Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
3. Introduction of the animal SBO ban
Consideration of a statutory animal SBO ban
Discovery of a cat with spongiform encephalopathy
Consideration of MAFF's presentation of the issues raised by the cat case
Pressure for a statutory ban from the NFU and others
SEAC meets to discuss the cat case
Pressure for an animal SBO ban builds
The NFU advises its members to avoid using MBM containing SBO

Discovery of a cat with spongiform encephalopathy

3.135 Whilst public concern over BSE had grown with each month of 1990, a further development was about to increase media interest in the issue dramatically both in the UK and in Europe. The death of a domestic Siamese cat from a spongiform encephalopathy (SE) in Bristol was reported to Ministers in May 1990. ¹ It was the first of a number of cases of feline spongiform encephalopathy recorded in Great Britain over the next four years.

3.136 On 9 May 1990 Mr Lowson reported the diagnosis of the cat to Mr Gummer. The minute was widely circulated to MAFF, DH, CVL, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries for Scotland (DAFS), Welsh Office Agriculture Department (WOAD) and Department of Agriculture Northern Ireland (DANI) officials. ² Mr Lowson stated that once news of the case became public it was 'bound to excite comment and a connection will be made with BSE, scrapie and possibly even with CJD'. He noted that MAFF's role was limited since it was for DH to field any questions on human health and for the veterinary profession, and in particular the British Veterinary Association (BVA), to respond to approaches about the implications for pets. However, he did note that:

Public attention is bound to focus on the question of whether this case shows that BSE or scrapie can transfer to pets through their food, and whether it indicates a need for further action to limit the use of particular types of material for feeding to animals. ³

3.137 Mr Lowson said that further detailed enquiries were required because it was not certain that the case was a TSE. He then noted that the manufacturers of the large majority of pet food had been operating a voluntary ban on the use of SBO since the previous year, and that the Southwood Working Party had been aware of the susceptibility of cats when they formulated their recommendations. Nevertheless:

Clearly this case will bring into sharp relief all the various issues that have been troubling the media for some time. We have already notified the various groups mentioned in this note so that they can prepare suitable defensive briefing for the press. There is nothing further that we need to do apart from bringing this issue to the attention of the veterinary profession so that suspect cases are brought to our attention. Above all it will be important not to encourage the public to jump to conclusions about the likely origin of this case. We will need to consider inviting [SEAC] to consider the implications. ⁴

3.138 On the same day, Dr Pickles identified for Mr Stephen Dorrell, newly-appointed DH Parliamentary Secretary, and other DH officials, some of the concerns this raised for MAFF:

* BSE has spread to yet another species: how many more?

* Whether it should still be permissible to include offal in pet food.

* Renewed pressure to ban the feeding of processed sheep and cow offal to pigs and poultry.

* Could there be spread between cats or to other species from cats? ⁵

3.139 A background note on BSE annexed to her minute said that:

. . . there are pressures to extend the ruminant protein ban: at present pigs and poultry receive this sort of feed. Publicity about the infected cat could increase these pressures. Such action, which would be hard to justify scientifically, would increase costs for the industry and cause perhaps insurmountable problems for abattoirs, who would find renderers no longer willing to accept offal. Many 1000s of tons of offal need to be disposed of daily. ⁶

3.140 On 10 May 1990 Mr Gummer and Mr Maclean met Mr Andrews, Mr Meldrum and others to discuss how to publicise the diagnosis of spongiform encephalopathy in a cat. The note of the meeting states that Mr Meldrum 'confirmed the Minister's assumption that there was no likely connection' between the SE in the cat and BSE - 'Nor was the illness necessarily linked with the cat's diet.' It was recorded that Mr Gummer thought 'it desirable to make the information available as soon as possible'. It was agreed during the meeting that a letter to the Veterinary Record giving details of the case would be issued as a press release that day. ⁷

3.141 The conflict of evidence that arose in relation to this note of the meeting is discussed in detail in vol. 6: Human Health 1989-96.

