Volume 4: The Southwood Working Party, 1988-89
1. Introduction to Southwood
Meetings on 19 May

1.17 On 19 May, before the Working Party had been officially constituted, Sir Richard met Sir Donald Acheson, Mr Andrews and Mr Cruickshank to discuss what would be expected of him. He was informed that MAFF intended to introduce a ruminant feed ban. ¹ He commented that this was an excellent first step and the one immediate piece of advice he had planned to offer. The minute of the meeting by Mr Frank Strang, Private Secretary to Mr Andrews, records that:

. . . the Working Party had been set up to look at both human and animal health . . . In particular the Working Party should consider the following:

(i) whether the action we [MAFF] had taken on the animal health front had been sensible, and what further steps we should consider;

(ii) whether the results of our further work implied that there was a safe method of processing [meat and bone meal] which we could authorise;

(iii) the transmissibility of the disease and, very importantly, whether it was likely that it could be eradicated. ²

1.18 Sir Donald, dealing with the risk to human health, said that advice was wanted on the chances of the agent being transmitted from affected cattle to man through meat, offal or milk and on the risks inherent in using bovine material in the preparation of biologicals. ³ He later asked for urgent advice from Sir Richard on the question of the manufacture of biologicals from cattle material.

1.19 In relation to the risk to human health, Mr Strang's minute records these comments from Mr Andrews:

Compulsory slaughter might well lock us into a very large public expenditure commitment, particularly if there was no prospect of eradication, because the current legislation required us to compensate. We would need to look very carefully at alternatives - such as dealing with the problem at the slaughterhouse by meat inspection - before deciding on that option. The important point was that Sir Richard's role would be to carry out a thorough assessment of the scientific data available (and we would make all that we knew available) and to provide advice on the dangers which that data implied. However, he [Sir Richard Southwood] should not put Ministers in a box as to the policy line they should take in deciding how to implement the scientific advice. ⁴

1.20 Insofar as this reflects, and we think it does, a concern on the part of Mr Andrews that the Working Party should not usurp the role of MAFF Ministers in taking policy decisions that involved substantial expenditure, we do not consider that this was a matter for criticism - particularly having regard to the concerns that his Minister had expressed in relation to paying compensation (see vol. 3: The Early Years, 1986-88).

1.21 Sir Richard's response, as recorded by Mr Strang, was that:

. . . his past record showed that he was well aware of the sensitivities involved and in particular the pressures on public expenditure. It would be his public duty to set out clearly the dangers which were revealed by the scientific evidence and to say that the chain needed breaking, if that were the case. However, the Group would not specify what administrative mechanisms would be appropriate. That would be a matter for the Government. ⁵

1.22 Sir Richard, in evidence, said that this accorded with his recollection that he said that the Working Party would recommend what they thought was needed and that it was up to MAFF how they achieved it. In the event it will be seen that the Working Party was to show no inhibitions about advising on practical measures to counter the risks posed by BSE, nor was there any suggestion that this was inappropriate.