Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
3. Introduction of the animal SBO ban
Voluntary animal SBO ban
Concerns about SBO in animal feed
MAFF's resistance to UKASTA's proposal for a voluntary animal SBO ban

Concerns about SBO in animal feed

3.27 Concern about the transmissibility of BSE to animals by including bovine offal in their feed was not limited to the pet food industry. On 20 June 1988 Dr Hilary Pickles ¹ informed Sir Donald Acheson ² that at the first meeting of the Southwood Working Party on that day, it was noted that the RFB still permitted 'affected sheep/cattle to be rendered for feed (with existing low-temperature processes) for pigs and poultry'. Dr Pickles said that this had 'caused concern'. ³ The official minutes of the Working Party's first meeting did not mention this concern, but stated:

Although there was no certainty that the agent could not jump the species barrier into pigs and poultry, action in relation to these species would not be recommended. ⁴

3.28 During late 1988 and early 1989, some members of the rendering and feed industries raised concerns about the inclusion of bovine offal in animal feed. The UK's largest renderer, Prosper De Mulder (PDM), was among them:

. . . we realised that if MBM was the vehicle for transmission of the infective agent then the tissue in which the agent could be expected to be found in animals not displaying clinical symptoms should be excluded from animal feeds as well as human foods. ⁵

3.29 On 31 October 1988 Mr Raymond Bradley of the Central Veterinary Laboratory (CVL) reported that Mr Paul Foxcroft of PDM 'thought it would be practical for brain (or heads), spinal cord, spleen and other specified tissues to be removed from the rendering chain (but at abattoir expense!!)'. ⁶ Mr Foxcroft told the Inquiry that he repeated this suggestion 'on many occasions'. ⁷ For instance, on 22 May 1989 he wrote to Mr Meldrum:

Over recent weeks we have had many requests from our customers following requests from their customers to give some reassurances regarding the absence of BSE contaminated material in our products . . . [I]t is obvious to anyone that undiagnosed/sub-clinical BSE animals are slaughtered normally, not to mention Scrapie infected sheep! . . . It appears to me that inevitably there will have to be a restriction on the use of ruminant brain and spinal cord materials in human food products and I repeat our suggestions of last year that these materials should be diverted at the point of slaughter from the by-product cycle . . .

Suggestions have been made that the UKRA should consider a voluntary refusal to handle such material from the slaughtering industry. Our company has approached several large abattoirs to ask if they would consider keeping this material separate. In every case the answer was no! ⁸

3.30 This correspondence echoed concerns about dealing with brain, spleen and spinal cord raised by the UK Renderers Association (UKRA) in a letter to Mr Meldrum in November 1988. At an earlier meeting with UKRA Mr Meldrum had identified this material as the most likely to transmit BSE, and UKRA stated that the feeling within the rendering industry was that 'we would now prefer not to handle these items'. UKRA proposed that MAFF ban these items from 'use as renderable materials'. The letter concluded:

We would therefore urge you to give this proposition serious thought. If the present restrictions on Meat and Bone Meal are not lifted then the renderers will voluntarily adopt your previous recommendations and not collect heads at all, nor accept any spinal cord materials or spleens . . . ⁹

3.31 UKRA representatives subsequently met Mr Meldrum, Mr Kevin Taylor ¹⁰ and Mr John Wilesmith, ¹¹ amongst others, on 28 November 1988. The note of the meeting records that:

UKRA was dismayed by Southwood's [interim] recommendation of an indefinite ban on meat and bone meal, which they thought would be unnecessary if the head, spine and spleen were not processed. However, Mr Meldrum pointed out that this partial exclusion would reduce but not remove the risk and it was for Ministers to decide whether to opt for a low risk, or for no risk at all. Ministers were aware of the problems an extension to the ban would cause, but had to consider other factors, such as human health, the public perception of 'animal cannibalism' and threats to cattle exports.

. . .

