Volume 15: Government and Public Administration
5. Risk analysis: an analytical approach to policy-making
Risk analysis in MAFF - risk communication

5.30 The quality and timeliness of guidance to the public were among the aspects of the handling by MAFF and DH of earlier food scares criticised in reports by two House of Commons Select Committees, ¹ as well as by the media. MAFF responded by setting up a Risk Assessment and Management Strategy Branch in its Food Science Division. Between 1989 and 1994, it did a lot of work on how the level of public understanding might be raised and on opening up public debate about relative risks, the relationship between individuals' views and scientific evidence, and how individuals rank risk. In 1991 the Chief Scientific Adviser welcomed plans by the Economic and Social Research Council for research on consumer perceptions relating to food safety. ²

5.31 Discussions within MAFF were supplemented by seminars involving invited speakers from inside and outside government, and research by external consultants into the views and approaches adopted in various parts of MAFF. There was an attempt to develop an IT system that could be used by members of the public to record the values they placed on the risks and benefits of different food-related hazards (this was called 'a risk prioritisation tool kit' ³).

5.32 Dr Christopher Fisher (MAFF, Food Science), a key figure in this work, told the Inquiry that initially 'the importance of taking outside views into account in policy-making was not yet fully understood'. ⁴ There was soon an attempt to remedy this and to mend damaged fences by establishing a discussion forum, the Consumer Panel. This first met in April 1990 and brought together MAFF Ministers, key MAFF and DH officials, and representatives of consumer groups.

5.33 Considerable hopes rested on these initiatives, but their outcome was rather disappointing. The consultants' report ⁵ identified some doubts about MAFF's effectiveness in communicating with the public on food safety issues, and a follow-up paper, Towards a Risk Communication Strategy, ⁶ which was not circulated to MAFF officials for consultation until September 1994, met with a lukewarm reception, and 'in the end there was no further action taken'. ⁷ The 'tool kit' IT system for recording public views was developed and extensively tested both within and outside MAFF, but was considered to be too slow and not sufficiently cost-effective to justify further work. ⁸ The Consumer Panel facilitated discussion, but as representative and campaigning organisations, the consumer groups could not be expected to convey messages on the Government's behalf. Nor did they have any means of communicating with the wider public beyond their own membership. At best, they could only enlarge at the meetings on current consumer concerns.

5.34 The evidence suggests that the food scientists' efforts were regarded as interesting but academic by their administrative colleagues:

We have made considerable efforts to make others aware of the R&D work on risk management, as you know, but even where we have had high quality work it has been something of an uphill struggle to get others to take notice. ⁹

Dialogue with consumers was accepted in principle, but was considered likely to be undermined by the media and by pressure groups with their own agendas. ¹⁰ The step from 'a purely academic context' to practical usefulness was difficult to take. ¹¹

5.35 In the case of BSE, there were two main dialogues: between the MAFF administrators and the veterinarians, doctors and other scientists who advised them; and between the Government and the public. The media (the press, radio and television) played an important role, as they were the main means of communication with the public.