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Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
2. Setting the context
Government and BSE

151 MAFF had lead responsibility on most BSE matters and was the 'sponsor department' for those industries which found themselves implicated in the generation and spread of the disease. This raises a question of conflict of interest which we shall discuss later in this volume. MAFF officials took the lead on research into the disease. Its veterinarians and scientists had particularly important advisory roles about its causes and nature and negotiated with their counterparts abroad about measures to control it. They had considerable national and international stature. On a number of occasions the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO), or an Assistant CVO, acted as the authoritative government voice.

152 The risk from BSE to human health took matters beyond MAFF's departmental borders. Acting as the authoritative public voice on the safety of beef was a role undertaken by the Chief Medical Officer (CMO) at the Department of Health (DH), and it was the CMO who had oversight of the response within his Department. He and his colleagues were closely involved in considering and agreeing with MAFF measures to reduce risks to human health via food, pharmaceuticals, occupational exposure and other pathways. They mainly relied on advice from outside experts and committees.

153 Measures affecting most aspects of agriculture and health in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were the responsibility of Departments overseen by the Welsh, Scottish and Northern Ireland Offices. Others directly concerned with the response to BSE included the Health and Safety Executive (HSE), because of risks through occupational exposure; the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) as sponsor Department for the cosmetics and toiletries industries; the Department of the Environment (DoE) in respect of the effects of various methods of waste disposal such as carcass burial and incineration; and the Department of Education and Science (DES), both in handling funds for the Research Councils sponsoring much of the BSE research, and in giving advice about dissecting bovine eyeballs.

154 Three general features of the arrangement of legislative powers and duties described in vol. 14: Responsibilities for Human and Animal Health bore directly on how BSE was handled:

  • Although Departments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland had responsibility for many agricultural and health matters, the guiding principle was that issues affecting the safety of food, medicines and other consumer products, and the prevention and control of infectious animal and human disease, should be dealt with consistently on a UK-wide basis.
  • The main Acts of Parliament governing the different areas in which BSE impacted were a heterogeneous collection of legislation. Each of those covering animal health, food safety, wholesomeness of feedstuffs, control of pollution, medicines safety, consumer protection, and occupational risk had its own set of basic concepts, preferred approach and basic machinery on matters requiring public intervention. Associated with each major Act or EU instrument was a shoal of subordinate legislation reflecting the differing powers, duties, sanctions and enforcing agencies. There could be no uniform approach to the response to BSE.
  • Although central government was largely responsible for the Regulations made about BSE, it usually fell to local government to enforce them.

155 Volume 15: Government and Public Administration explains how policy is developed and implemented within Departments, the main terminology and procedures that crop up throughout the other volumes, the relationship between Ministers and officials, and how accountability operates.

156 The volume also describes conventions for consultation and cooperation within and between Departments. The need for 'joined-up government' is not new. It reflects a basic characteristic of institutions. Policy matters rarely have neat boundaries or single solutions. Each Department, division or agency reasonably enough has its own agenda, reflecting its particular set of statutory responsibilities. It is necessary to secure agreement about the efforts of different agencies with different responsibilities, priorities and especially budgets, in order to achieve common objectives.

157 During the 1980s and 1990s decision-making was affected by legislative and financial control pressures, and by administrative developments:

  • the existing legislation. Departments generally had to make do with existing primary legislation, although it was often not ideally suited to addressing the problems of BSE. New secondary legislation could be introduced, but this required clearance, consultation, and time to introduce;
  • resource planning. Money to run Departments and finance their operations had to be voted by Parliament under itemised heads. The justification for bids was rigorously scrutinised by the Treasury as part of the control of government spending. Voted money could not be switched at will to different purposes, nor could Departments overspend. This system involved an annual cycle of bids and negotiations for resources for the next three years. The cost of any proposed new action was therefore a major consideration;
  • cuts in resources. The heavy squeeze on public spending on administration year on year throughout the period, both in Whitehall Departments and in local government, required MAFF to make significant cuts in running costs; it reduced its staff numbers by 12 per cent between 1986 and 1996. Research budgets were being slashed. Making room for BSE work involved jettisoning something else. Strict staff ceilings were in operation. Unclear prospects made recruitment for many types of post difficult, and staff in post were overloaded;
  • value for money and charging. There was increased emphasis on business efficiency, charging for services or certificates, and measured performance targets. Setting up Executive Agencies took considerable management time, including that involved in setting up systems for charges and fees; and
  • deregulation. A key aim of the Government was to lift the burden of state regulation from industry, especially small businesses. Instructions and government papers were issued urging this on Departments. Proposals for new measures had to be tested against their cost to industry. Enforcement was expected to be done with a light touch.
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