Volume 3: The Early Years, 1986-88
5. Human health implications, notification, and slaughter and compensation
The introduction of the slaughter and compensation policy
March 1988
April 1988
May 1988
June 1988
July 1988

March 1988

5.60 The CMO, Sir Donald Acheson, was notified about BSE by a letter from Mr Derek Andrews dated 3 March 1988. Having set out the nature of the disease, its incidence and clinical signs, the letter went on to explain that research was focusing on the possibility of its source being animal feed containing material derived from sheep, which were known to be susceptible to encephalopathies. Turning to the question of whether BSE might be transmissible to humans, Mr Andrews wrote:

. . . the human health considerations must be an important consideration here. It would be very helpful therefore to have your advice on the view we should take of the possible human health implications and how we should handle questions about the risks to human health. ¹

5.61 On the same day, Mr Rees and Dr Watson held a meeting with Dr Diana Walford, Senior Principal Medical Officer at the DH; Dr Ann Dawson, of DH's International, Microbiology, and Communicable Diseases Division; and Dr Murrell, also of DH, to discuss BSE. A minute of the meeting, dated 7 March 1988, and submitted by Dr Ann Dawson to Sir Donald Acheson, explained that the CVL believed that BSE was connected with animal feed. It went on to record that Mr Rees wanted to prevent cattle with BSE getting into the food chain and that this could only be achieved if the cattle were destroyed and incinerated. The question for DH was therefore whether the affected cattle entering the food chain posed a public health risk. ²

5.62 In his statement, Sir Donald Acheson explained that he considered there was insufficient evidence for him to be able to rule out the risk to human health posed by BSE. He therefore called for a meeting to be held as soon as possible between officials from DH, MAFF and the PHLS to discuss possible measures to protect human health. ³ On 7 March his private secretary recorded his comments:

If, as seems likely, this behaves like scrapie and kuru there should not be a problem in man. However, we need to take urgent advice from the experts . . . This raises again the issue of sterilising animal feed. ⁴

5.63 Sir Donald told us that his experience in relation to CJD governed his reaction to the news of the BSE epidemic in cattle. He determined that 'high priority' should be given to discovering whether there were risks of its spreading to man and the limiting of any such risks. ⁵

5.64 The interdepartmental meeting requested by the CMO took place on 17 March 1988. Together with Sir Donald, the meeting was attended by DH officials including Dr E L Harris (Deputy CMO), Mr Cruickshank (MAFF), Dr Watson (CVL), Dr Joan Davies (PHLS) and Dr Galbraith (Communicable Disease Surveillance Centre).

5.65 The DH note of the meeting records:

Sir Donald Acheson divided possible action into three categories:

(1.) nothing to worry about;

(2.) something to worry about that should be considered by an expert group (for which Ministerial consent was required);

(3.) the threat was sufficient to require an immediate recommendation for action.

Views within this framework were sought from those present. ⁶

5.66 Mr Cruickshank is recorded as stating that with 40 or so cases a month the disease would soon become newsworthy, and that it was important that both Government Departments should arrange appropriate action before this happened. ⁷ Mr Cruickshank's minute to Mr Andrews describing this meeting records:

After some discussion of the data provided by CVL, it became clear that all those present found it very difficult to give any clear advice on the subject. The meeting appeared to be tending towards the view that there is probably no risk in drinking milk or eating flesh from animals affected with BSE, but that the position was much less clear in relation to brains, spleens and other organs. This raised questions about the safety of human vaccines prepared using bovine material.

