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Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions 1037 The HSE had an established role on national guidance about handling dangerous pathogens. It also looked for expert outside advice to the ACDP, which reported jointly to it and DH. The ACDP Chairman was Dr Tyrrell. 1038 The ACDP had been closely involved in the categorisation of levels of risk from pathogens and advising on appropriate precautions. It had reviewed procedures for handling CJD and it was natural for the HSE and DH to look to it for advice on handling other TSEs. A Working Group of the ACDP (ACDPWG) was set up in February 1991 to: . . . report to the ACDP on the need for additional guidance on health and safety aspects of work with animals or humans, their tissues or in vitro systems infected or potentially infected with spongiform encephalopathy agent, and to draw up guidance. 1039 Professor Peter Biggs was asked to chair the Working Group, but Dr Pickles stood in for him at the first couple of meetings. Displaying the same energy and purposefulness as on other matters, she launched the work with her own paper. This not only provided draft outlines of the scope of the document that might be prepared but suggested a handling plan and timetable to enable the guidance to appear at the earliest possible date. Unfortunately, that timetable soon faltered and sank into a drafting morass. The following chronology illustrates this. The 14-month history of a so-called 'fast-track' professional letter for neurosurgeons is distinguished by italics. The 'Guidance Document' had a gestation period of over three years.
1040 Witnesses suggested a variety of reasons for this sorry tale. They included uncertainty about appropriate decontamination procedures and about blood products; pressure of other work on the secretariat; and being side-tracked into protracted drafting time on the professional letter of warning on neuro- and ophthalmic surgery procedures. Once the Working Group had become caught up in a cycle of widely spaced meetings to consider substantial redrafting, they were constantly overtaken by emerging new information. Professor Biggs described it graphically: In a way, the Working Group was on a treadmill in the sense that any delay arising from the time needed to address a subject, or any other reason, was time during which new information became available requiring re-addressing subjects already dealt with. 1041 A background factor influencing the handling of the exercise was the controversy over whether human TSEs were a category 2 risk or, as some argued, should be in category 3, requiring more rigorous safeguards. There was also debate over whether BSE should be categorised at all, it being open to question whether it was a human pathogen. 1042 Further delays were then incurred until September 1994, after the document had been agreed by the ACDP in mid-1993. We were told that this was while DH finalised advice on at-risk patient groups inadvertently treated with CJD-infected medicines or tissue grafts. 1043 While each of these reasons was no doubt thought to be valid justification at the time for taking a measured pace, collectively they produced what seems to us a quite unacceptable delay. The workers concerned were in occupations that potentially exposed them to particularly high risks, yet they were among the last to receive guidance. The best was allowed to become the enemy of the good. |
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