Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
3. Introduction of the animal SBO ban
Voluntary pet food ban
Voluntary measures taken by pet food manufacturers prior to May 1989
MAFF's attitude to the use of SBO in pet food
Pet food manufacturers adopt a voluntary ban on specified offal

3.4 The pet food industry acted before the rendering and animal feed industries in moving to exclude what was later to become known as SBO from its products. In June 1989 the Pet Food Manufacturers' Association (PFMA) advised its members not to include certain bovine offal in their products. This advice was issued upon the announcement of the Government's intention to introduce a statutory ban on SBO in human food. This reflected the fact that by this time some large pet food manufacturers had given independent consideration to the safety of bovine material, and had concluded that it was prudent to exclude certain material from their products.

Voluntary measures taken by pet food manufacturers prior to May 1989

3.5 Pet food manufacturers did not receive formal notification or 'warning' of BSE. A representative of Pedigree Masterfoods (Pedigree), one of the UK's larger manufacturers, thought they first became aware of its existence around June 1987. ¹ A representative of Spillers Petfoods (Spillers), another large pet food manufacturer, said that following publicity about the emergence of BSE, they were monitoring the issue closely and held their first seminar on 21 July 1988. ² Both Pedigree and Spillers took steps in response to the perceived risk posed by BSE.

3.6 In June 1988 Mrs Elizabeth Owen of MAFF's Food Safety, Fertilisers and Feedingstuffs Standards Division, ³ set out in a minute her discussions with a company representative, who believed that the company's practices were representative of the industry, on the inclusion of certain offal in pet food manufacture. Mrs Owen recorded that, given the very low level of nervous tissue used in pet food, it was thought that the risk was 'commensurately low'. There was also discussion on the temperatures used in the canning process. It was thought this would reduce, but not eliminate, any BSE infection. Literature studies undertaken by manufacturers indicated that contamination by the oral route was unlikely, but was much more likely through lesions. The existence of a 'species barrier' was also noted. Mrs Owen commented:

We prompted Animal Health to consult PFMA at an early stage in the BSE story and it's clear that this contact has given [the company] the opportunity to look critically at their raw material usage and canning operations. They conclude that since they are not using prime contaminated materials the risk to their workers, pets and pet owners is very low indeed. I can only agree. ⁴

3.7 Nonetheless, in July 1988, Pedigree considered the issue serious enough to warrant commissioning Dr Richard Kimberlin, an independent consultant on transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), to 'help with its understanding of BSE, and whether or not BSE carried any risk for pets who were fed prepared pet food'. ⁵

3.8 Since the late 1970s, Pedigree had ceased using certain bovine products in its products, including bovine brain, tonsils, thymus and intestines. Until May 1989 (see paragraph 3.20) they continued to use a limited amount of UK-derived spleen and vertebrae, which could include spinal cord. ⁶

3.9 Spillers responded to BSE by following a policy whereby only mammalian materials from animals that had been inspected and passed fit for human consumption were used. In July 1988 Spillers stopped using bovine spleen in its products and replaced it with liver. At the same time, they changed their specification for ground bone so that it excluded the use of bovine heads and backbones, with the intention of eliminating brains and spinal cord. In October 1988 Spillers stopped using meat and bone meal (MBM) which originated in the UK and replaced it with poultry meal, imported pork meat meal and prairie meal (derived from maize). ⁷

3.10 In February 1989 the report of the Southwood Working Party (see vol. 4: The Southwood Working Party 1988-89) stated that domestic pets could be susceptible to BSE, 'were the agent to reach them in an adequate dose by an appropriate route'. The implications for pet food were considered:

Whilst pet food frequently contains offal from both sheep and cows, so that the source material must have contained scrapie and possibly BSE agents, there is no evidence of relevant neurological disease in cats or dogs. It seems unlikely, but possible, that preclinical infection exists but it is not revealed because of an incubation period longer than the natural lifespan. On the other hand, it may be that infection cannot be acquired orally by these species or that the high temperatures used in pet food canning destroys any infectious agent . . . Nevertheless, transmission experiments in cats and dogs and surveillance of the health of domestic pets are items that should be brought to the attention of the Consultative Committee on Research and the veterinary profession. ⁸

3.11 By March 1989, as reported by Miss C Harrold, of the Food Safety, Fertilisers and Feedingstuff Standards Division, most companies manufacturing pet food were 'avoiding UK cattle nerve tissue, spleen and brains'. She said they were continuing to use all parts of sheep from all sources, though one manufacturer was using only poultry meat in dry products. ⁹ At the end of the month, the PFMA Executive Committee considered the Southwood Report and its recommendation on the 'non-use of brain, spinal cord, thymus, spleen and tripe in baby food':