UKRA urged a lifting of the ban at least until meat and bone meal is actually proved to be the cause of BSE. This was ruled out as we are certain that it is the cause; there is no evidence to contradict the conclusion. ¹²

3.32 Further consideration of what material ought to be fed to non-ruminant farm animals arose with the delivery of the Southwood Report to Ministers in February 1989. The report itself mentioned modern feeding practices in two places. Under the heading 'General Conclusions' the report said:

This problem has arisen as a result of the practice of feeding ruminant materials to herbivores, which are thus exposed to infective risks against which they have not evolved any defences. Such practices are a feature of modern intensive agriculture, but inevitably (as with BSE, and bacterial pathogens in poultry) they open up new pathways for infection to the farmed animals and potentially from them to man, via food and/or medicinal products. We note that animal meal supplements do increase the rate of growth of animals, whilst also providing a superficially efficient way of disposing of animal waste. But we believe the risks from inadequately sterilised animal products are such that this method of disposing of animal waste should be changed so as to eliminate these novel pathways for pathogens. We urge Ministers to address this general problem as part of the adjustment of the framework of the agricultural policy of the EC in the coming years. ¹³

3.33 In its summary, the report stated:

We note that this disease appears to have originated from unnatural feeding practices as found in modern agriculture. We question the wisdom of methods which may expose susceptible species of animals to pathogens and ask for this general issue to be addressed. ¹⁴

3.34 These recommendations caused 'very difficult presentational problems' for the Government. ¹⁵ A MAFF note prepared for the Prime Minister and Mr MacGregor's MISC 138 Cabinet Committee colleagues noted a further discussion with Sir Richard Southwood on the matter. It stated that Sir Richard had made it clear to Mr MacGregor that he was 'not advocating a ban on the use of all animal protein for pigs and poultry'. The note stated that poultry were 'most unlikely to be affected', and that the Southwood Report regarded the risk as 'so remote that no action is appropriate at this stage'. Pigs were omnivores and thus at greater risk, but the feeding of swill to pigs had taken place for many years without the development of any encephalopathies. Transmission experiments in pigs had commenced, and in the meantime it was not intended to ban the feeding of animal protein to them. ¹⁶

3.35 The matter was raised in a meeting the next day between Mr MacGregor, Mr Kenneth Clarke ¹⁷ and Sir Donald Acheson. The minutes of the meeting record:

MAFF had spent some time clarifying this [reference to 'unnatural feeding practices'] with Sir Richard Southwood and were now satisfied that it meant, for example, feeding meat products to animals which were naturally herbivores. The point was made that, until very recently, most members of the public were not aware that such practices took place. ¹⁸

3.36 The Southwood Report was discussed at a full Cabinet meeting later that day, but no reference was made to the recommendations on 'unnatural feeding practices'. ¹⁹ However the Question and Answer brief provided with the note prepared for MISC 138 members summarises the Government line:

Q.22 Is the Working Party recommending a total ban on the feeding of re-cycled animal waste to livestock? (Ban already applies to feeding of ruminant-based material to ruminants.)

A.22 No - they conclude that if animal waste is to continue to be re-cycled as animal protein feed it must be properly sterilised to eliminate the risk of disease transmission.

Q. 23 Government attitude on this?

A. 23 The Government will be giving further consideration to the Working Party's recommendations on animal feed in the light of the research which may be recommended by the Tyrrell Committee. The manufacture of processed protein feeds is a good way of using waste materials which it would be difficult to dispose of safely in other ways. Our concern is to ensure that it is safe.

Q. 24 Is there not a need for more immediate action?

A. 24 Southwood concludes that the risk of BSE spreading to poultry is so remote that no action is appropriate at this stage. So far as pigs are concerned, transmission studies are already under way. The Government will, as Southwood recommends, be considering the whole issue in the context of the adjustment of the agricultural policy of the EC in coming years. ²⁰

3.37 However, farmers remained concerned about the possible transmission of BSE through animal feed. At the meeting on 15 March between MAFF Ministers and officials to discuss animal health issues (see paragraph 3.12), it was noted that:

The Minister said that the question of a risk analysis on animal protein used in feed was really the most difficult question. Concern was growing among farmers generally and this centred not just on the question of destroying the BSE agent but also on the labelling of compound feed and whether we should go even further and ban animal protein in feed anyway. Farmers were worried that the disease might come back through the feed. It was agreed that there was a big educational job to be done in this area with farmers. ²¹

3.38 Following the Government's announcement of the introduction of the human SBO ban, the Chairman of UKRA, Mr John Field, informed Mr Alan Lawrence, responsible for BSE and related issues in MAFF's Animal Health Division, that UKRA was considering taking initiatives to improve customer confidence in its products. One measure under consideration was to identify regional rendering plants dedicated to processing the 'condemned bovine offals', whereby the tallow could be extracted and the MBM possibly incinerated. Mr Lawrence's note of the conversation on 22 June 1989 recorded that he had indicated that his personal view was that it was helpful and constructive that UKRA was thinking about the issue, and ways that it could reassure its customers and the public of the safety of its product. ²²

