation I have had with Professor Pattison, I have sought to do in the following proposal. ⁶¹

7.306 He proposed 'the very minimum we can do':

(i) banning the sale of beef and beef products derived from animals from UK herds and from animals over 2½ years of age;

(ii) banning the manufacture of products from bovine material from animals from UK herds and from animals over 2½ years of age;

(iii) banning the export of such beef and beef products. ⁶²

7.307 The draft letter proposed the possible withdrawal of all beef products. It said that Mr Hogg favoured this proposal though he acknowledged the 'enormous financial and other implications' and that a collective decision would be needed. ⁶³ Mr Hogg estimated that compensation for owners of cattle over 2½ years old 'could amount to somewhat in excess of £500m p.a.'. ⁶⁴

7.308 The draft letter also identified 'a much more cataclysmic view. On this basis the announcement we are about to make will finish the UK cattle industry for decades and we might as well accept the fact and order a complete slaughtering and restocking.' ⁶⁵ Furthermore, the draft letter also recommended a formal Inquiry into the Government's reaction to BSE, chaired by a High Court judge. ⁶⁶

7.309 In his covering note to Mr Hogg, Mr Packer said that he regarded this measure, and 'to a lesser extent' the beef withdrawal proposal, as 'disproportionate and unjustified'. ⁶⁷ Mr Packer told the BSE Inquiry that he viewed this as a 'possible prelude to my seeking an Accounting Officer Direction if such a policy were decided upon'. ⁶⁸ As the Accounting Officer for MAFF, Mr Packer was responsible for the Ministry's spending. To seek such a Direction would mean that he was advising against the expenditure and would not implement it without a specific instruction to do so from the Minister.

7.310 The same day (18 March) Mr Packer minuted Mr Hogg about the implications of a 'possible collapse of the beef market'. ⁶⁹ He attached a note that had been prepared by Mr Cowan, discussing 'arrangements for supporting the beef market under current EC rules and analysing what the implications might be for the situation with which we are likely to be faced'. ⁷⁰ The note discussed various options for supporting the beef market, including intervention buying, a calf slaughter scheme and an OTMS scheme. In contrast with his minute of 15 March, Mr Cowan concluded:

The industry might, however, see some attraction in a voluntary ban on the sale of cow-beef, provided that the market for it could be supported through some form of intervention or compensation. Those slaughterhouses which supply the major supermarkets would undoubtedly be in a better position to do so if they could guarantee that they were not slaughtering cows. It would not be difficult for the MHS to enforce such guarantees, and they might serve to protect the market for steer beef from the long-term effects of this scare.

7.311 During the afternoon Mr Dorrell met Sir Kenneth, Sir Graham Hart (DH Permanent Secretary), Dr Rubery and others. At 7.15 pm ⁷¹ they were joined by Mr Hogg, Mrs Browning, Mr Packer, Mr Meldrum and Mr Carden. ⁷² Mr Hogg said that he intended to make a statement to the House of Commons on Wednesday (20 March). He proposed:

1. to announce a judicial inquiry into the Government's reaction to BSE; ⁷³ and
2. to ban the sale of beef and beef products derived from UK animals over the age of 2½ years, the manufacture of products from bovine material from the same category of animals, and the export of such beef and beef products. The 2½ year age limit was already used in the context of EU exports and only about 84 out of a total of around 160,000 cases of BSE had been in animals below this age. ⁷⁴

7.312 The record of the meeting states that Mr Hogg felt that his proposals on animals over 2½ years would be an interim measure until recommendations were received from SEAC, which was due to meet again the next Saturday (23 March). He went on:

According to indications received so far from SEAC's chairman, Professor Pattison, the proposed measures fell 'within the spectrum' of what SEAC would think necessary, though probably at the pessimistic end of the scale. However, SEAC was unlikely to recommend anything less than these measures once the Government had already announced them. Mr Hogg felt strongly that his measures represented the minimum that the Government could defensibly do. ⁷⁵

7.313 Sir Kenneth Calman outlined the consequences for DH of SEAC's statement. He said they would have to investigate the safety of non-food products such as vaccines, medicine, gelatine and tallow. They would also have to investigate risks to abattoir workers. DH would need to brief doctors and NHS staff to help them deal with the 'likely flood of enquiries'. DH would need to consider setting up a helpline and running advertisements. It could also respond 'positively' to SEAC's recommendations for urgent research. ⁷⁶

