Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
11. Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland
Collective government and working relationships

1113 Tackling BSE entailed a huge exercise in public administration. It required close working between Ministers and officials, consultation and cooperation between Departments and efficient follow-up action. Our Inquiry has been a review of all these matters and of how far collective government rose to the challenge.

1114 Collective government across the different parts of the UK required its own set of working relationships. By and large the machine worked reasonably well, but there were many recognised endemic difficulties. Unsurprisingly these sometimes gave decision-making on BSE a bumpy ride. We were told with some vigour of frustrations about failures and delays in communication between Whitehall and the Territories.

1115 In some respects this mirrored communication failings between Whitehall Departments, and between the cadres of administrative and professional advisers. For the Territories, travelling times to and from London exacerbated the problems. Typical examples of these difficulties, where BSE was concerned, included MAFF delays in telling Scottish administrators about the disease, DH disinterest in views from Scotland and Wales, and the absence of territorial officials from formative meetings.

1116 Communication problems were particularly significant in relation to the Territories' reliance on Whitehall for scientific expertise and risk analysis. It made sense that such work was not duplicated. But if the material passed on was meagre and late, consultation was purely token. Moreover, without access to the basic information, the Territorial Departments had to rely on the judgements already made in Whitehall and on Q&A briefing that might itself slide over the underlying issues. The handling of BSE cast some of these difficulties into strong relief. The lessons they offer for the future are described in Chapter 14.