3.39 Renderers' concerns that the announcement of the human SBO ban would encourage animal feed compounders to refuse to include SBO material in their products were raised again on 14 July 1989, at a meeting between Mr Lawrence, Mr Crawford and UKRA representatives. UKRA stated that the 'message was loud and clear that Industry's customers did not want the banned materials in meat and bone meal'. UKRA had been informed that UKASTA would meet soon to consider a ban on MBM that contained SBO. UKRA representatives indicated that UKRA might be forced to refuse to take SBO from slaughterhouses if UKASTA decided that it would not accept MBM that contained SBO. In response to Mr Crawford's query as to what UKRA were asking of MAFF, UKRA suggested that 'it would be beneficial if MAFF were able to put out a form of official statement that gave meat and bone meal "a clean bill of health" and which also highlighted the necessity of distinguishing between the animal food chain and the human food chain'. Mr Lawrence said this was not possible, since it must be accepted that there was a causal link between MBM and BSE. The note of the meeting continued:

Mr Metcalfe [of UKRA] said that it should be recognised by MAFF that whatever materials were included in the list, once they were refused by Renderers, the abattoirs would have the responsibility of their disposal . . . [Mr Field of UKRA] continued there seemed to be a belief within MAFF that Renderers would still handle and dispose of these materials, whereas by stating that they would no longer take these materials, this effectively meant that the Abattoirs or some other sector of the Meat Industry would have to take and dispose of them. ²³

3.40 On 17 July 1989 Mr Lawrence informed Mr Thompson of the concerns raised by UKRA. In advising that a meeting should be held with UKASTA to determine whether the renderers' concerns were justified, he said:

UKRA have concluded that in order to protect their business they may be forced into a position of having to refuse the specified offals for rendering. If this were to happen it would cause grave problems for which there is no obvious and immediate solution. In global terms the specified offals probably represent a total of some 500 tons of material per week. ²⁴

3.41 On 21 July 1989 Mr Lowson briefed Mr MacGregor on a number of BSE developments. He referred to Mr Lawrence's minute to Mr Thompson and said that 'For the time being it is not easy to assess how serious this threat might be, but as Mr Lawrence says the consequences could be serious'. Mr Lowson advised that if it appeared a real problem was likely to arise, detailed advice would be needed, but in the meantime he suggested alternative courses of action that could be pursued should renderers find that they were unable to find economic outlets for SBO:

alternative disposal methods - nothing else (dumping at sea, landfill, etc) appears to offer a solution;

allowing the market to sort out the problem. The abattoirs would quickly have to cease slaughtering if they could not dispose of their waste (they are legally required to dispose of it within 48 hours), so renderers would be in a strong position to charge for a disposal service if necessary, in which case the cost would be passed on to producers and consumers;

to do what the renderers appear to want, ie, for the Government to finance disposal of the restricted offals. This would be very expensive, and the cost of it would be very difficult for the Government to control; or

for the industry as a whole to finance disposal through the MLC levy. Initial advice is that this could be done without primary legislation, but setting up the arrangements would no doubt be formidably complex and controversial. ²⁵

3.42 On 25 July 1989 Mr Lawrence and Mr Meldrum met representatives of UKASTA. A MAFF note of the meeting records that UKASTA explained their concern about adverse publicity, particularly in relation to animal waste. It was made clear that the Minister's action on bovine offals was 'simply to maintain public confidence'. ²⁶ A UKASTA note of the meeting records that UKASTA outlined the decisions that its Feed Executive Committee had reached in relation to BSE:

a) the ban on certain cattle offal from human consumption should be extended to cover animal feedingstuffs

b) the continued use of sheep offal in both human food and animal feedingstuffs should be reconsidered. ²⁷

3.43 UKASTA explained the background to these decisions:

. . . the feed industry were extremely concerned about the public perception of the use of these offals, particularly after MAFF announced the ban on certain cattle offals from human consumption. It was also considered that the decision not to include specified sheep offal appeared to be inconsistent with the line taken on cattle offal.