7.314 Instead of a helpline, Mr Dorrell preferred putting extra staff on existing DH/NHS lines. Mr Dorrell agreed that advertisements and information to GPs should go out by Thursday morning. ⁷⁷

7.315 Mr Hogg asked about compensation for the victims of vCJD. Mr Dorrell 'felt strongly that the Government could not accept responsibility for compensation. The Government had at all stages followed the advice of SEAC and its predecessors . . .' ⁷⁸

7.316 It was suggested that Mr Hogg's statement might be followed by a separate one from Mr Dorrell, then by a joint press conference with Sir Kenneth Calman, Mr Meldrum and Professor Pattison. It was also noted that 'the handling of the announcements would need further consideration in the course of the next day', and that collective agreement would need to be sought on the contents of the announcement. ⁷⁹

7.317 After this meeting, the second letter to the Prime Minister was sent as drafted. ⁸⁰

7.318 In the late evening of Monday 18 March, Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell met the Prime Minister, other members of Cabinet, and officials to discuss the two letters that had been sent to the Prime Minister that day. ⁸¹ Mr Hogg pointed out that 'once one admitted the possibility of transmissibility to humans, then one had equally to admit that controls were ineffective. Controls had been tightened in 1995 but those controls continued to be breached.' ⁸² The Prime Minister took the view that 'the risk of contracting CJD was considerably less than the risk of contracting lung cancer for example, but the Government had not only failed to ban smoking, it had failed to ban even the advertising of smoking'. None the less, those present recognised that when SEAC's conclusions were announced there would be massive panic. They concluded that there were three possible options, in terms of the Government's response:

1. do nothing and await SEAC conclusions;
2. stand firm on existing controls, recognising the short-term crisis that would cause; or
3. accept that the beef industry was doomed and plan for replacement of the herd.

7.319 The note of the meeting records the following discussion of the options:

Following the introduction of the SBO controls in 1989 and the further tightening of the controls in 1995, it was recognised that the cases of BSE had declined hugely. Although the full figure for contracted cases of CJD could not be known, there was no reason to assume that the same downward curve would not have taken place. This made the risk of contracting CJD infinitesimal despite the acceptance of transmissibility.

SEAC themselves were split on what action should be taken. Some were of the view that nothing should be done above and beyond the existing controls. Some were of the view that total eradication was the only answer. Others were of the view that the position the Minister of Agriculture was proposing would be acceptable. No doubt SEAC would produce a common position in due course, but given the differing views of some members of the committee, it might not be acceptable to rest on that . . .

. . . Perhaps some 40 per cent of dairy herds remained unaffected. There was no 'live test' which could be done. A 'dead test' was possible, although not currently in all cases. It might be that it would be a cheaper option to provide a 'dead testing facility' so that only safe carcasses were allowed for sale on the market. Whether that would be sufficient to restore confidence in either the domestic or the export beef market was open to question.

Beef sales per year were in the region of £2 billion. The slaughter of the beef herd over two and a half years old was likely to cost some £500 million per year in market support and a one-off cost of £1 billion in the withdrawal of existing food stocks. This represented a cost of some tens of millions per life against a cost per life of £500 million for a road death in a cost benefit analysis. It was not guaranteed that a pragmatic cost benefit approach would prove a containable way forward.

What was clear was that a position of no announcement was unlikely to be sustainable. With this in mind, a Ministerial Meeting would be held on 19 March which would take the opportunity to seek advice from the Chief Medical Officer, the Chief Veterinary Officer and the Chairman of SEAC. In the light of this, the timing of a statement to the House of Commons would be considered. ⁸³

Tuesday 19 March 1996

7.320 On 19 March, Mr Baldry (Minister of State, MAFF) sent Mr Hogg two minutes, copied to Mr Tim Boswell (MAFF Parliamentary Secretary (Commons, 1995-97)), Mrs Browning and Mr Packer. The first expressed his view that MAFF should not act without the advice of SEAC. He said there was no reason to announce more than that the Government was expecting further recommendations from SEAC on which it would seek to act:

I . . . feel very strongly that for Ministers to indicate action now in advance of any SEAC recommendation has every possibility of being 'over-reaction' and to lead to much more draconian consequences than in the event are necessary, for which the government and Ministers will attract opprobrium. ⁸⁴

7.321 In his second minute Mr Baldry gave his opinion on the legal implications of three matters that Mr Hogg had raised with him. On the first, compensation, he advised that at 'the very minimum, it should be full market value compensation for cattle which cannot otherwise be sold, but there is no way in this situation that we can just compensate farmers and no-one else'. ⁸⁵

7.322 On the question of a BSE Inquiry, Mr Baldry considered that this would be 'likely to undermine confidence in SEAC'. It was best to invite members of certain Royal Colleges to examine 'whether the right terms of reference have been given to SEAC i.e. are they sufficiently broad'. ⁸⁶ He noted that setting up any other kind of Inquiry 'would almost certainly imply political acceptance of fault on the part of MAFF. As we have fully complied with all scientific advice so far this seems unnecessary, setting us off on the back foot.' ⁸⁷

7.323 Thirdly, Mr Baldry 'strongly' recommended that MAFF should not make an Order until they knew SEAC's recommendations. This was because laying an Order under the Food Safety Act

requires asserting imminent risk of injury to health. That immediately would signal that we have no confidence in the existing control measures, goes way beyond what SEAC has said and runs the risk of MAFF being involved in litigation for some very considerable time. ⁸⁸

7.324 Mr Meldrum also sent Mr Hogg's Private Secretary a minute in which he advised that the proposed ban on beef from cattle more than 2½ years of age should be described as interim, because SEAC might take the view that the meat from such beef could safely be eaten, provided it was first deboned. Mr Meldrum favoured 'the banning of head meat from all cattle'. ⁸⁹

7.325 Mr Hollis (Livestock Group) provided an estimate of the cost of slaughtering the entire national herd. Mr Heseltine had asked Mr Hogg about this option the previous evening. The estimate was based principally on the value of milk that would be lost (value of milk production per year multiplied by 5, this being Mr Hollis's estimate of the number of years it would take milk production to return to normal). Mr Hollis remarked that the cost of such a slaughter programme would seem likely to 'comfortably exceed £20 billion in the dairy section alone'. ⁹⁰

19 March 1996: meeting with the Prime Minister

7.326 As agreed the previous evening, the Prime Minister held a meeting on the morning of Tuesday 19 March, to discuss with Professor Pattison, the CMO (Sir Kenneth Calman) and the CVO (Mr Meldrum) the Government's response to recent developments. ⁹¹

7.327 Immediately prior to the meeting Mr Kenneth Clarke, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was unable to attend, sent a minute to the Prime Minister outlining his views on possible Government action to be taken on BSE. He advised that 'the Government should make public as rapidly as possible the full facts it has at its disposal'. He commented that any action which the Government took should be proportionate to the risk to public health:

We want to be in a position in 4 weeks' time whereby intelligent people can look back and say that the Government's actions were measured and sensible, and not an absurd over-reaction which made things worse. ⁹²

7.328 He noted that the 'behaviour of the Government following the salmonella and listeria crises [when he was Secretary of State for Health] are widely seen to have been foolish and excessive, causing lasting damage to British agriculture'. In presenting the risk assessment of CJD he suggested:

. . . we need to find straightforward examples which people can readily understand. We should compare the risks of catching CJD with the risks of death from salmonella; blindness at birth from german measles; being struck by lightning; winning the jackpot on the National Lottery. No doubt colleagues can think of better examples.

We should also remind people that many die each year from the effects of smoking. But we do not plan to close down tobacco manufacturers. Indeed, we continue to defend the manufacturers' right to advertise.

I would regard a complete ban on beef products, or the culling of the beef and dairy herds, as completely over the top. Moreover, I suspect the general public would soon take a similar view, faced with endless media coverage of burning cattle piled high on funeral pyres.

