Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
5. Cattle-tracking
Further consideration of a computerised tracing system
The Interim Report
Consideration of the Interim Report
Mr Lowson's draft submission on the Agriculture Select Committee's recommendation
AHVG officials comment on the draft submission
ITD's comments on the draft submission
Mr Lowson's final submission to the Minister
Events following the Minister's decision

The Interim Report

5.103 On 29 May 1991 a draft report was circulated entitled, 'Study to Assess the Feasibility of an Animal Tracking System for the Animal Health and Veterinary Group (AHVG)' (the 'Interim Report'). It had been written by Mr Johnson. The Interim Report's management summary identified shortcomings in MAFF's current animal tracking system as follows:

- 'gaps' in the system (eg lack of universal adoption of the MAFF- approved ID system, duplication of IDs, data lost through retagging, not all movements recorded, slaughtered animals not identified);

- audit and enforcement difficulties (eg few mechanisms for verifying identification and movement information, limited resources available to conduct physical inspections); and

- problems with data access (ie all identification and movement records held remotely). ¹

5.104 The summary noted that:

At present, AHVG does not feel that these shortcomings are seriously affecting its ability to contain and control animal disease in [Great Britain]. However, the system could not cope adequately with a situation requiring very large numbers of tracings, possibly in a short timeframe; nor will it comply with the emerging EC regulations concerning the identification and registration of animals, which could be binding on Member States by [1 January 1993]. ²

5.105 Two possible 'pathways' were described. First, MAFF could modify and enhance existing systems, applying IT where appropriate. The second option was to 'build a new, fully automated, central system for animal identification and movement recording'. The first option 'would primarily be plugging the gaps in the current system' and would not 'address the problems of audit/enforcement and data access, nor would it meet EC requirements'. The second option would not only address these problems, but would also 'provide a "higher performance" system for AHVG which could cater for large numbers of tracings and be expansible to cover species other than cattle'. ³

5.106 The management summary then considered the advantages and disadvantages of a new computerised system:

Based on an investigation of animal tracking systems in other countries, a fully automated system is technically feasible . . . Benefits from computerisation are reported to include:

- significantly increased levels of data accuracy and accessibility, leading to much greater control over animal identification and movement for statutory purposes;

- rapid and fuller tracing of animals for disease control purposes, regardless of the numbers involved;

- the availability of statistical data on cattle, with particular application for epidemiological research.

However, initial indications are that, in [Great Britain], this would be a very costly exercise: broad estimates ranging from £3 million to £14 million, depending on functionality and approach, have been calculated for computer development and systems implementation; there would also be an administrative overhead for the responsible authority, particularly in the area of enforcement . . . Furthermore, such a system will impose a major administrative burden on sections of the cattle farming community and, for this reason, may meet with some resistance. ⁴

5.107 The management summary concluded:

The Ministry is likely to come under pressure from external sources, particularly the EC, to implement a pathway 2 solution. Because the various options have not been explored in sufficient detail, it is not possible to be at all conclusive about costs (including the cost to the industry of compliance), benefits (ie the ability to address current shortcomings and better meet requirements) and the internal and external impact of systems implementation. This is information that the Ministry will need if it is to take sound decisions about future courses of action with regard to animal tracking. It is therefore recommended that the study continue to the next stage: to examine more closely the options that have been identified, focusing on the factors above. ⁵

5.108 The introduction to the Interim Report, section 2, explained the reasons for the study. It noted that, with the exception of known BSE cases and their offspring, MAFF did not hold individual cattle data. In the case of an outbreak of disease, the farmers' identification and movement records would have to be accessed and interpreted, which could be 'a laborious and time-consuming task' and was error-prone. The Agriculture Select Committee had recognised this and made its recommendations accordingly (see paragraph 5.45). The Government's response had indicated that a study would be initiated, to look at the feasibility of establishing a system as envisaged by the Select Committee. ⁶