The industry had suffered badly because of the salmonella in eggs crisis and, in order to avoid similar experiences through BSE, considered that positive action was necessary. It was reported that some farmers were now asking for meat and bone meal to be removed from pig rations. A number of supermarkets were also expressing concern about the use, in animal feedingstuffs, of the cattle offal to be banned from human consumption. Failure on behalf of the feed industry to respond to these concerns could result in questions being raised in public on the use of meat and bone meal in general. ²⁸

3.44 MAFF outlined what was to become its standard response to these concerns:

. . . MAFF considered that no further legislation was required. Action already taken, and particularly the decision to ban certain cattle offal from human consumption, was as a means of extreme prudence. The introduction of additional measures now would, very likely, heighten public concern, penalise UK agriculture and associated industries and lead to increased imports of livestock products from overseas . . .

MAFF counselled against over-reacting to the situation. UKASTA accepted that the technical/scientific risk was very low; however the risk from adverse publicity on the continued use of cattle offal, in particular, was very high. ²⁹

3.45 Mr David Williams of BOCM Silcock, a major feed compounder, reported to others within his company, including board members, that at the meeting Mr Meldrum seemed relaxed about the prospect of voluntary ban action being taken and had suggested that removing bovine organs from MBM was a commercial decision for the trade. Mr Williams also reported that Mr Meldrum had urged UKASTA to reconsider its views on the inclusion of sheep offal in the ban. It was recorded that Mr Meldrum said that any action on sheep offal would have dramatic effects on the UK livestock industry and that action in relation to sheep was unnecessary at that time, since there was no evidence that scrapie in sheep 'had any effect whatsoever on the human population'. ³⁰

MAFF's resistance to UKASTA's proposal for a voluntary animal SBO ban

3.46 Two days after the meeting with UKASTA, Mr Lawrence conveyed his concerns to Mr Brian Hilton, ³¹ Mr Crawford, Mr Meldrum, Mrs Attridge and others including Dr Pickles of DH. He noted that:

1. UKASTA intended to seek voluntary agreement amongst its members not to use MBM that included material processed from SBO in animal feedingstuffs;
2. there was a possibility that the rendering industry, whose actions would be dependant on the attitude taken by UKASTA, would refuse to accept SBO once the human SBO ban was in place, or possibly even before; and
3. abattoirs could face difficulties in removal of SBO. ³²

3.47 Mr Lawrence suggested that 'in practical terms the only real option is for the market itself to sort out the problems', and that if this was accepted, there was merit in the Government acting quickly to make a public statement to the industries involved that they could not look to the Government for assistance. However, he noted the dangers of making public statements about a subject like BSE:

It would focus attention on BSE and might lead to criticism that the Government was neglecting a potential health hazard. It would also highlight the fact that the [human SBO] ban is not yet in force. ³³

3.48 Mr Meldrum agreed with this approach. A manuscript note on Mr Lawrence's minute said:

I would play this issue low key, advise industries involved that this is a problem for them to resolve and that Government does not intend to take any action. ³⁴

3.49 On 7 August 1989 UKASTA wrote to Mr John Gummer, who had succeeded Mr MacGregor as Minister of Agriculture in July, confirming that pressure from supermarkets and livestock farmers about the use of offal in animal feeds had compelled UKASTA to act:

After very careful consideration, and discussion with others in the industry and with your officials, we have concluded that a measured response to these concerns by the animal feed industry is essential if the confidence of our customers and the public is to be maintained. UKASTA is therefore recommending its members to stop using meat and bone meals containing the cattle offals which the Government proposes to ban from human food . . . We believe this move may help to allay farmers' worries about the safety of animal feeds, and thus discourage them from seeking the exclusion of allmeat and bone meals - a trend which, if continued, could have devastating consequences for the slaughtering and rendering industries. ³⁵

3.50 On 10 August 1989, as part of the official consultation process on the proposed human SBO ban, UKASTA wrote to Mr John Maslin ³⁶ notifying him of the intended voluntary ban and emphasising that it considered the compound feed industry to be 'an integrated part of the human food chain'. ³⁷ UKRA's submission on the proposed human SBO ban, dated 31 August 1989, stated that they would continue to remove from the slaughterhouse parts not intended for human consumption, provided that the end user of the products accepted them. Thus, 'as we expect the Feed Compounders to impose a ban on the inclusion of all products listed as prohibited for human consumption those items will by definition therefore be left at the abattoir etc for local authority disposal'. ³⁸

