Volume 1: Findings and Conclusions
Annex 2: Individual criticisms
Protection of human health, 1989-96

• Sir Donald Acheson and Mr Clarke should have ensured that the Department of Health reviewed the Southwood Report, and in particular considered the question why, if offal was not safe for babies, it was nevertheless safe for adults (Volume 1, paragraphs 542 and 550; Volume 6, paragraphs 3.63-3.134).
• Mrs Attridge should have pursued the question 'Why should we take action on baby food and not on hamburgers?'; Mr Cruickshank should have taken steps to find out why the Southwood Report drew a distinction between babies and others and between clinical and subclinical animals; and Mr Meldrum should have pursued these questions (Volume 1, paragraph 552; Volume 6, paragraphs 3.102-3.116).
• Mr Andrews should have raised with Mr MacGregor the need to have an answer to the question why action should be taken on baby food and not other food, and Mr MacGregor himself should have seen that the question was pursued (Volume 1, paragraph 553; Volume 6, paragraphs 3.63-3.124).
• Mr MacGregor is commended for introducing the SBO ban, but he should not have agreed to a presentation of that ban which played down its importance as a protection for human health (Volume 1, paragraph 569; Volume 6, Chapter 3, paragraphs 3.358-3.320).
• Mr Colin Maclean was responsible for inaccurate statements to the public in material prepared on behalf of the MLC in 1990. These statements, which exaggerated the safety of beef and suggested that precautions that had been put in place were unnecessary, were capable of misleading and Mr Maclean should have been more careful (Volume 1, paragraphs 645 and 654; Volume 6, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.729-4.743).
• Sir Donald Acheson should have appreciated that his public statement about the cat was likely to give false reassurance about the possibility that BSE might be transmissible to humans; the possibility of BSE having being transmitted to a cat was cause for concern and needed to be investigated by scientists (Volume 1, paragraph 660; Volume 6, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.170-4.724).
• Dr Metters told colleagues they should avoid the implication that 'somehow the disease poses a risk to human health'; he should not have adopted this approach (Volume 1, paragraph 672; Volume 6, Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.725-4.728).
• Sir Kenneth Calman should not have made statements in 1993 and 1995 without ensuring that they fairly reflected his appraisal of the risk posed by BSE (Volume 1, paragraphs 721-724 and 770; Volume 6, paragraphs 5.337-5.349 and 6.341-6.351).
• Dr Kendell should not have made a public statement in 1995 which did not make it plain that the safety of eating beef was dependent on strict compliance with the precautionary measures introduced by the Government (Volume 1, paragraph 773; Volume 9, paragraphs 11.40-11.53).
• Mr Colin Maclean, as Director-General of the MLC, was responsible for the vigorous advertising campaign that the MLC ran in 1995. In the course of that campaign there were occasions when hyperbole displaced accuracy. Mr Maclean should not have allowed this (Volume 1, paragraph 781; Volume 6, paragraphs 6.370 and 6.354-6.377).
• Mr Colin Maclean sent Dr Kimberlin a list of model answers which the MLC would have liked SEAC to give to questions which Mr Hogg had posed to the Committee. Dr Kimberlin was both a consultant to the MLC and a member of SEAC. Mr Maclean should not have asked Dr Kimberlin to provide this assistance; Dr Kimberlin should have told the members of SEAC of the request that the MLC had made (Volume 1, paragraphs 784-788; Volume 6, paragraphs 7.5-7.52).
• Dr Wight sent minutes to Sir Kenneth Calman of SEAC's meetings on 5 January and 1 February 1996 which were inadequate in certain respects. Her January minute should have communicated the concerns expressed at the SEAC meeting by Dr Will. Her minute of the February meeting should have communicated the concerns expressed by Professor Pattison and Professor Collinge (Volume 1, paragraphs 798-800 and 805; Volume 6, paragraphs 7.100-7.107 and 7.160-7.164).
• Mr Eddy circulated a minute about the SEAC meeting on 1 February to Mr Hogg, Mrs Browning, Mr Packer, Mr Carden and Mr Meldrum. He should have included a clear warning of the concerns that had been expressed about the young cases of CJD and the possibility that they might prove to be linked to BSE (Volume 1, paragraph 804; Volume 6, paragraphs 7.139-7.159).
• Despite the shortcomings in Mr Eddy's minute, on reading that minute Mr Hogg and Mrs Browning should have sought to discuss its implications with Mr Packer, Mr Carden and Mr Meldrum. Similarly, on reading that minute, those officials, after discussion among themselves, ought to have raised its implications with Mrs Browning and Mr Hogg. Each of these five individuals should have considered the action that might be required should the scientists advise that BSE had probably been transmitted to humans, and they should have recognised the need for MAFF and DH to address the implications in conjunction, for example by seeking the views of Sir Kenneth Calman and by discussion between Mr Hogg and Mr Dorrell (Volume 1, paragraph 837; Volume 6, paragraphs 7.390-7.482).
• When Sir Kenneth Calman and Dr Metters received Dr Wight's minute about SEAC's meeting of 1 February 1996, albeit that it was couched in sedative terms, they should have initiated discussions with MAFF officials to discuss the implications of the new evidence and Sir Kenneth should have alerted Mr Dorrell (Volume 1, paragraph 842; Volume 6, paragraphs 7.390-7.482).
• Mr M B Baker and, to a lesser degree, Mr Jacobs should have taken steps to avoid the delay that occurred during parts of 1991 and 1992, in circulating advice to schools about dissecting bovine eyeballs (Volume 1, paragraph 1045; Volume 6, paragraphs 9.141-9.151).