Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
4. Human health developments:January - December 1990
Intensification of public concerns about the safety of beef during 1990
Government response to the report of the Agriculture Committee
Discussion of increasing public concerns in 1990

Government response to the report of the Agriculture Committee

4.686 We conclude our description by recording that the Government's response to the Agriculture Committee's report included the following:

2. . . . as regards the safety of eating British beef, paragraphs 32 and 33 of the Report set out a balanced and reasonable conclusion that is wholly consistent with the view expressed by the Chief Medical Officer in May that beef can be eaten safely by everyone.

. . .

Government response to food scares

33. The Report (Chapter IV) considers the Government's campaign to reassure the public. It comments on 'a rather haphazard response to the initial BSE scare' and concludes that 'there must be some more systematic and measured way of responding and we urge the Government to address this problem' (paragraph 75).

34. When faced with ill informed and at times mischievous comments designed to arouse unjustified concerns about food safety, the Government inevitably must react immediately to correct alarmist and incorrect reporting. In dealing with a series of new angles on a developing story, it is difficult to avoid appearing to be reactive and, to an extent, 'haphazard'. Government actions and reassurances are less attractive to the media than the attacks of the scaremongers. Elsewhere in this Report, of course, the Committee commends the Minister for being 'robust and level-headed in maintaining his stance'.

35. The policy that has been followed is to publish relevant information and to explain this to interested journalists through individual or collective briefing by Ministry veterinarians and scientists. Such a briefing was arranged to deal with the cat case. In the immediate aftermath, the Chief Veterinary Officer continued to give interviews in order to put the significance of this development in its scientific context; and the Minister himself did not intervene with the media until the issue was clearly becoming political rather than scientific in nature. The timing of the Chief Medical Officer's reassurance enabled him to assess whether the discovery of a feline encephalopathy had any bearing on human health.

36. In order to strengthen the organisation for dealing with food safety issues generally, MAFF was reorganised last year with the creation of a single Food Safety Directorate. This is under the day-to-day leadership of the Parliamentary Secretary with responsibility for food safety matters. A main thrust of the Food Safety Directorate's work is its policy of openness with information of public interest and value. It has established a separate identity for press releases on food safety matters, an information bulletin to update consumer groups and others on food issues and regular meetings are held between the Parliamentary Secretary and consumer representatives through a consumer panel. About half of the Ministry's relatively small publicity expenditure is devoted to its food safety responsibilities. ¹

Discussion of increasing public concerns in 1990

4.687 In this section of our Report we look at increasing public concerns, and the public statements that were made about risk in the context of events in 1990. In Volume 1 of our Report we have discussed the perception of many that the public was deceived by Government about the risks posed by BSE and that information that suggested that BSE might pose a danger to human health was suppressed. The accusation has been levelled that MAFF put the interests of the farming industry before those of public health.

4.688 Our conclusion is that there was no deliberate deception of the public, nor after the early stages of the BSE story, was there suppression of information. The policy of openness promoted by Mr Gummer was applied within MAFF for the rest of the period covered by our Report. MAFF officials and Ministers none the less managed the manner and the timing of the release of information in an attempt to reduce its impact and thus to avoid 'scare stories'. There were examples of this low-key approach in 1990.

4.689 We believe that the perception that Government misled the public about BSE has arisen not because of misinformation, nor because of concealment of information, but because of a failure on the part of many to appreciate the limited nature of the reassurances given by Government. Concerns about BSE led individuals to stop eating beef and some education authorities to cease serving beef in schools. MAFF officials and Ministers believed that this response was unwarranted. They sought to address public concerns not by giving reassurance that BSE posed no risk to humans, but by giving reassurance that it was safe to eat beef. This reassurance received support from the CMO and from SEAC. It was, however, only limited reassurance. It was predicated on the belief that precautionary measures had been taken which reduced a remote risk to a risk so negligible that any reasonable person would disregard it. Those measures were the slaughter and destruction of animals affected by BSE and the removal from the food chain of SBO of apparently healthy animals.

