Volume 5: Animal Health, 1989-96
2. The ruminant feed ban, 1989-96
The chronological account
Developments in 1992 - infective feed identified as cause of BABs

Developments in 1992 - infective feed identified as cause of BABs

2.127 According to Mr Wilesmith:

As epidemiological data accumulated on the BAB cases, early in 1992, it became apparent that the 1988 and early 1989 born BAB cases were most likely to have been infected from the feedborne source as a result of cattle feedstuffs containing ruminant derived MBM which had been manufactured before the 18th July, 1988 and was still in the feed supply chain or on farms. ¹

Attack rate experiment begins

2.128 The attack rate experiment entitled 'Effect of Oral Inoculum Dose on Attack Rate and Incubation Period of BSE in Cattle' started in CVL in January 1992. The experiment sought to establish how many cattle in a group would be affected by oral inoculation with different doses of infected material, as well as to understand how incubation period might be related to dose. ² It also aimed to look at whether attack rate and incubation period differed for single and multiple exposures. Groups of calves received oral doses of BSE-infected cattle brain homogenate in doses of 1g, 10g, 100g or 3 x 100g and were monitored clinically through to the point at which they succumbed to the disease. ³ The latest completion date estimated for this experiment was December 1999. ⁴ Initial results of this experiment became available in late 1994. Their impact on MAFF's action on the monitoring and enforcement of the RFB is considered later in this chapter. See vol. 2: Science for further details on the experiment.

MAFF considers publishing BAB data

2.129 On 16 January 1992 Mr Lowson provided a summary of various BSE matters for Mr Maclean. On the BAB cases he said:

Over 300 BSE suspects believed to have been born after the ban on feeding ruminant protein to ruminants have now been investigated. Only 11 have been confirmed, of which one was the offspring of a BSE positive dam and has been announced. In several of these cases it is impossible to be certain of the animal's parentage or of whether or not it had been given ruminant protein. Nothing has therefore happened yet to alter the view that sources other than feed are not likely to be important for the future of the epidemic. ⁵

2.130 Mr Lowson advised that a clear statement on the topic should be made at some stage. In the meantime he recommended that the small number of BAB cases should be emphasised, as should the doubts about the age and history of some and their 'very limited significance in the long term control of the disease'. ⁶

2.131 Mr Simon Tanner, Private Secretary to Mr Maclean, advised Mr Lowson on 21 January 1992 that Mr Maclean would like Mr Meldrum to consider 'any opportunities where he could present a paper to put this information into the public domain'. Mr Meldrum indicated in a manuscript note on the minute that he could not think of any opportunities 'off hand'. In a further manuscript note, Mr Kevin Taylor identified the May 1992 report to the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) as a possibility, with an update to the British Veterinary Association (BVA) or a brief report in the Veterinary Record as alternatives. ⁷

2.132 On 7 February 1992 MAFF issued further instructions on BABs to all VOs via Animal Health Circular 92/17. It noted:

With the passage of time, more and more suspect animals will inevitably come within the "Born after the Ban" category. The diagnostic confirmation rate in such animals is at present extremely low, and the extension of such statistics into the three and four year old categories will not only severely strain the diagnostic capacity of the CVL Pathology department, where detailed investigation of these potentially epidemiologically significant animals is carried out, but will also 'prolong the epidemic' significantly, albeit with negative animals. ⁸

2.133 It advised that it was essential that all potential routes of infection were investigated. The circular made it clear that while farmers' feeding records should be checked (where available), no tracing of ingredients should be undertaken without further instructions from headquarters.

2.134 Following the receipt of a Parliamentary Question asking how many BABs had been confirmed, Mr Lowson suggested to the Parliamentary Branch, on 14 February 1992, that this presented 'the opportunity to get on record that the number of BSE cases in cattle born after the ban is very small and that most of these had in fact been fed on ruminant protein'. ⁹ He attached a draft reply to the question, which read:

Up to the end of January, there have been sixteen confirmed cases of BSE in cattle born after 18 July 1988 when the ban on feeding ruminant derived protein to ruminants was introduced. One of these, as previously announced, may have been a case of maternal transmission. Investigations are still continuing into some cases, while for others interpretation of data is incomplete, but it is already clear that most have probably received some ruminant protein largely by carry over of feed produced before the ban.

That there have been so few cases born after the ban is very encouraging. If either maternal transmission or other direct cattle to cattle transmission was a significant factor in BSE many more such cases would have been expected. The evidence so far still supports the view that sources of infection other than food are not likely to affect significantly the future of the epidemic and that the measures which have already been taken will eradicate the disease. ¹⁰

2.135 However, Mr Simon Dugdale, MAFF's Chief Information Officer, advised that if MAFF were to appear 'too bullish' about the development of the epidemic, undue attention could be created and MAFF might be accused of being too optimistic when the number of cases was still high. Mr Lowson therefore recommended that the second paragraph of the draft reply should be removed and the accompanying draft press notice should be withdrawn. ¹¹

2.136 Mr Lowson also provided a question and answer brief, which read in part:

Were all these animals fed ruminant protein?

We cannot say for certain. Must remember that we are dealing with events over three years ago. Our investigations are incomplete and may remain that way particularly if invoices for purchased concentrates have not been kept. Nevertheless apart from the one possible case of maternal transmission, most of the others probably were fed this material.