7.329 Mr Clarke emphasised that his perspective was 'not based simply on the potential public expenditure implications', but on his belief that 'the duty of Government is to give a responsible and calm lead to public opinion in the face of disturbing events'. ⁹³

7.330 Mr Major began the meeting by commenting that some 'very difficult decisions needed to be taken to ensure that the correct balance was struck between treating this matter seriously and over-reacting. Colleagues needed to recall that there were many issues which remained unknown.' ⁹⁴

7.331 Professor Pattison summarised the latest scientific findings on the 'new variant CJD', commenting that the most likely explanation for these cases was exposure to BSE, probably before the introduction of the SBO controls in 1989. ⁹⁵ The note of the meeting records that 'personally, Professor Pattison did not think that extreme measures would be necessary. In his view the committee was more likely to focus on controls concerning older cattle, together with further controls on mechanically recovered meat.' ⁹⁶ Mr Hogg commented that the Government had:

. . . to date adopted a belt and braces approach. The belt being that there was no risk of transferability from cattle to humans, the braces being that SBO controls were in place should such an unlikely event occur. Now that there was thought to be the likelihood of a link between cattle and humans, the belt had been removed leaving only the braces . . . The panic which would ensue from any statement would destroy the beef industry . . . It might be possible to save it if a firebreak could be erected and he had offered the best advice he could. He commented that the difficulty was that we knew that SBO controls were not wholly adequate and in the changed circumstances of the new information this made the Government's position untenable. ⁹⁷

7.332 Mr Major said that taking drastic action in advance of further scientific advice from SEAC would 'make the Government look silly and would open it to significant litigation if premature action was taken'. ⁹⁸ The Attorney General, Sir Nicholas Lyell, also commented that any action by the Government could lead to litigation on the basis that the Government's response was disproportionate. The Government needed therefore to be as clear as possible, what the maximum and minimum effect of any epidemic might be 'and indeed if we proposed to take measures to act against cattle over two and a half years of age then we needed to be sure that cattle under two and a half years were safe'. ⁹⁹ Mr Hogg told us that his proposals were discussed but were eventually rejected as disproportionate:

My recommendations had been comprehensively rejected by the colleagues round the table. It was clear that the Prime Minister, when I saw him the preceding night, did not think they were the right ones. I argued them as robustly as I could, and you may get a sense that I am capable of doing that fairly effectively. It had not been accepted, I thought they were wrong and ultimately we had to get on with the business of Government, a collective decision had been taken. One I disagreed with, but it had been taken. ¹⁰⁰

7.333 In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Hogg said that while he had accepted the decision of the meeting, he nevertheless felt that his proposals would have to be implemented at some point and that there 'were substantive and presentational advantages in making an early announcement'. He also stated: 'I thought that if we did this there was a better chance of retaining public confidence in beef.' ¹⁰¹

7.334 Professor Pattison explained SEAC's conclusions but would not be drawn into giving further advice on the wide range of measures proposed in advance of SEAC's meeting scheduled for the weekend. The meeting was concluded:

It was agreed that in an ideal world a statement would not be made until SEAC's firm views were available, but the risk of a leak and the Government's duty to protect the public tended towards an early statement. One possible option would be a temporary maximalist control until it was clear how serious the problem was. It would also be important to examine what options there were for improving existing controls to give greater security. It was agreed that if a statement were to be made, it would be important to include something of substance. In order to do that further information from SEAC would be necessary. An early meeting of SEAC would therefore be encouraged. The Lord President would convene a meeting of the relevant parties which would report to Cabinet on 20 March. ¹⁰²

SEAC meeting: 19 March 1996

7.335 After that meeting, Dr Rubery went to assemble as many SEAC members as could be found at such short notice. The meeting (the twenty-eighth) started at 4.00 pm. A number of members who could not be present were kept in telephone contact with the discussions. ¹⁰³ Present in London were Professors Pattison, Almond and Smith. Dr Will and Professor Collinge were there 'for part of the meeting'. Mr Bradley and Dr Kimberlin participated via a telephone link to Paris. Drs Matthews and Wight attended the meeting as observers. Mr Eddy and Mr Skinner constituted the Secretariat. Also in attendance for all or part of the meeting were Dr Kendell, Mr Gerald Robb, Mr G Ross (MAFF), Dr Rubery, Mr Wilesmith, Sir Kenneth Calman and Mr Meldrum. ¹⁰⁴

7.336 Professor Pattison explained that the meeting would focus on the adequacy of existing control measures to protect animal and human health. SEAC agreed that matters requiring detailed consideration in the light of new information would need to be dealt with at the meeting on 23 March. ¹⁰⁵

