Volume 2: Science
Part 2: Commissioning and funding of research, 1986-96
Providers
The Neuropathogenesis Unit (NPU)

The Neuropathogenesis Unit (NPU)

6.76 The NPU had its origins in a recommendation in 1977 by an Advisory Committee on Scrapie chaired by Professor Peter Wildy. The Committee described a provisional scheme for a collaboration between research units at Compton in Berkshire ¹ and in Edinburgh to pursue an 'urgent requirement' for an investigation into the relationship between Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (CJD) and scrapie agents, and recommended that it should receive additional funding. As both a human disease and an animal disease were involved, support by both the MRC and the Agricultural Research Council (ARC, later the AFRC) would be appropriate and liaison between them was considered important. ²

6.77 The collaborative work proceeded during the next two to three years in parallel with an Advisory Group on Scrapie Research. This too was chaired by Professor Wildy, and included as members Dr Richard Kimberlin and Dr Alan Dickinson, both experienced researchers into scrapie. In 1980 Dr Dickinson put forward 'a proposal to establish at Edinburgh a joint ARC/MRC Laboratory for the study of the comparative pathology and the pathogenesis of slow virus diseases and CNS degeneration'. ³ He noted that a suitable building at Edinburgh University was about to be vacated by another ARC unit, ⁴ and proposed that the costs of conversion should be shared by the MRC and the ARC, and that Dr Kimberlin's pathogenesis group should relocate there from the Compton laboratory.

6.78 The Advisory Group supported this proposal, ⁵ which was endorsed in the autumn of 1980 by the ARC and the MRC. ⁶ The NPU opened in 1981:

. . . with the remit of studying scrapie and other unconventional slow infections of the CNS such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease and dementias of the Alzheimer type. ⁷

Dr Dickinson was appointed Director and the AFRC was 'fully responsible for the administration of the Unit and the employment of the staff'. ⁸

6.79 The Unit brought together a wide range of expertise, especially in the genetics, strain characterisation and transmission of scrapie. In the late 1980s, the NPU was the only significant resource in the UK (and one of only a few worldwide) with knowledge and expertise in TSEs. It was therefore a major source of expertise in the investigation and characterisation of BSE.

6.80 From the start, Dr Dickinson was concerned about the level of funding and how this was split between the two Research Councils. He told the Inquiry that a reduction in the expenditure he had proposed had been imposed at the last moment before the ARC /AFRC would endorse the project; that the initial funding ratio of 70 per cent ARC to 30 per cent MRC was much less equal than he had envisaged; ⁹ and that the situation had been worsened by the decision in 1985 to reduce public funding for research into animal diseases by 20 per cent. ¹⁰

6.81 Initially, the NPU's progress was slowed by the need to relocate facilities and staff, and because:

1. refurbishment works were delayed;
2. it was necessary to establish pathogen-free colonies of inbred mouse strains; and
3. financial constraints delayed the appointment of new staff envisaged in the original proposal. ¹¹

6.82 However, the issues of funding, facilities and location that had arisen during its gestation continued to be significant throughout the period with which the Inquiry is concerned, and had an impact on the way in which the NPU carried out its remit. As the MRC reported to the Chief Medical Officer in June 1990:

The Unit has had a chequered history; for example on the scientific side it had been the intention (and this was a factor in the MRC's initial involvement) to establish a programme of work on Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, but for a variety of reasons (partly but not exclusively financial) this was never possible. ¹²

Specialised facilities for work with CJD and other material of human origin were eventually completed in 1994.

6.83 A 1985 Visiting Group was impressed by the quality of the work done so far and planned by the NPU. But it was concerned at the delays and expressed the view that the Director was 'excessively concerned' about the mouse colonies and that he had not given a sufficiently coherent account of the progress made by the Unit and of its future strategies and objectives. They also considered that more interaction was needed with other relevant centres of scientific excellence. ¹³

6.84 In October 1985 the AFRC announced the rationalisation of its research institutes described earlier. ¹⁴ From June 1986 the NPU became part of a new Institute for Animal Disease Research, ¹⁵ with three other laboratories: the Institute for Research on Animal Diseases (IRAD) (at Compton), the Houghton Poultry Research Station (HPRS) (near Huntingdon, Cambridge) and the Animal Virus Research Institute (AVRI) at Pirbright (near Woking, Surrey). It therefore reported to the Director of the new Institute, Professor Biggs.

6.85 Professor Bourne, the second Director (from 1988) of the IAH, was recorded in January 1991 as taking the view that:

. . . only by bringing the NPU within the IAH had the science at the NPU been protected from MAFF's burgeoning demands for BSE-transmission work. The IAH had diverted most of this 'non-science' pressure from the NPU by re-commissioning a 'mothballed' mouse facility at Compton. It was his [Professor Bourne's] view that the NPU standing on its own could not have withstood MAFF's demands; his aim was and is 'to develop and defend the science of the NPU'. Proportionally, the MRC contribution to core funding had fallen . . . He considered, therefore, that the NPU (and the MRC) was benefiting considerably from AFRC's investment in the unit and he was emphatic that a 'stand-alone' unit was 'not on'. ¹⁶