Why were these animals fed ruminant protein?

Should not cause great surprise. Although the feed ban was introduced on 18 July 1988 it would be unrealistic to expect that it was universally and immediately effective particularly if farmers already had stocks of feed on farm produced before the ban.

Will the farmers be prosecuted?

No. It is clear that in most if not all cases this was done through ignorance, accident or carelessness. The important thing is to obtain full and accurate details of what happened, for epidemiological purposes, rather than seek to punish anyone. ¹²

2.137 On 10 March 1992 Mr Lowson provided material for incorporation into a note requested by the Prime Minister's Private Secretary. He listed factors that supported the expectation that the ruminant feed ban would contain the epidemic:

- Only a very small number of cattle born after this feed ban succumbed to the disease. In most of these cases, the use of contaminated feed cannot be ruled out;

- The effectiveness of the feed ban can best be judged by the end of 1992, when BSE ought not to be confirmed in significant numbers of animals less that three years old. The first signs that this shift in the age incidence of disease are now discernible, although it is too early to be firm;

- The number of cases per herd has remained constant and very low, which suggests that animal-to-animal transmission is not an important factor.

- The incidence is the same in cattle which are the offspring of confirmed cases as in those which are not, which suggests that maternal transmission is not an important factor. ¹³

Feed carry-over becomes apparent

2.138 On 9 April 1992, SEAC met with the Lamming Committee, during which the integrity of the ruminant feed ban was discussed. Dr David Tyrrell, Chairman of SEAC, explained that 33 confirmed BABs were being fully investigated and though it was difficult to establish the cause of infection, there was a clear possibility the animals had received contaminated feed. Mr Bradley added that there was confidence that animals had only been fed ruminant protein up to three months after the ban, though there was an incident in June 1989 when a compounder had accidentally incorporated ruminant material into cattle feed. ¹⁴

2.139 On 11 June 1992 MAFF Ministers met Sir Derek Andrews, Mr Charles Capstick, ¹⁵ Mr Geoffrey Hollis, ¹⁶ Mr Lowson, Mr Wilesmith and other officials, to discuss the recent BSE figures. Mr Wilesmith reported that the number of confirmed BABs was sixty-nine. He advised that the total number of BSE cases for the year was almost half what it would have been had the ruminant feed ban not been introduced. In response to Mr Gummer's query as to whether a point had been reached whereby a drop in the number of cases in 3 and 4-year-olds confirmed that the ban was having its intended affect, the note of the meeting records that:

Mr Wilesmith said that the latest figures showed some reduction, but this was not yet a dramatic fall. Only one case of the disease had been found so far in which there was not a clear link with feed, and this case was being investigated further (while it was not necessarily possible to find out whether a particular animal had eaten contaminated feed, it was possible to find out whether it had access to such feed). The reason why the effect of the feed ban was taking longer to show than had originally been estimated was that it was now clear that some contaminated feed supplies had continued to be used after the implementation of the ban on 18 July 1988. The feed had a shelf life of about six months, and in some cases, it appeared that it had continued to be used on farms after 19 July. The best estimate was that this would lead to a three month lag in the effect of the ban. ¹⁷

2.140 Mr Gummer concluded 'that even on the most cautious interpretation, there was no evidence suggesting that the introduction of the feed ban was not proving effective'. ¹⁸

2.141 Mr Meldrum later wrote to Mr Rossington, Principal Private Secretary to Mr Gummer, to clarify aspects of the 'confused discussion' during the 11 June meeting. He explained:

Only one case . . . appears to have the potential to have been infected from its mother . . . At the time, although it had not been possible to obtain details of all ingredients in concentrates fed to the animal in calfhood, it was assumed that the ruminant feed ban had been effective from July, and that the risk via feed should have been zero. On reflection, taking into account more recent information gathered about carry-over of feed on farm, and from the compounding industry about carry-over of stocks manufactured before July 1988, we are now able to acknowledge that there is some risk of exposure via compounded feed. ¹⁹

2.142 In a statement to the Inquiry, Dr Matthews explained the implications of evidence of carry-over of feed for the identification of cross-contamination in mills as a source of BABs:

The information gathered by Veterinary Officers for many early BAB cases, born in 1988/89, clearly identified evidence of consumption of feed that had been manufactured and purchased before the 18 July 1988 (i.e. carry over of feed). It was therefore difficult to identify cross-contamination as a serious hypothesis until we began from 1992 onwards to gather more data on animals born in 1989 and 1990. In the majority of such instances it was not possible to confirm carry-over of feed on the farm, nor deliberate inclusion of ruminant protein in the feed. ²⁰

The Lamming Committee Report

2.143 The Expert Group on Animal Feedingstuffs (the Lamming Committee) was established in early 1991 following the recommendation of the Agriculture Select Committee in July 1990 (see paragraph 2.78). Its terms of reference were:

To review the existing regulatory framework covering the animal feed industry in the United Kingdom. To advise on whether any improvements are required in the mechanisms by which the responsible Departments take account of food safety requirements in regulating the industry and to report to Ministers by the end of 1991. ²¹