5.109 Section 2 also set out the objectives of the study, which were:

. . . to consider options for introducing a system into [Great Britain] that facilitates the identification of an individual animal, its parents, its offspring, and all locations at which it has been held, from birth to death, including all relevant dates; and to examine the feasibility of each option in terms of its cost/benefit, technical viability and acceptability (to all interested parties). The primary focus must be on identifying the system requirements (and possible solutions) necessary to enable the effective control of disease in cattle. However, given that certain diseases can spread between species, the applicability of such a system to non-bovine farm animals must also be assessed. Additionally, given that industry interest in such a system is high, particularly in quarters where herd improvement is a major factor, the costs of incorporating their requirements should also be assessed, together with any commercial benefit that might accrue. ⁷

5.110 Section 4 of the Interim Report described MAFF's existing cattle-tracing set-up. It noted that animal tracing for disease control purposes at the time involved accessing a small number, relative to the total, of movement and identification records. In 1989 fewer than 3,000 tracings had been undertaken, excluding those for BSE. In addition to accurate identification of animals and maintenance of their records, physically accessing the data was the main factor that influenced MAFF's ability to trace an animal rapidly. The problems inherent in the associated paper chase were reiterated, and the Interim Report noted that MAFF 'can carry out only a limited number of tracings before it begins to adversely affect other programmes of work'. It continued:

Notwithstanding the problems, the system is generally considered by veterinary and animal health staff to be effective in containing and controlling the current crop of cattle disease in [Great Britain]; and it operates at little cost because the administrative burden of record keeping and enforcement is outwith the Ministry. ⁸

5.111 The impact of proposed European Commission measures on domestic cattle-tracing requirements was considered in section 5 of the Interim Report. It suggested that 'the EC plan to develop legislation to harmonise current systems of animal identification and registration (movement recording) across the Community' could have major implications for cattle-tracking in the UK. ⁹

5.112 Section 6 of the Interim Report, entitled 'User Requirements', summarised AHVG's requirement for an animal-tracking system as a system which:

1. could be 'relied upon to provide complete, accurate and up-to-date animal identification and movement data';
2. enabled rapid tracing of animals in response to outbreaks of disease;
3. could cope with increased volume of tracing for chronic diseases without seriously affecting work performance in other areas; and
4. could be expanded to cover other animals. ¹⁰

5.113 A combined user requirement, which took into account EU and industry requirements, was set out at Appendix D1 of the Interim Report. Paragraph 6.4 drew conclusions as to how well the user requirements were met by the current system (an analysis of this was set out in full in Appendix D2), noting that it:

1. could not consistently support a 48-hour (or less) response time for tracings;
2. would be seriously over-stretched if it had to handle a substantial increase in volumes;
3. could not be relied upon to provide complete, accurate and up-to-date information;
4. did not give adequate data on stock levels (at holding) and on slaughtered animals; and
5. could not be expanded to cover other animals on an individual basis. ¹¹

5.114 The Interim Report's recommendation was set out in section 8. It noted that in the forthcoming 6-18 months, the Ministry was likely to come under mounting pressure: from the EC to implement Directive 90/425 by 1993. This directive introduced a tracing regime for the trade in certain live animals and animal products. In addition, MAFF would be likely to face increasing calls from the cattle industry to provide or sponsor systems that gave immediate access to animal identification and movement details and from the general public to demonstrate that it was capable of dealing with a chronic disease that required rapid tracing of large numbers of animals. It was thus recommended that:

To achieve these external objectives, and better meet its own requirements for an animal tracking system for disease control purposes, a central, computer-based solution for recording animal IDs and movements is required. Initial investigations show that such a system would be very expensive, and that it would take a considerable time to implement as well as involving a large administrative overhead for both the Ministry and the farming community.

