Volume 6: Human Health, 1989-96
3. Introduction of the ban on Specified Bovine Offal
Further developments leading to the decision to ban SBO in all human food
Mr MacGregor responds to Mr Charles Cockbill
The response to Mr MacGregor
Dr Jeremy Metters contacts Sir Richard Southwood and Dr Tyrrell
The meetings to consider the offal ban
Letter to Mr Clarke
DH's views on the proposals
The Prime Minister notes the proposal
Announcement of the decision to ban SBO

Mr MacGregor responds to Mr Charles Cockbill

3.233 Mrs Shirley Stagg (Private Secretary to Mr MacGregor) responded to Mr Cockbill's submission of 23 May on the draft baby food offal ban on 31 May 1989:

The Minister feels that we cannot go ahead on baby food without being clear about where we are going on the wider issue of the prohibition of the use of certain offals in human foodstuff generally. ¹

3.234 Accordingly, the Minister asked for a detailed background note and a draft consultation paper on a possible offal ban from all human food and said he would then wish to meet both Sir Donald Acheson and Sir Richard Southwood to talk through the issue. ²

The response to Mr MacGregor

3.235 On 2 June 1989 Mr Cockbill sent Mr MacGregor the background note he had requested on the merits of a possible ban on certain types of bovine offal and a draft consultation letter. ³

3.236 The papers were prepared by the Food Standards Division in consultation with the Animal Health Group. The background note stated that while research into the infectivity of BSE in different organs of cattle had yet to be carried out, by drawing an analogy with scrapie in sheep, it was possible to divide bovine tissues and fluids into four categories. Category (i) was most likely to be infective and comprised brain and spinal cord; Category (iv) was least likely to be infective and comprised milk, serum and faeces. ⁴

3.237 The note stated that:

5. If action is taken to extend the prohibition as a matter of extreme caution it might include brain and spinal cord (category i) and spleen (category ii), possibly with other organs which are not used in preparation of cooked meat products. ⁵

3.238 The note went on to discuss the impact that a ban would have on the meat industry, possible enforcement difficulties and implications for exports and the EU. ⁶ It concluded by stating that there were 'two options open'. One was to remain with the conclusions of the Southwood Report on baby food alone, possibly developing labelling and relying 'on the moratorium in the trade not to use the offals in meat products'. The second option was to prohibit the sale of SBO and 'lay ground in Brussels . . . in order to minimise any adverse reaction from the Community'. ⁷

3.239 The draft consultation letter referred to the baby food recommendation in the Southwood Report and commented:

The BSE agent has apparently crossed the species barrier from sheep to cattle. There is thus a (remote) possibility that it could do it again although the Southwood Report conclusions would suggest that this is very unlikely. Nevertheless with such a new disease and with such limited knowledge about it, it is appropriate to extend the caution expressed in the Southwood Report conclusions to the more general use of the offal concerned. ⁸

3.240 Mr Thompson then sent a note to Mr MacGregor recommending that he should go beyond the recommendations of the Southwood Report and ban the use of 'Southwood' types of offal from human consumption as quickly as possible. By 'Southwood' offal he meant brain, spinal cord, spleen and thymus. Mr Thompson added that the BMMA had given assurances that this offal was not used in processed food. Intestines, which were used to some extent, were a wider issue and needed further consideration. ⁹

3.241 In evidence to the Inquiry, Mr MacGregor said that he had already made up his mind to introduce a general SBO ban by this date. ¹⁰

Dr Jeremy Metters contacts Sir Richard Southwood and Dr Tyrrell

3.242 On 2 June 1989 Sir Donald Acheson asked Dr Metters to contact Sir Richard Southwood and Dr David Tyrrell to 'ascertain whether any new scientific evidence had emerged which cast doubt on the advice previously given by the Southwood Working Party'. ¹¹

3.243 Dr Metters's minute to Sir Donald Acheson on 9 June 1989 reported that Sir Richard Southwood 'considered the scientific position, and with it the case for a total ban on bovine offal, had not changed since his report.' He noted that Dr Tyrrell took:

. . . a similar view. There was no new data. However the infective agent was so similar or identical to scrapie that in scientific terms it was difficult to justify a ban on bovine but not sheep offal. ¹²

The meetings to consider the offal ban

3.244 On 6 and 7 June Mr MacGregor held two meetings to discuss the proposed SBO ban. There is a degree of conflict of evidence as to some of the details of these meetings which we consider further in the Discussion at the end of this section (see paragraphs 3.258-3.331).

