Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
8. Occupational risk
Overview of occupational health

1049 The factor that most influenced the pace of action in both these case studies, and in reviewing occupational safety generally, was the belief that the risk from BSE was remote. We discuss elsewhere the reverberations of the wording used in the Southwood Report. In particular, the recommendation to the HSE in the Report about the issue of further advice to at-risk groups was scarcely a clarion call to action. The HSE attributed MAFF's eagerness to get advice issued to political and media pressures. It saw no reason to depart from its normal number-based risk assessment approach and measured processes for evolving guidance. These were sound but slow.

1050 A second factor was the absence of a comprehensive review of pathways of transmission to ensure that all the critical points had been identified. As discussed in Chapter 9 of Volume 7, Dr Matthews of MAFF, immediately after his meeting with the HSE on 9 June 1989 to discuss the issue of advice, had commissioned a list of slaughterhouse products and their destinations. This was intended to assist thinking about high-risk occupations that should be given early consideration. Unfortunately, this exercise was not taken much further. Had the audit of possible pathways of infection proceeded, it might have helped to pinpoint where the issue of urgent advice could not wait.

1051 The third factor was the inherently slow metabolism of the consultative and drafting arrangements on occupational safety. While polished and carefully agreed detailed guidance was to be desired, it ought not to have been at the expense of prompt and straightforward interim warnings.