4.690 The majority of the public did not appreciate the basis upon which they were assured that it was safe to eat beef. They tended to equate the statement 'beef is safe' with 'BSE is no danger'. The dialogue between Mr Martlew and Mr Gummer which we have recorded at paragraphs 4.625-4.626 gives an example of this misunderstanding. Some of the statements which gave rise to this misunderstanding were made in 1990.

The significance of events in 1990

4.691 The Southwood Report had advised that the risk that BSE posed to human health was remote. BSE was probably caused by the scrapie agent and could be expected to behave like scrapie. The SBO ban was presented by Government as a measure of extreme prudence that went beyond the recommendations of the scientists. So indeed it did. But the scientists who produced the Southwood Report emphasised the paucity of the evidence upon which their conclusions were based, and the need to carry out research in order to learn more about BSE. Scientists in 1990 received further data of relevance to the assessment of the risks posed by BSE.

4.692 The successful oral transmission of BSE to mice by Professor Barlow was the first demonstration that BSE was orally transmissible from cattle to another species. As such the result supported the possibility that BSE might be transmissible to humans. It did not, however, add significantly to the likelihood of such transmissibility. This was because scrapie had been orally transmissible to mice in the same way. To those who believed that BSE would behave like scrapie, the result was no surprise and did not suggest that BSE would have a wider infective range than scrapie.

4.693 The same was not true of the oral transmission of BSE to cats. When the first cat was diagnosed with an SE, it was not clear that this had resulted from transmission of BSE, or indeed any transmission at all. Some, notably Mr Wells, concluded that the indications from the first case were that the cat had been infected from feed of cattle or sheep origin (see paragraph 4.518). Most were uncertain as to what conclusion to draw, as were the members of SEAC at its meeting on 17 May.

4.694 Mr Wells told us in a statement that Mr Meldrum telephoned him at home on a Sunday evening in May to discuss the implications of feline spongiform encephalopathy and that he expressed the personal view to Mr Meldrum that the discovery of FSE was probably of profound significance in relation to BSE and should lead to a complete ban on MBM entering the animal food chain. ² Mr Meldrum's recollection was that this conversation took place later in the summer, when further cases of FSE had been diagnosed. He commented:

Mr Wells believed that the cases in cats was in all likelihood connected with BSE because a number of cases by that time had been diagnosed and all had occurred in the same time frame as BSE. I had no reason to dispute Mr Wells' opinion because I had been drawn to that very same conclusion. ³

4.695 The first case of FSE had indeed been followed by others. By the end of the year 12 had been diagnosed. The possibility of a link with BSE had become more probable.

4.696 If cats were being infected with BSE, or with the agent that caused BSE, this was cause for concern to those who drew comfort from the analogy with scrapie. While it had proved possible to transmit CJD to a cat by experimental cerebral inoculation, attempts to transmit scrapie in this manner and orally had been unsuccessful. If BSE had been transmitted to a cat, this suggested that a more virulent agent was at large than scrapie. Dr Pickles appreciated the significance of this possibility (see paragraph 4.500), as did Sir Donald Acheson (see paragraph 4.568). It seems to us, as it seemed to Dr Helen Grant (see paragraph 4.526) that the fundamental question was raised: if transmission to a cat, why not to a human? We are unaware of any ready answer to that question.

4.697 Mr Meldrum told us that the cases of FSE also led to increased concerns within MAFF at the risks posed by BSE. This concern led Mr Gummer to apply to the domestic market the requirement for removal of obvious nervous and lymphatic tissue that Brussels had imposed in relation to exports. A further cause for concern was the diagnosis of SEs in exotic species in zoos. ⁴

The low-key approach

4.698 An example of the low-key approach to the release of information was the manner and timing of publication of the achievement of oral transmission of BSE to mice (see paragraph 4.481). MAFF's press release came close to suggesting that such transmission was reassuring in that it strengthened the similarity to scrapie. This did not avoid the press reaction that had been feared, and MAFF's response, as portrayed by the press, appeared defensive and unconvincing.