7.337 Dr Will said that a tenth case had been confirmed, in a 20-year-old. He said that the genetic information on 7 of the 10 cases would be available the next day. There was so far no evidence of genetic mutation. Professor Collinge commented that there was only a small possibility that the genetic sequencing would provide any information to change the view SEAC had reached at its meeting on 16 March. ¹⁰⁶

7.338 On the question of the safety of milk, SEAC felt there was no evidence that milk could act as a vehicle for BSE or other TSEs. Also, slaughtering the entire UK beef herd was not considered a justifiable course of action in the light of scientific evidence. ¹⁰⁷

7.339 SEAC then gave consideration to what further measures might be necessary, in light of the recent findings. Professor Pattison reminded members that SEAC had previously agreed to ban the use of mammalian MBM in feed as a further measure to prevent potentially contaminated material from entering the animal food chain. The other main options for consideration as additional measures were to slaughter the entire herd and restock; slaughter all cattle over 2½ years old; and de-bone beef for human consumption from cattle over 2½ years old. ¹⁰⁸

7.340 In respect of slaughtering the entire UK herd:

The Committee agreed that slaughtering the entire UK herd was not a justifiable course of action in the light of scientific evidence. There was no evidence to suggest that BSE could be transferred to humans via muscle and stringent measures were already in place in relation to the tissues which may contain infectivity. Such a recommendation would have far-reaching socio-economic implications and would have to be supported by stronger evidence than was already available. Professor Smith suggested that SEAC would have a better picture of the likelihood of there being a human epidemic caused by BSE in 6 months to a year's time. Dr Will agreed that any measures that the Committee recommended should reflect the lack of conclusive evidence that BSE was linked to the new form of CJD. ¹⁰⁹

7.341 In discussion of the option of slaughtering cattle over the age of 2½ years, Mr Wilesmith provided information which showed that from 1989 only 84 animals had a BSE 'onset' date of 30 months or less. In the last two years there had only been 3 cases of BSE in cattle aged 30 months out of nearly 5 million cattle. The Committee agreed that 2½ years would be an early enough cut-off point. Professor Smith calculated that there could be a possible 500-fold reduction in risk if cattle over 2½ years old were removed from the food chain. ¹¹⁰

7.342 The Committee agreed that de-boning of beef for human consumption from cattle over 2½ years of age was an option worth considering. Dr Kimberlin stressed that the nervous and lymphatic tissue trimmings would need to be treated as SBO. This view was supported by the rest of the Committee. ¹¹¹ Professor Pattison suggested that discussion of the options for additional measures in relation to cattle should be continued at a further meeting to start at 8.00 am the following day (Wednesday 20 March). At that time it would also be possible to decide the Committee's advice about the risk to human health from eating beef.

7.343 As requested by the Prime Minister at his earlier meeting with Professor Pattison, the Lord President, Mr Newton, chaired a further meeting of Ministers later in the evening. ¹¹² The meeting agreed that SEAC should deliver urgent advice, by 10.30 am the following day, on what response the Government should make to their latest conclusions. The Cabinet would then consider this and the Minister of Agriculture would make an interim statement at 3.30 pm. The statement would be followed by a press conference. ¹¹³

7.344 Dr Rubery relayed the request for further advice from the meeting chaired by Mr Newton back to the SEAC meeting. ¹¹⁴ She also went to No. 10 Downing Street at about 10.00 pm to brief Mr Major about the latest developments. He wanted to know what conclusions SEAC appeared likely to reach. ¹¹⁵

Other meetings on 19 March

7.345 Mr Hogg held a brief meeting with his junior Ministers, Mr Packer, Mr Carden, Mr Haddon, Mr Kevin Taylor and Mr Blakeway, at which the first minute which Mr Baldry had sent earlier in the day was discussed. ¹¹⁶ Mr Baldry stressed that 'it would be a mistake to pre-empt SEAC', and Mr Boswell 'stressed the need not to lead SEAC in any way'. Mr Carden noted the need not to place SEAC under 'unreasonable time pressure'. ¹¹⁷

7.346 Also on 19 March, Dr Rubery and other officials met with representatives of the MLC to discuss the 'consequences and how one might handle things on 20 March'. ¹¹⁸

SEAC meeting: Wednesday 20 March 1996

7.347 Fears that the news would leak were realised on the morning of 20 March 1996, when newspapers reported that Mr Dorrell was expected to announce that day that there might be a risk of humans contracting a form of BSE from infected meat. The Daily Mirror carried a headlined article entitled 'Official: Mad cow can kill you' and reported:

Humans could catch Mad Cow Disease from eating infected beef, the government will admit today.