3.142 A MAFF news release reporting the diagnosis of 'a sub-acute spongiform encephalopathy in a five-year-old Siamese cat' was issued that day. It attached a copy of a letter from Mr Meldrum to the Veterinary Record giving details of the case. ⁸

3.143 Also on 10 May 1990, Dr Pickles minuted Dr Metters, copied to Sir Donald Acheson, regarding the cat. Dr Pickles offered two alternative explanations:

Firstly, that cats have been susceptible to ingestion of infected meat for years and cases previously have gone unrecognised. Secondly, a new agent, presumably BSE, is virulent in a way in which previous agents such as scrapie have not been. The second possibility is most unlikely, but more worrying since it challenges the assumptions we have made for humans by analogy with scrapie. ⁹

3.144 Dr Pickles also suggested that pet food manufacturers would tighten their voluntary ban on SBO in pet food, but thought that:

. . . the public may start asking again about pig and poultry feed. We must be fully involved in discussions, particularly as some essential pharmaceuticals are made in pigs. ¹⁰

3.145 Sir Donald Acheson told the Inquiry that, based on both this minute from Dr Pickles and her minute on 9 May 1990:

. . . it was not immediately clear whether this represented a new disease, possibly caused by BSE infected pet food, or was a naturally occurring case of SE, previously unrecognised in cats. In either case it was important to get expert advice as soon as possible. I therefore gave instructions that although the first meeting of SEAC had just occurred and a second had been arranged for 2 July, an additional emergency meeting must be called. The first practicable date was 17 May. It was my earnest hope that I would not have to make a public statement on the significance of the case of FSE before having the advantage of the advice of SEAC on that date. ¹¹

Consideration of MAFF's presentation of the issues raised by the cat case

3.146 In saying that there was no basis for restricting the feeding of ruminant material to pets, pigs and poultry, MAFF officials consistently relied on the fact that no new scientific evidence had emerged since the Southwood Report. The question arose as to whether the position had now changed.

3.147 In his minute of 9 May 1990, Mr Lowson recommended that MAFF 'take the initiative' in releasing information to the public about the cat, cautioning that 'it will be important not to encourage the public to jump to conclusions about the likely origin of this case'. ¹² On the afternoon of 10 May 1990, a draft brief and 'Q&A' paper in relation to the cat was faxed to DAFS, WOAD and DANI. The draft brief included the following:

4. There is no reason to suspect that this incident is caused by an infectious agent. Investigations will however thoroughly assess this option as part of the broader epidemiological study. Evidence on the feeding history of the cat is currently limited, but it does appear that it was fed on a wide variety of products which may or may not be implicated.

5. While there have been no descriptions of naturally occurring spongiform encephalopathies in domestic pets, the Southwood Working Party on Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy did acknowledge that exposure to scrapie and BSE agents had been likely. It also stated that while infection with these agents seemed unlikely, domestic pets could be susceptible, and preclinical disease might exist.

6. The Consultative Committee on Research into Spongiform Encephalopathies (The Tyrrell Committee) emphasised the need for close surveillance of species fed on offal, including domestic cats and dogs. Cats in particular were known to be susceptible to experimental infection with spongiform encephalopathies.

7. In appreciation of perceived risks to domestic pets from BSE/scrapie, the Pet Foods Manufacturers Association (PFMA) has kept its members fully informed of progress since BSE was made notifiable. ¹³

3.148 The draft Q&A paper included the following:

15. Will Government ban any use of cattle/ruminant derived feed?

Too early to draw conclusions from this case. First we need to investigate background and likely cause. [PFMA] already advised its members not to use specified bovine offals. There remains no evidence of spongiform encephalopathies in dogs, pigs or chickens. Indeed Southwood said that the chance of one occurring in poultry was so small and the risk is so remote that action was not necessary. For pigs, recent US studies using Kuru failed to provide evidence that the disease is transmissible to pigs.

16. Time to stop recycling animal remains?

Animal protein is a useful and nutritious food supplement used in many countries. Southwood only pointed out the need to ensure that pathogens are not recycled. The stringent Ministry controls on production ensure that this is so.

17. What will MAFF do now?

Investigations have already begun into the history of the affected cat to establish in particular what it had been fed and the likely cause. Once we know more we shall consult [SEAC] on the implications of this case and whether any further measures are required. ¹⁴

3.149 On 11 May 1990 Mr Gerald Wells, Head of Neuropathology, CVL, drafted a note which he intended to send to Mr Bradley about comments made by Mr Meldrum concerning the cat case on the television news the previous day. Mr Meldrum had said:

This is only one cat death out of seven million cats in the UK, and there is no reason or cause for concern at all. If we hadn't got the other encephalopathies in animals in this country, this report would have been published without comment. ¹⁵

3.150 Mr Wells expressed the view that Mr Meldrum's comments were 'unfortunate, inappropriate and provocative'. He explained:

The current situation requires a guarded public statement. The findings are preliminary but have potential agreed importance and should not, from virtually all viewpoints, have been represented as inconsequential.

