Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
5. Cattle-tracking
Discussion

5.160 We have explored the history of cattle-tracking in some detail because it is one of the aspects of the response to the emergence of BSE that has given rise to public concern. In July 1990 the Agriculture Select Committee urged MAFF to move towards 'full control computerisation' of records so as to facilitate cattle-tracking 'at an early opportunity' (see paragraph 5.45). Not until 1996 did MAFF decide to seek Treasury consent to the setting up of a computerised CTS (see paragraph 5.157). Had such a system been in place in March 1996 MAFF would have been much better placed to resist the total ban on the export of beef and beef products that Europe imposed, for it would have been possible to identify with confidence the provenance of the beef in question. It has been suggested by some that there was culpable delay on the part of MAFF in recognising the need for a cattle-tracing system.

5.161 It cannot logically be inferred from the fact that MAFF decided to introduce a cattle-tracing system in 1996 that they should have recognised the need for this when it was recommended by the Select Committee in 1990. The decision to set up a Cattle Traceability System was taken in 1996 primarily for what were, in essence, 'business' reasons. Such a system was considered to be a precondition to the re-establishment of UK beef and beef product exports. The embargo on exports had followed the announcement on 20 March 1996 of a probable link between BSE and the cases of a new variant of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD).

5.162 In 1990 and 1991 the possibility that business reasons such as these might justify the costs of setting up a cattle-tracing system was not foreseen either by the Select Committee or by MAFF officials. We do not consider that it should have been foreseen. The business case for a computerised tracing system which was considered at the time identified possible advantages in terms of identification, ancestry recording, milk and beef recording, genetic evaluation and linear assessment. The Wilson Committee had been established by the MMB and the NCBA to see how industry could gain from a computerised tracing system (see paragraphs 5.77-5.80 above). However, in accordance with current policy, MAFF officials took the view that a scheme which would provide benefits for the industry should be paid for by the industry and not by the taxpayer. Mrs Attridge expressed the view in November 1990 that it would be difficult to justify a computerised system on food safety grounds (see paragraph 5.68). This was a reasonable conclusion to reach at that time.

5.163 The recommendation made by the Select Committee in 1990 was made on the basis that a cattle-tracking system was required for disease control purposes - more specifically as 'a useful adjunct to the control of BSE and other diseases of cattle' (see paragraph 5.45). The emergence of BSE raised two linked questions in relation to MAFF's system for tracing animals:

1. was a computerised cattle-tracking system needed to facilitate the handling of BSE? and
2. was a computerised animal-tracking system needed to enable MAFF to cope with animal diseases that might emerge in the future?

5.164 The Select Committee concluded that these two questions should be answered in the affirmative:

a comprehensive system for identifying and tracking animals is needed . . . We . . . urge MAFF to move towards the full centralised computerisation of the relevant information and not rely on a complicated paper-chase through farmers' records . . . The logging of the parentage and movements of all cattle, and the retention of that information in a central database, must be the objective of any scheme MAFF introduces. Every individual bovine animal should be traceable from birth, in much the same way that a car is.

5.165 After considering the Interim Report of the feasibility study, Mr Lowson and his veterinary colleagues formed the contrary view. This led them to conclude that the feasibility study should be taken no further and that, for the time being at least, MAFF should not pursue the setting up of a computerised cattle-tracking system. This conclusion was endorsed by Ministers. Did MAFF officials and Ministers give proper consideration to this matter and was their conclusion one that it was reasonable to reach, having regard to what was known at the time?

5.166 MAFF's immediate response to the Select Committee's recommendation was to set up a feasibility study of a cattle-tracking system. In recommending this course to Mr Gummer, Mr Lowson made it plain that the feasibility study should not simply be considering the requirements of handling BSE, but the possibility that a control programme might be found necessary in the future (see paragraph 5.50). As Mr Lowson explained to us in a written statement:

The animal tracking project was part of a wider study of the use of IT in MAFF's veterinary services. It therefore dealt with issues that went wider than BSE. ¹

5.167 We consider that the setting up of a feasibility study was an appropriate response to the Select Committee's recommendation. It was plainly sensible that this study should look beyond the narrow question of whether a computerised system was needed to cope with the handling of BSE.

5.168 In its response to the Select Committee's Report, MAFF accepted that a feasibility study was necessary and informed the Select Committee that it was intended to initiate a feasibility study. It was explained to the Select Committee that the Government needed to assess whether defects in the present system would be so serious as to prejudice the effective control of the disease and, if so, whether computerised systems would in practice improve the situation enough to justify the massive investment required. The Select Committee was not told that the feasibility study would be considering aspects of the question that went beyond the demands of BSE (see paragraph 5.76).

5.169 At ATPB's first meeting Mr Lowson explained that the project had been set up for two reasons: first to consider how best to meet the need to be able to trace the movement, progeny and ancestry of animals which was an essential part of disease control; secondly to consider what would be necessary in order to control BSE in the event that it might be found to be transmissible in the future (see paragraph 5.84).