Because the options . . . have not been explored in sufficient detail it is not possible to be at all conclusive about costs (including the cost to the industry of compliance), benefits (ie the ability to address current shortcomings and better meet requirements) and internal (ie organisational) and external impact. The Ministry will need this information if it is to take sound decisions about future courses of action with regard to animal tracking. It is therefore recommended that this study proceed to the next stage: to examine more closely some or all of the options that have been identified and, for each, report on the factors outlined above. ¹²

Consideration of the Interim Report

ATPB considers the report

5.115 The ATPB discussed the Interim Report at a meeting on 14 June 1991. It was agreed that any comments on the report would be sent to Mr Johnson, who would produce a final report incorporating them. During the meeting Mr Johnson reminded the ATPB that a pathway 2 option - building a new, fully automated, central system - would leave AHVG better placed to meet an emergency situation, but that more work needed to be done before a specific option could be chosen. The minutes record that:

Mr Lowson agreed that a new system might help deal with potential threats but that this was a highly speculative assumption at this early stage. ¹³

5.116 The ATPB considered how AHVG would report to the Minister and Agriculture Select Committee. Mr Matthews's note of the meeting recorded that, although there was agreement in many areas, there were still 'one or two quite major sticking points' between AHVG and ITD:

AHVG (rightly) point to the high cost of an IT system and a number of issues associated with data capture. We point out that the existing system, by AHVG's own definition (let alone when one takes account of external pressures), does not meet the user requirement. The report itself struck a fairly good balance between these areas, and therefore was not disputed to any extent. ¹⁴

5.117 According to Mr Matthews's note, it was agreed that Mr Lowson would prepare a draft report to the Minister, to be circulated to the ATPB for comment, and that Mr Matthews would circulate a proposal on 'how we carry this forward with regard to IT support'. Mr Matthews's note said that the ITD:

. . . would be looking for a quite clear statement in [Mr Lowson's report] that the existing system does not meet the stated requirement and is not expansible beyond a comparatively small increase in 'traffic' volume. ¹⁵

5.118 The official minutes of the meeting recorded that:

It was agreed that AHVG would advise Ministers in the light of the study's findings so far on a possible response to the recommendation of the House of Commons Agriculture Committee. [AHVG's Information Technology Management Group] would need to consider how and whether the study should go forward, and if so on what basis. ¹⁶

Mr Matthews's plan for further action

5.119 On 4 July 1991 Mr Matthews circulated to Mr Lowson, Mr Selwood, Dr Philip, Mr Gregg and Mr Long his note of what he considered to be the next steps. On the existing animal tracking system, he commented:

I believe that the feasibility study work performed by PA [Consulting] has established that the existing Animal Tracking 'support' system is very limited, in all respects. It does not meet the user requirement for AHVG described in the interim report, and just cannot touch EC requirements referred to therein (although it is acknowledged that these are still emerging/under negotiation). ¹⁷

5.120 Mr Matthews asserted that 'any UK animal tracing strategy based on the existing system' was limited in capacity and limited in terms of accuracy and completeness to tracing activities performed. These limitations made it 'fairly self-evident . . . how unprepared, in terms of "support" systems as opposed to veterinary systems, AHVG is to deal with any significant increase in animal tracing activity'. ¹⁸

5.121 In handwriting next to these comments, Mr Lowson noted that 'back-up systems exist to compensate for inadequacies of tracing, random monitoring for all key diseases, compulsory sheep dipping. Tracing is just one element'. ¹⁹ During oral evidence, Mr Lowson expanded the point he was making:

The point here is that tracing, as I say in the final sentence of that first note, tracing is but one element in a system of controlling diseases and I think it has to be understood that tracing is a very minor element in the machinery that is needed in order to deal with almost all animal diseases. ²⁰

5.122 With regard to next steps, Mr Matthews made the following points:

(a) For the report back to Ministers the IT element of the advice will be balanced to take account of the above. The limitations/risks implicit in the current system are considered extremely constraining, unacceptably so if contingencies involving significantly increased (against the current small volume) tracking activity are considered. However, the non-trivial nature of delivering an effective replacement system based on IT is well appreciated and should be acknowledged in the report;

(b) The ITD line will be that the risks are such that we cannot call a halt to work to try and identify improved systems at this stage. ²¹

5.123 Mr Lowson made a manuscript note next to paragraph (a), which asked, 'If a new situation arose which required a lot of tracing of individual animals - what circumstances?' During oral evidence, Mr Lowson explained that he was making the point that Mr Matthews had not clarified exactly what circumstances might give rise to significantly increased tracking activity, and this was an issue that needed to be addressed. In particular, 'how realistic was the possibility arising that a substantial extension of tracking activity would be necessary to meet AHVG's needs?' ²²