The CMO concluded the meeting by saying that he suspected there was no risk, but that it could take 30-40 years to prove this. In the meantime, Ministers would be very exposed if, as seems inevitable, the press began to devote attention to the subject. He proposes therefore to minute Health Ministers recommending that a small group of internationally recognised experts should be set up; this group should meet two or three times and examine all the information available; it should then deliver advice which would go to Agriculture and Health Ministers. It might be asked as a priority to advise on the use of bovine material in manufacturing vaccines and on the disposal of carcasses of affected animals. Sir Donald added as an aside that he thought it highly likely that the advice would be that carcasses of affected animals should not go for human consumption. ⁸

5.67 On 21 March 1988 Sir Donald Acheson forwarded a submission to Health Ministers, informing them of BSE, and seeking their agreement to the setting up of an expert group to advise on the human health risks and possible preventive measures. Sir Donald advised that although the risk was likely to be low, further expert advice was needed as soon as possible in light of the lethal nature of BSE and the uncertainties surrounding this disease. The minute drew attention to the risk of public concern and suggested that one approach which would play down the human health issue would be for the group to be set up jointly by MAFF and DH with strong public health input. Sir Donald put forward the name of Sir Richard Southwood, Professor of Zoology at Oxford and an ecologist, to chair the expert group. ⁹

5.68 In a minute to Mr John MacGregor dated 22 March, Mr Andrews expressed the view that there was no alternative but to accept the CMO's proposed suggestion. If the conclusion was, as Sir Donald Acheson had suggested it might be, that carcasses of affected animals should not go for human consumption:

. . . we shall have great difficulty in avoiding a compulsory slaughter and compensation scheme. ¹⁰

5.69 Mr MacGregor noted his reaction on the minute:

We have some time to think this through. I am concerned at the thought of a Government scheme. It runs the risk of reopening the compensation question.

5.70 On 23 March Sir Donald Acheson wrote to Mr Andrews summarising the results of the 17 March meeting and enclosing his submission to Health Ministers. Sir Donald reported ministerial approval to the setting up an 'Expert Working Party', and he repeated that he would not be surprised if the expert group, as a matter of prudence, recommended that the carcasses of affected animals should not go for human consumption. ¹¹

5.71 These two officials spoke on the same day. Mr Andrews's private secretary minuted Mr Cruickshank about the conversation and recorded that Health Ministers:

. . . had agreed that a small expert group should be set up to look at the health implications. Since the CMO's advice was that there was unlikely to be a health risk, it might be best to have a joint working party so as to avoid the implication that our sole preoccupation was the health risk. ¹²

5.72 At the meeting on 30 March between Mr Andrews, Mr Rees, Mr Cruickshank and Mr Bradley (see paragraph 3.43) there was discussion about the disposal of affected animals. Mr Andrews mentioned concern on the part of Mr MacGregor about having to finance a compulsory slaughter scheme. Mr Cruickshank said that he was looking into the possibility of an industry-funded compensation scheme. Mr Rees considered that, since the primary concern was over public health aspects 'despite the need to play them down', there would be difficulty in getting the industry to pay. ¹³

April 1988

5.73 At the meeting on 14 April between Mr MacGregor, Mr Thompson, Mr Andrews, Mr Edward Smith, Mr Meldrum and other MAFF officials (see paragraph 3.51) slaughter and compensation was again discussed. The minute records that Mr MacGregor commented that the issue needed to be considered particularly carefully, given the read-across to diseases such as rhizomania and Aujeszky's disease. The question was raised as to whether elimination of BSE was more a matter of public than industry interest.

5.74 One of the key issues was whether eradication of BSE was possible, which Mr Cruickshank noted was not yet clear. In the light of this and other uncertainties, the meeting concluded that further work was needed on the efficacy of a slaughter policy in eradicating the disease, and on whether compensation was appropriate. ¹⁴

5.75 On 19 April 1988 Sir Richard Southwood was formally asked to chair the expert Working Party. ¹⁵

5.76 On 22 April Farming News carried on its front page an article which suggested that many cases of BSE were going unreported. ¹⁶

Spongiform Fear Grows

The Ministry of Agriculture has been accused of seriously underestimating the true extent of bovine spongiform. The charge, by vets up and down the country, is made more acute by fears that the brain disease could be transmitted to humans.

Ministry sources say that a slaughter policy has been discussed but no decision reached. Ministry vets are severely worried that the escalating disease will cause problems for UK cattle exports . . .

Dr Tony Andrews of the Royal Veterinary College confirmed that there is disquiet about whether the disease - which affects the brain tissue - could be a danger to humans.

'We simply don't know,' he said.