Health Secretary Stephen Dorrell will accept for the first time that the brain wasting disease may have been passed to people from infected animals.

The U-turn by Ministers - who for 10 years have insisted it was impossible - will spark calls for tough new curbs on suspect meat. But some experts fear we may already have eaten more than a million infected animals - and that unsuspecting victims are living on borrowed time. ¹¹⁹

7.348 On the same day several other newspapers also reported the development. The Times, in an article entitled 'Dorrell set to admit mad cow disease may threaten people' reported that new research had led 'Mr Dorrell to accept that the risk is greater than had been supposed . . .' The Daily Telegraph reported the story in an article entitled 'Mad Cow disease alert is renewed', and the Daily Star under the title 'Mad cow disease does kill' reported that Ministers were preparing to launch a 'massive advertising campaign' to stop widespread panic. ¹²⁰

7.349 That morning Sir Kenneth Calman prepared a first draft of a statement before attending the resumed meeting of SEAC. ¹²¹

7.350 SEAC recommenced its meeting at 8.00 am. Present in London were Professors Pattison, Almond, Smith and Collinge, Dr David Pepper (Veterinary Surgeon and member of SEAC since 1990) and Dr Michael Painter (consultant in communicable disease and member of SEAC since December 1995). Dr Kimberlin and Mr Bradley were to return from Paris that morning, but the flight was cancelled. ¹²² The telephone link to Paris was re-established at 8.45 am. Dr Will had gone back to Edinburgh and he too participated by telephone, from 8.50am. ¹²³ Dr Matthews continued as an observer. Messrs Eddy and Skinner (Secretariat) were there. In attendance were Dr Rubery, Mr Wilesmith, Lord McColl (Mr Major's Private Secretary) and Dr Render. Sir Kenneth Calman and Mr Meldrum attended for part of the meeting. ¹²⁴

7.351 SEAC resumed its discussion of the de-boning option as 'the best way forward'. ¹²⁵ It also considered the option of making its recommendations 'retrospective' but decided against this 'in view of the extreme precautionary nature of [SEAC's] recommendations'. ¹²⁶ On its 16 March recommendation to ban all MBM in farm animal feed, it decided there was no need to ban MBM in pet foods or fertilisers. ¹²⁷ It also discussed worker safety. ¹²⁸

7.352 At 9.30 am Mr Hogg was 'informed of initial (but still uncertain) indications - received by telephone - of SEAC's likely advice'. ¹²⁹

7.353 SEAC finished the meeting and produced its final statement at 9.30 am. ¹³⁰ The statement said:

The Spongiform Encephalopathy Advisory Committee have considered 10 cases of CJD which have occurred in people aged under 42 as recently identified by the CJD Surveillance Unit, Edinburgh. The Committee have concluded that the Unit has identified a previously unrecognised and consistent disease pattern. A review of patients' medical histories, genetic analysis to date and consideration of other possible causes, such as increased ascertainment have failed to explain these cases adequately. This is cause for great concern. On current data and in the absence of any credible alternative the most likely explanation at present is that these cases are linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the SBO ban in 1989.

CJD remains a rare disease and it is too early to predict how many further cases, if any, there will be of this new form. Continued surveillance is of the utmost importance and the Committee are actively seeking further data from both the UK and abroad to help assess the full significance of the Unit's findings.

The Committee emphasised it is imperative that current measures to protect the public health are properly enforced and recommend constant supervision to ensure the complete removal of spinal cord.

The Committee also recommend:

a. that carcasses from cattle aged over 30 months must be deboned in licensed plants supervised by the Meat Hygiene Service and the trimmings must be classified as SBOs.

b. a prohibition on the use of mammalian meat and bonemeal in feed for all farm animals.

c. that HSE and ACDP, in consultation with SEAC should urgently review their advice in the light of these findings.

d. that the Committee urgently consider what further research is necessary.

