Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
5. The animal health story
Introduction of the animal SBO ban
The voluntary animal SBO ban
The cat
The pig
The statutory animal SBO ban

351 In Chapter 4 we examined the consideration given by the Southwood Working Party to the risk that attached to eating beef or offal from animals infected with BSE but not yet showing clinical signs (subclinical animals). We saw that the Working Party did not consider that the risk posed to humans (other than babies) justified any precautions. The same was true in relation to the risk involved in feeding such matter to animals, although the Working Party expressed some general reservations about the practice of disposing of animal waste in this way.

352 As we have pointed out, the virulence of the infectivity of subclinical animals is indicated by the fact that, despite the ruminant feed ban and the animal SBO ban, over 41,000 cattle born after 18 July 1988 developed clinical signs of BSE. Most of these would have been infected by MBM derived from apparently healthy cattle, since clinically affected animals were removed from the human and animal food chains.

353 In June 1989 the Government announced that it had decided to go beyond the precautions recommended by the Southwood Working Party and to ban Specified Bovine Offal (SBO) from human food. ¹ MAFF officials had reservations about imposing the human SBO ban. These included apprehension that it might lead to public pressure for further precautionary measures. These concerns were soon to prove well founded.

354 Even before the human SBO ban was introduced, the pet food industry had been considering whether to stop incorporating in pet food those bovine tissues most likely to be infectious if they came from an animal incubating BSE. The major pet food manufacturers have a guiding principle, which is that nothing should be incorporated in pet food which is not fit for human consumption. No sooner had the Government announced that it intended to introduce a ban on including certain types of bovine offal in human food than the Pet Food Manufacturers' Association advised its members to exclude this offal from their products.

The voluntary animal SBO ban

355 At this time farmers began to express concern about purchasing pig and poultry feed that contained animal protein - particularly protein derived from those parts of cattle which had been banned from human consumption. Some supermarkets were also showing a reluctance to purchase meat from animals that had been reared on such feed. In order to restore customer confidence UKASTA decided in July 1989 to advise its members to insist that any MBM which they purchased for incorporation in animal feed should be SBO-free. This led the UK Renderers' Association (UKRA) to threaten that its members would be forced to refuse to accept SBO for rendering if there ceased to be any custom for the end product. Mr Meldrum persuaded UKASTA to defer introducing its voluntary ban until the human SBO ban came into force. ²

356 It was at this time that Mr Gummer succeeded Mr MacGregor as Minister of Agriculture. In September he received a submission from his officials about UKASTA's proposed voluntary ban. They had considered, in the light of the Southwood Report, whether any restrictions should be placed on feeding animal protein to non-ruminants and decided that there was no scientific justification for this. In their submission to Mr Gummer, they warned of 'serious implications' if UKASTA went ahead with its proposed ban. Renderers would be likely to refuse to accept 1,500 tonnes of SBO per week. Slaughterhouses left with SBO on their hands might be forced to close. Public pressure might grow for a complete ban on animal protein in animal feed.

357 At a meeting with UKASTA on 2 October 1989, Mr Gummer sought to dissuade the Association from its proposed ban, arguing that there was no scientific justification for this. He said that the human SBO ban was only being introduced for 'administrative convenience'. ³ UKASTA remained unmoved by this and by continued pressure from MAFF officials to drop its ban. Later in the month Mr Lawrence wrote:

Despite all our efforts UKASTA seem hell bent on pursuing their potentially damaging course . . . I am concerned and aggrieved that UKASTA seem blind to the consequences of their actions.

358 On 9 November, four days before the human SBO ban came into force, UKASTA issued a circular to its members recommending that their contracts for the purchase of MBM should stipulate that this must be SBO-free.