It's time the Ministry came clean about its findings. There is a distinct feeling that the investigation centre at Weybridge is over-secretive about its findings.

'We have got to know how the disease is going to be tackled nationally. At the moment the Ministry has neglected to give farmers or vets any guidelines about spongiform.'

The latest Ministry figures show that there are 421 confirmed cases of bovine spongiform in 352 herds. But these figures mask the true picture as many farmers and vets are not bothering to report an outbreak to MAFF . . .

Roger Eddy, British Veterinary Association officer, has 25 cases of BSE in his Somerset practice. He is annoyed that he has not been given clear guidelines from the Ministry about the disease.

He argues that if the disease is similar to scrapie, then it is most virulent at calving.

'Many farmers are keeping infected animals until they calve down, and then send them for slaughter. This could be leading to a huge spread of the disease.'

May 1988

5.77 Mr Rees's submission to Mr MacGregor of 6 May, ¹⁷ which recommended a ruminant feed ban (see paragraph 4.4) discussed two further recommendations:

(1) Making BSE notifiable. The advantage of making it notifiable would be firstly that the Government would be seen to be taking positive steps to deal with the problem and secondly it would provide a better overall picture of the disease's prevalence. ¹⁸

(2) Slaughter with compensation. In view of Minister's reservations about the possibility of a slaughter and compensation policy funded by the Exchequer it might be appropriate now to initiate discussion with the industry to explore the possibility of an industry funded slaughter/compensation scheme to back up the notification proposal. ¹⁹

5.78 By way of overall strategy the submission stated:

It is the CVO's opinion that action should now be taken with two objectives in mind:

(1) To eliminate the continuing source of infection by a temporary withdrawal of meat and bone meal from ruminant feedingstuffs until effective processing systems are operating.

(2) To dispose of affected animals at an early stage in the clinical syndrome to establish control of the disease pending the long term study into cattle to cattle transmission.

This action would also help to protect our exports by making export certification possible - if later required by some importing countries - and raising confidence that positive action to control the disease is being taken.

In the light of what has been described the Minister is recommended to agree:-

(a) that urgent discussions take place with the feed trade with a view to a temporary and voluntary withdrawal of meat and bonemeal which is currently used as an ingredient in feed for ruminants;

(b) discussions take place with the NCBA [National Cattle Breeders Association], breed societies and the NFU's with a view to making the disease notifiable and introducing an industry funded slaughter policy for affected animals;

(c) that Sir Richard Southwood be informed of the action we propose taking. ²⁰

5.79 It was suggested that such action would not be seen as pre-empting the Southwood Inquiry because it would be introduced primarily for animal health reasons, whereas the emphasis of the Southwood Inquiry was on public health implications. ²¹

5.80 Mr Rees's submission was discussed at the meeting held on 18 May between Mr MacGregor, Mr Thompson, Mr Andrews, Mr Cruickshank, Mr Wilesmith, Mr Coe, Mr Suich and Mr Meldrum (see paragraph 4.9). In addition to the introduction of a ruminant feed ban it was agreed that officials should inform the agricultural industry of the intention to make BSE notifiable. However:

The Minister stressed that the industry should not be under any illusions that there would be any Government funding for any slaughter policy which might be introduced for affected animals. ²²

5.81 On 19 May Mr Andrews met Sir Richard Southwood and Sir Donald Acheson. The note of the meeting recorded a comment by Sir Richard that 'it might be necessary to take steps to deal with any direct sources to humans'. ²³ When he subsequently read the record of the meeting, Mr MacGregor asked for advice in due course on the possible steps to cut off the various sources of BSE to humans. ²⁴ Mr Cruickshank was sent this request.

5.82 On 26 May Mr Cruickshank minuted Mr Suich indicating the line he proposed to take in response. Compulsory slaughter was the most effective way of stopping BSE-affected cattle from entering the human food chain. MAFF could then insist on safe disposal of the carcasses, whether by incineration, burial or otherwise. He had looked at making use of the Meat Inspection Regulations instead, but there were major obstacles. ²⁵ He put forward a fuller version of this advice on 7 June (see below). ²⁶

5.83 While progress with a slaughter policy was held up by the question of discussions with industry, further progress was being made in making BSE a notifiable disease. At a meeting on 27 May between Mr Thompson and Messrs Meldrum, Rees and Cruickshank to discuss the imminent ruminant feed ban, it was noted that the feed ban Order would also provide for compulsory notification of BSE.

