Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
4. Human health developments:January - December 1990
Intensification of public concerns about the safety of beef during 1990
Continuing concerns
Evidence on the safety of beef received by the House of Commons Agriculture Committee Inquiry into BSE
The Committee's conclusions and recommendations

Continuing concerns

Concern from consumer groups

4.608 On 21 May 1990, Mr David Maclean and Mr Meldrum met with representatives from consumer groups. ¹ The meeting had been called by Mr Maclean in order to 'take stock of the latest developments on BSE and to reassure consumer groups on any points of detail concerning the disease'. ²

4.609 The minutes of the meeting record that the point was raised that scientific opinion was not united on the risks associated with BSE and that this left consumers in a very difficult position as to whom to believe. Mr Maclean offered to provide a list of all the top experts who were specialists in this area. In addition it was suggested that guidance should be offered to consumer organisations on the criteria to follow in assessing which 'experts' to believe. ³

Concern from the Consumers' Association

4.610 A minute from Dr J Bell on 30 May 1990 informed MAFF officials that the Consumers' Association had decided to hold a private seminar to discuss risk assessment. ⁴ She noted that :

The Consumers Association have clearly begun to recognise that there is no such thing as 100% safe food.

4.611 Having attended the meeting she later reported in a minute dated 7 June 1990: ⁵

General concern was expressed over the loss of confidence of the public in the pronouncements of Government in general and those relating to the safety of food in particular. It was agreed that the assessment/approval system had worked well in the past but [was] now increasingly being called into question. The reason for this was thought to be a better educated public with a greater interest in the quality of life. Simple risk information along the lines that food is safe/unsafe as deemed by the Government was no longer thought to be acceptable. The feeling was that there was a need for more transparency in the risk assessment process.

4.612 On 25 June 1990 the Consumers' Association issued two press releases. The first was entitled 'Consumers Lose Confidence in MAFF over "Mad Cow Disease" '. ⁶ This stated that the Association questioned the eating of beef. It continued:

And the bland reassurances of the Agriculture Minister, John Gummer, that beef is '100 per cent safe' have contributed to public confusion and concern, says the Association.

Recent surveys show an erosion in consumer trust in MAFF, and in the Government's willingness to protect consumers and give them accurate information about food safety issues such as BSE. Although the Minister claims to be representing the consumer interest, there is strong evidence that many consumers are highly sceptical of his actions. They say they can no longer trust MAFF to protect consumers' interests.

Although the risk of BSE being transmitted to human beings appears to be remote, great caution is needed in handling the current outbreak, warns the Association.

4.613 The press release concluded:

The measures already introduced by the Government have been welcome - but are insufficient, says the Association. Further action is vital as a precaution and to reassure consumers about the Government's intentions.

4.614 The second press release, also issued on 25 June 1990, was entitled: 'Act Now on BSE, Urges Consumers' Association'. ⁷ This stated that the Association was calling on the Government to take urgent action on BSE. It continued:

The recommendations include measures to improve consumer confidence, disease investigation and slaughterhouse practices

4.615 The press release listed 10 areas that the Consumers' Association wanted the Government to act upon. These ranged from spinal bones, MRM, feed practices, a ban on animal offal, slaughterhouse practice and cattle tracking and breeding. One of the points was to 'give consumers more information about meat products, including species, country of origin and presence of MRM'.

4.616 The press release concluded:

The Government must act, even though the risk of BSE being transmitted to humans appears to be remote' says CA's Head of Policy Research, Stephen Locke. 'Any measures it takes are, however, unlikely to win back consumer confidence unless the Ministry abandons its patronising and secretive approach to legitimate consumer concerns. ⁸

4.617 Sheila McKechnie, the Director of the Consumers' Association, told us that surveys commissioned by the Consumers' Association explored consumer attitudes to food safety. ⁹ She stated that, in July 1989, three out of four people agreed with the statement 'The Government has failed to protect consumers from unsafe food.' In December that year another survey found that publicity about food safety had affected the buying of food for 39 per cent of respondents.

4.618 She also told us that the Consumers' Association submission to the 1990 Agriculture Committee (see later in this section) contained some relevant survey results. One survey for the Today newspaper found that over half of respondents (55 per cent) believed that MAFF could not be trusted to tell the truth about the health crisis surrounding BSE. Similarly, a Gallup survey found that 60 per cent believed MAFF to be withholding facts about BSE.