Even at this early stage of investigation the indications are: that this is unlikely to be an isolated incident; that the cat is susceptible to a scrapie-like disease by a route other than the intracerebral; that the origin of infection is likely to be cattle or sheep and that the possible vehicles of implications include products of the rendering industry, prepared pet food and fresh meat trades. The temporal occurrence of this incident is also consistent with possible exposure to scrapie or BSE agents during the period of recycling of carcasses of clinically affected cattle in addition to the continuance of recycling of sheep material.

Reassurance regarding this incident from both the CVO and the BVA in the media is at present an over optimistic response which may well, in a very short time, result in a loss of credibility for the veterinary profession in this whole sensitive subject area.

Furthermore, the trivialisation of the occurrence in the public statement made has incensed the research workers in the Departments of Veterinary Pathology and Veterinary Medicine, the University of Bristol Veterinary School . . . ¹⁶

3.151 However, a manuscript note records that, in the event, the note was never used. ¹⁷ Mr Wells told the Inquiry that his views about the significance of the case were still made known to Mr Meldrum:

I recall that Mr Meldrum telephoned me at home on a Sunday evening in May to discuss the implications of the occurrence of FSE and that I expressed my personal view that discovery of FSE was probably of profound significance in relation to BSE and should lead to a complete ban on meat and bonemeal entering the animal food chain. ¹⁸

3.152 Mr Meldrum told us that he remembered this conversation well, but that it took place after a number of further cases of feline spongiform encephalopathy (FSE) had been confirmed 'later in the summer of 1990'. ¹⁹

3.153 Mr Meldrum also told the Inquiry that this case of SE in a cat had caused considerable uncertainty:

. . . it was not at that time known whether it was a TSE and, if it was a TSE whether it could have been caused by either scrapie or BSE (through feed or a medicinal product) or indeed could have been a sporadic case without a connection with any naturally occurring TSE . . . It would have been irresponsible and premature to conclude that this one case amounted to scientific justification for a ban on the use of SBOs in feed for pigs, poultry or other animals. ²⁰

3.154 Mrs Attridge gave similar evidence:

. . . one of our problems was we did not know whether this was a phenomenon, a sporadic phenomenon, in cats which was now being picked up because of the interest in BSE, or whether it actually was a new manifestation. ²¹

3.155 Mr David Maclean, MAFF Parliamentary Secretary, told the Inquiry that there were a number of factors which satisfied him that the cat case was not linked with BSE:

. . . that this cat had no connection with the animal feed, that it did seem to have a diet which was of the highest quality cat food, which was made I think by manufacturers who said they used none of the specified offal, and therefore on the evidence which I think we were presented with there was no sensible possible connection between the cat and its diet and its behaviour or links to what were then the known sources of BSE, the animal feed. ²²

3.156 Mr Gummer gave a similar explanation for the conclusion that there was no link between the cat case and BSE, both to the Agriculture Committee on 23 May 1990, ²³ and to the Inquiry:

So there seemed to be no background on which you could measure this, so we did not know whether this was merely us finding something because we were looking for it or whether this was in fact something new. Secondly, of course, all the indications from the diet were that there was not a link with the source of the disease, so the third thing was that when one looked at the nature of the cat, a Siamese cat I think, it appeared to have had a diet from a manufacturer - and this is entirely by memory, I may be wrong - but from a manufacturer who not only had not used this for the period of time before, but was one of those manufacturers who always claimed they did not use material of this kind. So it was very difficult to see that there was any link at all which you could place a finger on. And that was the background to coming to this conclusion. ²⁴

3.157 Regarding the implications for other animals, Mr Kevin Taylor told the Inquiry that:

. . . the infection of a cat tells you nothing at all about the susceptibility of a pig or any other animal. It just tells you that a cat, as we learned later, is susceptible to a transmissible spongiform encephalopathy, in this case BSE . . .

The transmission of infection/disease between two species gives you information only about those two species . . . Of course, we did have quite a lot of information at that time about the susceptibility of pigs by the oral route, not as a result of research but by the knowledge that both pigs and poultry were actually the animals which for decades had been fed most of the material which was believed to have caused the disease in cattle.

