Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
6. Breeding
Discussion
The decision not to refer AI to the Southwood Working Party
Use of the progeny of BSE for breeding

6.136 The approach of MAFF to the different aspects of cattle breeding that are covered in this chapter illustrates some of the issues that arise in relation to the use of expert committees. ¹ We propose first to consider AI.

The decision not to refer AI to the Southwood Working Party

6.137 The reason given by Mr Meldrum to Mr Suich for not referring the issues in relation to AI to the Southwood Working Party differed from that which he gave to us (see paragraphs 6.105-6.107). To Mr Suich he said that he did not wish to put the matter to the Southwood Working Party because he was 'fully aware' that they would suggest legislation banning the use of semen from infected bulls, or the introduction of bulls from affected dams into an AI centre. Inferentially this indicated that Mr Meldrum thought it preferable to form his own view on the matter rather than have it resolved by the Southwood Working Party in the manner he anticipated. If this was Mr Meldrum's preference, was it one that he should have adopted and was Mr Suich right to have accepted it?

6.138 We consider that Mr Meldrum acted reasonably in deciding that he would prefer, himself, to resolve the issues in relation to AI rather than refer them to the Southwood Working Party. Resolution of the issues involved an exercise in risk assessment, informed by expert advice. The expert advice needed was of two varieties:

1. He needed advice from an expert or experts in TSEs in relation to the likelihood that BSE would be transmissible genetically, or directly as a consequence of semen containing the BSE pathogen.
2. He needed legal advice on the duties owed by MAFF in public and private law.

6.139 The Southwood Working Party was not itself in a position to provide either areas of expertise. Mr Meldrum sought advice directly from those who had the expertise - the MAFF lawyers in relation to MAFF's legal position and Dr Kimberlin and Professor Bourne in relation to risks of transmissibility.

6.140 The advice which he received in relation to transmissibility was that the possibility that there was a genetic factor in BSE could not be ruled out (see paragraphs 6.113-6.114) and that there was a low, but finite probability that semen from a bull incubating BSE might contain the pathogen (see paragraph 6.116).

6.141 In the light of this advice Mr Meldrum, no doubt after consulting his veterinary colleagues, decided on the policy recommendation set out in his submission to Mr Thompson (see paragraph 6.117). That recommendation struck, it seems to us, a balance that reasonably reflected both the transmission risk and the commercial considerations. Semen from affected bulls should not be used. Progeny of an affected dam should not be selected for breeding purposes, but if a bull had already been purchased by the AI centre before its dam developed clinical symptoms, it should be for the AI centre to decide whether or not to use its semen.

6.142 Mr Meldrum told us that he did not wish to refer the AI issue to the Southwood Working Party because this would have held up its Report. Whether the Southwood Working Party would have held up their Report to deal with this issue, or whether, had it been referred to them, they would have given it separate consideration, they might well have needed a considerable period to consider the implications of AI, obtain expert advice, and reach their conclusions. This is a further reason why we consider that Mr Meldrum acted reasonably in carrying out his own enquiries and forming his own view. As with the ruminant feed ban, so with AI, MAFF had no need of the guidance of the Southwood Working Party in order to reach an informed policy decision.

Use of the progeny of BSE for breeding

6.143 The possibility that there might be a genetic factor in susceptibility to BSE, or that BSE might otherwise be transmissible from cow to calf ('maternal transmission') led both the MAFF veterinarians and the BVA to conclude that it was preferable that the progeny of cattle with BSE should not be used for breeding lest they, having been infected with the disease, should pass it on to their own progeny.

6.144 On 30 April 1988 MAFF recommended, in the Veterinary Record, that the progeny of affected cows should not be retained for breeding purposes (see paragraph 6.9). This would have brought the advice to the attention of veterinarians, but not to most farmers. On 25 January 1990 the BVA issued a press notice giving the same guidance (see paragraph 6.15).

