Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
5. The animal health story
Conclusions

483 We have reached the end of a black chapter in the BSE story. There are lessons to be learned from it, which we consider later. At this point we have a few concluding remarks.

484 Mr Meldrum was correct to stress the structural problems prior to 1995 of enforcing Regulations in slaughterhouses. The MHS was not introduced as a response to the problems of BSE. Its introduction was, nonetheless, of the greatest significance in addressing the dangers that BSE posed to the human and animal food chains.

485 The SVS, of which the VFS was one arm, had no statutory role in relation to the enforcement of the SBO Regulations. The monitoring role that it had undertaken was essential. Statutory recognition of that role, and statutory power of entry in support, would have been desirable.

486 In the event, largely as a result of the direction of Mr Meldrum, the SVS found itself increasingly filling the gaps in the statutory machinery for enforcing the animal SBO ban. One example was the monitoring that the VFS undertook of collection centres. Another was the negotiation with UKRA of the Code of Practice that was introduced in order to reduce cross-contamination at the renderers.

487 Finally, we should recognise the credit due to the continued efforts of the MHS, the SVS and slaughterhouse operators themselves, spurred on by the vigorous intervention of Mr Hogg, in turning round in 1995 what, up to then, had been a most unsatisfactory state of affairs. They were assisted in doing so by the belated introduction of an excellent regulatory scheme.