3.51 If MAFF officials had previously been relaxed at the prospect of a voluntary ban on SBO in animal feed, concern was now developing about such a ban and its timing. On 11 August 1989 Mr Meldrum telephoned UKASTA and asked that the voluntary ban be introduced at the same time that the human SBO ban came into force. His primary arguments were that:

1. any voluntary ban by UKASTA in advance of the legislation banning SBO in human food would cause a 'major disruption in the marketplace';
2. MAFF was still consulting interested organisations on the proposal to ban SBO from human food;
3. the SBO to be covered by the human food ban could change; and
4. MAFF officials had yet to discuss the matter with the new Ministerial team. ³⁹

3.52 At a meeting between UKASTA and UKRA one week later, it was agreed to hold off commencement of the voluntary ban until the Government's human SBO ban came into force. This was because they could be guided by the Regulations as to what offal would be included in the ban, and such offal would be stained and separated, which would make it easier to identify in practice. ⁴⁰

3.53 Meanwhile, MAFF was assessing the likely impact of UKASTA's ban. On 11 September 1989 Mr Lawrence forwarded a submission to Mr Gummer, which was copied widely within MAFF. Its purpose was two-fold: first, 'to alert the Minister to the difficulties which seem likely to arise if UKASTA advise their members not to accept meat and bonemeal which includes material rendered' from the specified offal; and second, to suggest ways forward for the forthcoming meeting with UKASTA. The submission envisaged the following problems if UKASTA was to go ahead with its ban:

1. UKRA members would be likely to refuse to collect SBO, which could amount to 1,500 tonnes per week, leading to serious disposal problems;
2. if SBO could not be disposed of, some slaughterhouses might be forced to close; and
3. the difficulties would focus 'a great deal of attention on the use of animal protein in feeding stuffs', and might lead to public pressure to impose a complete ban. ⁴¹

3.54 The submission concluded:

Clearly there are likely to be serious implications if UKASTA go ahead with the action they envisage. If we wish to avoid this situation arising it will be necessary to try and head them off. The meeting the Minister is having with UKASTA will provide an opportunity for him to explain some of the consequences of their action, to underline his concern and seek to find ways in which it might be possible for UKASTA to reverse its decision. It is also recommended that the Minister or Parliamentary Secretary (Commons) (Mr Curry) should talk to representatives of the UKRA to discuss the issues involved. ⁴²

3.55 On 18 September 1989 MAFF and DH officials including Mr Meldrum, Mr Lawrence, Dr Metters and Dr Pickles met Sir Richard Southwood, Dr Tyrrell and Dr Kimberlin to discuss BSE. In relation to animal feed, the minute of the meeting recorded:

Sir Richard Southwood saw no reason to change his view about the feeding of ruminant material to [pigs and poultry]. In the case of pigs they were noted scavengers and had been exposed to higher concentrations of meat and bonemeal for a number of years without any apparent ill-effect. Neither was there any recorded transmissible spongiform encephalopathy in pigs or poultry. ⁴³

3.56 On 2 October 1989 Mr Gummer 'reacted forcibly' to the proposed voluntary ban at a meeting with representatives of UKASTA. The meeting was attended by the new Parliamentary Secretary, Mr David Maclean, ⁴⁴ and by officials including Mr Richard Packer, ⁴⁵ Mr Cruickshank, Mr Meldrum, Mr Richard Gueterbock and Mr Lawrence. Mr Gummer was recorded as saying:

The Southwood Report provided no basis for such action. In making its proposals to ban these offals from entering the human food chain, the Government had gone slightly beyond the Southwood recommendations, but only for the purposes of administrative convenience. This would be made clear when final decisions on this matter were announced. The additional measures which UKASTA was proposing to take were not justified scientifically and would create a most unfortunate precedent for its members. Pressure would arise for them to take scientifically unjustified decisions in other areas too and UKASTA would have no credible means of responding. Moreover the tide of public opinion was changing and people were beginning to be less affected by unjustified scare stories. If UKASTA acted on a non-scientific basis, this would lend additional credibility to the scaremongerers. ⁴⁶

3.57 Mr Meldrum added that:

It was important to prevent a 'steam roller' effect of reacting to scares: if UKASTA reacted as they proposed to do, pressure would arise to act on sheep offals, then a control programme for scrapie would be pressed for. ⁴⁷

3.58 Mr Jim Reed, Director-General of UKASTA, who was present at the meeting, recalled in his oral evidence to the Inquiry:

It needs to be borne in mind that there were not many issues on which we ever disagree with the MAFF view. But we have done on this occasion. Great efforts had been gone to to persuade us out of our position and we had stuck to our guns. It was a very uncomfortable position to be in because as we have said repeatedly we did not have any expertise to match their scientific understanding of the situation. We nevertheless felt that it was wrong at that time to allow something to be done in the human field that was not done in animal feed. ⁴⁸

3.59 On 6 October 1989 Mr Meldrum wrote to the major feed compounders, and UKASTA, to 'summarise the position as we see it and consider some of the implications if major compounders seek to restrict the origin of the feed material they use'. He stated that MAFF had no plans to introduce any ban on the use of ruminant feed material in pig and poultry feed. He noted that the Southwood Working Party had stated in relation to ruminant material in pig and poultry feed that 'the risks are so small that action is not appropriate'. He said that it was worth noting that a spongiform encephalopathy had never been recorded in a pig and that in all the circumstances there was 'absolutely no justification for any additional measures'. Mr Meldrum stated that Sir Richard Southwood fully supported this view. ⁴⁹

3.60 When Mr Crawford, Mr Meldrum and Mr Lawrence next met UKASTA representatives on 11 October 1989, UKASTA reiterated its intention to recommend a voluntary ban on SBO to its members. It was also considering the possibility of extending this ban to include sheep offal. MAFF responded that:

. . . tremendous problems would be caused if the animal feed industries stopped using sheep offal. Firstly, they would be taking action that the Government had not perceived to be necessary. It could precipitate official action on Scrapie which would decimate the UK sheep industry . . . Secondly, there was a physical problem of trying to separate out sheep offal from the rest of the carcass. ⁵⁰

3.61 UKASTA suggested that MAFF's support on how to handle the sheep offal 'dilemma' was necessary. Mr Meldrum said that once MAFF was given a clear indication of the line that UKASTA members would take on sheep offal, he was prepared to meet with representatives of the major supermarkets. UKASTA welcomed this and agreed to keep MAFF informed of the decisions taken by the companies represented at the meeting. Finally, UKASTA agreed that it would keep a low profile on the voluntary ban, and that members would be asked not to publicise their decision to exclude bovine offal from animal feedstuffs. ⁵¹

3.62 During the meeting UKASTA also suggested that it would be useful if it had written confirmation from Sir Richard Southwood that there was no scientific justification for extending the ruminant feed ban to pigs and poultry. ⁵²

3.63 On 16 October 1989 Mr David Curry, the Parliamentary Secretary, ⁵³ Mr Meldrum and Mr Lawrence met UKRA representatives. It was pointed out that feed companies were concerned about product liability. MAFF said it would write to Sir Richard Southwood to ask him to confirm that there was no scientific basis to 'extend the feed ban to include pigs and poultry'. UKRA also asked MAFF to make a public statement about the use of MBM in feed for non-ruminant animals. ⁵⁴

3.64 Two days later, Mr Meldrum wrote to Sir Richard Southwood explaining UKRA's and UKASTA's concerns about the implications of the proposed human SBO ban and sought his views on the issue. He noted that major feed companies might seek assurance from the renderers that the MBM they provided was SBO-free and that renderers might react by refusing to remove SBO from slaughterhouses. He continued:

Our view, following extensive discussion with all parties, is that the worst case scenario is unlikely to materialise because it seems probable that not all feed companies or renderers hold the same view. Nevertheless we are concerned to try and ensure that we do not end up with a huge disposal problem and, to that end, we have explained to UKASTA that there is absolutely no scientific evidence which suggests that a ban on the feeding of animal protein containing the specified offals to pigs and poultry is either necessary or scientifically sound.

It would be extremely helpful indeed if I could have your own views on this issue. ⁵⁵

3.65 Sir Richard replied on 26 October 1989, agreeing with Mr Meldrum's stance against extending the feed ban to include pigs and poultry. He said 'there is no evidence that these encephalopathies could be transferred to pigs or chickens. Indeed I think it extremely unlikely that they would be transferred to either group'. He noted that 'to cross the mammal/bird barrier would indeed be a major jump'. ⁵⁶ UKASTA had not seen this reply by the time of its next meeting with MAFF officials on 1 November 1989 (see paragraph 3.68). ⁵⁷

3.66 A minute of 23 October 1989 from Mr Lawrence to Mr Hilton gives an indication of MAFF's attitude to the animal feed industry at this time, and of the level of opposition to UKASTA's proposed action:

Despite all our efforts UKASTA seem hell bent on pursuing their potentially damaging course by advising members not to purchase MBM which contains the specified offals . . .

