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Volume 15: Government and Public Administration 8.4 Constitutionally, Ministers alone were accountable to Parliament for their own actions and also for those of their officials, who were seen as an extension of the Minister, acting on his or her behalf. Officials were accountable up the hierarchy within their Department to the Minister but it was the Minister who informed Parliament about any errors or delays. 1 8.5 A Cabinet Office memorandum to the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee in 1993-94 sought to distinguish 'accountability' from 'responsibility'. Quoting the 'Armstrong Memorandum' of 1985 (described in more detail later in this chapter), it stated that: A Minister is accountable to Parliament, in the sense that he has a duty to explain in Parliament the exercise of his powers and duties and to give an account to Parliament of what is done by him in his capacity as a Minister or by his Department. 2 Against this, Ministerial 'responsibility': . . . implies direct personal involvement in an action or decision, in a sense which implies personal credit or blame for that action or decision. 3 8.6 On this basis, a Minister would be accountable for the actions of his or her Department but not necessarily responsible for them. 8.7 The Inquiry has taken the view that it need neither adopt nor challenge this constitutional convention. It is not a helpful guide in considering how to assess the adequacy of the response to BSE, whether anyone should be criticised for any inadequacy, and what lessons can be learned and recommendations made for the future. 8.8 Holding Ministers accountable for any inadequacy may provide a means of ensuring the accountability of the executive to Parliament, by requiring Ministers to explain matters to the House, but it cannot provide the Inquiry with a means of considering how decisions came to be taken and actions implemented, or how the process of public administration can be improved. That requires a detailed examination of the precise part played by officials and Ministers, including what information was available to each individual, what Ministers were told by officials, what Ministers told officials, and who in fact was involved in decisions or actions. The story of how BSE was identified, how officials and Ministers considered what to do, and how the various control measures evolved and were introduced, is told in volumes 3 to 11 of this Report. The Inquiry Committee's summary consideration of what happened and its conclusions are set out in volume 1. 1 An exception to this is the position of the Accounting Officer described below at paragraph 8.17 2 Ministerial Accountability and Responsibility: Memorandum Submitted by the Cabinet Office, in the Treasury and Civil Service Committee Fifth Report, The Role of the Civil Service (HC 27-II 1993-94), Volume II, p. 189, para. 6 3 Treasury and Civil Service Committee Fifth Report, The Role of the Civil Service (HC 27-II 1993-94), Volume II, p.189, para. 8 |
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