It has been suggested . . . that pigs did not live long enough to go down with the disease. That is rubbish. There is a large breeding herd of pigs and they do live long enough, and because they are food animals they are pretty well surveyed through the VI Service surveillance system which actually picked up BSE in the first stages, so there was good evidence to suggest that, whatever was the situation with the cat, the pig was not susceptible to oral infection. ²⁵

3.158 Mrs Attridge expressed a further view as to why the transmission to a cat had limited significance for MAFF's policy on the feeding of pigs:

My understanding is that cats were known to be susceptible to spongiform encephalopathies under laboratory conditions. Pigs were not. ²⁶

3.159 On 15 May MAFF issued a news release on BSE, which recorded that although some ruminant zoo animals had been diagnosed with a scrapie-like disease:

There is no record of pigs or poultry ever getting a similar disease. A recent post mortem of a cat in the UK showed a brain condition which is being further investigated. There is at present no evidence that it is transmissible or connected with other animal brain diseases of the scrapie family. ²⁷

Pressure for a statutory ban from the NFU and others

3.160 On 14 May 1990 Mrs Dorothy Blatcher of the Association of County Councils wrote to Mr Maslin welcoming the decision to increase to 100 per cent the compensation payable for cattle confirmed with BSE. She went on to say:

However, the Association is concerned that, whilst the supply and feeding to cattle and other ruminants of feed containing animal protein derived from sheep have been banned by the Government in order to combat BSE, it is still allowed to be fed to other livestock, such as pigs and poultry. The Southwood Report recommended that transmission experiments should be conducted on pigs and these are, of course, being carried out. While there is insufficient knowledge of the BSE organism and associated risks of its presence in the food chain, it is wise to adopt the safest possible position until further research can be completed.

The Association considers that all animal feed should be labelled with its constituents and source. There is no compelling reason why ruminant-derived protein should form part of pig rations. The Association seeks the adoption of measures which will ensure that the BSE organism is removed from the food chain. ²⁸

3.161 The NFU proposed that SBOs should be banned from inclusion in feed for pigs and poultry. ²⁹ On 15 May 1990 Mrs Attridge, Mr Kevin Taylor, Mr Cowan, ³⁰ Mr Gueterbock and Dr Pickles were present when Mr Gummer met Sir Simon Gourlay, President of the NFU, and other NFU representatives. The NFU stated that whilst it accepted that there was no scientific basis for banning the practice, public concern existed about feeding SBO to pigs and poultry:

. . . in the light of the increasing number of species found to be susceptible to spongiform encephalopathies, the public was becoming increasingly nervous about the safety of pig and poultry meat. Many pig farmers were now already requiring from their feed suppliers that no specified offals be included in the feed. There was a strong case for the Department regaining the initiative and restoring public confidence by banning this practice outright. ³¹

3.162 Mr Gummer was recorded as responding that:

. . . he had considered this issue in the greatest detail on a number of occasions. It was extremely difficult and the consequences of what was being proposed were very considerable. There was no scientific justification for making the change and there was a major risk that doing so could merely move the debate onto another vulnerable area, whilst doing little to allay public concern. ³²

3.163 Mr Cowan also pointed out that the change could have considerable consequences for producer returns, and Mrs Attridge stressed the danger of acting in an irrational manner instead of relying on scientific advice, which would risk MAFF being pushed into further, 'equally unjustified' measures later. In conclusion:

The Minister pressed the NFU hard to ensure that in any public statement they did not draw attention to the individual issues still to be discussed and did not do anything which suggested a division between them and MAFF. With some reticence, Sir Simon agreed to this. ³³

3.164 Later that same day, Mr Gummer, Mr Maclean and MAFF and DH officials ³⁴ met to discuss how MAFF should respond to the NFU's proposal to ban SBO in animal feed:

The question of animal protein feed had two aspects: pet food and pigs and poultry. As regards pet food, the PFMA guidelines covered the majority of producers, and the PFMA would be writing to all the others. In answer to the question of whether the ban on feeding this material to pets should be made statutory, Mrs Attridge pointed out that there was no health justification for this. The Parliamentary Secretary added that, given that our primary concern was to protect public health, it would not be justifiable to ban animal protein feed in pets without banning its use in pig and poultry feed too. There was clearly no scientific justification for banning it in pig and poultry feed. ³⁵

3.165 Mr Maclean and Mr Meldrum outlined possible ways of banning specified offal in pig and poultry feed without an overt shift in policy. The note of the meeting recorded:

After some discussion, however, it was agreed not to make any policy change. The NFU's proposal was unjustified in health terms and would inevitably lead to pressure for further extensions of the ban. Thus, if we banned the specified offals (which came from healthy animals), we would come under pressure to ban them also from scrapie-affected sheep. However, for technical reasons this would in practice prevent the use of sheepmeat entirely in pig and poultry feed. Once sheepmeat was banned from pig and poultry feed, feeding scrapie-infected sheep to humans would come under scrutiny. A ban on this would be entirely without merit scientifically and would have devastating economic effects. ³⁶

3.166 The NFU was due to be informed of this decision that evening. ³⁷

3.167 In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Meldrum said:

The NFU's proposal to ban the use of SBOs in pig and poultry feed was clearly discussed at some length at [this] meeting . . . The scientific evidence which underpinned MAFF's view that there was no reason to extend the ban to pig and poultry feed . . . had not changed . . . there were no transmission results yet reported from the intracerebral and intraperitoneal exposure of pigs to the agent of BSE . . . ³⁸

3.168 On 16 May 1990 Dr Ruth Jacobs, Senior Medical Officer in the Welsh Office Health Department (WODH), wrote to Dr Pickles. Dr Jacobs had that day met the Chief Medical Officer in the Welsh Office to discuss the BSE situation. Amongst other matters raised in the letter, Dr Jacobs stated that the practice of 'continuing to feed pigs and poultry with foodstuffs containing bovine offal is severely in question'. She added that the 'continued use of sheep offal as an animal feedingstuff in species other than bovine, is similarly questionable'. ³⁹

3.169 The Institution of Environmental Health Officers (IEHO) expressed similar concerns about SBO around this time. Referring to the PFMA ban on the inclusion of SBO in pet food, the IEHO's BSE policy document stated that it would like to see the Government reconsider this issue. ⁴⁰

SEAC meets to discuss the cat case

3.170 On 17 May 1990 SEAC held an emergency meeting. It discussed, among other things, the spongiform encephalopathy in the cat. The agenda of the meeting noted that the committee would need to consider:

a. are there any possible direct routes of transmission from cats to humans? and if so is any action called for?

b. what if anything this occurrence tells us about the species range of spongiform encephalopathies particularly BSE?

c. does this alter the advice given previously that the Southwood view on the probable lack of hazard from BSE to humans still stands. ⁴¹

3.171 The minutes of the meeting record that the possible explanations identified by SEAC were:

(a) This was a feline disorder in its own right with no association with BSE or scrapie.

(b) It was feline scrapie, neither (a) n or (b) having been recognised previously in view of the rarity of cat neuropathological studies.

(c) It was feline BSE. ⁴²

3.172 Since at that time there had only been one confirmed case, SEAC felt it would be premature to draw conclusions without further data being available. It was noted that it would be discussed again at the next meeting. The Committee also asked for consideration of pig and poultry feed at the next meeting. ⁴³

3.173 On 22 May 1990 Mr Gummer discussed with Mr Andrews the possibility of referring to SEAC the question of feeding animal protein to animals. The note of this discussion records:

As regards the question of feeding animal protein to animals, the Minister said that, given that the Committee intended to look into this anyway, it was sensible for him now to request that they do so. There were three principal issues, all of which we should invite the Committee to address: first, the question of whether there should be a ban on the feeding of any animal protein to ruminants; secondly, whether we should continue to permit the feeding of any animal protein to any animal; and thirdly, whether there should be a ban on the inclusion of specified bovine offals in pig and poultry feed.

The Secretary acknowledged the case for requesting advice from [SEAC] in the circumstances. However, the issue would have to be very carefully handled. It would be appropriate for the Department to provide a background paper explaining our present policies and the reasons underlying these. . . .