5.170 The draft feasibility study Interim Report made no express reference to the needs of handling BSE from beginning to end. It looked in general at MAFF's needs for disease control, identified gaps in the existing system and concluded that this system could not cope adequately with a situation requiring very large numbers of tracings, possibly in a short time frame. The report identified pressure from the public and its representatives to demonstrate a capability for dealing effectively with a 'son of BSE' (ie, a chronic disease that requires rapid tracing of very large numbers of animals). It also identified future pressure from the EU and from the cattle industry. Having regard to all these considerations the Interim Report recommended continuing to the next stage of examining more closely the options that the study had identified for 'a new, fully automated, central system for animal identification and movement recording' (see paragraphs 5.103-5.114).

5.171 In oral evidence to us Mr Lowson emphasised that the views of his IT colleagues were advanced on a contingency basis. They took the view that an IT solution was needed if a future outbreak of disease were to require more tracings to be done than the existing manual system could support. The likelihood of such an outbreak occurring was essentially a matter for the judgment of AHVG. In oral evidence Mr Lowson referred us to the following passage in the minute from Mr Matthews to him on 15 August 1991:

We acknowledge of course that the veterinary/professional judgements are the key ones here. If AHVG's judgement is that the risk from emergencies requiring larger numbers of tracings is so insignificant as not to require any increase in tracing capacity, then of course ITD would accept this judgement. ²

5.172 Mr Lowson commented:

I think very properly Mr Matthews was recognising that it was for us and more particularly veterinary colleagues to identify whether there was a situation that would require the kind of support that he said the present system would not give. ³

5.173 Mr Lowson made it plain that he and his veterinary colleagues could not envisage the disease situation postulated by the feasibility study as necessitating a computer based cattle-tracking system. ⁴

5.174 We believe that the reason the Interim Report gave no express consideration to the needs of handling BSE was that it had become apparent to the APTB that the setting up of a computerised system was unlikely to be of significant assistance in dealing with these. As MAFF was to point out to the 1994 Select Committee inquiry into methods of identifying farm livestock, the system would not contain the necessary historical data to facilitate tracing of progeny of animals already infected with BSE. In any event it did not appear that it would be necessary to carry out this exercise in order to eradicate the disease. This point was accepted by the Select Committee in 1994 when it conceded that the 'justification for a control database for disease purposes under current conditions' was 'slim' (see paragraph 5.153).

5.175 For these reasons we are satisfied that the demands of BSE did not themselves justify the costs of setting up a computerised cattle-tracking system. The question remains whether the emergence of BSE had demonstrated the desirability of putting in place a computerised animal-tracking system, so that if a disease emerged in the future which required animal-tracing on a large scale, MAFF would be in a position to deal with it.

5.176 In 1991, at the time of the Interim Report of the feasibility study, veterinarians and administrators in the AHVG could not foresee a future scenario where the demands of disease control would require a computerised system. In 1995 the Select Committee expressed the belief that 'MAFF's ability to cope with future disease problems, should they arise, would be enhanced by the introduction of some form of central database', but accepted that 'no simple use to which a national database might be put would justify the high costs of its establishment'. They predicted that 'the sum of uses, particularly as time goes by, will make the case for a national database increasingly compelling' (see paragraph 5.153).

5.177 This prediction was correct. Ultimately it was commercial considerations, rather than the demands of disease control, which led MAFF to decide to introduce a Cattle Traceability System.

5.178 One thing that the Interim Report had confirmed was that the costs of a computerised cattle-tracking system were going to be very considerable. Whether there was justification for taking the computerisation project further at that stage depended critically on the likelihood of the emergence in the future of a disease calling for an ability to trace animals on a scale larger than any anticipated in the past. It appears to have been the unanimous view of the veterinarians, including Mr Meldrum, that this was so unlikely that the feasibility study should be taken no further at that stage - a view endorsed by Sir Derek Andrews and the AHVG administrators.

5.179 We have concluded that MAFF officials responded reasonably in concluding that neither the demands of BSE, nor the future demands of disease control, justified the expense of setting up a computerised cattle-tracking system in 1990 and 1991. Those with vision, and we suspect that Mr Matthews was one of them, may have perceived that computerisation was inevitable. If MAFF officials adopted a more conservative approach they cannot be criticised on that account for failing to respond adequately to the emergence of BSE.

5.180 We had, at one stage, a concern about the terms of Mr Lowson's submission to Ministers of 11 October 1991. We read it as purporting to summarise the key findings of the Interim Report of the feasibility study, whereas it seemed to us that it did not do so, but rather represented conclusions of Mr Lowson. Mr Lowson addressed that concern with care, both in oral evidence and in writing. In particular he explained that his submission was intended only to address the Select Committee's recommendation that a computerised system be set up to deal with BSE, and made the point that his submission was circulated in draft to his fellow members of the ATPB who, apart from Mr Matthews, appeared content with it. Mr Lowson's evidence satisfied us that our concern was misplaced.

5.181 Having reached the conclusion that MAFF officials acted reasonably in advising that the Select Committee's recommendation to set up a computerised cattle-tracing system to deal with BSE and other diseases should not be implemented, it follows that we have no criticism of Ministers for accepting that advice.