2.144 During his attendance at the Lamming Committee's second meeting on 13 March 1991, Mr Meldrum outlined recent developments on BSE. The minutes of the meeting record that:

Mr Meldrum was not totally content with the current controls, as at present there was no test for ruminant protein in feed. However, an ELISA method was currently being validated for use in the field . . . ²²

2.145 On the other hand, Mr Meldrum was 'fairly confident' that on-farm feed mixers were observing the controls and were aware of the ruminant feed ban. ²³

2.146 LACOTS's submission to the Lamming Committee, dated 25 March 1991, also mentioned the enforcement difficulties associated with the ruminant feed ban:

The Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (No. 2) Order 1988 has caused some enforcement problems. Agricultural Analysts initially did have difficulty in identifying the presence of meat proteins but this has been resolved even though it is impossible to give exact quantities present. Analysts report to the nearest 5%. ²⁴

2.147 At its ninth meeting on 10 October 1991, the Lamming Committee agreed that there should be a recommendation in its Report on the need for greater control of on-farm mixing to minimise the occurrence of contamination in feedstuffs. ²⁵

2.148 The Lamming Committee held its eleventh meeting on 14 November 1991. It was attended by NFU representatives, who told the Committee that home-mixing did not represent a major problem in terms of food safety, as farmers took care to establish that ingredients were of the appropriate standard. Mr Robert Parsons, Chairman of the NFU Animal Feed Group, argued that registering home-mixers would be more burdensome than was necessary to protect the public. When asked why home-mixers should be subject to less stringent controls than compounders, Mr Parsons said that, with regard to medicated feed, there was less likelihood of cross-contamination through home-mixing. ²⁶ An NFU representative also noted that the emergence of BSE had meant that farmers were questioning compounders more about the content of their feeds. ²⁷

2.149 The Lamming Committee reported to the Government on 15 June 1992, and the report was published shortly thereafter. The Committee recommended that:

. . . the [ruminant and animal SBO] feed bans be retained, even after the results of the inactivation study become available, unless the results provided unequivocal information on the inactivation of the scrapie/bovine spongiform encephalopathy agents, and that the necessary conditions can be consistently achieved by the rendering industry. ²⁸

2.150 The Committee also concluded:

The evidence suggests that in the majority of cases, the controls are working, despite the fact that the ruminant protein ban and the specified bovine offals ban are to a considerable extent dependent on self-regulation by the industry. However, there are indications that some cattle may have had access to ruminant meat and bone meal since the 1988 ban and it is thought that this may account for most of the 69 confirmed cases of BSE in cattle which, up to 5 June 1992, have been born after the ruminant feed ban was introduced. The majority were born shortly after the statutory intervention. This number is small compared with the earlier incidence, but it suggests that the integrity of the ban is not complete. ²⁹

2.151 Although the Committee acknowledged there were signs that this was a diminishing problem, it recommended:

. . . that the incidence of BSE in cattle born after the ruminant protein ban is monitored carefully. We also welcome the development of the tests for the detection of ruminant protein in meat and bone meal and compound feedingstuffs which, when they become available for enforcement purposes, will provide an additional safeguard. ³⁰

2.152 Later in its report, the Committee said:

There is currently no method of analysis available for detecting ruminant protein in ruminant rations and therefore for the enforcement of the BSE Order 1991. However, an ELISA system has been developed by MAFF. It has proved successful in tests involving meat and bone meal and it has been possible to differentiate between bovine and ovine material in samples processed below temperatures of 130oC. The method has now been validated and can be applied to compound feedingstuffs. We welcome the development of this test. ³¹

Availability of the ELISA test

2.153 On 3 June 1992 Dr Cawthorne advised Dr Dawson that:

When I left the VI Service, the [ELISA] test had been developed to the point where it could be used to detect animal proteins in a limited number of compound feeds but that further work was necessary to resolve a number of outstanding problems. I gather that these have now been overcome and that the test can now detect cattle and sheep proteins in all the compound feed rations currently available.

. . .

One of the reasons for developing the test was to enable us to enforce the ruminant feed ban. No doubt you will now wish to discuss with Robert Lowson, John Maslin, Kevin Taylor and Ian Robertson how this technology should now be exploited. ³²

2.154 On 13 July 1992, having read Dr Cawthorne's minute, Mr Maslin sought advice from Dr Dawson on the use of the ELISA test to enforce the RFB. He questioned whether trading standards officers could use the test with appropriate equipment, or whether samples would need to be submitted to the VIS. ³³

2.155 Dr Dawson requested the relevant information from Mr Ansfield, which was provided on 11 August 1992. In addition to providing a project summary, which had been circulated earlier in the year, Mr Ansfield provided an update on the test sensitivity. For both ovine and bovine material, detection in meat and bone meal was now 1/6,400 and detection in compounded feeds was 1/200. It was now possible to differentiate between bovine and ovine material. ³⁴

2.156 Mr Ansfield advised that the test required 'high standards of laboratory expertise and a composite range of equipment'. He estimated that for bovine detection, 310,000 samples could be tested, and for ovine samples, 216,000 (the availability of antiserum limited the test's capacity). The tests would be performed on the third day following receipt of the sample. ³⁵