4.619 She added that qualitative research in May 1990, for example, found that consumers viewed the Minister of Agriculture's statement that 'beef is safe' as simplistic.

The MAFF Consumer Panel

4.620 At the MAFF Consumer Panel ¹⁰ meeting on 11 July 1990 the minutes of the meeting recorded the following:

Mr Maclean explained that despite what people were saying, the Government's policy on BSE is, and has been, to ensure the public got as much reliable information as possible. He asked for the Panel's view on how the Government could get its message across to the public without causing undue alarm. Mrs Craig believed that Mr Gummer's statement that beef was entirely safe had not been helpful. With a disease such as BSE it was impossible for anyone to prove that beef was entirely safe. Mrs Leather added that that from the public's point of view, MAFF were perceived as ignoring as pointless, informed calls for research into specific areas of concern such as slaughterhouse practices. ¹¹

Evidence on the safety of beef received by the House of Commons Agriculture Committee Inquiry into BSE

4.621 As described earlier in this chapter, the Agriculture Committee of the House of Commons produced the report on its inquiry into BSE in July 1990. The Committee dealt with a broad range of issues relevant to BSE; earlier in this chapter we looked at the evidence it had received in relation to brain removal and MRM. In this section we are mainly concerned with the evidence received by the Committee on the safety of beef.

Mr Gummer's evidence

4.622 Mr Gummer gave oral evidence to the Committee on 23 May 1990. Mr Meldrum, Mrs Attridge and Dr Pickles accompanied him to the hearing.

4.623 Mr Gummer commenced by briefly summarising the emergence of BSE and the steps taken by the Government in response, and then commented:

[T]he Government has responded to the emergence of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy with a vigorous and coherent programme of measures. These are directed first to concerns about human health, however theoretical the risk may be, and second to eradicate the disease as quickly as possible from our cattle population. As far as public health is concerned the clear advice of top independent experts is that the risk to humans is remote . . . The plain fact is that there is no evidence that BSE poses any risk. ¹²

4.624 He concluded his opening statement 'more personally':

When I became Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food just less than a year ago, I made it plain from the first day that I was a consumer minister whose first and overriding concern was public safety and the interests of the customer . . . I am determined to continue to put consumer safety first, to rely on the best available scientific advice, and to be utterly open about all the information upon which I act. I welcome the Chief Medical Officer's statement that British Beef may be eaten safely both by adults and children and I intend to keep it that way. ¹³

4.625 Mr Eric Martlew (MP for Carlisle) questioned Mr Gummer on his public pronouncements on the safety of beef. Mr Martlew pointed out that Southwood had said it could be a decade before a complete reassurance could be given on the transmissibility of BSE to man, yet Mr Gummer and Sir Donald Acheson seemed to be telling the public that beef was 'perfectly safe'. Mr Gummer responded:

I certainly would not dream of doing other than saying what I am advised. I have no independent knowledge which would lead me to be able to say on my own volition what I think the risk of these matters are. What I have done, consistently and continually, is to quote the precise words of the Chief Medical Officer . . . It seems to me to be proper for me to say to the public the one thing which they want to know: is it safe to eat British beef? ¹⁴

4.626 Mr Martlew pressed Mr Gummer further, and argued that there was still a credibility gap: Sir Richard Southwood was not prepared to say there was no remote risk, and therefore Mr Gummer should acknowledge to the public that a complete assurance that beef was safe could not be given. Mr Gummer did not accept this, and sought to draw a distinction between two matters:

On the one case we are talking about whether BSE could be transmitted to humans. What Dr Southwood was worried about was other means whereby BSE might be transmitted to humans. The question we are asking when you ask can you eat beef is: is there a chance of you getting BSE from beef? What the Chief Medical Officer is saying is: 'I have no hesitation in saying that British beef can be eaten safely'. Those are two different things. ¹⁵