5.124 Mr Matthews's note then went on to discuss a variety of follow-on actions. In closing, Mr Matthews offered to discuss and clarify the issues raised by him with Mr Lowson before Mr Lowson finalised his reply to the Minister. ²³

Mr Lowson's draft submission on the Agriculture Select Committee's recommendation

5.125 On 1 August 1991 Mr Lowson circulated a draft submission to the Minister, including a summary of the feasibility study for comments. ²⁴ Mr Lowson's covering minute read:

1. I attach the draft of a paper to go to Ministers to deal with the recommendation of the Agriculture Select Committee last year that we should introduce a centralised computer system of animal records so as to deal with BSE. I would be grateful for comments, to reach by the time I return from leave on 2 September 1991.

2. This note takes account of the finding to date of the animal tracking feasibility study, which has looked at the whole range of AHVG's requirements in the area of identification, movement, etc records. We need to consider what further work needs to be done in this area as a whole, and Mr Matthews and I are aiming to circulate short notes on the next steps, for consideration at the next meeting of the AHVG ITMG. ²⁵

5.126 The draft submission read:

BSE: COMPUTERISED RECORD KEEPING

Background

1. One of the recommendations of last year's report by the House of Commons Agriculture Committee was that a computerised system should be set up to record the parentage and offspring of all cattle. In response the Minister said that a feasibility study would be undertaken. We have pursued the study over the past year with the aid of the IT Directorate and an independent consultant. The coverage of the study was wider than the single issue raised by the Select Committee, because of the need to assess the options for fulfilling possible Community requirements for animal identification and tracking. How to pursue these wider aspects will need to be considered further in AHVG. But it is possible to draw conclusions now about the Select Committee's recommendation.

Objective

2. Neither the Select Committee nor those who advocated the creation of a computerised database (among whom the NFU were prominent) produced detailed arguments about how it would work or what it would be designed to achieve. It was however widely believed that if BSE were to be transmissible from dam to offspring it would be necessary to slaughter all offspring of BSE cattle in order to achieve eradication of the disease. Although the identities of known offspring of BSE cattle are recorded so that they can be identified when marketed so as to avoid their being moved out of the UK, the theory presumably was that a new system was needed to locate all the calves of BSE cattle so that they could be found and dealt with. As the Tyrrell Committee made clear in its advice on the control of BSE, however, the basic premise is faulty; if the disease is transmitted only to the calves of animals which eventually show clinical signs, it would still die out of its own accord, but if other routes of transmission occur (as they appear to in the case of scrapie) slaughtering such calves would not be enough to eradicate it. Another factor was that when public concern about BSE was at its height farming organisations were looking for ways of securing guarantees that the animals that were bought on the open market were not the offspring of BSE cows.

3. Developments over the past year have reduced the pressure for action. Overall concern about BSE has subsided; while disease has occurred in one animal where maternal transmission appears to be the most likely explanation, it is only one, so the evidence at present is that maternal transmission is not likely to be an important factor in the future of the epidemic; and while the cattle market as a whole has been depressed there is little sign of differentials depending on whether or not an animal is the calf of a BSE case. Furthermore if epidemiological forecasts turn out to be right the number of cases will be falling rapidly by the time a system is running and data relating to the peak of the epidemic will be gone forever.

Feasibility Study

4. The key findings of the study as regards the Select Committee proposal were:

(i) a fully automated system of cattle records is technically feasible - indeed several European countries are already embarked on systems like the one advocated by the Select Committee;

(ii) a system which simply provided records of the offspring and parentage of cattle would be of limited use for the control of diseases other than BSE (and, as indicated above, its value in dealing with BSE is limited too). An elaborate computerised animal identification and movement record system might have wider application - but even so its value in improving our ability to deal with most known disease problems would still probably be limited. While there is no doubt that such a system would greatly improve the amount of data available to assist in disease enquiries, it is less clear that this would yield benefits in line with the costs (see (iii) below). IT investment could well pay higher dividends if applied to other aspects of disease control;

(iii) the cost could be very high; depending on the approach used and range of functions offered by the system, initial costs could be in the range of £3-14 million, and annual costs £0.5-6 million;

(iv) although a computerised system is technically feasible, it would stand or fall on the readiness of those involved in the animal trade to record data with the necessary speed and accuracy; and

(v) the Community is developing its own system of animal identification and record keeping. Any UK system would need to be compatible with that, and therefore to avoid becoming too far developed before decisions had been taken at a Community level.