359 Not all feed compounders refused to accept MBM derived from SBO. A limited market developed for this, at a lower price than SBO-free meal. Renderers sought to satisfy the demands of those customers seeking meal that was free of SBO by insisting that slaughterhouses separate the SBO from other offal. Renderers collected the SBO in separate containers for processing as waste, but charged for doing so. Renderers had, however, no means of ensuring that slaughterhouses complied strictly with this requirement. MAFF officials continued to protest that there was no justification for the ban.

360 In introducing a voluntary SBO ban, UKASTA and UKRA were doing no more than responding to customer demand. They were not concerned with the question whether or not their customers' perceptions were scientifically sound; or with the adverse financial consequences that the ban had for slaughterhouses. These were matters of legitimate concern to MAFF. There were good grounds for believing that pigs and poultry had shown themselves impervious to TSEs - a point on which Mr Meldrum sought and obtained confirmation from Professor Southwood. We have no criticism to make of MAFF officials' and Ministers' vigorous opposition to the voluntary SBO ban at this stage of the story.

361 In the months that followed, MAFF came under increasing pressure to introduce a statutory ban on the incorporation of SBO in animal feed, and some pressure to introduce a total ban on feeding animal protein to animals. Ministers sought reassurance that there was no merit in these proposals. Their officials assured them that they had no scientific justification. This reassurance Mr Gummer conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mrs Margaret Thatcher, at the end of January 1990, when she in her turn queried whether it was desirable to continue feeding animal protein to pigs and poultry. Over the months that followed, MAFF officials continued to insist that there was no scientific justification for an animal SBO ban. Then came the cat.

The cat

362 On 9 May 1990 Mr Gummer was informed that a Siamese cat had died of a spongiform encephalopathy. This was the first known case of Feline Spongiform Encephalopathy (FSE). The public reaction was predictable. Had the cat caught BSE? If BSE could be transmitted to a cat, why not to humans? The media had a field day. We deal with the human health implications of the cat later. Here we are concerned with the implications it had in relation to animal feed.

363 It was not clear at the time whether there was any connection between BSE and the cat. It was possible that cases of FSE had occurred in the past, but had never been diagnosed. Mr Gummer understood from Mr Meldrum that there was no likely connection between the cat and BSE. Mr Meldrum should not have given this reassurance, for it put the matter too high.

364 The cat led to renewed public concern about the practice of feeding SBO to pigs and poultry. In a meeting with Mr Gummer, Sir Simon Gourlay, the President of the National Farmers' Union (NFU), suggested that MAFF should introduce a statutory SBO ban for pig and poultry feed, thereby regaining the initiative and restoring public confidence. Mr Gummer's response was that there was no scientific justification for such action, which would be unlikely to allay public concern but would merely move the debate to another vulnerable area. The NFU was not convinced. In June 1990 it issued advice to farmers recommending that they should not use animal feed that included SBO.

365 That there was no scientific justification for an SBO ban remained MAFF's public position. The cat had changed nothing. SEAC had, however, been asked to give urgent consideration to the implications of the cat. SEAC then indicated that it wanted to give consideration to pig and poultry feed. This led Mr Gummer, who previously had seen no need to refer this matter to SEAC, to ask the Committee to consider the whole question of feeding animal protein to animals. Neither he nor his officials thought it appropriate to inform the feed industry or others that he had done so. Mr Andrews, the Permanent Secretary, remarked that 'the issue would have to be very carefully handled'.

366 The issue was carefully handled. Over a period of several months a paper was prepared for SEAC on the inclusion of SBO in feed for non-ruminants. This set out MAFF's reasons for concluding that there was no justification for preventing this practice and invited SEAC to endorse that conclusion. In August 1990 the paper was submitted to Mr Gummer for his approval, which it received. But before the paper could be considered by SEAC, it was overtaken by events (see paragraph 368 below).