4.627 The discovery of SE in cats was also discussed with Mr Gummer. He explained to the Committee the difficulties the Government had in that they did not know whether SE had always been present in cats, since they were not examined upon death. It was only due to BSE that vets had been extra-vigilant in looking for SEs. Mr Gummer found it very difficult 'to say other than that we have had these cases, that the reason we have had these cases is largely because of the concern about BSE but there is absolutely no evidence at all that it is connected with BSE . . .' ¹⁶

Evidence of scientists with alternative views to Government

4.628 Scientists who had expressed opinions and theories that were at odds with the official Government line were examined on 13 June 1990. Among those who appeared were Professor Richard Lacey, ¹⁷ Professor I H Mills, ¹⁸ Dr Helen Grant ¹⁹ and Dr Gareth Roberts. ²⁰

4.629 The witnesses were first asked whether they agreed with Sir Donald Acheson's statement that beef was safe to eat. Dr Roberts and Professor Mills agreed, but Professor Mills pointed out that 'made up meat dishes' were not safe because there was not 'enough care in the slaughterhouse'. Professor Lacey and Dr Grant did not agree with Sir Donald. Professor Lacey commented that the 'measures that have been taken have been largely cosmetic aimed at reassuring the public, not curative'. He continued:

British beef could well contain three components that could make it dangerous: one is nerves; two is lymphatics and lymph nodes; and three, during the actual slaughtering process, opening up the brain and spinal cord, those products could be present on the actual meat. We do not know if it is safe or not. ²¹

4.630 Mr Christopher Gill (MP for Ludlow) then questioned Professor Lacey at length, his main theme being that Professor Lacey's written evidence to the Committee was short on fact and long on speculation and conjecture. Professor Lacey maintained that he was right to say that beef was not safe, and that 'we cannot rule out the possibility of the disease spreading to humans, particularly pregnant woman and children'. He further claimed that these were opinions based on facts. ²²

4.631 Dr Grant pointed out that throughout her reading she had come across only one occasion upon which red meat had been used to transmit scrapie from sheep to goats, whereas infective tissues such as brain and pituitaries transmitted the disease easily. Therefore:

We have to face the fact that there is perhaps a risk in eating the red meat of mutton and of beef but it is infinitesimally small, there are so many more risky things in life. We have to be practical about these matters. The thing is to get the offal out of the system and then we can forget about the fact that muscles have nerve supplies and there may be the odd bug lurking in the nerve. ²³

Evidence of the Government's scientific advisers

4.632 Sir Richard Southwood (Professor of Zoology and Chairman of the Southwood Working Party), Mr Wilesmith and Mr Bradley appeared before the Committee on 14 June 1990.

4.633 Sir Richard was asked to clarify any confusion over whether the chance of BSE being transmitted to man was remote or non-existent. He explained that, given the precautions taken by Government, the chances of BSE being transmitted to humans were extremely remote. However, it was not impossible. Further, when asked whether he believed it safe to eat beef, he replied: 'I think it is safe to the extent that anything in this life is safe.' ²⁴

Sir Donald Acheson's evidence

4.634 Sir Donald Acheson, CMO, gave evidence to the Committee on 20 June 1990. ²⁵

4.635 He described the circumstances surrounding his 'beef is safe' statement on 16 May 1990 (see paragraph 4.570). He emphasised that the statement had been cleared with the Government's scientific advisers, and that he was under no pressure from either MAFF or DH Ministers to make the statement. He continued:

I just say it is safe. It can be eaten safely by everyone. There is the question of whether one should speak about theoretical risks and remote possibilities. I considered that and, of course, also I looked carefully at what Sir Richard Southwood said and what David Tyrrell advised me and I considered that it would be proper not to qualify these words in any way in either direction. ²⁶

The Committee's conclusions and recommendations

4.636 The Committee noted that despite the introduction of the slaughter and compensation policy and the SBO ban:

Additional grounds for concern do exist. They derive from the many scientific uncertainties surrounding BSE which are currently the subject of investigative research. We should emphasise at this stage that, because of the disease's long incubation period and for other reasons, research is unlikely to provide early or decisive answers to many of the questions of public concern. We shall simply catalogue the principal issues and provide an assessment of the available evidence. ²⁷

4.637 The Committee's conclusions are described below.

Are humans at risk from BSE-affected cattle?