Conclusion

5. There appears to be no case for accepting the Select Committee's recommendation. It was initially based on a wrong premise (that the wholesale slaughter of calves might be necessary to control BSE); the factors that gave rise to premise for action have diminished considerably; and a computerised system to replace existing manual record keeping, while technically feasible, would be very expensive, perhaps not cost-effective even if applications other than the control of BSE are considered (although these need to be considered further, and need to be developed, if at all, in line with a Community system).

6. Ministers have not given any commitment to communicate further with the Agriculture Committee on this topic. However if the conclusion in paragraph 5 is accepted it would make sense for the Minister to round off consideration of the Select Committee Report by writing to the Chairman, and a draft letter is attached. ²⁶

5.127 The attached draft letter to Mr Jerry Wiggin, Chairman of the Agriculture Select Committee, noted:

A number of interesting conclusions arise from this study. It is clearly feasible at a technical level to develop a centralised system to hold data on the identity, breeding, and movements of all cattle. Costs would depend on the kind of approach adopted and the range of functions that the new system would carry out, but they would be very high. It is not easy to demonstrate that the investment required would be worthwhile in disease control terms - even taking account of applications that go wider than the control of BSE alone. ²⁷

5.128 The draft letter concluded:

I do not want to be obstructive on this question. If it could be shown that computerised record keeping could materially help us deal with the disease then I would want to pursue it, as I have pursued every other control measure supported by independent scientific advice. We will have to continue to study possible changes in our record keeping arrangements in the context of developing Community requirements, and we have made changes to our existing rules to cater for the problem of BSE. But I have to conclude that at this stage there are no grounds for pursuing the kind of system that your Report advocated. ²⁸

AHVG officials comment on the draft submission

5.129 Mr Meldrum responded to Mr Lowson's minute on 2 August 1991. ²⁹ In general, he agreed with the arguments put forward by Mr Lowson for concluding that there appeared to be no case for accepting the Agriculture Select Committee's recommendation. ³⁰ In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Meldrum gave an indication of his thinking at the time:

In the context of the issues being looked at by this Inquiry, unfortunately a cost effective case was not made for a cattle tracking system to deal with either BSE or the rather more run of the mill cattle diseases present in the UK at that time. So far as the latter are concerned I was extremely disappointed at the outcome of the feasibility study because I was committed to the eradication of the serious cattle diseases such as tuberculosis and brucellosis but, as far as BSE was concerned and for the reasons explained in the documents that I wrote at the time, there was little if anything to be gained in the short term from a system of computerised recording of cattle movements. ³¹

5.130 Mr Bradley expressed his agreement with the draft submission to Mr Lowson on 5 August 1991. ³² Mr Kevin Taylor, who had seen Mr Meldrum's response, suggested one further drafting amendment on 7 August 1991, ³³ and Mr Wilesmith did not raise any major points. ³⁴

ITD's comments on the draft submission

5.131 On 5 August 1991 Mr Matthews sent Mr Johnson a copy of Mr Lowson's draft submission. In his covering minute, which sought Mr Johnson's comments on the draft submission, and which was not copied to Mr Lowson, he commented:

What strikes me is that this focuses totally on BSE, with no real reference to Animal Tracking generally. It is obviously in response to this paper that we need to make some of the points made in the feasibility study about general unpreparedness etc . . . ³⁵

5.132 Mr Johnson replied on 13 August 1991. In addition to suggesting some minor drafting changes, he commented that:

Para 5 seems too strongly worded. It may be true that a computerised system would be of limited benefit for BSE; but it could help considerably dealing with a "son of" situation should one crop up sometime in the future, which is, in part, what the Select Committee was driving at. I appreciate the reasons why [Mr Lowson] has confined his comments to BSE, but he leaves himself open to criticism if he does not address animal tracking on a more general basis. ³⁶

