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Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions 1044 We turn now to our other cautionary tale, this time involving a different part of Whitehall, the Department of Education and Science (DES), as it was then known. We deal with this topic at some length in vol. 6: Human Health, 1989-96, Chapter 9. The dissection of bovine eyeballs in biology lessons was one of the 'unusual pathways' for possible disease transmission - to teachers and pupils - and needed to be addressed, since the eye is closely associated with the brain structure. There was no basic disagreement among officials about that. What went wrong was that the relatively simple task of agreeing the text of a brief warning note about it turned into a two-year saga.
1045 We know this episode has rightly been investigated by DES itself. Mr Baker had identified the issue as a matter for his branch, Schools Branch 3, in July 1990. We have concluded that steps should have been taken to avoid the delay that occurred from May 1991 to December 1992. As he himself acknowledged, responsibility for this delay fell in considerable measure to Mr Baker. Mr Jacobs, who had day-to-day responsibility for the issue within Mr Baker's branch until February 1992, also shared some of the responsibility. Mr Baker and, to a lesser degree, Mr Jacobs should have ensured that this matter was promptly and properly addressed. Mr Baker and Mr Jacobs faced a heavy workload of competing priorities at that time and this is something we have borne in mind. 1046 Unfortunately, it seemed to us that some delay was also caused by Dr Ernaelsteen's advice in May 1992 that guidance was no longer timely. Having commendably stood her ground up to then, we consider it regrettable that, in the absence of any new medical facts, Dr Ernaelsteen countenanced any further delay in issuing advice on stopping the practice of bovine eyeball dissection. 1047 The story seemed to us to offer salutary lessons. The people handling the matter were far from the scene of action on BSE. That was other Departments' business. Their own Minister was not involved. No framework of overall action was in place through which they were accountable. All in all there seemed to be no hurry. Meanwhile other work was more pressing. Safety of pupils and teachers was outside DES's normal remit and many people had to be consulted. As with all civil service documents, there was an urge to refine and polish wording. As time went by, the delay itself made the issue of guidance less appealing. 1048 Here as in other areas, excessively reassuring language about the risk from BSE sedated those who needed to act. Insofar as they had a perception of the situation, it was that the risk was remote. There was no strong sense of 'ownership' of the topic to overcome the difficulty of working across normal boundaries in unfamiliar territory. There was no overall frame of reference and accountability. |
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