3.245 The meeting of 6 June was attended by Mr Cruickshank, Mr James Coe (Head of Information, March 1987-October 1989), Mr Meldrum, Mr Lawrence and Mr Gueterbock of MAFF and Dr Metters (Deputy CMO, DH). Its objective was to prepare for a meeting with Sir Richard Southwood on the following day. The minute recording this first meeting, prepared by Mrs Stagg, included the following:

2. The Minister said that he felt wider action was now needed on offals to meet concerns firstly about animals in the latter stages of incubating the disease and secondly, to meet the frequently made point that cattle with BSE were getting through the net to the market. Dr Metters said that Sir Richard had indicated that he would not move from the position as set out in his report: the scientific evidence had not changed to enable him to recommend going any further. There was also the problem about what one did with sheep offal if one acted on bovine material since similar quantities of sheep offal were going through the food chain. It was however thought that Sir Richard would probably accept the argument on the risk of cattle getting through to the food chain. In any case, this issue would have to be thoroughly discussed with him.

3. Dr Metters pointed out that the CMO was concerned that we should not take action on offal now and then be faced with the possibility of taking further action on medicines in, say, September. The Minister pointed out the political realities of the situation meant that it would be impossible to wait until September before taking action here.

4. There was some discussion of the definition of the offals which should be prohibited. It was agreed that categories i and ii were the target materials, although since lymph nodes and nerves were everywhere in the carcass, it was not practicable to take action on these. Thus the prohibited offals would be brains; spinal cords; spleen; tonsils; and thymus. Mr Meldrum thought that action on these items would enable us to give complete reassurance to the general public since the rest of the carcass would not contain the BSE agent in any significant quantities based on our considerable experience with scrapie. Intestines which were used for sausage casings, did not pose a problem since these were thoroughly scraped and cleaned before use. The Minister asked the experts to look carefully at the position on casings.

5. The most practicable solution for preventing offals getting into the food chain appeared to be to act at the slaughterhouse. This would remove any enforcement difficulties. Mr Meldrum was unhappy about destroying the offals: this would be costly and logistically difficult. Instead he recommended that they should be separated into a bin for dyeing and then rendering. There would be no compensation.

6. There was some discussion of what one should do about sheep offal. Dr Metters said that the DoH view was that the agent appeared to be the same for cattle and sheep; however this was not certain. Mr Meldrum pointed out that we had to give considerable weight here to our 200 years of experience with scrapie: there was by no means a strong case for acting on sheep as we were proposing to do for beef. ¹³

3.246 On 7 June 1989 Mr MacGregor met Sir Richard Southwood with Mr Meldrum and Mr Coe of MAFF and Dr Metters and Dr Pickles of DH. ¹⁴ In her minute Mrs Stagg recorded:

2. The Minister opened the discussion by pointing to the growing concern on certain aspects of BSE. There was growing consumer pressure for the 'Southwood' offals to be banned from the food chain whether they came from infected cattle or not. The industry themselves were now saying that they would not use these offals because of the consumer perception. Sir Richard himself had pointed to the fact that a considerable amount of uncertainty still shrouded this whole issue. We could not monitor and control every market and slaughterhouse; and this suggested that certain animals might be getting through the net. We held very firmly to the view that action should be based on the best scientific evidence; but the combination of these other factors suggested that there was a case for going wider than baby food and banning the 'Southwood' offals of all bovine animals.

Sir Richard replied that the scientific evidence had not changed on this issue . . . If one took further action without scientific evidence it would be difficult to decide where the line should be drawn. He was not persuaded that many animals showing clinical symptoms were slipping through the net although possibly some sub-clinical animals were getting through . . .