5.133 In a minute discussing aspects of the feasibility study, which was sent to Mr Lowson on 15 August 1991, Mr Matthews commented that:

If AHVG's judgement is that the risk from emergencies requiring larger numbers of tracings is so insignificant as not to require any increase in tracing capacity, then of course ITD would accept that judgement. However, from the business analysis work done so far the ITD view (and given the numbers and percentages involved, I think the 'commonsense' view) is that the low capacity of the current system in comparison with the known population is such as to create a potentially very risky situation if future large scale tracing has to take place. ³⁷

5.134 On 21 August 1991 Mr Matthews, having received Mr Johnson's comments on Mr Lowson's draft submission, minuted Mr Lowson further. He opened by noting that ITD had concerns about the 'nature and capacity of existing tracing procedures, whether in the BSE context or any other'. Mr Matthews then set out ITD's concerns with Mr Lowson's draft submission:

Whilst we appreciate that the primary focus of your briefing has to be BSE, we consider that the absence of any reference to wider aspects of the feasibility study's findings (particularly limitations in the 'support' systems for tracing) may be counter-productive in the long-run. In the event of a 'son of BSE' situation, particularly one that required levels of tracing well above the limits of the existing system, we might have some difficulty in defending the restricted context you propose for the Minister's reply, particularly as presented in the final paragraph of the draft letter.

Our view on this key point is that the reply should be broadened to draw out the fact that the feasibility study has highlighted areas where current systems can be improved. We could also make the more positive point that both in the short and longer term we are actively pursuing the use of IT to develop and enhance the support systems to the Veterinary/Professional staff. We suggest that this sort of flavour should be injected into both the second and final paragraphs of the draft letter. ³⁸

5.135 Mr Matthews then commented specifically on paragraph 5 of the submission, which had concluded that a computerised system as envisaged by the Agriculture Select Committee was not needed:

Given what we've said above you will recognise that we think paragraph 5 of the briefing is too strongly worded. It may be true that a computerised system would be of limited benefit for BSE, but it could help considerably in dealing with similar situations if they crop up in the future. AHVG is much better placed than ITD to interpret if the Select Committee's thinking was totally confined to BSE or not, our view from a more general business analysis perspective is that, with regard to the systems that support AHVG's business in this area, there are currently weaknesses that can and should be addressed. ³⁹

5.136 Mr Matthews concluded by saying, 'I hope this is helpful. Please get back to me if you wish to discuss this further'. ⁴⁰ We have been unable to find evidence that Mr Lowson responded, and in oral evidence, he stated that he did not remember 'one way or the other'. ⁴¹

Mr Lowson's final submission to the Minister

5.137 Mr Lowson's final submission was forward to Mr Gummer on 11 October 1991. The covering minute read:

One of the recommendations of the House of Commons Agriculture Committee when they reported on BSE last year was that we should introduce a computerised system to record the parentage and offspring of all cattle. In our response we said that a feasibility study would be undertaken and the attached note summarises the results. ⁴²

5.138 The final submission did not differ significantly from the draft that Mr Lowson had previously circulated.

5.139 The draft letter to Mr Wiggin attached to the submission, which, in the event, was not sent to Mr Wiggin, was amended to read:

If it could be shown that computerised record keeping would be a cost effective help to us in dealing with the disease then I would want to pursue it. But this is not the case . . . I have to conclude that at this stage there are no grounds for pursuing the kind of system that your Report advocated in the context of our national measures for dealing with BSE. ⁴³

5.140 In a statement to the Inquiry, Sir Derek Andrews said that he agreed with the submission's conclusion that there was no case for accepting the Agriculture Select Committee's recommendation for a computerised database. He considered that the submission summarised the key findings of the Interim Report, and its purpose was not to provide a detailed summary of the Interim Report. ⁴⁴