4.699 Another example of the low-key approach was the decision to cease publishing details of further instances of FSE, suggested by Mr Lowson to avoid 'damage in terms of stirring up controversy' (see paragraph 4.606).

Mr Meldrum's statements on risk

4.700 We commend the statement on risk made by Mr Meldrum in his interview with The Times on 22 January 1990 (see paragraph 4.473). This drew the clear distinction between the risk that BSE posed to man and the risk from eating beef, and made it clear that it was impossible to be certain that there was no risk to man from BSE.

4.701 Mr Meldrum did not deal with questions about the significance of the cat in as satisfactory a manner. It seems to us that he took too much comfort in the assumption that there was unlikely to be a connection between the cat and BSE. Mr Lowson's minute of 9 May 1990 had informed Mr Gummer about the discovery of SE in a cat, and had stressed the importance of not encouraging the public to jump to conclusions about the likely origin. This led to the Minister's meeting of 10 May 1990, which Mr Meldrum attended. Mr Meldrum challenged the correctness of Mr Lebrecht's minute, which recorded that he confirmed Mr Gummer's assumption that there was no likely connection between the cat and BSE (see paragraph 4.502). He told us that he did not believe that he would have used the words 'no likely connection'. He would probably have said there was 'no known connection' between the cat and BSE. ⁵ Mr Lebrecht's minute suggests to us that it was Mr Gummer who used the phrase 'no likely connection' and that Mr Meldrum agreed with it. It would not have been a surprising question for Mr Gummer to ask, for Mr Lowson's minute to him conveyed that impression (see paragraph 4.499). Mr Gummer confirmed that he left the meeting with the understanding that there was no likely connection between the cat and BSE. ⁶ We have concluded that Mr Lebrecht's minute was an accurate record of the meeting.

4.702 We do not see that Mr Meldrum was in a position to advise on the likelihood of a connection with BSE without speaking to the CVL. Mr Wells had formed the view that the cat was likely to have contracted the disease as a result of eating infected material from cattle or sheep. ⁷ Had Mr Meldrum learned of this view he would have been unable to be so sanguine. When giving evidence in Phase 2 Mr Meldrum accepted that it would be unjustifiable for Mr Gummer to have assumed that there was no likely connection between BSE and the cat. ⁸ Mr Meldrum should not have acquiesced in that assumption.

4.703 The press reports suggest that in his public response to questions about the cat Mr Meldrum played down its potential significance to a greater degree than an objective appraisal would have justified. He himself accepted that it was putting the matter too strongly to say that the cat was no cause for concern at all. ⁹ Mr Meldrum was entitled to express the view that Professor Lacey's response to the cat was an over-reaction, but we do not think that it was fair to castigate the concerns he had expressed about the implications of the cat as 'absolute nonsense'.

4.704 We recognise, however, the pressure that Mr Meldrum was under. He was faced with the likelihood that far more alarming conclusions would be drawn from the cat than were justified in the uncertainty that prevailed. His was not an easy task. With hindsight one can see that on this occasion, as on others, MAFF's response would have carried more conviction had there been a concession of a limited degree of concern. We do not, however, think it fair to criticise Mr Meldrum for adopting in public the defensive stance that he did.

4.705 Events at and following the meeting of 10 May 1990 are discussed further in vol. 5: Animal Health 1986-1996.

Mr Gummer's press releases

4.706 There is uncertainty on the evidence as to whether Mr Gummer met Dr Pickles on the afternoon of 15 May to discuss the statement that MAFF intended to make about the safety of beef. Neither recollected such a meeting. Mr Gummer's evidence that one took place was founded on a minute that indicated such a meeting was planned. Dr Pickles said that she would not have agreed to a statement that beef was 'perfectly safe' knowing the views of the CMO and those of DH's expert advisers. ¹⁰ Sir Donald Acheson told us that he could think of no circumstances in which he would have approved the formulation 'perfectly safe'.