The inclusion of porcine MBM in ruminant rations is proposed

2.157 On 2 September 1992 Mr Meldrum advised Mr Gummer that a company producing MBM from pig waste was considering selling it for incorporation into ruminant rations. Mr Meldrum had advised a reporter that the ruminant feed ban would not prohibit the use of porcine MBM in ruminant rations, nor was it contrary to the Southwood Working Party's or SEAC's advice. He continued:

We intend to follow this report up with the animal by-products company concerned to determine what exactly they have in mind and how they intend to ensure that there is no possibility of adulteration or cross contamination. In addition they will be advised that we have the ability to detect low levels of ruminant protein in meat and bone meal. ³⁶

2.158 Mr Meldrum sought Mr Gummer's confirmation that he did not want MAFF to make any comment on the advisability of incorporating porcine MBM into ruminant rations. ³⁷

2.159 Mr Rossington replied to Mr Meldrum on 8 September 1992 and advised that Mr Gummer was 'extremely concerned' to hear that a company was proposing to incorporate porcine MBM in cattle rations. He thought that MAFF should actively discourage, and be seen to discourage this practice. ³⁸

2.160 On 16 September 1992, Mr Meldrum instructed the local Deputy Regional Veterinary Officer (DRVO) to visit the company intending to produce porcine MBM for incorporation into ruminant rations. He set out a number of presentational points that needed to be made, including:

. . . it would have to be produced under the very highest standards to ensure that there was no possibility of ruminant protein being incorporated and that there was no possibility of cross-contamination with ruminant protein. To that end we would be keeping a very close eye on the production of the meat and bone meal and would be carrying out detailed analytical tests to ensure that no such contamination arose. ³⁹

2.161 He concluded that he hoped the DRVO would be able to do his best to persuade the company not to go ahead with its proposal. ⁴⁰

2.162 The DRVO reported on 22 September 1992 that it appeared the project was no longer viable and there was little chance of it being revived, even without pressure from MAFF. ⁴¹ Mr Meldrum forwarded the report to Mr Dugdale, suggesting they needed to decide what line to take in response to Mr Gummer's previous comments on the topic. ⁴²

2.163 It was subsequently decided that if pressed for comment, MAFF's line should be that neither the Lamming Committee nor SEAC had identified the feeding of porcine material to ruminants as requiring action, though SEAC would be asked to consider the issue at its next meeting. ⁴³ In the event, at its meeting on 15 October 1992 SEAC noted that in practice porcine material was not being fed to ruminants and felt that it was advisable for this situation to continue. ⁴⁴

Concerns about non-compliance with the ban

2.164 Meanwhile, Dr Matthews minuted Mr Meldrum on 4 September 1992. He referred to the November 1988 BAB case that had been publicised as a potential case of maternal transmission, and stated:

You will recall that in this instance we were unable to trace the ingredients of one compound feed supplied. In addition, we were not in a position to openly admit to the fact that the ruminant feed ban was not absolute as of 18 July. In view of the information received from the major compounders both before the ban and recently, it is clear that they needed at least three months to clear stocks, in some cases longer. Add to that the fact that some heavy discounting led to bulk buying of meal just before or after the ban, and the risk of carry-over on farm has to be seen as considerable. Initial evidence suggests however that smaller compounders are disproportionately represented amongst suppliers to owners of BAB cases, and not being party to discussions prior to the introduction of the ban they might be expected to take longer to clear their stock. ⁴⁵

2.165 On 8 September 1992 Mr Meldrum advised Dr Matthews that 'we need to write to UKASTA about the feeding of animals born after the ban and our suspicions that there was a significant time lag before existing stocks of meat and bone meal were consumed within the ruminant feed chain'. ⁴⁶

2.166 Mr Meldrum wrote to Mr Reed, Director General of UKASTA, on 18 September 1992. He reported that as at 9 September 1990, 220 BABs had been confirmed and that 'We do consider the majority to have been at risk from consumption of concentrate containing meat and bone meal, but short of tracing feed to source for every case this will be difficult to prove'. Mr Meldrum continued:

My concern at the moment is the extent to which there was slippage in full implementation of the ruminant feed ban. Realistically we could not expect an absolute ban from 18 July and carry-over on farm was expected. Furthermore, we were aware from discussions with major compounders before the ban came into effect that it would take considerably longer than the few weeks given to them for stocks of concentrate containing meat and bone meal to be cleared. At the moment our modelling suggests a time lag of between three and six months before the ban became fully effective, excluding human error.

While interest in this area has hitherto been muted during the quiet summer season, I do not expect the status quo to be maintained for long. As a consequence, not only will this cause us additional pressures, but it may also turn the spotlight on your members. Indeed it may well present the risk of litigation, a prospect already encountered by some compounders as I understand.