The possibility of recommending to all PFMA members' non-use of brain and spinal cord was discussed. There was no justification in doing so for some of the identified materials and not others, especially when cats and dogs did not appear to be at risk. It was therefore agreed to simply inform all members of developments and provide a reserve statement, and to monitor the situation, especially any further government research into the transmission of BSE to domestic pets. ¹⁰

MAFF's attitude to the use of SBO in pet food

3.12 On 15 March 1989 the Minister of Agriculture, Mr John MacGregor, and the Parliamentary Secretaries in MAFF, Mr Donald Thompson and Mr Richard Ryder, met a number of MAFF officials ¹¹ to discuss a note prepared by the Chief Veterinary Officer, Mr Keith Meldrum, on animal health issues. At the meeting the use of MBM in dog and cat food was discussed:

Mrs Attridge pointed out that if we were to go wider than Southwood suggested on this issue then logically we would also need to look at such points as the use of thymus in hamburgers. It was thought that the dog and cat food manufacturers were very sensitive to the good image of their product and would alter their feeds if they felt that there was a public perception problem. It was agreed that Mr Thompson would meet the pet food manufacturers to explore the issue further with them. ¹²

3.13 Following the meeting, Mrs Attridge informed other MAFF officials of the agreement that Mr Thompson would meet the pet industry to discuss the Southwood Working Party's recommendations. She advised caution in what was said to the pet food industry about the risk posed by BSE:

. . . we assume that dogs, cats and humans have been used to eating meat and have therefore evolved defences. Therefore, there should not be any specific concerns relating to products which have been traditionally used both in human diet and in the diet of dogs and cats. . . I am concerned particularly if we were to leave the pet industry with the impression that dogs and cats should not be fed ruminant meat and offal when this is a normal part of human diet. We need to be consistent. ¹³

3.14 Mr John Garnett, Head of the Food Policy Division of MAFF, concurred with Mrs Attridge and went further, advising Mr Thompson, 'or indeed any Minister', against entering into discussions with the industry:

I entirely share her concern that, in raising with the pet food industry at Ministerial level the possibility that the Southwood Committee's references to the desirability of monitoring cat and dog populations were based on something more than extreme prudence on the part of the Committee, we could be creating 'problems' which do not exist. Worse still, there is serious risk that the media would get to hear of such a meeting and might then begin to ask questions along the lines of why we were apparently concerned that cats and dogs should not be fed ruminant meat and offal when we were content that these should continue to form part of the adult human diet. ¹⁴

3.15 During a subsequent meeting to discuss the issue, Mr Garnett was able to convince Mr Thompson that the proposed ministerial consultation with the pet food industry was inadvisable or unnecessary. The minute records Mr Thompson as stating that 'he did not feel it essential at the present for him to have a meeting with the industry to discuss BSE'. Nonetheless, it was noted that he would welcome the opportunity to 'meet the industry on a social occasion to discuss this issue less formally'. ¹⁵

3.16 In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Terry Plant, Quality Assurance Manager at Spillers, said that MAFF only consulted with the pet food industry to a small degree, because the 'pet food industry was on the sidelines of the BSE crisis.' However:

MAFF personnel were continuously available for consultation and to discuss the latest scientific information on BSE. The Ministry also gave early advice of major developments as the BSE crisis unfolded. ¹⁶

3.17 The minutes of Mr Garnett's meeting with Mr Thompson also record Mr Garnett as stating:

. . . infective levels of the scrapie agent in pet food were so low that, even if domestic animals were susceptible to BSE (and there was no evidence that they were), there was unlikely to be any risk of the disease developing. ¹⁷

3.18 Mr Derek Andrews, ¹⁸ MAFF Permanent Secretary, subsequently asked Mr Meldrum to confirm Mr Garnett's advice about the risk of BSE for domestic pets. ¹⁹ On 24 April 1989 Mr Meldrum circulated a minute within MAFF noting:

In particular I do not believe one can say that the levels of the scrapie agent in pet food are so low that domestic animals are not exposed. ²⁰

3.19 Mr Garnett explained to Mr Meldrum the next day that his statement at the meeting was based on conclusions drawn from research by the pet food industry. ²¹ On 3 May 1989 Mr Meldrum elaborated his concern about the advice given to Mr Thompson on the risk of BSE in pet food:

On occasions, material obtained from slaughterhouses will be derived from sheep affected with scrapie or cattle that may be incubating BSE for the use in petfood manufacture. Some of this material must be classified as high risk since it contains brain, spinal cord, spleen or lymphatic glands.

