Volume 3: The Early Years, 1986-88
5. Human health implications, notification, and slaughter and compensation
Chronology
January 1988
February 1988

January 1988

5.40 Following the 15 December meeting, three possible policy options were set out in a paper circulated among MAFF officials on 4 January 1988, and the pros and cons of each presented. Those options were: maintaining the existing policy; making BSE notifiable only; and making the disease notifiable while also introducing a slaughter and compensation scheme. ¹

5.41 On 8 January Mr Rees chaired a meeting at which Mr Cruickshank, Dr Watson, Mr Meldrum, Dr Peter Dawson, Mr D Kyle, Mr Wilesmith and Mr Lawrence were present. The options paper was discussed. The minutes record:

After discussion it was concluded that a 'halfway house' of making the disease notifiable was not a viable proposition and that the real choice lay between maintaining the present policy (at least for a further period of time) or recommending to Ministers that we should adopt a slaughter with compensation policy. In concluding that, on balance, the latter should be recommended the following points were made:

(a) From the evidence gained so far there was a strong welfare case for killing clinically affected animals on farm and not allowing them to be moved to a slaughterhouse . . .

(b) There was a good veterinary case for the slaughter of affected animals - it can be accurately diagnosed on a clinical basis and whilst investigatory research continues into the cause and transmissibility of the condition it would, at least, be helping to control the problem. By tackling it now it may be that we can get on top of it before it becomes too late to do so.

(c) Although there is no evidence so far that the condition is transmissible to man - if at some future date it turns out that this is the case - the Government would be held responsible.

(d) Although a slaughter policy would focus attention on the condition and may stimulate importing countries into (at least) seeking health conditions (herd/area freedom) this may happen anyway. By making the condition notifiable and adopting slaughter/compensation we would probably be able to provide certification, which would not be possible by maintaining the current arrangements. ²

5.42 In his oral evidence, Mr Rees said that carcass destruction was, at the time, primarily directed towards protecting animal health against further spread of the disease. If there was a danger to human health, however, carcass destruction would also achieve the secondary objective of preventing the carcasses from entering the human food chain. ³

February 1988

5.43 In mid-January Mr Lawrence circulated a first draft of the submission inviting comments from those who had been present at the meeting on 8 January. ⁴ On 16 February, following a series of revisions, Mr Cruickshank minuted Mr Edward Smith, the Deputy Secretary for Land and Resources, with the agreed submission to the Minister as prepared by Mr Suich. The minute and its enclosure were copied to officials in MAFF ⁵ and the Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Offices. ⁶

5.44 In his covering minute, Mr Cruickshank stated:

1. The attached submission, prepared by Mr Suich in consultation with veterinary colleagues, deals with the very difficult question of what to do about this new disease.

2. We do not know where this disease came from, we do not know how it is spread and we do not know whether it can be passed to humans. The last point seems to me to be the most worrying aspect of the problem. There is no evidence that people can be infected but we cannot say that there is no risk. We shall not be in a position to give a definite view on this until the current tests on marmosets yield results - possibly in two years' time. In the meantime Ministers will be exposed to considerable risk of criticism if the meat from diseased animals continues to go for human consumption.

3. If we believed the risk to human health was so remote as to be negligible we might advise Ministers to ride out the criticism. I would however be reluctant to say the risk is negligible. One theory is that BSE may have originated from sheep affected with scrapie . . . If this theory is correct - and I emphasise that it is only one of a number of possible explanations - we have to face up to the possibility that the disease could cross another species gap . . .

6. Of the two main options discussed in the submission, I see little real merit in the first - making the disease notifiable but not requiring slaughter of affected animals. This would increase anxieties about the disease without doing anything to answer the human health question or to stem further spread. Only if we introduce compulsory slaughter with compensation can we ensure that affected animals are taken promptly and that the carcasses are destroyed. This course would in fact give us a good deal more control over the situation, and I think the submission is right to advocate it. ⁷

5.45 The submission itself, in setting out the reasons for reviewing the current policy, included:

More importantly, although there is no evidence to suggest that the condition can be transmitted to humans we cannot be sure there is no risk; we could therefore be criticised for allowing affected animals to be sold for human consumption. MAFF are already being asked to advise on whether there is any risk to humans. There have also been a number of letters from the general public on this issue and correspondence between the Minister and Lord Montagu of Beaulieu. ⁸

5.46 The submission then set out the options, including:

Option (2): Slaughter and Compensation

12. The second possibility would be to adopt a policy of slaughter and compensation for those animals in which the condition is confirmed. The principal advantages of taking this course are that it would avoid any welfare problems arising and enable Government to answer criticism about the human health implications. It might also help to stem any possible spread of the disease. The availability of compensation would reduce the temptation for farmers to send suspect animals for slaughter without notifying suspicion of the disease. ⁹

5.47 Paragraph 16 discussed the possibility of industry funding:

It would not be the first time that the industry agreed to meet the costs arising from a slaughter/compensation policy. Both Newcastle disease in poultry (from 1981-1985 through an insurance arrangement) and Aujeszky's disease eradication have been funded by industry . . . BSE, moreover, differs from Aujeszky's disease and Newcastle disease in that there would be less obvious economic benefit to the industry from a slaughter policy, the main reasons for considering such a policy being public health safeguards and animal welfare. Furthermore with BSE we cannot say, as we could with Aujeszky's disease, that eradication is a feasible option. ¹⁰

5.48 Under the heading 'Performance Evaluation' the submission stated:

18. The main reason for introducing a policy of slaughter with compensation would be to safeguard public health in the absence of knowledge about possible transmissibility to humans. This objective would be achieved immediately on introduction of the policy. It will be possible to re-examine the need for the policy in this respect when the results of the research on transmissibility of the condition are available. ¹¹