There appears to be a slight chance, at least, that the smaller compounders, particularly non-members of UKASTA, may have taken longer to clear their stocks. We are examining this aspect by analysis of the data on these cases, but it is perhaps a little premature to draw any conclusions as there is nothing to substantiate the hypothesis and we are dealing with a rather small number of cases. ⁴⁷

2.167 Mr Meldrum concluded by asking whether UKASTA would be content to meet MAFF to discuss the assistance they might be able to give in 'quantifying the risk of feeding ruminant protein to ruminants after July 1988'. ⁴⁸

2.168 During oral evidence, Mr Meldrum commented on his reasons for writing the letter:

. . . I [had] no evidence, at that time, that the compounders were supplying material after the date set. I have said already and I believed at the time that there could be small amounts of material left on farm after 18th July that were consumed after that time; and that would account for the number of cases, born after the ban cases that I referred to in paragraph 4. My concern at the time was that the number was going up very fast indeed. Looking at the figures in 1992, in the third and fourth quarters there was a very significant number of cases born after the ban and I was worried. That is why I wrote to Mr Reed. But I do not think it can be - I do not think you can assume from that letter that I assumed that the smaller compounders had not in fact complied. ⁴⁹

2.169 On 2 October 1992 Miss Nelson of UKASTA sent Dr Brian Cooke a note that had been prepared using comments made at a recent Scientific Committee meeting. Miss Nelson asked for Dr Cooke's views because she intended to use the note as background briefing for UKASTA's forthcoming meeting with Mr Meldrum. The note explained that Mr Meldrum would be seeking explanations as to why MBM could have been available for consumption by cattle after the imposition of the RFB. It advised that information required from UKASTA would be 'in general':

i) Confirmation that feed manufacturers stopped using meat and bonemeal in ruminant rations on 18 July 1988.

ii) Whether or not material was recalled from merchants' premises.

iii) Whether or not material was recalled from farms. ⁵⁰

2.170 Points of interest to UKASTA were the history of suspect BABs, including the geographical spread, and whether they had received feed containing MBM from UKASTA members. The note continued:

It would also be interesting to know what member companies' responses were to the imposition of the feed ban. This would include the use of returns (such as sow feeds) in cattle rations. It was noted that MAFF were not concerned about cross contamination of feedingstuffs in mills because the dose rate of meat and bonemeal would be too low.

On feed in merchant stores, it was considered that the stock concerned would have been rundown by the end of September at the latest. It was possible, however, that farmers could have ruminant feed containing meat and bonemeal which was delivered in June and still be available for feeding in the early autumn. ⁵¹

2.171 During oral evidence, UKASTA witnesses were asked whether they could attribute the comment in the note on MAFF's attitude to dose and cross-contamination in feedmills to a particular meeting or person. Miss Nelson replied:

No, I cannot. It is just my general understanding at the time. I cannot attribute it to any particular MAFF official or a particular meeting. I am just reflecting the views held within the UKASTA at the time that I wrote that memo. ⁵²

2.172 However, Miss Nelson referred to two UKASTA meetings - one attended by Mr Wilesmith on 10 April 1990 and the other by Dr Matthews on 14 November 1990 - as examples of the information UKASTA was receiving on dose. ⁵³ Mr Wilesmith had said that a greater dose led to a shorter incubation period (see paragraph 2.66), while Dr Matthews had said that a greater dose gave a greater chance of BSE developing (see paragraph 2.91). Mr Reed accepted that:

That does not mean necessarily that a small dose cannot pass the infection on. But it reinforced the view we had been developing that a larger dose was more likely to pass the disease, a smaller dose much less likely. And of course all those terms, 'larger', 'smaller', are relative. You did not know what the infective dose was. ⁵⁴

SEAC's consideration of BABs

2.173 At SEAC's meeting on 15 October 1992 Dr Matthews and Mr Wilesmith gave a 'detailed presentation of the procedures for investigating individual BSE cases born after the feed ban and of the epidemiological evidence'. ⁵⁵

2.174 A paper on BAB cases prepared for SEAC's consideration stated that up to the end of August 1992 there were 122 confirmed BABs. It explained in detail the investigations undertaken when a suspected BAB was reported, and described the risk assessment used for potential sources of infection. Three categories were used to assess the risk for feed:

High : There has been a definite carry over of food rations purchased before 18 July 1988 or where a ration was fed in which MBM was known to have been included accidentally

Medium : Potential exposure from feedstuffs potentially containing MBM manufactured before 18 July 1988

Unknown : No feedstuffs potentially containing MBM known to have been fed during the animal's lifetime. ⁵⁶

2.175 The paper summarised the detailed epidemiological investigations that had been undertaken and concluded:

The results of the investigations of these cases supplement the results of analyses of age specific incidences over time which indicates that the ban on the inclusion of ruminant derived protein in ruminant rations has produced the expected effect on the epidemic.

It was known at the time the legislation was introduced that rations manufactured before 18 July 1988 could remain in the food supply chain for 6 months. Therefore, realistically, an instantaneous effect of the ban could not be expected. The current epidemiological evidence suggests that the lag in the ban taking effect is between 3 and 6 months. This is supported by these specific investigations. As a result cases in animals born after 18 July 1988 will continue to occur and increase in number over the next two years when animals born shortly after the ban will reach the modal age at onset of BSE. However, the results indicate that the cases which have occurred so far do not present any cause for concern. ⁵⁷

2.176 The main points to emerge from discussion during SEAC's meeting were:

- the pathological characteristics of the BABs remained the same as those of the rest of the epidemic;

- it was impossible to establish how much meat and bone meal remained in the animal feed chain, and for how long, after the ban. But because of recycling, this would have been the material with the greatest level of infectivity;