The above material will be exposed to a low processing temperature in the preparation of dry petfood (as against canned petfood) which will be insufficient to destroy the agent of scrapie/BSE. Thus, on occasions, domestic pets will be exposed to the agent. This was recognised by Southwood who said 'domestic pets could well be susceptible to BSE were the agents to reach them in an adequate dose by an appropriate route'. He went on to say that it seemed 'unlikely but possible that preclinical infection exists but is not revealed because of an incubation period longer than the natural life span'. Southwood went on to comment that 'hounds that are often fed uncooked carcasses would be particularly appropriate for study'. ²²

Pet food manufacturers adopt a voluntary ban on specified offal

3.20 Meanwhile, the pet food industry was determining its own approach, based on advice obtained independently of MAFF. Dr Kimberlin wrote a series of five reports for his pet food industry clients between September 1988 and March 1989. ²³ In May 1989, following receipt of advice from Dr Kimberlin, Pedigree decided to cease purchasing from UK sources both spleen and those parts of the vertebrae that might include spinal cord. This was in addition to its existing policy to exclude bovine brain, tonsil, thymus and intestine from its products (see paragraph 3.8). ²⁴

A representative of Pedigree said:

In essence this advice [from Dr Kimberlin] was that certain bovine raw materials which Pedigree were then using did carry a potential risk, which could only be avoided if their use was discontinued. He was unable to be definitive but nonetheless he recommended that the limited number of risk materials which Pedigree were using should no longer be included in its raw material purchasing programme and recipes. The materials did not represent a major part of Pedigree's raw material supply and could be relatively easily and inexpensively replaced. Pedigree decided in May 1989 no longer to include them in its recipes, and told the PFMA and MAFF of its decision. ²⁵

3.21 On 16 May 1989 Mr Meldrum attended a meeting where Pedigree presented research that had been undertaken to try to assess the risk of using bovine products in pet food. ²⁶ Following the meeting, at Mr Meldrum's request and with the permission of his clients, Dr Kimberlin explained his research to Mr Meldrum and provided him with copies of his reports. ²⁷ The significance of these meetings is considered in vol. 6: Human Health, 1989-96. In his final report, Dr Kimberlin had concluded that it was not possible to predict with certainty whether BSE might be transmissible to cats and dogs via the oral route. ²⁸ However, in his second report, by analogy with scrapie, Dr Kimberlin identified those tissues that could possibly carry the infective agent at sufficient levels to transmit the disease (see vol. 6: Human Health, 1989-96). ²⁹

3.22 By June 1989 MAFF had decided to introduce a ban on the inclusion of certain bovine offal in all human food - 'the human SBO ban' (see vol. 6: Human Health, 1989-96). On 13 June 1989 Mr MacGregor announced the Government's intention to introduce such a ban in Parliament and via a joint press release with the other agriculture departments and the Department of Health (DH). ³⁰

3.23 Three days later, the PFMA announced a voluntary code of practice under which its members would not use certain bovine materials of UK origin. The materials to be excluded were the same as those to be banned from human food under the Government's proposals. In particular, PFMA members were advised not to include:

- spleen;

- thymus gland; and

- tonsils;

- any emulsions, forms of ground material or other product containing any material from heads (from which cheek meat, tongues and lips have been removed) and spinal columns, including the spinal cord. ³¹

3.24 In a letter to its members, the PFMA explained the basis for the advice:

Although there is no scientific evidence for giving this advice, (the Government's expert Southwood Committee having reported in February that there are no descriptions of spongiform encephalopathies in domestic pets) it is nevertheless being given owing to the adverse publicity which could well accrue if the pet food industry does not react to the latest Government announcement. ³²

3.25 The level of compliance with the PFMA voluntary ban appears to have been high. Members of the PFMA were responsible for at least 95 per cent of all pet food manufactured in the UK, and the PFMA said that compliance was not difficult for its members as the specified tissues were 'only in minimal use for quality and quantity reasons'. Whilst the PFMA was satisfied that its members were observing the ban, it was less certain about observance by non-member manufacturers. These tended to be small businesses who were unlikely to have distributed their products nationally. They were considered a mixed group, which included 'small enterprises attached to granaries, abattoirs, knacker's yards and butcher shops'. ³³

3.26 In November 1989 the PFMA added small and large intestines to its list of bovine products to be excluded from pet food, so that it accorded with the human SBO ban. ³⁴