4.707 In the light of this evidence, we think it unlikely that the planned meeting between Mr Gummer and Dr Pickles in fact took place. Despite the comments made on the use of the phrase 'perfectly safe', we would not criticise Mr Gummer in respect of the terms of his press release. Some time was taken at oral hearings discussing the distinction between 'it is safe to eat beef', 'it is perfectly safe to eat beef', 'beef can be eaten with confidence', 'beef can be eaten with complete confidence' and 'there is no scientific justification for not eating beef'. None of those suggests any reservation about the safety of beef, and we do not believe that members of the public would have distinguished between them. While some found Mr Gummer's statement lost conviction by over-emphasis, ¹¹ we would not criticise him for the terms of the press release.

4.708 Mr Gummer's press release put at the forefront the precautionary measures that had been taken to 'ensure that the customer is reassured and protected'. It was in the light of the existence of those measures that it was claimed that beef could be eaten with complete confidence. The distinction was drawn between beef, which was 'perfectly safe' to eat, and BSE, which was 'most unlikely to have an implications for human health'. These releases reflected the position as Mr Gummer reasonably understood it to be. We have no criticism to make of them.

Cordelia

4.709 No single attempt at communication of risk to the public made a deeper impression than Mr Gummer's televised attempt to feed a beef-burger to his daughter Cordelia. This no doubt conveyed to any reasonable person the message that he was confident that it was safe to eat the beef-burger. We suspect, however, that the reaction of many was that it was distasteful for the Minister to involve his young daughter in a publicity stunt of this nature. The stunt was not Mr Gummer's idea. He was, we believe, challenged by a newspaper to show his confidence in beef in this way. He no doubt feared some adverse press comment if he rejected the challenge. It may seem with hindsight that caught in a 'no win' situation, he chose the wrong option, but it is not a matter for which he ought to be criticised.

Sir Donald Acheson

4.710 We discuss the role of the CMO in Volume 1. He is the person to whom the Government and the public naturally look for objective and authoritative advice on risks to health. Mr Dorrell told us that on a matter of public health CMOs had a professional responsibility to make their own decisions about what they were and were not willing to say. ¹² We believe that a CMO must take the greatest care that any statement made about a public health risk is, and is seen to be, objective and uninfluenced by any considerations other than the safety of public health.

4.711 MAFF Ministers and officials were concerned at the public reaction to the cat because of the damage that it was threatening to do to the beef industry. They did not believe that this was justified and were aware that the DH was also of the opinion that beef remained safe to eat. In these circumstances it was understandable that MAFF should have sought to persuade the CMO to make a public statement about the safety of beef.

4.712 The CMO's concern was properly for the public, not for the beef industry. We consider that, faced with the degree of public concern that had been raised by the cat, it was appropriate for the CMO to make a public statement to address that concern.

4.713 Sir Donald Acheson expressed concerns to us that the language that he used when dealing with the safety of beef might not have been appropriate. The wording that Dr Tyrrell had approved by telephone on 15 May was 'there is no scientific justification for not eating beef and beef can be eaten by adults and children with confidence'. Sir Donald said that he was unable now to remember why he substituted the word 'safely' for the phrase 'with confidence'. ¹³ As we have indicated, we do not find this change of any significance. Nor did Dr Tyrrell when he was asked about this. ¹⁴ Sir Donald Acheson was also concerned that in his television interview he had said there was 'no risk', though he added:

it is for you to judge whether 'no risk' and 'no scientific justification' in terms of practical effect is similar. I personally think it is. ¹⁵

4.714 We think so also.

4.715 Our concern about the statement made by Sir Donald is rather different. Sir Donald has told us:

My statement was made, as were Mr Gummer's, on the confident assumption that the SBO ban was already fully implemented. ¹⁶

4.716 In a subsequent statement, he added:

To safeguard human health against the risk of transmissibility, both the slaughter and compensation scheme [July 1988] and the ban on the consumption of the specified bovine offals [November 1989] had already been in place for some time. Accordingly, even if the BSE agent was transmissible to humans, as far as I was aware, all bovine tissue which might present any hazard in that circumstance was being removed from the human food chain at the slaughterhouse and was not available for consumption. I was therefore confident, having consulted with my external advisors, that such bovine material, or 'beef', as remained in the human food chain could be eaten safely by the public. ¹⁷