5.84 Mr Cruickshank explained that the Order would confer the power to impose movement restrictions, so as to give MAFF more control over preventing affected animals coming to market. Mr Thompson said that a licence would be granted for slaughter of infected animals provided that they could be certified as fit to travel and there was no public health risk. He enquired whether it was possible to condemn only the heads and possibly the offal of affected animals, which would allow farmers to sell the rest of the carcass on for human consumption. Mr Cruickshank said this would be difficult as there were no similar exceptions for sheep infected with scrapie.

5.85 In response to the point that questions might be asked about why so much trouble was being taken to ban the source of BSE, when products from infected animals were still being allowed to enter the food chain, Mr Thompson felt that officials should continue to take the line that BSE posed no dangers to human health.

5.86 Mr Rees felt that the industry should be encouraged to set up a compensation scheme, so that there would be no need to allow infected animals to go for slaughter and hence into the human food chain. He had been told that the Milk Marketing Board had a mechanism which could be used and had funding available. ²⁷

June 1988

5.87 On 1 June 1988 Mr Meldrum became the CVO. On the same day he chaired a meeting with cattle industry representatives concerning the possible introduction of a slaughter and compensation policy. They were informed that the forthcoming ruminant feed ban Order would include provisions making BSE notifiable. Mr Meldrum explained that cattle owners could be prosecuted if they passed on to slaughter animals they suspected of having the disease.

5.88 Slaughter and compensation was discussed. Mr Meldrum made it clear that the industry should not expect the Government to fund compensation. Mr Cruickshank explained the Government position that there was no evidence of human risk, but that an 'expert Working Party' was looking at all aspects of the disease. Industry representatives indicated that it was very unlikely that the industry would agree to fund a scheme. ²⁸

5.89 On 4 June an article on BSE was published in the British Medical Journal of which Dr T A Holt, a house officer at St James's Hospital in London, and Ms J Phillips, a dietician, were co-authors. The article opened with the following statement:

Press announcements released last year about an outbreak of a brain disease, spongiform encephalopathy, in the cattle of South West Britain were received with alarming indifference by the medical profession as well as by the general public. Fears that transmission of the disease to man might occur through the sale of animal products were immediately allayed by reassurances largely from the veterinary profession, but no contribution was made from the food industry, and the basis for this confidence was not adequately explained. It has generally been accepted that the slaughter of animals showing characteristic signs of infection - such as behaviour changes - as well as the usual processes of sterilisation and pasteurisation, are enough to remove any risk to the consumer. Unfortunately, this is a view that is naïve, uninformed, and potentially disastrous. ²⁹

5.90 The article then described the analogies between BSE, CJD, scrapie and kuru. It went on to discuss the circumstances in which cattle brain could enter the food chain and it concluded:

In summary, we are faced with the fact that spongiform encephalopathy, whether or not we are at risk from it ourselves, is now established in the cattle of this country. This is a disease for which there is no serological marker, and the incubation period is probably long. There is no way of telling which cattle are infected until features develop, and if transmission has already occurred to man it might be years before affected individuals succumb. It is possible, but unproved, that many asymptomatic cattle are nevertheless as infective as those symptomatic animals which are immediately destroyed for public health reasons. So should not the use of brains in British foods be either abolished outright or more clearly defined? Then in the absence of more compelling evidence those of us who wish to exclude it from our diets at least have that choice. ³⁰

5.91 On 6 June 1988 Mr Alan Lawrence (now joint secretary, with Dr Pickles of DH, to the Southwood Working Party) wrote to Sir Richard Southwood summarising the latest developments. Ministers had decided to make BSE notifiable and at the same time to prohibit the use of ruminant protein in ruminant feed. Although at that stage slaughter and compensation was not envisaged, MAFF would require the brains of affected animals which were moved off farms for slaughter to be sent to the CVL for histological examination. This might help to allay some of the human health fears expressed. ³¹

5.92 The next day Mr Cruickshank submitted advice to Ministers on the possible steps MAFF might take to prevent meat from affected cattle entering the human food chain. He advised that compulsory slaughter on farms was the most effective option. MAFF could then ensure the carcass was incinerated. If this were done, concerns raised about human health implications, however ill-founded, would be largely dispelled.