The Minister is due to dine with Dr Tyrrell tomorrow evening and will convey this request orally on that occasion. He will also invite Dr Tyrrell to bring forward the Committee's discussion of [this issue] in order that recommendations can be made well before July. ⁴⁴

Pressure for an animal SBO ban builds

3.174 On 24 May 1990 UKASTA and NFU officials met to discuss animal feed. Many farmers were pressing feed manufacturers to supply feed which was free of all MBM, and the possibility of taking steps to remove all animal protein from feed was discussed. In the event, it 'was agreed that the NFU would consider further the possibility of obtaining an industry-wide voluntary ban on the use of the specified bovine offals'. ⁴⁵

3.175 On the same day Mr Maclean requested a paper to critically examine MAFF's position on BSE issues in order that 'Ministers can have carefully thought out their line to take rather than being forced to take decisions with no notice'. The paper was to include consideration of the possibility that UKASTA might seek to remove all meat and bone meal from all animal feed. ⁴⁶

3.176 On 31 May 1990 Mr Gummer was informed that Mr C D Naish, the NFU Deputy President, had indicated that the NFU was in discussion with the rendering, slaughterhouse, feedstuffs and food industries about agreeing to a voluntary ban on the use of SBOs in all animal feedstuffs. In response, Mr Gummer considered that the industry would be 'greatly mistaken in going down this road' and would try to persuade Sir Simon Gourlay 'to put a stop to it'. ⁴⁷

3.177 On 1 June 1990 Prosper De Mulder (PDM) issued a circular to its 'raw material suppliers', which stated that:

. . . in response to the demands of their customers, mainly pig producers, many feed manufacturers have found it commercially necessary to produce animal protein free feeds. Such actions can of course have a 'domino' effect and there now exists the distinct possibility that animal proteins could cease to be used at all in feeds. Consequentially the rendering industry will become primarily one of waste disposal.

In such an event the costs of removal, processing and disposal of by-products from the meat industry are likely to be in the region of £100 per tonne.

This Company is and has been, for several months now, making every effort to avoid such a situation arising . . .

To assist in this aim you might consider asking your pig suppliers to ensure they do use Meat and Bone meal in their feeds. After all, they are the originators of the by-products in the first place and any disposal costs will inevitably be passed back to them! ⁴⁸

3.178 A document attached to the circular setting out some of PDM's actions so far said:

The cost of disposing of the 1.75m tonnes of animal waste produced in the UK each year would be about £200m. This would initially be borne by the abattoir operators, but would be passed back down the line and eventually lead to higher retail prices for meat. ⁴⁹

3.179 On the same day, Mr Lawrence minuted Mrs Attridge and attached a draft response assessing the impact of UKASTA's proposed ban on the use of any MBM in any animal feed, as requested by Mr Maclean on 24 May 1990. Mr Lawrence noted that, in the event of such a ban, UKRA would probably seek Government assistance on the basis that their revenue would be reduced and their disposal costs increased. He calculated the overall cost of such a ban at £90 million a year. Dealing with the current position, he wrote:

Renderers have been attempting to balance the books and maintain profit margins by adjusting their collection charges from abattoirs. Currently they pay £20 to £35 per tonne for high grade material (fat and bones) and charge £20 - £45 per tonne for low grade material (green offal). However, their ability to do this have been complicated by the need to process specified offal separately. PDM have a single dedicated plant at Hartshill, Nuneaton, to process specified offal. Transport charges are an expensive element in this operation, which is again reflected in charges to abattoirs at up to £80 per tonne. They and all the other members of UKRA are part of a scheme to deal with specified offals separately, so that they can meet the demands of compounders that the meat and bone meal they purchase does not contain such material. Even so there is still a market for meat and bone meal processed from specified offal, but the price is well below that of other material ie up to £85 per tonne.

There is some evidence that the increased charges has led to abattoirs being reluctant to pay up, or at least delaying payment. This creates a cash flow problem for renderers, as does the unsold stock of meat and bone meal (currently put at 30,000 tonnes - valued at £3 million). ⁵⁰

3.180 Mr Lawrence forwarded the final submission to Mrs Attridge for onward submission to Mr Maclean on 12 June 1990. It was copied to Mr Meldrum, Mr Lowson and Mr Maslin. ⁵¹ It appears that this submission did not go to Mr Gummer in this form, though Mr Andrews forwarded a note on 26 June 1990 based on the material in the submission (see paragraph 3.195).