367 The furore that greeted the announcement of the first case of FSE led MAFF to adopt an unnecessarily defensive approach to pressure for an animal SBO ban. Public pronouncements suggesting that the cat was no cause for concern did not carry conviction. MAFF witnesses emphasised to us that if any doubt had been expressed, this would have been treated as being of major significance, indicating a possible change of policy. We do not criticise MAFF officials for the cautious stance that they took, but we feel that it was ill-judged in that it harmed their credibility. They would have done better to state openly that, while MAFF did not consider that the cat called for any change of policy, SEAC had nonetheless been asked to advise whether it had any implications in relation to the composition of animal feed.

The pig

368 In August 1990 the whole picture was changed by the experimental transmission of BSE to a pig by injection of infectious material into the brain. This experiment had started 15 months earlier. In July 1990, in a note to Mr Gummer, Mr David Maclean, the Minister for Food Safety, suggested that some contingency planning should be put in hand against the possibility that this experiment might produce a positive result. He expressed the view that in that event:

We would have no option but to ban specified offals from pig and poultry feeds also. No-one should imagine that we could do anything else. It would be pie in the sky to believe that we could hold the line on this or somehow distinguish poultry feed from pig feed.

369 MAFF officials did not agree. In a note to Mr Andrews, which he told us he had cleared with his veterinary colleagues, Mr Robert Lowson ⁴ said that there was not much that they could do to prepare for the possibility that offal would have to be banned from pig and poultry feed, but that this would only become necessary if it was shown that transmission could be effected by the feed route. Transmission by inoculation would not justify a ban. Mr Andrews endorsed this view. It proved to be wrong.

370 When, on 20 August, news was received that BSE had been transmitted experimentally to a pig, Mr Meldrum and Mr Gummer agreed that this should be kept confidential until SEAC's advice had been obtained. An emergency meeting of SEAC was held on 7 September. A paper was prepared for this meeting by Mr Meldrum which put forward three options:

• Do nothing
• Ban MBM derived from SBO from animal feed
• Ban all MBM from animal feed.

The paper stated that the second option:

. . . would, in practice, simply add the weight of legislation to an arrangement which is already operating de facto on a voluntary basis. This is the option that holds most attraction for the Ministry's veterinary advisers.

371 By the time of SEAC's meeting, FSE had been reported in nine cats. SEAC concluded that the result of the pig experiment indicated that it would be prudent to exclude SBO from pig diet, and that the cases of FSE suggested that a cautious view should be taken of those species which might be susceptible to BSE. Accordingly SBO should be excluded from the feed of all species. Mr Meldrum's second option had found favour.

The statutory animal SBO ban

372 When Mr Gummer was informed of this advice, he accepted it. This accorded with an approach to BSE that he had decided to adopt as a matter of principle: decisions on what action should be taken in the face of any development should always be referred to SEAC, and SEAC's advice should be followed.

373 On this occasion Mr Gummer was determined that news of the result of the pig experiment should not leak out until MAFF was in a position to announce its response to it. The task of drafting appropriate Regulations was tackled by the MAFF lawyers based on instructions from officials in what had become the Animal Health and Veterinary Group, but without any wider consultation. Although implementation of an animal SBO ban would involve, as a matter of critical importance, practices in the slaughterhouse, Mr Keith Baker, the Assistant Chief Veterinary Officer responsible for meat hygiene, was not consulted. Instructions were given that the Territorial Departments in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland were to be informed 'at the latest possible moment and in such a way that as few as possible people were in the picture'.

374 SEAC confirmed its advice on 20 September. The draft Order implementing it was submitted for signature on 21 September. MAFF announced the making of the Order ⁵ in a news release on 24 September and the Order came into force on the following day. Mr John Maslin of the Animal Health Division was to describe the Order as made 'in haste and secrecy'. That was a fair description.

375 The new Order amended the Order that had introduced the ruminant feed ban. It prohibited the sale, supply and use of SBO, feedstuffs containing SBO, or animal protein derived from SBO for feeding to animals and poultry. It also prohibited the export to EU Member States of feedstuffs containing SBO or animal protein derived from SBO.