5. Both the Minister and Sir Richard felt that the most difficult problem was in drawing the line at sheep meat. Dr Metters thought there might be some justification in acting on bovine offal given that agents which jumped species could sometimes be more virulent than in the original species. However, it was felt that, given the lack of evidence on this point, this was not a strong argument to use. After some discussion it was agreed that the right way to tackle this problem would be to say that the most effective way of dealing with the baby food point was to prevent all 'Southwood' bovine offal getting into the food chain. This was the safest and most readily controllable way of implementing the Southwood recommendation and would have the benefit of preventing any material going to other areas in the foodchain. Sir Richard was wholly content with this approach. ¹⁵

3.247 Dr Metters's minute of 9 June to Sir Donald Acheson, reporting on the outcome of the meetings of 6 and 7 June, drew attention to the 'possibility that MAFF's action may refocus attention on bovine constituents of pharmaceuticals'. He commented that, while he had raised this point more than once, it had 'cut little ice' with MAFF officials. ¹⁶

3.248 Mrs Attridge also informed Mr Cockbill of the outcome of the meeting on 7 June with Sir Richard. She noted:

(i) Professor Southwood maintained his position that there was no scientific evidence to support the belief that offal presented a human health hazard (DOH Dr Metters did not dissent).

(ii) The Minister maintained his view that presentationally something had to be done to allay public concern.

(iii) The CVO pointed out that the easiest way to ensure any ban was operated was to remove offal (brains, spinal cord, spleen, tonsils, thymus) that were to be covered in the baby food regulations at the slaughterhouse.

(iv) I suggested that the way to proceed was to say that the Minister considered the easier and more enforceable way to implement the Southwood recommendation on baby foods was to remove the offal at slaughterhouses and where it would be dyed and used for fertiliser and that the Minister would thereby not be appearing to contradict the scientific evidence in the Southwood Report by taking more comprehensive action than recommended and there would be no need to proceed with consultations under the Food Act. ¹⁷

Letter to Mr Clarke

3.249 On 9 June 1989 Mr MacGregor wrote to Mr Clarke setting out the case for a bovine offal ban covering all human food consumption. ¹⁸ Mr MacGregor referred to the Southwood Report's advice that there was no scientific evidence that the human population was at risk from BSE.

Despite all this there is continuing concern (including a body of opinion in some scientific circles), which I share, that these bovine offals should be prohibited from use for human consumption, especially since they may come from cattle incubating the disease but still not showing clinical symptoms. Notwithstanding Southwood's evaluation of the risk, my conclusion, in the light of the advice I have received, is that we should take further action to reassure the public and safeguard human health. I am proposing therefore to take action to prevent the use of certain bovine offals for human consumption. ¹⁹

3.250 Mr MacGregor also referred to the concern that diseased animals might be entering the food chain:

We cannot be sure that all diseased animals are prevented from entering the food chain. There is much talk that some animals are not being offered for slaughter but are being slipped through and I have strong suspicions that this is right. It is also possible that some are simply not being detected. ²⁰

DH's views on the proposals

3.251 On 12 June 1989 Dr Pickles minuted the Private Secretaries of Sir Donald Acheson and Mr Clarke about MAFF's proposed ban. ²¹ She noted that Mr MacGregor's letter to Mr Clarke had suggested that there should be a joint MAFF/DH announcement. She proposed, however, that DH suggest that MAFF handle it on its own and enclosed a draft reply for the Secretary of State. She said that Sir Richard Southwood agreed that there had been no real change in the scientific position since he had produced his Report. Her draft reply said:

Medical advice within this department supports Sir Richard Southwood that the scientific position has not altered since his report was published, although I see now your department is accepting (but not publicly) that some clinically affected cattle still may be going for slaughter. That infected but clinically normal animals are entering the human food chain was of course known to Sir Richard and his advice that banning all bovine offal was unnecessary was given in the light of that knowledge.