The Committee does not consider that these findings lead it to revise its advice on the safety of milk.

If the recommendations set out above are carried out the Committee concluded that the risk from eating beef is now likely to be extremely small. ¹³¹

7.354 After this, Sir Kenneth redrafted his statement. ¹³²

7.355 Mr Hogg discussed the recommendations briefly with Mr Packer and Mr Carden. He said that 'we should do no more and no less than SEAC was recommending'. It was noted that the orders would not be under the emergency provisions of the Food Safety Act and would therefore need to be consulted on. ¹³³

7.356 Mr Hogg also noted that since there was no product recall, there would be no need to decide immediately on issues around compensation. 'We would, however, need to consider the mechanisms for providing for MAFF-approved plants for deboning.' ¹³⁴

20 March 1996: Cabinet meeting

7.357 The Cabinet met at 10.45 that morning to consider SEAC's advice, as well as a draft statement by Sir Kenneth Calman (CMO) which had been circulated before the meeting. The minutes recorded that 'in view of the seriousness of the matter, [the Prime Minister] had invited the Chief Medical Officer and Professor John Pattison, the Chairman of the SEAC, to attend the first part of the meeting, to explain the thinking behind both statements'. ¹³⁵

7.358 Sir Kenneth Calman said that recent research had identified a new variant of CJD in young people, which had a distinct clinical and pathological appearance and therefore was a cause for concern. He explained that although there was no direct evidence of a link between BSE and this new variant, the theoretical risk that such a link existed now seemed more significant. He noted that special attention would need to be given to what was said about the position of children but there was no scientific evidence that the disease was affected by age. ¹³⁶

7.359 Professor Pattison said that the new evidence had been provided by the CJD Surveillance Unit, which had identified 10 cases of CJD and was still investigating two others. He reported that after much consideration, and in the absence of any credible alternative account, SEAC had concluded that the most likely explanation for the new variant of CJD lay in exposure to BSE before the introduction of the 1989 SBO ban. ¹³⁷

7.360 It was agreed important that SEAC's advice and the CMO's draft statement were consistent with each other. ¹³⁸

7.361 The Cabinet agreed that the Government should accept the SEAC recommendations in full. It was also agreed that both Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell should make statements to the House of Commons, and that a statement should also be made in the House of Lords to explain why the Government was going to implement SEAC's advice on vCJD. ¹³⁹

7.362 At lunchtime Mr Packer, Sir Kenneth Calman and Sir Robin Butler briefed Harriett Harman (Opposition spokesperson on Health) and Mr Gavin Strang (Opposition spokesperson on Agriculture) on the announcements to be made that afternoon. In a minute to Mr Hogg later that day Mr Packer recorded:

The meeting at lunchtime today . . . was constitutionally unusual and it may be worth recording the background and the content which appeared in some respects to influence subsequent exchanges in the House. ¹⁴⁰

7.363 Mr Packer noted that the CMO led by detailing the background of the SEAC report and his own statement but then 'speculated':

. . . despite the formal SEAC advice, individual SEAC members might prefer their own children and grandchildren not to eat beef.

7.364 Mr Packer inferred that the CMO had implied that this was his own position and noted that Ms Harman's interest was attracted by this comment.

7.365 After the Cabinet meeting Mr Dorrell went to his office to prepare his statement. Dr Rubery and other DH officials helped him. Mr Dorrell told the BSE Inquiry that in the course of preparing his statement:

I was reminded of speculation in the press that children were at particular risk of infection from BSE. I asked the Chief Medical Officer what his advice was. He told me that he did not feel qualified to respond. Since it was clear that I would be (and indeed was) asked the question, I asked the CMO to ensure that SEAC considered this specific question at the further meeting which they planned to hold over the weekend. ¹⁴¹

7.366 Sir Kenneth also prepared a further redraft of his statement. ¹⁴² The previous day Mr Packer had prepared a statement for Mr Hogg to make to Parliament. ¹⁴³ Following the decision that Mr Dorrell should make the main statement, Mr Packer drafted an alternative version for Mr Hogg, which was delivered broadly as drafted (see below). ¹⁴⁴