4.717 Sir Donald told us that when on 9 May he heard from Dr Pickles of the cat he:

remained deeply concerned about the possible implications of a further transpecies 'jump' of BSE. ¹⁸

4.718 Because of that concern he called an emergency meeting of SEAC.

4.719 In contrast to the press releases made by Mr Gummer, Sir Donald's statement did not explain that his confidence in the safety of beef was premised on the removal of all SBO. It gave no indication of any concern about the cat. It was, we feel, a statement which was likely to convey the message not merely that 'beef is safe' but that 'BSE is no risk to human health'. It seems to us that this was the meaning attributed to Sir Donald's proposed statement by the Welsh Office and explains why they were not prepared to endorse it (see paragraph 4.579).

4.720 We do not consider that, as CMO, Sir Donald should have restricted his public statement in the way that he did. The development of an SE in a cat had raised a concern that BSE might be transmissible in a way that scrapie was not. Sir Donald was in no position to allay that concern. He avoided addressing it by limiting his statement to the safety of beef. He did not explain that he considered beef safe only because the parts of the cow that might be infective were being removed from the food chain. His statement was likely to give false reassurance about the possibility that BSE might be transmissible to humans and we think that he should have appreciated this. In fact the possibility that BSE might have been transmitted to a cat was cause for concern and needed to be investigated by the scientists. He should then have explained that he believed that beef was safe to eat because of the precautionary steps that had been taken to guard against the possibility that BSE might be transmissible in food.

4.721 We appreciate that this conclusion applies to Sir Donald an exacting standard in a difficult situation. We believe, however, that such a standard is to be expected of the CMO when making a statement to the public. The trust that the public place on the objectivity of the CMO is a precious commodity. It calls for the greatest care when making a statement on any matter affecting the safety of public health.

4.722 The unqualified statement by Sir Donald that it was safe to eat beef was to set a precedent, as we shall see when we consider statements made by his successor. As time progressed, however, the Government was to introduce a series of further measures aimed at protecting the public from any risk that there might be from eating beef or beef products. These steps, coupled as they tended to be with the repeated message that it was safe to eat beef, gave a confused message to the public. If the previous message that it was safe to eat had been accurate, why was there a need to introduce further precautionary measures?

4.723 The truth was that the need for additional measures demonstrated that the premises upon which the previous assurances had been given had been shown to be open to doubt. The premises were that all tissue that might carry risk to humans was removed in the slaughterhouse. Thus, the result of the pathogenesis experiment, in 1994, demonstrated a possible risk from the intestines and thymus of calves less than 6 months old. These had previously been excluded from the SBO ban. In 1995, evidence that removal of spinal cord in the slaughterhouse was not always fully effective undermined the premise on which assurances about the safety of beef had been given. A ban on extracting MRM from the vertebral column was the result.

4.724 Had assurances about the safety of beef made clear the basis upon which they were given, it would have been apparent that those statements were qualified and not absolute. The public would then have been able to understand more readily the reason for the introduction of additional precautionary measures when this occurred and the fact that no absolute guarantee could be given that eating beef was without risk.

Dr Metters's concern

4.725 In the context of risk communication, we turn from Sir Donald to his Deputy, Dr Metters. In October 1990 Mr Murray was anxious that the DH should be more active in giving information about BSE to those with responsibility for public health. Dr Metters's response to this was to emphasise his concern 'that BSE should not be portrayed as a human health risk'.

4.726 Happily, we do not recognise as an accurate statement of the position, even of DH alone, that part of Dr Metters's response which said:

Every effort has thus far been made to underline the Government's position, based on advice from the Southwood and Tyrrell Committees that the disease is not a risk to humans. ¹⁹

4.727 Sir Donald Acheson had lent his strong support to the SBO ban and Dr Pickles and Dr Metters had played a diligent part in identifying those tissues that should be subject to that ban.