- the incubation period did not appear to have changed substantially, which was surprising in view of the recycling effect; and

- although the numbers were very small, there appeared to be a deficiency in the very youngest category (ie born in 1989). ⁵⁸

2.177 SEAC noted that a large majority of BABs analysed to date were likely to have been exposed to infected feed. The minutes recorded that 'all the evidence continued to suggest . . . that infected feed was the origin of infection and that there was still no evidence of any alternative source'. ⁵⁹

Further BAB cases are anticipated

2.178 In response to a request from Mr Capstick, on 19 October 1992 Mr Lowson provided an update on the ruminant feed ban's effect on the BSE epidemic. He made the following 'key points':

1. of the 291 confirmed BABs that had been analysed in detail, all had either a high or medium risk (see paragraph 2.174 for a description of the risk categories) of having been fed ruminant protein. SEAC had endorsed the view that there was no evidence to suggest an alternative source of infection;
2. by 1 October 1991, 1,774 cases had been confirmed in animals born after 18 July 1987. In the absence of the ruminant feed ban, the number of cases born after 18 July 1988 confirmed by 1 October 1992 would be expected to be much higher than 1,774; and
3. the proportion of the national herd succumbing to BSE under four years of age during the period January to March 1992 was significantly lower than the proportion for the same period in the previous two years. ⁶⁰

2.179 Mr Lowson concluded that the 'picture therefore remains encouraging'. However, he said:

There does however emerge from all this what will be a very difficult presentational problem. The cases that are currently emerging are only the first of a group that will continue to emerge for years to come. We can expect that the rate at which the new born-after-the-ban cases are reported will accelerate over the coming years. It will be important not to give the impression that we expect the current rate of new cases to tail off; rather what has happened so far shows that numbers will increase markedly. ⁶¹

2.180 After seeing this update, Mr Meldrum informed Mr Capstick that he had 'no wish' for the public use of statistics comparing numbers of BABs with confirmed cases in the same period in the previous year. He explained that 'we have a significant number of cases in the pipeline where the animals were born after the ban but where there will be some delay in confirmation'. He noted that while it was correct to say there were 291 confirmed cases, 'this figure would be higher if we were to confirm within the same time frame after slaughter as we did in the previous 12 month period'. Mr Meldrum concluded that although there was a significant reduction in the number of BAB cases as compared with the previous 12 months, such absolute comparisons 'are not wise and should not be used specifically in Ministerial correspondence or PQs'. ⁶²

Meeting on UKASTA's survey of feed compounders

2.181 Mr Meldrum met with UKASTA representatives on 10 November 1992 to discuss a UKASTA survey of feed compounders. By this time, there were 353 confirmed BABs, with an estimated 16 of those born in 1989, the youngest of which was born in September 1989. Of the confirmed cases, 341 were thought to have consumed feed containing ruminant protein. ⁶³

2.182 To meet Mr Meldrum's request for information (see paragraphs 2.166-2.167) as to when companies ceased to incorporate ruminant MBM into ruminant rations, UKASTA had asked all companies represented on its Executive Committee to complete a questionnaire. The companies surveyed accounted for over 50 per cent of ruminant feed production. At the meeting, UKASTA summarised the findings:

(a) Date when incorporation of ruminant protein in ruminant rations stopped.

Two companies replied that they did not use animal protein. The other replies ranged from December 1987 to July 1988 with most saying July 1988.

(b) Date when such stocks were cleared from compounders' premises.

Replies ranged from February 1988 to October 1988 with most saying August/September 1988.

(c) Date when stocks were cleared from distribution premises or merchants' stores.

The point was made that merchants' stores were not under the control of compounders. As in (b) replies ranged from February 1988 to October 1988 with most saying end August or end September 1988.

A further question on the date when stocks were cleared from farms was also asked.

The replies were, however, obviously estimates and varied greatly so no details were given. In theory feed should have been used by the expiry date on the bag which would have been some 3 to 4 months after manufacture. ⁶⁴

2.183 Other points made included:

(i) Most of the feed supplied after July 1988 would have been in bags not bulk and thus probably used as calf feed.

(ii) Protein supplements have a shelf life of 5 to 6 months (and would probably still be edible for a while after that).

(iii) UKASTA were not aware of any court proceedings against its members in respect of BSE.

(iv) BSE cases could well occur into 1989 because of the tendency of some farmers to take feed bags from the top of the pile thus leaving the lower bags some time before use. ⁶⁵

2.184 MAFF's note of the meeting concludes:

[Mr Meldrum] thanked UKASTA for the information it provided but expressed his extreme concern that compounders had supplied ruminant rations containing ruminant protein after the ban was introduced. It had always been recognised that stocks on farm would have been used up but it had not been expected that material would continue to have been supplied. UKASTA's reaction was to claim that recalling stocks was not practical and to say that the questionnaire replies were of course the outside possibilities when such feed might have been supplied.