5.93 The minute went on to explain that just making BSE notifiable would permit control over affected animals, but could not ensure material derived from such animals did not enter the food chain, except for the brains, which would be sent for examination. He passed on the views of the cattle industry that without compensation, farmers might simply send affected animals to the abattoir without reporting them as BSE cases.

5.94 Finally, Mr Cruickshank referred to the possibility of the Milk Marketing Board funding compensation. The next day, Mr MacGregor authorised Mr Cruickshank to enter into discussions with the Milk Marketing Board. ³²

5.95 An article in Farming News of 10 June discussed the ruminant feed ban and notification requirement and commented on the possibility of a slaughter policy. ³³

Spongiform Cash Clash

The Ministry is considering a compulsory eradication scheme for bovine spongiform (BSE). And the NFU fears producers will have to pay for it.

The union has told the Ministry it wants compensation for any 'inconvenience' associated with the disease. But the Ministry insists that if an eradication policy goes ahead, it must be industry-funded.

5.96 On 11 June 1988 Mr Bradley minuted Dr Watson with some additional information on BSE generally. Among his comments, Mr Bradley referred (at his paragraph 16) to Mr Cruickshank's minute of 7 June to Mr MacGregor. Mr Bradley pointed out that although the plan to retain bovine brains for analysis would help calm public health fears about them, Mr Cruickshank had ignored 'spinal cord and spleen which are likely to be infected tissues'. ³⁴

5.97 In the meantime, discussions with the cattle industry were progressing. The overall message to come out of these talks was that the representative bodies were generally supportive of a slaughter policy for affected animals. However, while the industry felt the Government should provide compensation, officials stuck to the Government line that this should be financed by the industry, as there was no public money available. ³⁵

5.98 On 14 June the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order 1988 was made. On 21 June it brought into force the notification requirement in relation to BSE. The ruminant feed ban was to come into force on 18 July. ³⁶

5.99 On 21 June Sir Richard Southwood wrote to Mr Andrews setting out the recommendations that his Working Party had agreed at their first meeting the previous day. These included a recommendation that carcasses of infected animals should be condemned and destroyed by incineration or a comparable method:

'Removal of the head is not an adequate safeguard, they are not the only source of infection.' ³⁷

5.100 In a minute to Mr Andrews covering a progress report on BSE, Mr Cruickshank said of the recommendation:

This advice is not of course unexpected, but it is somewhat surprising that it has come so soon. I gather the Working Party felt unanimously and quite strongly on the point. ³⁸

5.101 Mr Cruickshank's minute went on to state that the Southwood advice had significantly altered the Government's bargaining position, by giving the industry grounds to say that the Government had no alternative but to require affected animals to be slaughtered. Accordingly, under the Animal Health Act 1981, compensation would have to be paid. However, he did note:

We can argue in reply that the Animal Health Act does not say how much compensation should be paid, and that in the circumstances, given that BSE-affected animals will have little market value anyway, we would be justified in paying only a small amount. We could then invite the industry to top up an Exchequer financed scheme. But I do not think we could avoid accepting that there would need to be some Exchequer financing. ³⁹

5.102 Following discussion with Mr Andrews, Mr Cruickshank prepared a submission for the Minister explaining the Southwood advice and recommending a slaughter and compensation policy with a compensation level of 50 per cent of market value. This recommendation was based on the knowledge that affected animals would have to be culled anyway, and would be unlikely to achieve anything like the full market price. It was also backed by precedent. ⁴⁰ Less than 50 per cent, however, gave rise to the danger of non-reporting. On that basis, annual costs were estimated at about £300,000 to £350,000. ⁴¹

5.103 It was recommended that Mr MacGregor write to Mr John Major, then the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, along the lines of a draft attached to the submission.