5.49 The submission concluded by recommending:

20. . . . that the most appropriate course of action would be to make the condition notifiable and to introduce a policy of compulsory slaughter with compensation. ¹²

5.50 The Permanent Secretary, by now Mr Derek Andrews, received the submission under cover of a minute from Mr Edward Smith setting out his agreement with the notification, slaughter and compensation proposal. Mr Smith added the following comment:

I have also considered whether we should recover the cost from the industry. I was an architect of the development of policy in the early 1980s that, where the industry wished us to introduce an eradication scheme, they should foot the bill, since they would receive the economic benefits of the eradication. This however is not the case here - we are recommending this course primarily in view of our public health and animal welfare concerns. It would not therefore be appropriate to require the industry to fund the programme - and in any case levy funding would require primary legislation. ¹³

5.51 Mr Brian Dickinson, Principal Finance Officer at MAFF, minuted Mr Andrews on 19 February with reservations about the proposed policy. These included concern about where the money for the compensation policy would be coming from. ¹⁴ Mr Dickinson explained to us that the Public Expenditure Survey (PES) position for 1988/89 had recently been settled. It was not therefore a good time to approach the Treasury for more money. He thought that public funding of compensation would only exacerbate the difficulties facing MAFF from the 1988/89 PES cutbacks. ¹⁵

5.52 In relation to this point Mr Cruickshank stressed in a minute to Mr Andrews that the submission had been cleared in draft by the Financial Guidance Division and reflected their advice. He added:

(i) BSE is invariably fatal in cattle and would also be fatal if transmitted to humans . . .

(ii) human spongiform encephalopathies exist and there is some evidence that they may be transmissible through meat.

We have to weigh the cost of the suggested policy against the cost of doing nothing. It may be that doing nothing would prove painless, but there is a real possibility that it would prove extremely costly. ¹⁶

5.53 The submission was forwarded to the Minister, Mr John MacGregor, on 24 February. In his covering minute Mr Andrews advised:

If you took no action now and worrying positive results were to emerge from these studies, you would have laid yourself open to criticism for not acting to reduce the risks to public health. I do not see how you could defend taking no action now unless you had the support of the Chief Medical Officer. But, on the face of it, it seems unlikely that he would feel able to endorse a wholly reassuring statement of the likely risks of transmission of this disease to man until we have much more information available. ¹⁷

5.54 Mr Andrews's conclusion was:

I am reluctantly led to the conclusion that, unless the Chief Medical Officer is ready to support you in taking no immediate action, you are faced with no real option but to move to a slaughter and compensation policy. But I do not think that you should take a decision on this until we have consulted the CMO. ¹⁸

5.55 In his written statement to us Mr Andrews said:

I recall that my overriding concern at the time [February 1988] was the possible risk to human health. I felt that the correct way forward on the basis of the information we had was to introduce a slaughter and compensation policy as soon as possible. I advised the Minister that anything short of that would need to be agreed by the CMO. I had reached this conclusion despite the fact that this policy could turn out to be costly and that we were unlikely to persuade the industry to meet the cost of compensation. I had also decided that this was the correct policy in spite of any adverse repercussions on our exports of cattle, semen and embryos to other countries. ¹⁹

5.56 Two days later, Mr Andrews and other MAFF officials met Mr Thompson, the MAFF Parliamentary Secretary, to discuss the submission. According to a minute by Mr Thompson's private secretary, Mr Rees was able to report that recent enquiries appeared to establish a link with feedstuffs containing MBM and tallow, the use of which had increased in the 1980s. The minute noted further discussion on this aspect:

The Secretary felt that, since the evidence on the link with feedingstuffs had been firmed up, it might be possible to effectively contain the problem thus obviating the need to rush into a slaughter policy which would undoubtedly have immediate detrimental effect on exports. It was generally agreed that there would therefore be no need to enter into an open-ended commitment but that it would not deal with the problem of the disease in the national herd at present.

The Secretary felt that it was now necessary to consult the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) on the question of human health. He should be told the decision that Ministers were being asked to take and should be asked for his opinion on the possibility of BSE's transmissibility to humans. He would undoubtedly take a very cautious line on this, but we would, of course, need to be guided by him on this. ²⁰

5.57 Mr Andrews explained to us that this comment was simply addressing the suggestion that a slaughter policy should be introduced as a step towards eradicating the animal disease. So far as the potential risk to human health was concerned, his advice was to approach the CMO. The minute captures this. ²¹

5.58 Mr MacGregor received a copy of this minute. His reaction to this and the submission was described in a minute dated 29 February sent by his private secretary to Mr Andrews's private secretary:

2. He has commented that he is very cautious about this.

3. He does not see how we could proceed without being clear where the offsetting savings are coming from; and it is not just the first year estimate which is relevant here. The figures for later years - which could possibly be much higher - also need to be taken into account.

4. More importantly, there is a read-across to such things as rhizomania. The Minister has commented that although he knows the analogy is not completely exact, he feels that this is not the way it will be seen. The argument that a slaughter and compensation policy would help to stem the spread of the disease (advocated in these papers) is precisely the one sugar beet growers have been making, and which we have strongly and publicly been rejecting.

5. He also thinks that action along the lines recommended now would make the export position much worse, not better. ²²

5.59 Whether this correctly reflected Mr MacGregor's reaction to the submission we shall consider in due course. What is not in doubt is that he did not reverse the decision taken on 26 February that Mr Andrews should seek the advice of the CMO on the possibility of the transmission of BSE to humans. We shall consider the terms in which that advice was sought and subsequent developments later on in this chapter.