Nevertheless, I appreciate the position in which you have been placed and am happy for you to take the action you feel is now needed to reassure the public. I presume your experts have confirmed that stripped intestines contain so little lymphatic tissue that their exclusion from the ban does not appear anomalous and liable to become the subject for further public criticism. Since this announcement is primarily for public reassurance I would be entirely content for it to be made by your department alone. ²²

3.252 This draft did not find favour with Sir Donald. At his request Dr Metters produced a new draft:

I recognise the increasing public anxiety about BSE and the pressure this has created for your Department to prohibit the inclusion of bovine offal in food for human consumption.

The nutritional value of the categories of offal you mentioned in your letter is minimal, and their exclusion will serve to reassure the public. It will also show that the Government is responsive to public perception of the BSE risk.

I agree entirely with the various actions you propose to take. As the implementation of the ban on these selected bovine offals will primarily affect abattoirs and the meat trade, I would be quite content for your Department to make the appropriate announcements. ²³

3.253 Mr MacGregor outlined the proposed ban in relation to BSE at a meeting with Sir Donald Acheson on 12 June 1989. MAFF's minute of the meeting noted that the CMO 'warmly welcomed this' and thought the measure 'prudent and appropriate'. ²⁴

3.254 Mr Clarke told the Inquiry in written evidence that, as Secretary of State for Health, he agreed that the SBO ban should be made even though the scientific advice of his own Department was that the measure was not necessary to protect public health. Mr Clarke accepted that public reassurance was a legitimate aim and might be achieved by a step that went beyond the weight of scientific evidence that the Government had received. ²⁵

The Prime Minister notes the proposal

3.255 On 12 June 1989 Mr Andrew Turnbull, Principal Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, wrote to Mrs Stagg. He informed her that the Prime Minister had seen Mr MacGregor's letter of 9 June to Mr Clarke, and had noted the proposal to apply the ban on specified offal to all human consumption and not just to baby food. Mr Turnbull's letter was copied to the Private Secretaries to the members of MISC 138 and to Sir Robin Butler, the Cabinet Secretary. ²⁶

Announcement of the decision to ban SBO

3.256 In a joint news release on 13 June 1989, MAFF and DH announced the intention to introduce an SBO ban to cover all human food. This news release quoted Mr MacGregor's answer to a written Parliamentary Question by Mr Tim Boswell, MP:

The Government has already taken wide ranging action to deal with this new disease problem and has acted on all the recommendations made by the Southwood Working Party which was set up to look at all aspects of the disease, including any human health implications.

Although the Southwood Working Party regarded the risk to humans as remote, the Government acted on their recommendation that, as a precautionary measure, all cattle suspected as having BSE should be slaughtered and destroyed to take them out of the food chain.

As a matter of extreme prudence, the Southwood Working Party also suggested that certain offals should not be used in the manufacture of baby foods. We established in February that these offals are not in fact currently used by baby food manufacturers. In order to provide even more reassurance to the public, I indicated then that we would bring forward regulations to ensure that there is no possibility of their use in the future.

In working out the details, I have concluded that a better way of dealing with this would be to ensure that the relevant types of bovine offals should be rejected at slaughterhouses for all cattle so that they cannot be used for human consumption in any way. These offals, which include brain, spinal cord, thymus, spleen and tonsils, will have to be stained in the slaughterhouse and disposed of under conditions similar to those applying to unfit meat. This approach also deals with a separate problem, namely ensuring that if there is any risk that there are cattle incubating the disease but not showing clinical symptoms which are not being slaughtered and destroyed, their offals do not enter the food chain either.

Detailed proposals for regulations under the Food Act implementing this change will be issued for consultation, as required by the Act, very shortly. ²⁷

3.257 On 14 June 1989 Dr Pickles circulated a copy of the press release. In her covering minute she said:

I was unaware that it was to be a joint announcement. It is not clear what is to be proposed for intestines.

I do not like the suggestion that there is only a remote risk infected but clinically normal cattle are being slaughtered and eaten - of course we know this is bound to be happening. ²⁸