Volume 3: The Early Years, 1986-88
2. Dissemination of information
Introduction

2.1 Once the CVL had identified the emergence of a new disease in cattle which was possibly a TSE, there were many reasons why wide dissemination of information about the disease was desirable.

2.2 If information about the discovery of the disease, and its nature and symptoms, is widely disseminated within the State Veterinary Service, to private veterinarians and to farmers, then the identification and reporting of cases of a new animal disease will be stimulated. In the case of BSE, encouragement of the reporting of cases with symptoms was essential if MAFF was to learn of the extent of a possible epidemic.

2.3 Once the potential implications of BSE for human and animal health were recognised, all those within areas of government responsible for addressing these implications needed to be informed of them. If the nature of BSE was to be explored, researchers needed to be informed what had been discovered about it. More particularly the DHSS, ¹ as the Department with primary responsibility for considering the implications of BSE for human health, needed to know of its emergence.

2.4 More generally, the principle of freedom of information made it desirable that the emergence of BSE should be communicated to, rather than concealed from, the public.

2.5 Dissemination of information has its downside. While they are keen to be the first to publish, scientists are reluctant to publish details of a new discovery until they are sure of their ground, and are opposed to premature disclosure that may enable others to steal their thunder. Where information will provoke a public demand for an immediate response from the Government, the Government is reluctant to disclose the information before the response has been fully prepared. If the information throws doubt on the safety of food, it may lead to a food scare with adverse financial consequences for producers, or even to trade embargoes, which may prove unwarranted or disproportionate once additional facts are known.

2.6 The Government, and MAFF in particular, has been accused of a failure to disclose full and accurate information about BSE and its potential consequences at all stages of the story with which we are concerned. In this chapter we consider the adequacy of the response to BSE in respect of dissemination of information in the period up to March 1988. We do not, however, consider here the passing of information from MAFF to the Department of Health (DH). We deal with this in Chapter 5.