5.104 The submission, which had been copied by Mr Cruickshank to colleagues in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, was forwarded by Mr Andrews to Mr Thompson under a covering minute expressing Mr Andrews's agreement with its advice. Although MAFF should press the case for industry to fund half the cost of compensation, Mr Andrews felt that there was little prospect of success in this. ⁴²

5.105 Mr Andrews and Mr Cruickshank met Mr MacGregor on 28 June to discuss Mr Cruickshank's submission. Mr MacGregor was very concerned about the possible read-across to other diseases, and felt that the letter to the Treasury should make it clear that the proposed action was being taken on public health grounds, and that was why it was considered that government funding was inevitable. Mr Cruickshank agreed to revise the draft letter to the Treasury. ⁴³

5.106 Following their meeting with the Minister, Mr Meldrum, Mr Cruickshank and other MAFF officials met with representatives of the cattle industry and made one final, unsuccessful, attempt to persuade them to agree to contribute to a compulsory slaughter scheme. ⁴⁴

5.107 On 29 June Mr MacGregor wrote to Mr Major, Chief Secretary to the Treasury. He explained that, despite his reluctance to introduce a government-funded disease control scheme, BSE raised public health implications. He stressed his belief that it was essential to take immediate steps to implement the Southwood recommendation to protect public health.

5.108 In asking for authority to proceed, Mr MacGregor pointed out that MAFF should be able to contain what were expected to be the relatively small costs for that year within its existing public spending provision. This assertion was made on the basis that cases would continue at 60 per month and total expenditure would be around £200,000 - £250,000 in a full financial year. ⁴⁵

5.109 On the same day Sir Donald Acheson forwarded the Southwood Working Party recommendations to the Minister for Health, Mr David Mellor. As to the recommendation to destroy the carcasses of clinically affected animals, Sir Donald informed Mr Mellor that MAFF Ministers were minded to accept the advice. He advised Mr Mellor that 'such action is indeed essential', on the grounds of risk to man. ⁴⁶

July 1988

5.110 Mr Major replied to Mr MacGregor on 6 July 1988. Although he did not consider that a case had been made out for a government-funded scheme to control BSE, he approved the introduction of the slaughter and compensation at 50 per cent of the market value for affected cattle, on the basis that, until it was established whether the disease was transmissible to humans, special care was necessary.Mr Major based his decision on the need to protect human (and not animal) health, and stressed that this must be made clear in industry discussions and public announcements. Because of the clear benefits to the industry arising from the policy, Mr Major considered that it should continue to be pressed for a contribution. As to the costs, Mr Major noted that compensation for that year was being covered by MAFF's existing budget, and indicated that, in future years, MAFF should be able to contain what were expected to be the relatively small costs within its programme. ⁴⁷

5.111 On 7 July 1988, in answer to a written Parliamentary Question, Mr Thompson announced that the Government had accepted the Southwood Working Party's interim recommendation that 'as a precautionary measure' the carcasses of affected cattle should be destroyed. Pending the Working Party's final conclusions, compulsory slaughter and the destruction of carcasses would be introduced, with compensation payable at 50 per cent of market value. ⁴⁸ Following this, MAFF issued a news release in similar terms. ⁴⁹

5.112 On 21 July Mr Cruickshank updated Ministers on the progress in implementing the slaughter and compensation scheme. Two Orders were in draft, one to amend the existing Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Order 1988 to provide for compulsory slaughter of affected animals, and the other to provide for compensation. Mr Cruickshank felt that the Orders should come into force on 8 August 1988, to allow time for detailed instructions to staff and arrangements for slaughter, transport, valuation and disposal to be in place. Although incineration had been envisaged for all cases, cost and practical considerations meant that in some cases burial would be a cheaper option. ⁵⁰

5.113 The two Orders were enacted on 28 July 1988. ⁵¹ A MAFF news release the next day announced that both Orders would come into force on 8 August 1988.