Volume 11: Scientists after Southwood
5. Challenges to the Government's approach
Introduction

5.1 Shortly after the emergence of BSE, the Government introduced control measures on the basis of work by government scientists who had identified the vector of disease and begun to characterise the nature of the infective agent. However, the conclusions reached were not universally accepted by all scientists, some of whom criticised government findings as well as the reluctance of the Government to allocate funds for research into alternative theories. Several scientists and farmers developed views about the disease, that ran counter to the Government's views. They were often vigorous in seeking to persuade MAFF and DH of their views and concerns about the disease, including the implications for human health. The media regularly took up their cause.

5.2 In this chapter we look at the views of three microbiologists (Professor Richard Lacey, Dr Stephen Dealler and Dr Harash Narang) and one organic farmer (Mr Mark Purdey) and their interactions with MAFF and DH from the late 1980s up until March 1996. In the first section of this chapter we look at Professor Lacey and Dr Dealler, who have featured in other parts of the Report, eg, vol.6: Human Health 1989-96. Before BSE emerged they had worked together on promoting food safety, and often shared the same views on the Government's response to BSE.

5.3 We then turn to Dr Narang who developed several diagnostic tests for BSE and sought to promote their adoption by MAFF and DH. Finally we look at the Government's response to the theories of Mr Purdey regarding the relationship between BSE and the use of organophosphates (OPs) in agriculture. Further details of Dr Narang's diagnostic tests and a scientific assessment of Mr Purdey's theories are given in vol.2: Science.

5.4 Our intention in providing the above accounts is to explore the Government's response to, and handling of, unsolicited independent views, particularly from those who pursued their case with persistence during 1986 to 1996. We are aware, of course, of other independent scientists, farmers and members of the public who were interested in BSE and voiced their concerns during this period. Indeed we have received evidence from many of these during the course of the Inquiry. Elsewhere in the Report, for example, we mention Dr Helen Grant (a consultant neuropathologist) who was often cited in the media during this period about her concerns that beef-eaters in the UK were consuming large doses of the causal agent of BSE which 'would inevitably infect genetically susceptible people'. ¹ Her concerns were first raised shortly after the Southwood Report was published, as discussed in vol.6: Human Health, 1989-96.