4.728 We must, however, criticise the message expressly set out by Dr Metters to Mr Murray and Dr Pickles as to the attitude of DH to the risk posed by BSE to human health. We cannot say what the effect of this message may have been. EHOs who enforced Regulations under the Food Safety Act 1990 in slaughterhouses looked to MAFF for guidance in relation to their duties, but EHOs who inspected butchers' shops also had a role to play (see the discovery by an EHO of spinal cord in beef at a Birmingham butcher's premises in 1996). ²⁰ These and other EHOs involved in retail sale of meat and meat products looked to DH for guidance. While monitoring of such EHOs was not his responsibility, Dr Metters should have been keen to ensure that they appreciated the importance of the enforcement of the SBO ban rather than seeking to avoid suggesting that BSE posed a risk to human health.

Statements made by the MLC

4.729 The relevant statutory functions of the MLC are described in vol. 14: Responsibilities for Human and Animal Health. They included promoting the merits and increasing the sales of livestock and livestock products. In carrying out their functions they were required to have regard to the interests of consumers as well as those of the producers.

4.730 Mr Colin Maclean served as Technical Director of the MLC from July 1988 to July 1992. He was then promoted to Director-General, a post which he held throughout the rest of the period with which we are concerned. Mr Maclean holds a Master's degree in Veterinary Science and is a Fellow of the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons.

4.731 Mr Maclean assisted the MLC to mount a vigorous publicity campaign aimed at reassuring the public that beef and beef products were safe to eat. That was a perfectly acceptable role to play, for the MLC could properly rely upon the public assurances given by MAFF and DH that this was the case.

4.732 The MLC's duty to have regard to the interests of consumers as well as those of the beef industry meant, however, that it should be scrupulous in ensuring that any statements that were made to the public in relation to the safety of beef were accurate. For this the MLC relied upon Mr Maclean. He, for his part, looked for advice to what he described as an 'informal network of scientific contacts', ²¹ including Dr Kimberlin, who became a paid consultant of MLC in 1993, Dr Bradley, Mr Meldrum, Mr Kevin Taylor, Dr Danny Matthews and Dr Will. ²²

4.733 We have concluded that on a number of occasions the MLC, under the guidance of Mr Maclean, made inaccurate statements to the public that exaggerated the safety of beef and suggested that precautions that had been put in place were unnecessary. We are satisfied that there was no basis upon which Mr Maclean could reasonably believe that these statements were accurate.

4.734 The first occasion to which this criticism relates was the letter to the Independent of 16 January 1990, ²³ for which Mr Maclean was personally responsible (see paragraph 4.465). It is an irony that he wrote to complain of suggested inaccuracies in an earlier article in the Independent. The statement that a human would have to eat an impossible amount of pure cow brain at the height of infection to reach an oral dose equivalent to that required to infect sheep or cows was spectacularly inaccurate. Mr Maclean has accepted that it was an 'overstatement'. ²⁴ In a supplementary statement, he has said that:

advisers were telling me that it would require a very large amount of high titre tissues to pose any risk and that the controls imposed post-Southwood had effectively removed that risk. ²⁵

4.735 We do not believe that any of Mr Maclean's informal advisers would have supported his statement about the amount of pure cow brain needed to infect. Dr Kimberlin certainly would not have done so and we have noted the view expressed to Mr Lowson by Mr Bradley in October 1990 that 'a gram of infected cow could have a lot of infectivity'. ²⁶ Mr Maclean did not believe that BSE was transmissible to humans, but that does not excuse this lack of accuracy. He should have exercised more care to ensure his statement was accurate.

4.736 Mr Maclean reverted to the question of dose in his video about beef that was to be circulated to local authorities (see paragraph 4.597). The material passage was:

There has been some concern expressed about small amounts of brain and spinal cord getting onto the carcass in the abattoir.