Dr Matthews added that we now have a very sensitive test which can detect ruminant protein in feed. ⁶⁶

2.185 UKASTA's note of the meeting does not record this final point made by Dr Matthews. It does record that:

MAFF noted that very shortly before the ban came into operation, the risk of exposure to contaminated feed increased greatly and thus the animals born in the 1988 calving season would have been at the highest risk of exposure for all time. The MAFF, therefore, expected that the number of animals with BSE who had been born after the ban would increase, over time, to between 1,000 to 2,000. The number of animals with BSE born in 1989 was expected to show a considerable decline over those for the previous year. ⁶⁷

2.186 Regarding Mr Meldrum's concern that some companies had supplied feed containing ruminant MBM after the ban, UKASTA's note said:

No feed containing this material had, however, been manufactured after that date.

UKASTA explained that in completing the proformas, individual companies had been totally honest in reporting that ruminant feeds containing ruminant meat and bone meal could have been supplied after the introduction of the ban. This was essentially because the feedingstuff would have a shelf life of between three to four months from the date of manufacture. Thus the latest date on which stocks would have been cleared from compounding premises and/or distribution premises/merchant stores would have been October at the latest . . .

The question of stocks of feedingstuffs available on farm was unknown. UKASTA stressed that the use of feedingstuffs at farm level was out[side] the control of the manufacturer. It was possible that a farmer could keep a protein concentrate for between five to six months. Thus it was suggested that the Ministry accept that there would have been a period of about six months before the ban was fully operative.

Mr Meldrum reiterated his concern that the ban had not been immediately observed. It was expected that the Ministry could be challenged, in due course, to what action officials were going to take in view of the fact that compound feed containing ruminant animal proteins was sold after the introduction of the ban. He did, however, reconfirm that the information that he had been handed would be treated in the utmost confidence and stated that he wanted no further information on companies that might have supplied feed after the imposition of the ban. He also stated that the information provided by UKASTA would provide MAFF officials with a clear lead in the investigations being carried out into the incidence of BSE in cattle born after the ban. ⁶⁸

2.187 In a statement to the Inquiry, Mr Meldrum expressed his concern at the discovery that some compounders had supplied ruminant feed containing ruminant protein after the ban, as 'it had not been expected that the supply of such feed would continue after the ban'. ⁶⁹

2.188 During oral evidence, despite the records of the 10 November 1992 meeting, UKASTA and GAFTA witnesses said that feedmills would have disposed of cattle feed containing ruminant MBM by 18 July 1988. UKASTA witnesses had not heard of any company that at 18 July 1988 was left with unsaleable material. GAFTA witnesses believed that trade in feed containing ruminant protein would have ceased on the date the ban came into force. ⁷⁰ This conflict of evidence is discussed in vol. 3: The Early Years, 1986-88.

MAFF acknowledges a six-month carry-over period of contaminated feed

2.189 On 19 November 1992 Mr Nicholas Soames ⁷¹ met Sir Derek Andrews, Mr Meldrum, Mr Wilesmith and Dr Matthews to discuss recent statistics relating to BSE. Dr Matthews reported that, overall, the recent figures were 'encouraging', and explained that 'the bulk' of the new BSE cases being identified were 5-year-old animals which had been infected prior to the introduction of the ruminant feed ban. However, Dr Matthews commented that the figures for BABs were 'disappointing'. ⁷²

2.190 Mr Wilesmith explained that, despite the introduction of the ruminant feed ban on 18 July 1988, there was 'clear evidence that contaminated feed would have been available for at least six months after that date':

This was because feed produced before the introduction of the ban could have been sold afterwards and because farmers may have bought in bulk and thereby established a store of contaminated feed. [Mr Lowson] added that as a result of the potentially contaminated feed being available after the introduction of the restrictions, the number of cattle infected which were born after the ban would continue to rise for some time. ⁷³

2.191 Following agreement during the meeting, a report entitled 'Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in the United Kingdom - A Progress Report' was produced by MAFF and placed in the Library of the House of Commons in December 1992. On BABs it recorded:

The effect of the ban on ruminant protein in feed in 1988 is not yet reflected by a decline in the epidemic of BSE in Great Britain. This is because the modal age at onset has ranged between 60 and 62 months, so that any major effects on the national incidence in terms of the number of cases reported each week will not become apparent until during 1993. Nevertheless there are several factors which already indicated the effectiveness of the ban:

- The significantly smaller number of cattle born after the feed ban which have succumbed to disease than would have been expected had no ban been in place. As indicated above, there is evidence in almost all of these cases, that ruminant protein was the source of infection. If non-food routes of transmission had been significant the number of cases in animals born after the ban would have been much higher;

- the percentage of affected animals within affected herds each year (within herd incidence) has shown no significant increase other than that which would be expected from the increase in exposure from recycling through feed containing material from infected cattle before the feed ban was imposed. This supports the view that direct animal to animal transmission is not an important factor;

- the slowdown in the numbers of cases being reported . . .

- the most reliable early indicator of the success of the control policy is a change in the age specific incidence of the disease. By the end of 1992, BSE should not be confirmed in significant numbers of animals less than four years old . . . recent information [shows] a significant fall in incidence in the two youngest age-groups in the first 9 months of 1992 by comparison with 1990 and 1991.