I am concerned and aggrieved that UKASTA seem blind to the consequences of their actions. I therefore feel that the Minister should write to them now in a last effort to get them to think again. ⁵⁸

3.67 He attached a draft letter from the Minister for this purpose. It appears that Mr Hilton decided the letter should not be sent. ⁵⁹ The draft letter read in part:

I am writing because I am quite frankly very concerned indeed about this. I do of course recognise the arguments you have put forward in support of the action. But in this particular case we have a situation where, if there is customer resistance, it has no scientific basis. The stance you are taking can only focus attention once again on this issue and increase speculation about the practice of feeding meat and bonemeal to pigs and poultry. I say again, there is absolutely no scientific evidence to warrant the action being taken. If there were steps would have been taken to prohibit the action some time ago.

. . .

I cannot overstate the situation both here and abroad should you go ahead, especially if it results in disposal problems at slaughterhouses, with all the adverse and unwelcome publicity that would bring. ⁶⁰

3.68 Mr Curry and Mr Cruickshank met with UKASTA representatives on 1 November 1989. A UKASTA minute of the meeting records that Mr Crawford of UKASTA said that it had been extremely difficult to persuade compound manufacturers not to 'jump the gun' on excluding certain offal from animal feed. However, national compounders were now prepared to continue to use sheep and goat offal, provided UKASTA made a clear recommendation to its members against the continued use of bovine offal, as soon as the Government introduced the human SBO ban. Mr Curry expressed his hope that this step would not be necessary, but accepted that 'it was no use asking the feed industry to do the impossible'. He did, however, suggest that the handling of the issue in public required great care, and hoped that it would be possible to coordinate any response to the Government's announcement of the human SBO ban. ⁶¹ A MAFF minute of the meeting records that:

UKASTA explained that major members were under intense pressure from multiple retailers and producers to follow the expected ban on certain offals for human consumption with a ban of their use in animal feedingstuffs. If UKASTA did not take these steps, there was a danger that major members would move along this route alone, thus making fragmentation of the market. ⁶²

3.69 On 2 November 1989 Mr Lawrence sent a submission to Mr Gummer seeking agreement to the terms of the Regulations implementing the proposed human SBO ban. He submitted:

Although there are signs that UKASTA are having second thoughts, it seems unlikely that they will reverse their decision, which comes largely from pressure from the four major feed companies. On the other hand they are now fully aware of the implications, both domestically and internationally, that their action could spark. Because of this they have at least conceded that it would be unwise to make any press statement about their action.

At the same time what seems to be emerging is the view that it is unlikely that feed companies or renderers will act in unison, whatever action their Associations may advise. In other words some renderers will process the designated offal and some feed companies will still buy material which includes it. What it might lead to, at least for a time, is a two tier price structure, with grade 1 material (not including specified offal) selling at a high[er] price than grade 2 meat and bone meal (including the specified offal). ⁶³

3.70 This submission was considered at a Ministers' meeting on 7 November 1989 to discuss the proposed human SBO ban. However, the note of the meeting does not record any discussion of the feed industry's concerns. ⁶⁴

3.71 MAFF officials met the British Retail Consortium and representatives of Britain's major retailers on 6 November 1989. Mrs Cheney of the British Retail Consortium told the meeting that she was not aware of any retailers categorically refusing to accept products from pigs and poultry that had been fed MBM containing SBO. Retailers such as Sainsbury's, Marks and Spencer and ASDA stated that, whilst they had not introduced a specific ban on such products, they were actively considering the issue. ⁶⁵ Mr Stephen Ridge of Somerfield told the Inquiry that:

There were customer complaints, customer letters and enquiries all the way through this period depending upon what was in the media at any particular one time. Certainly there would have been questions asked as to whether the ruminant ban was being operated effectively and whether it was getting any wider. ⁶⁶

3.72 Furthermore, whilst they might have initially supported MAFF's position, Mr Ridge suggested that 'I think we changed our view after a period of time that we did not support [MAFF's position] and we wanted to take [SBO] out of all feeds.' ⁶⁷

3.73 Mr Maclean wrote to retailers on 21 December 1989 confirming MAFF's advice that there was 'no scientific justification' for prohibiting the inclusion of SBO in pig and poultry feed. ⁶⁸