3.181 On 5 June 1990, in accordance with a UKASTA Feed Executive Committee resolution of 16 May 1990, ⁵² Mr Reed wrote to Mr Meldrum repeating UKASTA's support for a ban on the use of SBO in animal feed. ⁵³ Mr Meldrum replied on 12 June 1990. He said:

I will not repeat the views I have expressed in earlier discussions but they remain the same and I see no reason to restrict the use of such materials in feed for pigs and poultry. Nevertheless, all such issues are kept under continuous review and if any new scientific evidence comes to light then it would be wholly appropriate for this Ministry to reconsider its position based on any recommendations from [SEAC]. ⁵⁴

3.182 On 6 June Mr Maslin responded to Mrs Blatcher's letter of 14 May 1990 (see paragraph 3.160). ⁵⁵ He said:

There is no scientific justification to extend the ruminant feed ban to pigs and poultry. No spongiform encephalopathy, either natural or experimental, has ever been reported in these species and the Southwood Report, whilst acknowledging the importance of the feed ban for ruminants, did not recommend that it be extended to pigs and poultry. Indeed, pigs have had a greater exposure to the agent than the feeding of meat and bone meal derived from ruminants - double the inclusion rate of that used for cattle and throughout their lives - without ill effect. ⁵⁶

3.183 On 7 June 1990 Mr Capstick wrote to Mr McKinley, copied to Ministers, regarding a draft circular that UKASTA planned to send to its members in confidence. The circular reiterated UKASTA's commitment to the voluntary ban on the use of MBM containing specified offal in animal feed. Mr Capstick had argued with UKASTA that the circular would not remain in confidence and that it would generate further controversy. UKASTA agreed not to issue the circular. However, it was clear to Mr Capstick that 'UKASTA, with NFU support, are eager to take steps to further measures not supported by scientific evidence'. ⁵⁷

3.184 On 13 June 1990 Mr Andrews forwarded a submission to Mr Gummer on labelling of feedstuffs. He said that 'if we set off on the labelling route in relation to the specified offals, we could well come under pressure to take further action on ruminant protein generally'. He referred to the technical problems that would arise over disposal, the cost burdens that it would impose on the food chain and particularly the additional costs involved in finding alternative disposal arrangements either for specified offal alone or for MBM. He addressed a number of the 'potential ramifications' which, he said, were 'difficult and uncertain'. He pointed out that SEAC was now reviewing the matter at Mr Gummer's request and he suggested that Mr Gummer should wait to see what SEAC had to say. 'It would look very strange if, in the light of all we have said about resting on scientific evidence, you were now to press ahead with a policy decision without regard to the conclusions' of SEAC's deliberations. ⁵⁸

3.185 At its meeting on 13 June 1990, SEAC had before it a paper prepared by MAFF's Animal Health Division entitled, 'Spongiform Encephalopathies and other Species: Pigs and Poultry'. The paper noted that the Government had 'resisted calls to extend the scope of the ban in the firm belief that there is no scientific justification for such action'. It explained that this view was based on the conclusions of the Southwood Report that non-mammalian species were unlikely to be susceptible to BSE, scrapie or any spongiform encephalopathy and on the absence of any record of pigs getting a TSE. Kuru had not proved to be experimentally transmissible to pigs. The paper went on to explain the value of MBM as a source of protein. It gave details of transmission experiments of BSE to pigs, with negative results after 16 months. ⁵⁹

3.186 The minutes of the meeting record that SEAC agreed that the question of feeding ruminant material to pigs and poultry needed further study. Points for consideration were that pigs would have received the same exposure to the BSE agent as cattle, that most pigs were slaughtered before the disease was likely to express itself, and that bovine material in the gut contents of slaughtered pigs might be used in MBM fed to cattle. However, it was felt that the probability of the agent being recycled back into cattle was small. ⁶⁰

3.187 SEAC also had before it a paper entitled, 'Domestic Cats with Spongiform Encephalopathies', which included the history of two cats confirmed with a spongiform encephalopathy. ⁶¹ The minutes of the meeting record that SEAC considered the question of possible human health implications. It was noted that specialists believed it to be a new condition but there was no way of knowing whether the condition was:

1. a species-adapted encephalopathy which had not previously been observed;
2. a scrapie-based disease which had spread to cats in the same way as BSE had spread to cattle; or
3. a BSE-based disease acquired as a result of consuming bovine material. ⁶²

3.188 The minutes record that SEAC 'was in no position to offer advice on the implications for human health until more was known about the condition'. ⁶³

The NFU advises its members to avoid using MBM containing SBO

3.189 MAFF's concerns that the NFU would follow the action taken by UKASTA were soon realised. On 13 June 1990 the NFU issued advice to farmers recommending that they should not use animal feed that included the bovine offal banned for sale for human consumption. ⁶⁴ A subsequent letter to members from Mr Naish about its action stated that:

. . . this is part of an agreement between ourselves, and representatives of abattoirs, renderers and compounders. They in turn will be making similar recommendations to their own members.