4.638 The Committee addressed the following circumstances in which BSE might be transmitted to humans:

1. Through medical injections of material derived from bovine sources from an affected animal;
2. In specified offal from an affected animal consumed prior to the introduction of the SBO ban in November 1989;
3. In specified offal from an affected animal consumed after the introduction of the SBO ban; and
4. In beef or products from an affected animal. ²⁸

4.639 Although transmission via injections was a serious consideration, the Committee noted that since the Licensing Authority for medicinal products had been alerted to BSE issues, and injections had no bearing on whether beef was safe to eat, it did not need to deal with the issue any further. ²⁹

4.640 Regarding the consumption of SBO prior to the ban, the Committee stated it 'lies in the past'. However, because of the possibility that transmission could have taken place, and those humans affected would probably not have manifested clinical signs as yet, the monitoring of CJD incidence was important. ³⁰

4.641 The Committee observed that while human consumption of affected cattle's offal may seem to be a dangerous scenario, 'most experts seem to feel that transmission of the BSE agent by this route is most unlikely'. It noted that no causal link had been found between scrapie and CJD, which was 'extremely suggestive, although scientists are rightly wary of regarding it as conclusive, since each known spongiform encephalopathy has individual characteristics'. ³¹

4.642 There were two further reasons why the transmission of BSE to man in food was considered unlikely by the Committee:

Preliminary experimental comparisons of the relative infectivity to non-human primates of scrapie/BSE and CJD suggest that scrapie/BSE are far less infectious;

The oral route has proved inefficient, in laboratory experiments, in transmitting encephalopathies. ³²

4.643 While the latter factor was not conclusive, the Committee believed that, taken together, 'these arguments provide substantial reassurance'.

4.644 The Committee then considered the SBO ban. It noted that 'the offals could enter the food-chain through slaughterhouses failing to carry out the letter of the regulations and allowing possibly infected tissues to be included in mechanically recovered meat (MRM)'. The Committee said that passing the legislation was one thing, but ensuring it was rigorously enforced in practice was another. While there was no evidence of an irresponsible approach to the regulations, 'it cannot be assumed they are watertight'. ³³

4.645 Finally, the Committee discussed the fourth possible route of infection: through beef from an affected animal. It pointed out that most scientists considered this to be 'an extremely remote hypothesis', but noted Professor Lacey's dissenting view (see paragraphs 4.629-4.630). The Committee gave emphasis to the point that 'the infectivity of the agent is related to the quantity of the agent involved'. Thus:

Although, therefore, the authorities are right to address the possibility that infectious tissue from a sub-clinically affected animal might inadvertently be included with, or otherwise contaminate, meat sold for human consumption, such a possibility need not cause undue concern because of the small quantities of the agent likely to be involved. This element in the scientific arguments has a critical bearing on the food safety issue, but has been consistently ignored or understated by those wishing to present the risks to humans in their most dramatic light. ³⁴

4.646 The Committee concluded that BSE was a comparatively new disease about which many questions remained unanswered and that few of the scientists examined could say anything about the disease with absolute certainty. On the other hand there was no evidence that it did pose a threat to human health. The Committee believed that the Government's action in cutting off the presumed source of the disease in cattle and the banned sale of all SBO for human consumption should 'reassure people that eating beef is safe'. ³⁵

Government response to BSE

4.647 The Committee identified the introduction of the SBO ban, the publication of the Tyrrell Report and the introduction of full compensation for slaughtered animals as instances where too much time elapsed between the need for action arising and action being taken. ³⁶

4.648 In particular, on the introduction of the SBO ban, the Committee stated that:

We believe that, in this instance, the Government showed a lack of urgency in doing what was necessary. This contrasts with the prompt manner in which decisions generally have been taken. ³⁷

4.649 The Committee also concluded that the cornerstone of the Minister's policy - to take 'the best scientific advice' and not go beyond that advice just to satisfy public anxiety - was too restrictive. The Committee added:

We believe that the Minister should be prepared to go beyond what his scientific advisers have recommended, whether for political, commercial or other reasons. Scientists do not automatically command public trust, particularly when they are in disagreement with each other, and when the issues concerned do not lend themselves to simple yes/no answers but involve computations of whether particular risks are acceptable or unacceptable to members of the public, decision-making is not a purely scientific process, however much one might wish it was. ³⁸