5.141 On 21 October 1991 Mr Matthews sent Mr Selwood of the ITD a copy of Mr Lowson's final submission. He noted that, when the submission was still at the drafting stage, he had suggested to AHVG that both it and the draft letter be broadened to 'at least expose slightly the fact that not everything in the garden was lovely with regard to current systems'. He further commented: 'You will see that, although he has made one or two cosmetic changes in our direction, the papers remain very much as originally drafted'. ⁴⁵

5.142 Mr Gummer's Private Secretary replied to Mr Lowson on 23 October 1991. He wrote on the covering minute of Mr Lowson's submission, 'Thank you: The Minister decided not to write to Mr Wiggin'. ⁴⁶

5.143 In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Capstick set out his recollection of the circumstances of Ministers' decision on the implementation of a computerised cattle-tracking system:

I cannot now recall discussion of the whole matter with Ministers in October 1991, but they made the decision, that the proposed system should not be pursued, on grounds that (a) a system, capable of dealing with BSE, at the time already existed; and because of: (b) the complexity and risks attached to the proposed system; (c) the timescale involved in its creation; (d) the cost to Government and industry of such system; and (e) the uncertainty about a common system being considered for the European Community. ⁴⁷

Events following the Minister's decision

Circulation of the Final Report

5.144 As recorded in a minute from Mr Matthews to Mr Lowson, at a meeting on 6 December 1991 involving Animal Health (Disease Control) Division and ITD staff, it was agreed that work on the feasibility study report should be considered complete, and that the report could be circulated. Any further action would await clarification of new EU requirements. Mr Matthews noted that at the meeting he raised the issue of how AHVG intended to respond to the findings of the feasibility study, 'which indicated that existing manual animal tracking systems are fairly limited in scope'. In his minute, Mr Matthews also took the opportunity to:

. . . echo the concern expressed in the feasibility study about the possible adverse consequences of having to depend on the existing manual system if emergencies involving increased numbers of trackings arise. ⁴⁸

5.145 Mr Geoff Sheldon of ITD distributed the Final Report within MAFF on 23 December 1991. His covering minute confirmed:

The Minister [has] accepted AH(DC) [Animal Health (Disease Control)] Division's recommendation not to proceed with the development of a computerised system.

At a meeting with AH(DC) Division earlier this month it was agreed to draw a line under this study but for any follow-on work to await AH(DC)'s report on the latest EC Directive on Animal Identification. The report is therefore being circulated for information. AH(DC) will keep under review the need for follow-on work by ITD including any requirements for interim facilities as discussed in the report. ⁴⁹

MAFF publicises its decision on a computerised database

5.146 On 10 January 1992 Mr Lowson sent Mr Curry a draft speech and speaking note for use at the British Cattle Breeders International Conference on 14 January. The prepared speech stated that MAFF aimed 'as far as possible to build upon our existing tried and tested system, and to avoid the need for expensive computerised support'. The speaking note attached included the following:

Attempts have been made to convince us that a computer system would provide substantial benefits for animal and therefore public health. We have carried out a feasibility study, using external consultants, which has shown this not to be so. ⁵⁰

5.147 Four days later, Mr David Rossington, Principal Private Secretary to Mr Gummer, wrote in a letter to Mr Hawker of the MMB:

A feasibility study has been carried out to assess the extent to which a computerised data base could support the control of animal diseases. It has been concluded from the research carried out by external consultants that there is no cost benefit for animal health in moving away from the present on-farm movement records which continue to serve us well. ⁵¹

5.148 On 13 February 1992 Mr Lowson sent Mr Gummer a briefing note, which included information on the feasibility study. Mr Lowson wrote:

The House of Commons Agriculture Committee's report on BSE included the recommendation that a computerised animal identification and tracking system be set up. A feasibility study led to the clear conclusion that such a system would not be cost effective. ⁵²

5.149 Mr Lowson suggested the following line for Mr Gummer to put to interest groups:

A feasibility study carried out by an external consultant has shown that a computerised animal identification system would not provide substantial benefits for animal and public health.

The present system is adequate for disease control purposes and does not require a fundamental overhaul although we recognise that there is scope for tightening up and improving compliance. ⁵³