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Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
3. The early years, 1986-88
Restraints on information

175 CVL staff thought that they might have identified a bovine form of scrapie, but they were not sure. The experts in this field were the members of the Neuropathogenesis Unit (NPU) in Edinburgh. If the CVL had consulted them at this stage, the NPU would have confirmed that there were very strong indications that this was indeed a new Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy (TSE). In the event the CVL did not seek the collaboration of the NPU until June 1987, and Mr Wells did not get confirmation from the NPU of his diagnosis until the end of July. Having regard to the importance of this matter, we think that Dr William Watson, the Director of the CVL, should have sought the assistance of the NPU from the outset.

176 It was important that MAFF should discover not merely the nature of the problem, but also its scale. If private vets and members of the VI (Veterinary Investigation) Service around the country were told of what the CVL had found and asked to look out for cattle with similar signs, reporting of cases, which might otherwise go unremarked, would be encouraged. Unfortunately, in the first half of 1987 there was a policy that one Senior Veterinary Investigation Officer described as 'a total suppression of all information on the subject'. This was encouraged by an understandable anxiety on the part of Mr Wells that MAFF should not go public until the CVL was sufficiently sure of its ground to advance a scientifically responsible claim to have discovered a new disease. In March 1987 a proposed publication about BSE in Vision, a VI Service newsletter, did not proceed. The decision was Dr Watson's, who should not have permitted Mr Wells's concern to prevail over the desirability of effective surveillance.

177 Events after March 1987 demonstrated a policy of restricting dissemination of information about BSE. The principal reason for this was concern about 'the possible effect on exports and the political implications' should news get out that a possible TSE in cattle had been discovered in Britain. Publication to the VI Service of information about BSE eventually took place in June. This was not in Vision, which was circulated to Veterinary Investigation Officers (VIOs) not only in England and Wales, but also in Scotland. Instead a circular letter was sent to Senior VIOs in England and Wales, describing the clinical signs and the pathology and calling for notification of similar cases to a Senior Veterinary Officer at the State Veterinary Service headquarters at Tolworth, Surrey. It directed that VI staff should not consult Research Institutes or University Departments, or publish anything about BSE or discuss it at meetings without clearance. A proposed letter by a VIO to the Veterinary Record describing the clinical signs and the pathology of BSE was refused permission for submission to the journal.

178 Primary responsibility for this policy lay with Mr Rees, the CVO, but it received support from his subordinates, Dr Watson and Dr Bernard Williams, the head of the VI Service. We can see why there were concerns that reports of a possible TSE in cattle might harm the industry and, in particular, the export market. But this did not justify suppression of information needed if disease surveillance was to operate effectively. Dr Watson and Dr Williams should have urged the merits of publication and Mr Rees should have permitted it.

179 An article by Mr Wells for the Veterinary Record, which compared the pathology of BSE and scrapie, was embargoed and it was made plain that comparisons with scrapie were not acceptable. This line was taken at the instigation of Mr Rees. He should have permitted publication of the article and he should have permitted comparisons with scrapie.

180 Had there been a policy of openness rather than secrecy, this would have resulted in a higher rate of referral of cases to MAFF in the earlier part of 1987. This, in turn, might have led to a better appreciation of the growing scale of the problem and hence to remedial measures being taken sooner than they were.

181 In the second half of 1987, restraints on publication of information about BSE were progressively relaxed. Articles about BSE were submitted to the Veterinary Record and the disease was the subject of discussion at a number of agricultural trade meetings. In October articles about the disease appeared in the farming and national press. The number of cases reported increased rapidly. At the end of May there had been 6 identified cases and 13 suspected cases. By the beginning of September there were 66 suspect cases, of which 8 were histopathologically confirmed. By the end of October the figures were 120 and 29, and by the end of the year 370 suspects, of which 132 were confirmed.

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