True enough, this may happen but it presents no threat. If this material was all infected - which it isn't - then you would have to eat an impossible amount to put yourself at any risk. ²⁷

4.737 It seems to us that, giving the words their natural meaning, Mr Maclean was once again saying that 'you would have to eat an impossible amount of brain and spinal cord to put yourself at any risk'. He has stated that he meant 'an impossible amount of meat'. ²⁸ The original draft for the video was unambiguous, for it continued:

You would need to eat half your body weight in infected brain in just eight days. Imagine 8 kilos of brain a day. You would have to be force-fed. And with the offal ban, none of it should be infected anyway. ²⁹

4.738 Mr Maclean thought that these latter sentences were deleted at the suggestion of Dr Kimberlin. ³⁰ At best the deletion substituted an ambiguity for a clearly inaccurate statement. We consider that Mr Maclean should have been more careful to see that his statement to the local authorities was clear and accurate.

4.739 A further point arises in relation to this passage. It clearly suggested that contamination with spinal cord or brain in the slaughterhouse was no cause for concern. Yet at about the time that the video was being made, Mr Maclean appeared to be expressing concern to his Chairman about contamination from head and carcass-splitting (see paragraph 4.598). Mr Maclean has told us, however, that his concern was to avoid a problem of perception on the part of some supermarkets and consumers rather than to remove any real risk. He was concerned with presentation, not actual risk. ³¹ We accept this explanation for what had appeared a conflict between Mr Maclean's public statement and private thinking.

4.740 There was one further occasion in 1990 when Mr Maclean failed to exercise proper care to make sure that his public statements were accurate. We are not surprised that the press furore that followed the disclosure that a cat had contracted an SE provoked a strong press release from the MLC. Mr Maclean's enthusiasm to rebut what he described as 'alarmist stories and overblown claims' led him to overblow his defence of beef.

4.741 His press release of 14 May stated that if no further action had been taken following the outbreak of BSE there was considered to be no risk to consumers from eating beef (see paragraphs 4.537-4.539). The release went on to refer to the requirement for notification, the slaughter and compensation ruling and the SBO ban and to state that any one of these should have been enough to remove any fears.

4.742 Mr Maclean described this press release as clumsy. We find that it inaccurately suggested that BSE presented no risk. We accept that Mr Maclean did not intend to suggest that it would have been safe to eat sick animals, but that is none the less the meaning of what he said.

4.743 It may be asked to what extent, amidst the barrage of media coverage and press releases, these inaccuracies on the part of MLC mattered. That is not a question anyone can answer. But MLC made these statements as part of a campaign to influence public opinion. The inaccuracies would have tended to foster a belief not merely that beef was safe, but that BSE posed no threat. To that extent they would have made their contribution to the perception in March 1996 that the public had not been told the truth.

The sequel to the cat

4.744 At its emergency meeting on 17 May 1990 SEAC concluded that there were three possibilities:

1. the case was one of a feline disorder in its own right that had no association with BSE or scrapie
2. it was a feline form of scrapie
3. it was a feline form of BSE.

4.745 SEAC decided that it was premature to draw conclusions without further data. ³²

4.746 On 13 June 1990, by which time two further cases of FSE had been identified, SEAC again considered the position. Specialists at the Bristol Veterinary School had by now indicated their belief that this was a new condition as opposed to one that had been previously recognised. SEAC concluded that it was still impossible to know how the condition had originated and that no conclusions could be drawn about the risk to human health until more was known. It was agreed that urgent research work was very important to establish its incidence, to seek evidence about its similarity to existing conditions, to establish whether or not it had occurred in the past and to determine whether it was transmissible. ³³

4.747 FSE-to-mouse transmission studies were put in hand at the NPU. BSE-to-cat transmission experiments were considered, but rejected on ethical grounds. ³⁴

4.748 By the end of 1990 FSE had been diagnosed in 12 cats.

4.749 By June 1991 the University of Bristol had results from transmission experiments which established that FSE was transmissible. ³⁵ At their meeting on 28 June SEAC noted that after an 'initial flurry' few cases were being reported and suggested that consideration should be given to ways of stimulating reports of cases, so as to obtain a clear picture of the disease. ³⁶