Taken together these indicators provide solid evidence of the success of the feed ban. As the ban continues to take progressive effect the average age of cases being reported will rise. As successive age groups drop from the picture, (first the three year olds, then the four year olds and so on) the total number of confirmed cases will decline until the ultimate disappearance of the disease in the UK. ⁷⁴

2.192 The reported concluded:

All the evidence continues to point to infected ruminant protein as the origin of the epidemic, and to justify confidence that the ban on feeding such material to ruminants will bring about its end. The evidence from cases born after the feed ban is wholly consistent with this view, but because it was not universally observed for some months after it was imposed it is inevitable that cases of BSE will continue to occur in animals born after 18 July 1988. ⁷⁵

Enforcement difficulties are identified

2.193 On 11 December 1992 Mr Adrian Dixon of MAFF's Animal Health (Disease Control) Division minuted Mrs Davis of the Legal Department and explained that MAFF was undertaking investigations into potential sources of infection for BABs. Although investigations were carried out with the full cooperation of feed companies, it was thought that over time they might begin to feel vulnerable and fear legal action from farmers. He sought legal advice on two points:

(i) Do we have the legal powers to require the feed compounders/suppliers to provide the information we need?

(ii) Do we have powers to prosecute if we found that feed containing ruminant protein had been sold, supplied or fed, for example in 1989? ⁷⁶

2.194 Mrs Davis responded that offences under the BSE Order were summary only and subject to the normal six-month limitation period. ⁷⁷

2.195 She also advised that the Animal Health Act 1981 did not provide specific powers to require feed compounders or suppliers to give information. Powers of entry for the purpose of documentary enquiry were not provided either. Mrs Davis continued:

There is a power of entry in section 63(2) [of the Animal Health Act] for an inspector to enter land, a building or place where he has reasonable grounds for supposing there is to be found anything in respect of which any person has on occasion failed to comply with an order of the Minister or where he has reasonable grounds for supposing an order of the Minister has not been or is not being complied with. So if there were suspect feed on premises or if it were suspected feed had been wrongly made up on premises it would be possible to gain entry. It would be an abuse however to use that power to enter premises where there were no feed and where the suspect activity took place over 6 months ago.

If the inspector does enter premises he is not empowered to look at documents. ⁷⁸

2.196 Mrs Davis suggested it might be possible to make a new Order to require disclosure of information or documents. However, such an Order would only operate if inspectors had existing powers of entry, since the Order could not extend the powers of entry. It could only extend the activities that could be carried out once on the premises. ⁷⁹

2.197 On 29 January 1993 Mr Dixon sought clarification from Mr A Corbett of the Legal Department, of MAFF's powers to prosecute. Mr Dixon suggested that section 127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act allowed prosecuting action to be taken within six months of the discovery of the offence, which would apply to the situation where BABs led to the discovery that contaminated feed had been supplied after the ban. ⁸⁰

2.198 Mr Tony Williams, Trading Standards Adviser, informed Mr Dixon on 2 February 1993 that 'I have no reason to question the advice given by Mrs Davis'. He noted that the Feeding Stuffs Regulations 1991 now gave inspectors power to require the production of documents, but they related only to compound feedstuffs. However, he commented:

Regulations made under the Agriculture Act require compound feeds to bear a list of ingredients. However, ruminant derived protein can be disguised in such a list under a generic term - 'Land Animal Products'. Officers enforcing the legislation under the Agriculture Act have powers to inspect recipes, computer records, etc of compound feeds and would be able to determine what animal products were included in the feed.

The Agriculture Act has a further provision restricting the use of ingredients which are deleterious to animals. It may be difficult to prove that any ruminant protein was deleterious. Suspicion is one thing, proof is quite another. The powers to inspect records etc of raw materials under the Act do not exist and this makes enforcement difficult. However, the provisions of the Agriculture Act may be strengthened shortly to take account of new EC legislation.

Another difficulty facing enforcement officers under the Agriculture Act is that having found ruminant derived protein in an animal feed, they have no power to pass the information onwards. To do so could be a criminal offence. ⁸¹

2.199 Mr Williams suggested three possible options to deal with these difficulties:

1. Strengthen the BSE Order/Animal Health Act to include similar provision to Regulation 21 [of the] Feeding Stuffs Regulations 1991 [which provided a power to inspect records] or the Food Safety Act 1990, Section 32.

2. Ask local authorities, through LACOTS, to monitor samples of compound ruminant feeds for the presence of ruminant protein, either by an examination of recipes or, preferably, by analysis. I understand that a method of identifying ruminant protein in compound feeds is now available.

3. Include in Regulation 15(6) Feeding Stuffs Regulations 1991 [which controlled inclusion of certain products] an entry for ruminant derived protein in ruminant compound feeds. Local authorities could then enforce this and achieve what the BSE Order 1991 is trying to do. They would have all the necessary powers of inspection of documents, etc. ⁸²

2.200 On 16 February 1993 Mr Dixon informed Dr Matthews that feedstuffs legislation was 'not of help' in tracing feed details of BABs. Before pursuing the proposals to obtain the powers, he wished to confirm that these powers were in fact needed.

On the question of available prosecution powers to pursue compounders, he noted that as his interpretation of section 127 of the Magistrates' Courts Act was incorrect, they had 'reached a dead end'. Mr Dixon sought views as to whether attempts should be made to acquire the required powers, although he appreciated that they would be retrospective and might be deemed impermissible by lawyers. ⁸³