6.86 This change had three significant consequences. Firstly, it led in September 1987 to the early retirement of Dr Dickinson, who found it difficult to accept what he and others saw as a loss of autonomy and of a 'direct line to the [MRC's] Neurosciences Board'. ¹⁷ It proved hard to attract a distinguished independent scientist to succeed him, partly because of the difficulty of putting together a sufficiently attractive package of terms and conditions, and partly because of uncertainties over the future funding and status of the NPU. ¹⁸ After a succession of internal temporary appointments, Dr Chris Bostock ¹⁹ took overall charge of the NPU in April 1990, as head of the IAH TSE programme. Dr Hilary Pickles, the DH Principal Medical Officer whom the Chief Medical Officer had appointed to lead DH's work in relation to BSE, considered that the delay in appointing a new director for the NPU was 'blighting research progress at the most important UK centre for work in this field', and noted that:

The past history of bad feeling between the research councils over the NPU will make research co-ordination a very difficult, if not impossible, task. ²⁰

6.87 Secondly, the NPU was directly affected by the ongoing funding problems that afflicted the new IAH. These stemmed from the decision to withdraw from near-market research, which led to a substantial cut in public funding for agricultural research, and from the Priorities Board's recommendation that spending on animal health research should be reduced by 20 per cent. This led to proposals to rationalise and relocate the IAH's facilities, in order to save on administrative overhead costs.

6.88 The AFRC was attracted by the option of co-locating all the IAH's facilities, including the NPU, on a single site at Compton in Berkshire. Transferring the NPU to Compton was 'a recurring theme that seems to have been driven by attempts to save money rather than for any coherent short- to medium-term scientific imperative'. ²¹ Other possibilities were considered, but the debate returned repeatedly to the Compton option.

6.89 In 1986 the AFRC decided, although not unanimously, to aim to contract the IAH to a single site within five years. ²² However, there was widespread recognition that although a financial and scientific case could be made for relocation, such a move would lead to major disruption and loss of parts of the research programme. Furthermore, at least two reviews recommended against relocating the NPU. The report of a working party chaired by Professor Wildy ²³ and published in February 1988 was unequivocal:

The NPU should on no account be moved as this would seriously disrupt its research programme. ²⁴

6.90 The NPU Site Group of the AFRC's Animal Health Visiting Group advised in June 1988 that it 'could not identify any scientific benefit from moving the NPU to Compton'. ²⁵ The MRC's Neurosciences Board agreed at the same time that:

. . . a change of location in the next few years could have a devastating effect on the Unit's international competitiveness and on the contribution they could make to the BSE problem. ²⁶

6.91 The AFRC deferred a decision on moving the NPU to Compton pending discussions with the MRC. By January 1990 it:

. . . was committed to sustaining the Unit in Edinburgh as an integral part of the AFRC Institute for Animal Health and wished to maintain the joint involvement with MRC. ²⁷

However, subsequent MRC decisions, described below, led:

1. in 1992 to further consideration of the option of moving all or part of the NPU to Compton; ²⁸ and
2. in 1995 to recommendations that the protein science work at the NPU should be moved to Compton and that further consideration should be given to relocating the entire NPU programme there. ²⁹

6.92 This consideration was overtaken by wider developments on BSE, including ministerial concerns about public reaction to perceived reductions in spending on TSE research. ³⁰ Although discussions about the timing of the withdrawal of MRC core funding were continuing, it was decided that 'the NPU will remain in Edinburgh for the foreseeable future although the protein science will be moved to Compton as agreed'. ³¹

6.93 The issue of relocation had become interlinked with the third consequence of the setting up of the IAH: the concern of the MRC about its scientific links with the NPU. ³² When the MRC learned, early in 1988, that the AFRC planned to reduce its funding of the NPU in the hope that the reduction would be made up by MAFF or the farming industry, and that this might mean that the NPU did more applied research at the expense of curiosity-driven work, it concluded that:

Some aspects of the Unit's work were of considerable fundamental importance and had potential implications for man. However, the continuation of the present joint Unit was not necessarily the most appropriate setting in which to pursue work relevant to the MRC. ³³

6.94 The ability of the IAH Director to switch funds between the four laboratories meant, at least in principle, that MRC funds could be used for work that had little or no implications for human health. Dr Dickinson had predicted in 1986 that in such circumstances 'Neuroscience Board members' would be likely to 'rebel'. ³⁴

6.95 Both Research Councils accepted that:

. . . there should be a joint MRC/AFRC review of research on slow viral agents in animals and man with particular reference to BSE, as a prelude to joint decisions about the future work of the Unit, its location and management. ³⁵

This took place in January 1990. Its two key conclusions were that a new Director should be sought and that:

. . . the person appointed would be expected to redirect its programme to focus on the identification of the [BSE] agent using state of the art cellular and molecular biological techniques. ³⁶

6.96 However, in July of the same year, the MRC decided to withdraw its annual core funding of £300,000 after three years and replace it with contracts or commissions. Thereafter:

The level of their financial involvement, which may increase or decrease, will reflect the relevance of the work of the Unit overall to MRC strategy in the field. ³⁷

6.97 In the event, however, a new funding agreement was reached in 1994 and the MRC maintained its core funding contribution until March 1998.