We have been in regular contact with the major multiple retailers and consumer groups all of whom have welcomed this initiative, acknowledging that this action goes beyond the scientific need and is done in the interests of consumer confidence. ⁶⁵

3.190 The NFU communicated its decision to UKASTA on 28 June 1990. UKASTA in turn issued Feed Circular 480 to its members on 16 July 1990, informing them of the NFU's position. It noted that 'the NFU wholeheartedly backs the Industry agreement voluntarily to exclude specified bovine offals from any pig and poultry rations, in order to meet possible consumer anxiety.' ⁶⁶

3.191 Consumer groups welcomed the NFU's action. The National Consumer Council's submission to the Agriculture Committee of the House of Commons in June 1990 described the move as a 'step in the right direction', and called for a ban on the inclusion of SBO in pig, poultry and pet feedstuffs. ⁶⁷

3.192 A Food Safety Advisory Centre press statement dated 19 June 1990 also called upon 'the Secretary of State for Agriculture to impose a ban on specified offal for pig, poultry and pet feed stuffs'. ⁶⁸

3.193 On the same day, Mr Maclean replied to Mr Prentice of the Consumers Association, who had written to him on 6 March 1990. In response to the Association's call for a suspension on the use of ruminant protein, including the specified offal, in feed for non-ruminants, Mr Maclean stated:

. . . there is no scientific justification for an extension to the ruminant feed ban. The Southwood Report acknowledges the importance of the feed ban for ruminants but did not recommend that it be extended to pigs and poultry. ⁶⁹

3.194 On 21 June 1990 the Isle of Wight Council's Public Protection Committee wrote to Mr Gummer, urging him to take a series of steps to minimise the risk of BSE to humans and animals. One of the measures sought was an extension of the 'ban on feeding animal protein to sheep and cattle to include pigs, poultry and other animals'. ⁷⁰

3.195 On 26 June 1990 Mr Andrews put a submission to Mr Gummer about further measures to be taken on BSE. On MBM, he noted that a paper on the risk from specified bovine offal to animals other than ruminants was being prepared for SEAC's meeting on 2 July 1990 (in the event, the paper was still in hand at the time of that meeting). ⁷¹ He also addressed the proposal that there should be a blanket ban on the use of MBM in animal feedstuffs. He said:

. . . we have said that there is no scientific basis for such a ban. [SEAC] are not currently considering this question. I do not propose, therefore, to ask the Department to do more on this unless you or Mr Maclean want some specific aspect looked into. ⁷²

3.196 In a manuscript note on the minute it was recorded that 'the Minister is content with the scope of the work currently in hand. He is content that there should not be any additional work on the possibility of a blanket ban on meat and bonemeal in [animal feedstuffs]'. ⁷³

3.197 Mr Lawrence attended GAFTA's Marine and Animal Products Committee meeting held on 2 July 1990 and confirmed MAFF's position: no scientific justification existed for extending the ruminant feed ban to pigs and poultry. In particular, he explained that there was no record of BSE having occurred in pigs and poultry, and pigs had been fed MBM for many years and at a higher concentration than  cattle. He referred to experiments in the USA where attempted transmission of kuru to pigs had failed. Mr Lawrence said that he appreciated that there had been pressure from certain groups to extend the ban - not necessarily for scientific reasons but because of public perception - and that the latter was something the Government would seek to remedy. ⁷⁴

3.198 On the same day, Mr Maclean and Mr Lawrence met PFMA representatives. Dr Malin, the Chairman of the PFMA's Technical Committee, explained that the PFMA had taken advice from independent consultants, including Dr Kimberlin, who had recommended that the industry should not use 'high risk' material. He also stressed that the pet food industry had introduced its voluntary ban on the inclusion of SBO in its products for 'health as well as for marketing reasons; it took seriously the theoretical possibility that pets could contract the disease on a scrapie-type transmissible basis'. Indeed, the PFMA indicated that it was looking at means of implementing the recent EC ban on lymphatic and nervous tissue for pet food, but 'felt hampered by the lack of statutory regulations governing the identification of these materials'. Mr Maclean expressed his view on the introduction of the PFMA ban:

[He] accepted that the move to equivalence with human foods had helped to market pet foods successfully. He added that the inevitable consequence of this policy was that any scare over human food would have a potential effect on the pet-food market. In short, the pet food sector was a victim of its own publicity: there was no scientific reason why pet food should share the same standards as human food. ⁷⁵