4.750 At its meeting on 6 September SEAC was given the statistics of reported and confirmed cases of FSE. It emphasised that it considered it important to have a 'properly constructed study of FSE'. ³⁷ Bristol University was keen to carry out such a study, but was having difficulty in obtaining funding. ³⁸

4.751 By the end of 1991, 23 cases of FSE had been confirmed.

4.752 During 1992 Bristol University continued to seek funding in relation to research into FSE. MAFF declined to provide this on the ground that it would not further any MAFF policy objective. It also declined to provide samples of BSE-infected brain for experimentation on cats on ethical grounds. ³⁹

4.753 By the end of 1992 the number of confirmed cases of FSE had reached 33.

4.754 In its September 1994 Report on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) ⁴⁰ SEAC made the following comments on FSE:

When a cat was reported in 1990 to have succumbed to feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE) the public and some scientists expressed some concern. But it was already known that this species was experimentally susceptible to CJD and had been used in the USA and Czechoslovakia for investigating the human disease. ⁴¹

. . .

The major pet food manufacturers voluntarily removed MBM and specified bovine and ovine offals from their products once the potential risks of infection of these tissues were recognised and before the SBO ban came into effect for humans in November 1989. However it is likely that some animals were infected before these measures were taken . . . No cats with confirmed disease were born after September 1990 when the SBO ban was extended to protect animals including cats from exposure. ⁴²

4.755 The section of the CVO's report for 1995 dealing with BSE contained a paragraph on FSE. This stated:

An initial analysis of the descriptive epidemiological features of FSE in Great Britain was completed during the year. This involved the first 54 cases for which complete basic epidemiological data had been collected. The cases were distributed widely throughout Great Britain. Although there was a regional variation in the observed incidence this was consistent with a geographical variation in the ascertainment of cases because of local interest. There has been an apparent excess incidence in male cats, which could not be simply explained. In examining the possible sources and routes of infection, a feed borne source was most likely. ⁴³

4.756 By the end of 1995 the cumulative number of confirmed cases of FSE had reached 65. As to conclusions as to the human health implications of these, nothing was said. Mr Meldrum has summarised the position as follows:

SEAC neither came to any conclusions nor made any recommendations at their meeting on 17 May 1990. ⁴⁴ Similarly, at their meeting on 13 June 1990 ⁴⁵ (by which time there were two confirmed cases) SEAC concluded that they were 'in no position to offer advice on any human health implications' and simply agreed that urgent research was needed. Whilst at subsequent meetings SEAC continued to receive updates on the FSE situation and discussed issues of surveillance and research, no specific observations or recommendations on the risk to humans were made. That remains the position to the present day. ⁴⁶

4.757 If, at the same time that BSE emerged, cats had begun to succumb to an SE as a result of food-borne infection, this would cast doubt on the comforting assumptions that the cause of BSE was a conventional scrapie agent and that BSE would behave like scrapie. It suggested that a more virulent agent was abroad. The case of the first cat did no more than raise the possibility of this, but by the end of 1990 the confirmation of 12 cases of FSE made this seem more probable.

4.758 By the time SEAC produced its Report on TSEs in September 1994 it had concluded that FSEs had been caused by consumption of SBO. In that Report SEAC ended with this conclusion:

Our scientific assessment is that the risk to man and other species from BSE is remote because the control measures now in place are adequate to eliminate or reduce any risk to a negligible level. We do however point out that any species exposed already and before any bans were effective could be incubating disease, and therefore continuous monitoring is very important until any possible incubation period has been exceeded. ⁴⁷

4.759 There had been, we suggest, a significant shift from the risk evaluation of the Southwood Working Party. This was not something of which the public was aware. One can well understand why it was not thought desirable to point out to the public that the Government's scientific advisers believed that some of them might be incubating a human form of BSE. However, the failure to point this out when emphatic statements were made about the safety of beef led the public to perceive in March 1996 that it had been deceived about the risk posed by BSE.