6.145 On Mr Gummer's initiative, the SVS prepared a paper setting out the options for action to address the possibility that BSE might be vertically transmissible. In essence, the choice was between simply advising farmers not to breed from the progeny of cattle affected by BSE or imposing regulations that would prevent them from doing so. The latter course raised tricky policy considerations. If statutory action was taken, this might reinforce public concern about the disease and have an adverse effect on the market. If no mandatory action was taken, the public might criticise MAFF for failure to take adequate precautions. In the event, the decision was taken to refer the matter to SEAC (see paragraphs 6.43-6.44).

6.146 We do not believe that it can have occurred to MAFF that there would be anything controversial about giving advice not to breed from offspring, pending the possibility of SEAC recommending more stringent measures. Dr Pickles's intervention, in a matter which was pre-eminently one of veterinary expertise, cannot have endeared her to the MAFF veterinarians.

6.147 The arguments raised by Dr Pickles against the issue by MAFF of advice against breeding from the offspring of dams affected by BSE were:

1. Southwood had not given such advice. For MAFF to do so might call in question the soundness of other parts of the Southwood Report, including its assessment that the risk to humans was remote.
2. Such advice would raise concerns on the part of the public and the media about the offspring of BSE victims. This might lead to their being made the subject of an export ban.
3. There would be pressure to replace such advice with statutory controls.
4. The result might be a loss of income to farmers.

Dr Pickles added that there would be little benefit from the advice as, even if maternal transmission occurred, BSE would almost certainly die out in a few years.

6.148 The question of the extent to which the proposed advice would be beneficial in expediting the eradication of BSE, should maternal transmission occur, was one that called for expert input from the veterinarians. The points raised by Dr Pickles were essentially political questions.

6.149 In those circumstances we question whether SEAC had much to contribute to the debate. MAFF's veterinarians were as well if not better placed to provide the expertise that was needed to inform the debate as SEAC. It was for MAFF administrators and for Ministers to weigh veterinary considerations against the wider political implications of the proposed advice.

6.150 We can, however, see force in Dr Pickles's point that, having just set up SEAC, it might discredit the Committee to proceed to issue advice without consulting them. In these circumstances we consider that Mr Gummer acted reasonably in deciding that guidance from SEAC should be sought before MAFF's advice to farmers was given.

6.151 The basis on which SEAC's advice was sought, however, was not satisfactory. They appear to have been expected to produce an opinion on a difficult matter at their first meeting. They were asked not merely to advise on the scientific justification for taking action in relation to breeding from the offspring of cattle suffering from BSE, but to have regard to 'wider issues such as perception of the media, public and the export trade'. We do not think that SEAC was the right body to reach a decision that involved evaluating those wider issues. Yet the minutes of SEAC's meeting indicate that much of their discussion was devoted to these issues.

6.152 It seems to us that after their meeting SEAC had some difficulty in formulating a scientific basis that justified their disapproval of the advice that MAFF had wished to give to farmers. Dr Tyrrell failed to produce a convincing explanation of this when he appeared before the Select Committee and SEAC's Final Paper did not persuade us that Mr Meldrum's position was unsound. But SEAC, dealing with this matter at their first meeting, were constrained to advise under pressure. For most members of SEAC, policy on animal breeding was unfamiliar territory. Their advice is not a matter for criticism.

6.153 Mr Gummer felt that he could not take a decision which contradicted SEAC's advice as he was basing his position firmly on scientific advice. We, like the NFU, appreciate the difficulty that Mr Gummer would have had in disregarding the first advice to be proffered by the new advisory Committee. Mr Meldrum commented in a minute to Mr Lowson:

. . . in such delicate situations it is imperative that I am in a position to present my case to the Tyrrell Committee. ²

6.154 We sympathise with Mr Meldrum. On a matter such as this it would have been preferable for SEAC to have had the benefit of hearing from him.

6.155 In summary, we consider that a preferable way to have made use of SEAC in relation to the breeding issue would have been:

1. to have targeted the advice sought on the scientific issues;
2. to have allowed SEAC more time to reach a considered advice; and
3. to have invited SEAC to discuss the veterinary issues with Mr Meldrum or some other member of the SVS.

6.156 Although this episode provides a lesson for the future about the way in which the Government should make use of scientific advisory committees (we discuss this further in vol. 11: Scientists after Southwood), we do not think that it calls for criticism of any of the individuals who were involved at the time.