7.367 A note was sent from the Prime Minister's office to MAFF, copied to DH, outlining two points that Mr Major wanted to see brought out in any statements that were made that day. The first was that there was no proven link between BSE and CJD. All that had happened was that 'the balance of probabilities has now shifted in the light of new evidence. The Prime Minister feels it is important to emphasise this so as to explain earlier statements about there being no scientific evidence of such a link.' ¹⁴⁵

7.368 The second point was that the scientists whose advice the Government had received should be named. 'The Prime Minister feels that simply to say "we are advised" will sound very weak when there will be other scientists prominently saying "we told you so".' ¹⁴⁶

7.369 Mr Hogg told the BSE Inquiry that he did not remember this note. He did not use the particular phrasing in it. He made his statement to the House in his own words. ¹⁴⁷

20 March 1996: statements to the House of Commons

7.370 Mr Dorrell began his statement to the House of Commons at 3.31 that afternoon. ¹⁴⁸ He stressed the Government's policy of basing its decisions on SEAC's advice, and then outlined the CJD Surveillance Unit's findings based on work relating to ten confirmed cases of CJD in people under the age of 42. He stated that there remained no scientific proof that BSE could be transmitted to man by eating beef, but referred to SEAC's conclusion that the most likely explanation at that time was that those cases were linked to exposure to BSE before the introduction of the SBO ban in 1989.

7.371 He also confirmed that the Government had accepted SEAC's findings in full and that they would be put into effect as soon as was possible. As far as DH responsibilities were concerned, there would be an urgent consideration of what further research was needed, and the HSE and the ACDP would be tasked with reviewing their advice on worker safety. ¹⁴⁹

7.372 Mr Dorrell also addressed the question about the possibility that children were now at more risk of developing CJD. He stated:

There is at present no evidence for age sensitivity, and the scientific evidence for the risks of developing CJD in those who eat meat in childhood has not changed as a result of the new findings. However, parents will be concerned about the implications for their children, and I have asked the advisory committee to provide specific advice on that issue following its next meeting. ¹⁵⁰

7.373 Mr Dorrell concluded his remarks by stating that any further measures SEAC recommended would be 'given the most urgent consideration by the Government'.

7.374 Ms Harriet Harman stated that the question of a link between BSE and CJD was an issue of immense importance to consumers and particularly to parents of young children. She asked whether the Secretary of State remained uncertain and suggested that it was now apparent that there had been 'too much reassurance and too little action'. ¹⁵¹ Ms Glenda Jackson (Labour MP for Hampstead and Highgate) also raised the issue:

Was not the previous scientific advice categoric that there was no possibility of BSE entering the human food chain? In the light of the possibility that the disease takes 10 years to incubate, should not stronger advice be given - certainly to schools and parents - on the possible effects and dangers of feeding beef to small children? ¹⁵²

7.375 In response, Mr Dorrell stated that SEAC had not given any specific recommendation about children but it would consider the issue at its next meeting and the advice would be available at the weekend. ¹⁵³

7.376 Mr Hogg began his statement at 4.17 pm. He confirmed that the Government had accepted SEAC's recommendation that carcasses from cattle over 30 months old must be de-boned in specially licensed plants supervised by the Meat Hygiene Service (MHS), and that any trimmings would be kept out of both the human and animal food chains. In addition, Mr Hogg explained that he had instructed that existing controls in slaughterhouses and other meat plants and in feedmills should be more rigorously enforced. ¹⁵⁴ He emphasised that if the public accepted 'the best opinion that we have' that beef and beef products can be eaten with confidence then he believed there would be no damage to the British beef market.

7.377 Ministers were then faced with a catalogue of questions about the development of a live test for BSE, resources for research into BSE and CJD, the reasons for imposing the de-boning requirement only on animals over 30 months of age, and whether the existing controls in slaughterhouses were being adequately enforced. Some questions emphasised that the Government had previously assured the House that the controls were being properly monitored and enforced and therefore questioned the Government's sincerity and authority in this regard, as well as the Government's ability to enforce its own rules. ¹⁵⁵

7.378 Action was taken on 20 March 1996 to inform the EC Commission and other member states of the announcement. ¹⁵⁶

7.379 This brings to an end the period with which this Inquiry is concerned. It is, however, necessary to record some of the events which followed soon afterwards.